Commonwealth v. Sovann Rean.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: October 6, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-1392
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1392

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

SOVANN REAN.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant was convicted after a jury-waived trial of

negligent operation of a motor vehicle. On appeal he argues

that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction

and that the prosecutor made improper statements in her closing

argument. We affirm.

1. Sufficiency of evidence. The offense of negligent

operation of a motor vehicle requires proof "that the defendant

(1) operated a motor vehicle (2) upon a public way

(3) negligently so that the lives or safety of the public might

be endangered." Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377,

379 (2017). The defendant contests only the third element. To

satisfy that element, the Commonwealth must show "that the defendant's conduct might have endangered the safety of the

public," but need not show "that it, in fact, did."

Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 369 (2019).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, see Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 378, the judge

could have found the following facts. At about 9 P.M. on

January 13, 2023, the defendant struck a parked car while

driving down a two-way, dead-end street in a residential

neighborhood in Lowell. The defendant's car sustained

"[e]xtensive" damage from the collision. Both airbags had

deployed, and the driver's side doors could not be opened,

requiring firefighters to use the "Jaws of Life" to remove the

defendant. The parked car had damage to the rear driver's side

panel and wheel, and gasoline was pouring out of it. The impact

of the collision also caused the defendant's car to sideswipe a

second parked car.

A five year old boy was in the rear passenger seat of the

defendant's car. He was crying and had a bump on his head. The

boy's mother came and accompanied him to the hospital. The

defendant was also transported to the hospital, where a nurse

"immediately" formed the opinion that he was intoxicated. The

defendant was unable to walk and "barely able" to talk, and the

nurse had to give him a sternal rub to wake him up to answer

questions. The defendant admitted to the nurse that he drank

2 two beers that night. Tests of the defendant's head, neck,

chest, and abdomen were negative for cranial trauma and other

injuries.

A worker from the Department of Children and Families later

spoke with the defendant. The defendant told the worker that he

was a friend of the boy's mother and had been taking the boy on

a ride to the store. The defendant admitted that he did not

have a car seat in his car. He also admitted to drinking two to

three beers that night.

Based on this evidence, a reasonable fact finder could have

found that the defendant operated his vehicle negligently.

Although "[t]he mere happening of an accident" is not enough to

prove negligent operation, here, the amount of damage caused by

the accident permitted an inference that the collision "occurred

with considerable force" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v.

Howe, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 358 (2023). This in turn

"permitted an inference that the defendant was not driving with

the care he ought to have been exercising" on a residential

street. Id. at 359. In addition, the defendant admitted to

drinking that night and appeared to the nurse to be highly

intoxicated. The judge could consider that the defendant had

been drinking before the accident, and that he failed to secure

3 his child passenger in a car seat,1 in determining whether he

drove with reasonable care. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 414

Mass. 343, 350 (1993) ("Evidence that the defendant was

consuming alcohol prior to driving with passengers late at night

is patently relevant to whether the defendant exercised

reasonable care while driving"). The totality of this evidence

was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction. See

Commonwealth v. Tantillo, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 20, 26-27 (2023)

(evidence that defendant struck pole, was disoriented, and

admitted to taking medication sufficient to prove negligent

operation); Commonwealth v. Tsonis, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 214, 220

(2019) (evidence of defendant's erratic driving, near collision

with parked vehicles, and apparent intoxication sufficient to

prove negligent operation).

2. Closing argument. The defendant argues that the

prosecutor made two misstatements in her closing argument.

Because the defendant objected to both statements, our review is

1 Under G. L. c. 90, § 7AA, "[a] passenger in a motor vehicle on any way who is under the age of 8 shall be fastened and secured by a child passenger restraint, unless such passenger measures more than 57 inches in height." It is undisputed that the defendant's passenger was five years old. Furthermore, the defendant acknowledges that, based on an officer's testimony that the child was "[s]mall, probably up to [the officer's] hip," the judge could have found that the child was less than fifty-seven inches in height.

4 for prejudicial error. See Commonwealth v. Lester, 486 Mass.

239, 247 (2020).

The defendant first argues that the prosecutor referred to

facts not in evidence when she stated, "[T]he defendant chose to

drive a forty-to-fifty-pound boy . . . in the backseat without a

car seat." As the Commonwealth concedes, this was error because

no evidence was presented about the child's weight. The

defendant has failed to show, however, that the error prejudiced

him. Contrary to his suggestion, the child's weight was not

relevant to whether the defendant violated G. L. c. 90, § 7AA,

by failing to secure the child in a car seat.2 Also, in response

to the defendant's objections, the judge stated, "Yeah, I've

heard the evidence," and told the parties that he was "going to

take a look at [his] notes and review the exhibits" before

rendering his decision. It is thus "reasonable to assume that

the trial judge realized that the prosecutor's misstatement[]

did not have evidentiary value." Commonwealth v. Martinez, 67

Mass. App. Ct. 788, 796 (2006). Moreover, even without the

evidence about the car seat, there was ample evidence to support

a finding that the defendant operated his vehicle negligently.

For these reasons we conclude that the error was not

prejudicial. See Lester, 486 Mass. at 248-249.

2 See note 1, supra.

5 The defendant next argues that the prosecutor referred to

facts not in evidence when she stated that "[t]he speed that

[the defendant] was driving at that you can infer he was driving

at on a residential street headed to a dead end" showed that "he

wasn't judging and driving safely." We discern no error. A

prosecutor may suggest "reasonable and possible" inferences from

the evidence. Commonwealth v. Roy, 464 Mass. 818, 829 (2013).

Here, it was proper for the prosecutor to ask the judge to infer

that the defendant was speeding, given the evidence that the

accident occurred on a residential street and that the

defendant's car and the car he hit both sustained significant

damage from the collision. See Howe, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 358.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Shin, Grant & Hershfang, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: October 6, 2025.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.