OPINION
McDermott, justice.
A jury convicted appellant, James Strong, of murder in the first degree,1 kidnapping,2 robbery,3 theft of an automobile,4 and theft of personal property valued at $200.00 or more.5 A separate penalty hearing was held for the first degree murder charge in accordance with Section 9711 of the Sentencing Code.6 The jury unanimously found three aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances, and accordingly sentenced appellant to death. Post-verdict motions were denied and the appellant was formally sentenced to death. He also received the following sentences on the lesser included offenses: kidnapping — a consecutive sentence of twenty year maximum and ten year minimum; robbery — a consecutive sentence of twenty years maximum and a ten year minimum; theft of an automobile — a consecutive sentence of seven years maximum and [450]*450three and one-half year minimum; theft in excess of $200.00 —no sentence imposed.
The appellant pursued a direct appeal to this Court from the judgments of sentence.7 Eleven (11) assignments of error are raised which will be addressed after first examining the sufficiency of the evidence.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Although appellant does not directly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his murder conviction, it is nonetheless the practice of this Court to review the sufficiency of the evidence in death penalty cases regardless of whether the issue is contested. See Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 26-27, n. 3, 454 A.2d 937, 942 n. 3 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983).
The applicable standard in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the jury to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 361 A.2d 282 (1976). If the evidence offered by the Commonwealth at trial was legally posited, as we hold, and accepted by the jury, as it was, it can lead to no conclusion other than guilty as charged.
According to that evidence, Mr. John Henry Strock, Jr., age fifty (50) risked the danger of kindness to strangers and lost. He picked up two hitchhikers and had his head blown off with a shotgun. The inculpation of the appellant was given by one James R. Alexander, eyewitness and companion in crime. He told how he and appellant were hitchhiking on Rt. 81 in Greencastle, Pennsylvania, and how Mr. Strock pulled over and offered a ride. The two got in, Alexander in the front seat and the appellant in the back. [451]*451While proceeding along Rt. 30 the appellant produced a .20 gauge shotgun and put it on Mr. Strock’s shoulder. Taking possession of the car, they rode awhile, Alexander driving, and when they stopped to relieve themselves, the appellant took Mr. Strock to the gulley and shot him. When Alexander heard the shot and a scream he saw appellant standing over Mr. Strock who was lying face down. Alexander asked the appellant why he shot Mr. Strock and he replied “I am tired of leaving witnesses behind.” Appellant then offered the gun to Alexander and told him to shoot Mr. Strock in the head. Alexander declined, but at appellant’s request removed Mr. Strock’s wallet. Alexander then heard another shot, that evidence showed, blew Mr. Strock’s head off his body. When appellant was captured he had Mr. Strock’s license in his possession, and there was testimony that appellant intended to use this license as false identification. Mr. Strock’s life was only a ticket for appellant’s further passage: as events proved, but a small distance.
We are satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict of guilty on the charge of murder in the first degree.
II. PRE-TRIAL RULINGS
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude or prevent the Commonwealth from impeaching him by use of his prior criminal record.
Appellant’s record included a conviction for robbery and auto larceny in 1969, and two additional convictions for robbery, the most recent of which occurred in 1975. The motion was denied in part by the trial court, which allowed the prosecution to impeach the credibility of appellant through the use of his most recent robbery conviction.
We have recently held that “evidence of prior convictions can be introduced for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness if the conviction was for an offense involving dishonesty or false statement, and the date of [452]*452conviction or the last day of confinement is within ten years of the trial date.” Commonwealth v. Randall, 515 Pa. 410, 415, 528 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1987). As appellant’s robbery conviction in 1975 involved an element of dishonesty tending to discredit him as being untruthful, Commonwealth v. Perrin, 484 Pa. 188, 398 A.2d 1007 (1979), and as appellant falls squarely within the ten year time frame, we are satisfied that no error was committed by the trial court in allowing the admission of the 1975 conviction.
III. ASSERTED TRIAL ERRORS
Appellant asserts that error was committed by the trial court through the admission of certain photographs into evidence. The first allegation of error pertains to a pre-death photograph of the victim. This particular piece of evidence, which was found on appellant, was offered by the Commonwealth to establish the identity of the victim: it was presented to the victim’s father in furtherance of that particular objective.
We have held that pre-death photographs of a victim can be admitted if they are relevant to a determination of guilt or innocence, Commonwealth v. Green, 488 Pa. 611, 615, n. 2, 413 A.2d 651, 656 n. 2 (1980); and that the admission of photographs is largely within the discretion of the trial court, the rulings of which will not be overturned on appeal unless there is an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Woodward, 483 Pa. 1, 394 A.2d 508 (1978). In this case the identity of the victim was arguably at issue, in that the rate of decomposition had made fingerprint analysis impossible, causing initial identification to be based on dental x-ray comparisons. However, even if we agreed with appellant’s contention that the admission was erroneous, appellant must still demonstrate that the error was prejudicial.
In Commonwealth v. Mehmeti, 501 Pa. 589, 462 A.2d 657 (1983), we held that an error may be harmless where the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the error is insignificant by compar[453]*453ison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. See Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978).
In this case the Commonwealth’s primary evidence consisted of appellant’s partner, who not only saw the victim after he had been shot, but removed his wallet at the direction of the appellant. Additionally, when arrested, appellant had in his possession the victim's belongings.8 We also note that the picture which was introduced was that contained on the victim’s drivers license, and its introduction was not accompanied by a recitation of the victim’s family life, as was the case in Commonwealth v. Story, id. As in our decision in Commonwealth v. Mehmeti, supra, we are satisfied that the introduction of this photograph, even if it was erroneous, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant next takes issue with the introduction into evidence of several post-mortem photographs of the victim. To determine whether such photographs are admissible, we have utilized a two-tiered analysis. The trial judge must initially decide whether the photographs possess inflammatory characteristics. If they do not the photographs are admissible as are any evidentiary items, subject to the qualification of relevance. If the photographs are deemed inflammatory, then the trial judge must decide whether the photographs are of such essential evidentiary value that their need clearly outweighs the likelihood of their inflaming the passions of the jurors. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 489 Pa. 620, 630, 414 A.2d 1381, 1386 (1980).
These black and white photographs depicted the shooting scene and the victim’s body. In the photographs [454]*454the body was covered by vegetation and debris and the pictures were neither very clear or graphic. As they were relevant in establishing the location of the shooting and the condition of the body when it was found, their admission was not error.
Appellant next contends that during his trial several acts of prosecutorial misconduct were committed. The first is said to have occurred during closing arguments when a statement was made with regard to the Commonwealth’s key witness, accomplice James Alexander. The district attorney said: “I tell you ladies and gentlemen, there were absolutely no promises made to him.” (N.T.1890). Appellant argues that this statement was an attempt to bolster the credibility of their key witness.
Generally, “comments by the district attorney do not constitute reversible error unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant so that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict.” Commonwealth v. McNeal, 456 Pa. 394, 400, 319 A.2d 669, 673 (1974). As the outcome of this weighing process rests with the trial court our inquiry of necessity must turn to whether an abuse of discretion was committed. Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 248 A.2d 289 (1968).
The remark in question was in response to a direct attack upon the witness’ credibility. That attack took the form of the following comments.
Let’s look at James Alexander. Here’s a guy on the stand, he’s charged with murder, robbery, kidnapping and theft. Observe his demeanor on the stand. He’s a guy who told you he had no deal, no deal. Do you believe it? Do you believe it by the way he testified. Did he look concerned, did he look worried about being faced with the charge of murder? You decide. That’s for you to decide but recall the way he testified from that stand. Did he look concerned about it? Was he worried about it? Did [455]*455he look like somebody who said, hey, baby, I’m home free, I don’t have a care in the world?
N.T. 1858-1859. The obvious intent of these remarks was to put the idea in the minds of the jurors that some deal had been struck between the Commonwealth and its chief witness. Certainly the prosecution was entitled to respond to these comments, and the retort was both proper and necessary. Accordingly, we are satisfied that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s refusal to grant a mistrial.
We are similarly satisfied that the next challenged statement made by the district attorney was not an example of prosecutorial misconduct. The statement was that “James Alexander told the whole ugly truth.” Though petitioner argues this statement prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury we are inclined to agree with the trial court’s classification of the statement as “an appropriate comment.” A shotgun killing of an innocent man is certainly, among other things, an ugly event, and the prosecutor’s description as such was not inaccurate.
Appellant’s final assertion of prosecutorial misconduct is directed at the Commonwealth’s closing argument during the penalty phase of the trial. During their testimony appellant’s parents had attested to the good character of their son. In his closing the following statement was made by the prosecutor.
The Strongs testified that James Strong was a good person, and what did you expect of them? I’m sure his parents are fine people, no doubt in my mind about that. But remember, they’re not on trial. James Strong is on trial.
And remember, everyone at one time or another had parents. Atilla the Hun had parents. Adolph Hitler had parents. Every murderer that ever set forth on this earth had parents.
Appellant argues that reference to these notorious figures during the penalty stage of the trial had the effect of inflaming the passions of the jury by likening appellant to [456]*456those figures. For authority he relies upon cases wherein new trials were granted when the defendant was characterized as an “Al Capone”, Commonwealth v. Valle, 240 Pa.Super. 411, 362 A.2d 1021 (1976), and as a “Pontius Pilate” and “Judas Iscariot,” United States v. Steinkoetter, 633 F.2d 719 (6th Cir.1980).
We note at the outset that discussing such characterizations are not new to this Court. In Commonwealth v. Whitney, 511 Pa. 232, 512 A.2d 1152 (1986), the prosecutor also made reference to Adolph Hitler. In determining whether such a reference tended to inflame the passions of the jurors we looked to the context in which the comparison was made. Here the names of these figures were employed to dilute the potentially mitigating testimony of appellant’s parents. The logical implication of the prosecutor’s remark was that fine parents are capable of producing murderous off-spring, which is not, we are sad to say, a novel proposition. We are satisfied that in the context of this case the statement was an allusion and not a direct comparison. We further decline to adopt the view that a prosecutor’s argument during the penalty stage should be a sterile affair. Many cases are sordid, mordant tales and their very description are librettos for threnodies of death and loss. To tell their story is to inevitably touch human emotions, because they are about human things: sad, terrible, alien human things. They cannot be left undescribed because they are terrible or alien to ordinary human standards of conduct. They are the issue in question and unless one transcends the evidential terms or deliberately calculates to do what the evidence does not support, they must be told and whatever human emotions they may awake are inescapable in the context of the truth of the occasion. See Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288 (1983); Commonwealth v. Whitney, supra.
IV. SENTENCING PHASE
Appellant next asserts that the death sentence imposed upon him should be vacated due to various errors that occurred during the penalty phase of the trial.
[457]*457He first argues that the trial court committed error when it permitted the Commonwealth to argue as an aggravating factor that the victim was a Commonwealth witness to a felony committed by the defendant and was killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony against the defendant in a grand jury or criminal proceeding involving such offense. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(5).
The Court has previously held that under § 9711(d)(5), evidence must be introduced to prove that the victim was a prosecution witness who was killed to prevent his testimony in a pending grand jury or criminal proceeding; and that the burden of the Commonwealth will not be met by simply showing that an individual who witnessed a murder or other felony committed by a defendant was also killed by the defendant. Commonwealth v. Crawley, 514 Pa. 539, 561, 526 A.2d 334, 345 (1987). See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 516 Pa. 441, 448, 532 A.2d 813, 817 (1987).
Recently this rule was amended so as to permit “a finding of the existence of this particular aggravating circumstance where the killing results from the intention to eliminate a potential witness, if such facts can be established by direct evidence.” Commonwealth v. Appel, 517 Pa. 529, 539 A.2d 780, 784 n. 2 (1988).
Applying this reasoning to the case at bar it is clear that Mr. Strock was killed to prevent him from reporting the fact that he was robbed. Mr. Strong’s avowed purpose in killing Mr. Strock became evident when he stated to his co-defendant, James Alexander, that he was “tired of leaving witnesses behind.” Therefore the jury’s finding of an aggravating circumstance pursuant to § 9711(d)(5) was not contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Appellant next contends that the evidence does not support a finding that he had a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9). The felony convictions introduced as an aggravating circumstance were: assault, robbery and auto larceny in 1969; assault and robbery with a deadly weapon in 1970; and robbery in 1975. The 1969 [458]*458conviction involved a fact pattern almost identical to that of the present action. Clearly, on this record there was sufficient evidence of previous felony convictions to submit to the jury, and that the jury’s finding of an aggravating circumstance in this regard was not error. Furthermore, appellant’s contention that the term “significant history” contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9), is overly broad, is also meritless as we have previously rejected this challenge in Commonwealth v. Fahy, 512 Pa. 298, 516 A.2d 689 (1986).
Appellant also contends that the language contained in § 9711(d)(6) is unconstitutional because it is overly broad. The specific section provides for the assessment of an aggravating circumstance if the jury finds “the defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6). We have previously rejected this challenge in Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 510 Pa. 603, 511 A.2d 764 (1986). Therefore, appellant’s argument requires no further discussion.
Appellant next contends that the trial court committed error in failing to grant his request to terminate the proceedings, and in failing to impose a sentence of life imprisonment after the jury submitted the following question during deliberations at the penalty phase: “Would life imprisonment result in the possibility of parole at any time.” (N.T. 2047). In response the trial court stated:
I will not answer the question that you have sent to me except to tell you that your responsibility in this case is statutorily limited to deciding the presence or non-presence of any aggravating factors or any mitigating factors, and no other factors unless it falls within the mitigating factor listed as No. 8 is to be considered by you.
You will decide in this case whether the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has proved beyond a reasonable doubt any one of the three aggravating circumstances. If you find that they have not, the sentence must be life. If you find that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt one or more aggravating circumstances, then [459]*459you will determine whether or not there is proof by a preponderance of any one of the eight (8) enumerated mitigating circumstances and if you find that any one of those eight (8) have been established, then it is your responsibility to weigh them one against the other.
If when you weigh them, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstance or circumstances, then the sentence must be death.
If you find an aggravating circumstance or circumstances and you find a mitigating circumstance or circumstances and you find that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating, then, again, the sentence must be life. That is the law and it is on that basis and that basis alone that you shall determine and set the verdict in this case. Once again, ladies and gentlemen, on the basis of the instructions as I have given them to you, you will return to the jury room, continue deliberations in hopes of unanimously agreeing upon responses to the questions that have been submitted to you.
Whenever you agree upon a sentencing verdict, whatever it is, it shall be received and recorded by the Court and you are instructed that the Court shall thereafter impose upon the Defendant the sentence fixed by the jury. With those instructions, you shall return to the jury room.
Appellant argues that the refusal of the trial court to answer the jury’s question left an impression in the jury’s mind that if life imprisonment were imposed there would be possibility of parole, thus this response prejudiced any chance of the jury returning a verdict of life imprisonment.
In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 368 Pa. 139, 81 A.2d 569 (1951), a case strikingly similar to the present case, we set forth the nature of the required response. There we said “that whether the defendant might at any future time be pardoned or have his sentence commuted is no concern of their’s and should not enter in any manner whatsoever into their consideration of the proper penalty to be imposed, which should be determined solely in the light of the relevant facts and circumstances as they then existed.” Id., [460]*460368 Pa. at 148, 81 A.2d at 573. While the response given by the learned trial judge was not as concise as that suggested by us in Johnson supra, it did stress to the jurors that the future possibility of parole was not to enter into their decision process, and therefore was an adequate response.
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for a mistrial based upon pre-trial statements made by the district attorney which were in violation of a gag order.
The particular comments in issue appeared in an article printed in the October 7, 1984, edition of the Citizens’ Voice, a local newspaper. The comments appeared after the commencement of jury selection and after several jurors had been selected. In the article the district attorney made mention of appellant's attempt to fight extradition to Pennsylvania. The comments were made in a commentary regarding an unrelated case. In an attempt to counteract the district attorney’s indiscretion, the trial court gave counsel for defendant the option of conducting another voir dire examination of those jurors already selected, with the right to challenge for cause any juror who had read the article. Defense counsel and defendant were given the entire evening to accept or reject this option. The offer was rejected, and the majority of the remaining prospective jurors indicated that they were not sure whether they had read the article, and said that if they had they were not influenced by it.
We are satisfied that no prejudice resulted to appellant through the violation of this pre-trial order by the district attorney.
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in appointing an investigator from the public defender’s office to assist him, as opposed to a private investigator. The record reveals that petitioner’s limited financial resources precluded him from independently securing the services of a private investigator. An investigator was requested in order to locate alibi witnesses. To aid petitioner the court [461]*461appointed an investigator from the public defender’s office." As this investigator was from the same office that ultimately would be defending co-defendant James Alexander, petitioner argues there was a conflict of interest. Petitioner does not allege that the services provided by the investigator were lacking; nor does he allege that the investigation was conducted with an eye towards impacting on the representation of James Alexander.
We begin our analysis of this issue by first stating that there is no requirement on the part of the Commonwealth to furnish investigative services at the Commonwealth’s expense. Commonwealth v. Box, 481 Pa. 62, 391 A.2d 1316 (1978). Secondly, although we have held that the public defender’s association is considered to be a law firm, and that representation of multiple clients with inconsistent defense would result in a conflict of interests Commonwealth v. Westbrook, 484 Pa. 534, 400 A.2d 160 (1979), we are not prepared, for conflict of interest purposes, to analogize the services of an investigator to those of an attorney. To do so would be to stretch the scope of the rule beyond the legitimate purposes for which it was intended.
Appellant also argues that the sentences imposed by the lower court, with regard to the lesser included offenses, were illegal because they were beyond those set forth in the sentencing guidelines. As these guidelines were held unconstitutional by us in Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 532 A.2d 775 (1987), this argument is without merit.
Y. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY STATUTE
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to bar imposition of the death penalty. In this argument appellant launches a thirteen (13) point assault upon the constitutionality of our death penalty statute. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 et seq. He alleges the statute is unconstitutional because:
[462]*462(1) The required finding that aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances is so vaguely phrased as to allow totally unguided discretion to the jury and introduces an element of arbitrariness of decision which violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in their provisions against cruel and unusual punishment and in violation of defendant’s rights to due process and equal protection of law in sentencing procedures. (2) The Statute is unconstitutional in requiring a defendant to prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. (3) The Statute unconstitutionally makes the death sentence mandatory whenever a jury finds single aggravating circumstance which “outweighs” any mitigating circumstances. (4) The aggravating circumstances relating to commission of a killing is vague as applied to the facts of this case. (5) The Statute fails to provide meaningful historical proportionality review in light of the inapplicability of any death penalty in Pennsylvania from 1967 to 1978. (6) The Statute fails to provide meaningful participation by defendant in any proportionality review and fails to provide other proper procedures for such determination. (7) The imposition of the sentence of death by electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment because of the unnecessarily excessive infliction of physical pain. (8) The imposition of the sentence of death under the present statute is unconstitutionally arbitrary and capable of whimsical application because it imposes no limitation upon the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in electing to demand the death penalty in a given case even if aggravating factors are present. (9) The imposition of the sentence of death under the Pennsylvania Statute is arbitrary because Pennsylvania murder trial procedure allows the jury to return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter without evidence. (10) The imposition of the sentence of death is cruel and unusual punishment because it violates current societal standards of decency. 11) The application of the aggravating factor described as “the defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony” under [463]*46342 Pa.C.S.A. Section 9711(d)(6) is unconstitutionally vague, confusing and arbitrary because of its confusing similarity to the definition of second degree murder in 18 Pa.G.S.A. Section 2502(b). (12) The Statute represents an unconstitutional infringement by the legislature of the separation-of-powers. (13) 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 9711(b) permits a defendant by pleading guilty (to murder generally) or waiving trial by jury to secure a trial on the issue of degree of guilty (plea) or guilt itself (waiver) before a finder of fact (i.e., the presiding judge) who is not necessarily death prone or as to whom the Commonwealth has no right to “death qualify”.
All but one of these challenges has been previously addressed and rejected by this Court. See Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh. denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983 and Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700 (1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963, 105 S.Ct. 360, 83 L.Ed.2d 296 (1984); Commonwealth v. DeHart, 512 Pa. 235, 516 A.2d 656 (1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010, 107 S.Ct. 3241, 97 L.Ed.2d 746 (1987). Therefore, a reiteration of our reasoning in these cases would accomplish little.
Appellant’s unique constitutional attack is that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(b) is unconstitutional in that it permits a defendant by pleading guilty to murder generally, or waiving trial by jury, to secure a trial on the issue of the degree of guilt, or guilt itself, before a finder of fact who is not necessarily death prone, or as to whom the Commonwealth has no right to “death qualify”. As such he argues this is a denial of equal protection of the law. Appellant takes this argument one step further by hypothesizing that the above constitutional infirmity could have been rectified in the instant action had two separate juries been empaneled, one for the guilt stage and the other for the penalty stage of the proceeding.
We begin by disagreeing with appellant’s liberal paraphrase of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(b). This section applies to a [464]*464defendant’s plea of guilt to first degree murder. It does not apply to a plea of murder “generally”. Indeed, if one were to plead guilty to murder “generally”, there would be a trial, either by a judge or jury, to establish the degree of guilt, e.g., first degree murder or third degree murder. Secondly, we disagree with petitioner’s contention that one is denied equal protection by requesting a jury, which would be “death qualified,” as opposed to requesting a trial by a judge, who would not be explicitly “death qualified”.
It is important to emphasize that the death qualification of the jury is not for the purpose of assembling a conviction prone and/or death prone body. Rather the purposes is intended to ensure that the full letter of the law will be upheld if the circumstances so require. A judge by definition is sworn to uphold the law pursuant to the oath of office; and, consequently he or she is duty bound to impose the death penalty should the circumstances so dictate. Therefore, we see no unequal treatment accorded to defendants who elect a jury trial.
Appellant next argues that the trial court committed error in sustaining the Commonwealth’s challenge for cause of six prospective jurors on the basis that they could not vote for the death penalty. Appellant alleges that the trial court’s ruling deprived him of a fair and impartial jury, and resulted in the selection of a panel more likely to convict.
Under federal constitutional law this very argument was addressed and rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986). Additionally, as a matter of state constitutional law, this court has declined to afford an accused greater protection in this instance than that which is mandated by the federal constitution. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 320, 513 A.2d 373, 384 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070, 107 S.Ct. 962, 93 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1987), Commonwealth v. Sneed, 514 Pa. 597, 605, 526 A.2d 749, 753 (1987). Accordingly, as we have adequately disposed of this issue on several previous occasions, further discussion is not warranted.
[465]*465VI. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
Finally, we turn our attention now, as we must, to the proportionality of appellant’s sentence. Because the jury found no mitigating circumstances and three aggravating circumstances have been upheld, we sustain the conviction and affirm the sentence of death. Based upon our review of the statistical data provided by the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts, see Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700 (1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963, 105 S.Ct. 360, 83 L.Ed.2d 296 (1984), we conclude that the sentence of death was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.9 42 Pa.C.S. § 971 l(h)(3)(iii).
HUTCHINSON, former Justice, did not participate in the decision of this case.
ZAPPALA, J., files a dissenting opinion in which NIX, C.J., joins.