Commonwealth v. Sonia Garcia-Rivera.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: November 15, 2024
• Docket: 23-P-1492
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1492

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

SONIA GARCIA-RIVERA.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Sonia Garcia-Rivera, was convicted of

assault and battery on a police officer, G. L. c. 265, § 13D;

resisting arrest, G. L. c. 268, § 32B; disturbing the peace,

G. L. c. 272, § 53; and disorderly conduct, G. L. c. 272, § 53.

On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence regarding the convictions of assault and battery on a

police officer and disturbing the peace. Discerning no error,

we affirm.

Background. We recite the facts in the "light most

favorable to the Commonwealth." Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378

Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). At around 7:30 P.M. on February 17,

2022, Worcester Police Officer Ibsan Morales initiated a motor vehicle stop in a residential neighborhood as a result of a call

for a domestic disturbance and arrested the nephew of the

defendant in this case. The defendant was called to the scene

to take possession of her nephew's car. When she arrived, the

defendant started walking towards the victim of the domestic

assault and began yelling at her. Officer Morales stepped in

front of the defendant and directed the victim to leave the

scene.

After the victim left the area and the defendant appeared

to have calmed down, Officer Morales handed her the car keys.

Instead of taking possession of the car and leaving the area,

the defendant walked to a police cruiser where Officer Brian

Powers was seated, started yelling, and punched the cruiser's

driver side window. Officer Powers exited the police cruiser

and attempted to arrest the defendant who, in response, began

thrashing and punching Officer Powers in the arms. Officer

Morales traded places with Officer Powers while the defendant

continued to resist arrest. The defendant continued pulling and

thrashing, resulting in her and Officer Morales falling into the

side of the police cruiser. As a result, Officer Morales

sustained an injury to his shoulder, preventing him from working

for three months.

At some point during the altercation, Officer Morales

radioed for backup, and at least six additional police officers

2 arrived on the scene within minutes. Various residents of the

neighborhood were watching the events unfold through the windows

of their homes, and some had made their way onto the sidewalk to

see what was happening. The defendant, who was now handcuffed,

continued to yell obscenities in Spanish at the officers in the

street. After the defendant was secured, Officer Morales,

fearing that a crowd would form and become reactive, spoke with

residents in an attempt to deescalate the situation.

On appeal the defendant contends that the evidence was

insufficient as to the intent element of assault and battery on

a police officer and as to the victim element of disturbing the

peace. We address each argument in turn.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "When reviewing

claims of insufficient evidence, we assess the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth to determine whether

any rational trier of fact could have found each element of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (quotation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Baez, 494 Mass. 396, 400 (2024). "In satisfying

that test, the Commonwealth may rely on reasonable inferences

drawn from circumstantial evidence" (quotation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 622, 626 (2007).

2. Assault and battery on a police officer. The defendant

argues the Commonwealth introduced insufficient evidence for a

rational trier of fact to find that she had the necessary intent

3 to commit an assault and battery on Officer Morales. Assault

and battery is defined as the "intentional and unjustified use

of force upon the person of another, however slight, or the

intentional commission of a wanton or reckless act (something

more than gross negligence) causing physical or bodily injury to

another." Commonwealth v. Correia, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 456

(2000) (quotation and citation omitted).1 This definition

encompasses two distinct theories under which a defendant can be

convicted -- intentional conduct or reckless conduct. See id.

We begin our analysis with the recklessness theory. To

sustain a conviction for assault and battery under a

recklessness theory, "the Commonwealth must prove (1) that the

defendant's conduct . . . constituted . . . a disregard of

probable harmful consequences to another, and (2) that, as a

result of that conduct, the victim suffered some physical

injury" (quotation and citation omitted). Correia, 50 Mass.

App. Ct. at 458. The victim's injury "need not have been

permanent, but it must have been more than transient and

1 Under G. L. c. 265, § 13D, the Commonwealth must also prove the defendant knew the victim was a police officer "engaged in the performance of his duties at the time." Commonwealth v. Moore, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 461 (1994). The defendant does not dispute that the Commonwealth proved this element.

4 trifling."2 Commonwealth v. Burno, 396 Mass. 622, 627 (1986).

"Proof of an intent to strike the officer [is] not required

under a recklessness analysis." Correa, supra.

Here, the Commonwealth presented testimony that the

defendant was "turning, twisting . . . thrashing, [and] . . .

wasn't allowing [the officers] to gain control of her arms" in

an attempt to avoid arrest. Her conduct directly resulted in

Officer Morales's injury. When viewed in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, a reasonable jury could conclude

that such actions demonstrated a disregard of probable harm to

Officer Morales. See Correia, 50 Mass. App. Ct. at 458-459

(evidence of defendant kicking and flailing sufficient evidence

of reckless assault and battery where it caused serious

injuries). The defendant acknowledges that she intended to

twist and pull away from Officer Morales but claims that her

actions did not demonstrate a disregard of probable harm. We

disagree. Based upon the evidence presented at trial of the

defendant's behavior in twisting, pulling, and thrashing, a

rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that it established a disregard of the probable harmful

consequences to Officer Morales. Because a finding of intent

2 The defendant does not dispute that Officer Morales suffered an injury which caused him to be unable to work for three months.

5 may be inferred from the defendant's conduct, see Commonwealth

v. Maia, 429 Mass. 585, 587 (1999), the Commonwealth's evidence

of the defendant's actions was sufficient for the jury to find

the conduct reckless. Accordingly, we need not reach the

question of whether the evidence was sufficient for an

intentional battery.

3. Disturbing the peace. The defendant also contends the

evidence was insufficient for the jury to find there was a

"victim," a required element of the crime of disturbing the

peace. See G. L. c. 272, § 53. The crime of disturbing the

peace requires a finding that the defendant engaged in

activities that, "first, most people would find to be

unreasonably disruptive,[3] and, second, did in fact infringe

someone's right to be undisturbed." Commonwealth v. Orlando,

371 Mass. 732, 735 (1977). More specifically, the "second prong

requires that the crime have a victim, and thus subjects

potential defendants to criminal prosecution only when their

activities have detrimental impact." Id. at 735.

The Commonwealth introduced testimony from two officers

that the defendant's disruptive actions caused numerous

residents of the neighborhood to watch the events unfold through

3 The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for this element.

6 their home windows, with some coming out onto the sidewalk. In

Commonwealth v. Federico, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 711 (2007), we

affirmed a conviction of disturbing the peace when "neighbors

were peering out their windows and watching from the sidewalk."

Id. at 714. The defendant argues these residents were merely

satisfying their curiosity and that observing a disturbance

between a citizen and a police officer cannot amount to

sufficient evidence that the observer's peace was disturbed.

This argument fails to take into consideration the applicable

standard of review. The defendant was free to characterize the

residents' behavior as such at trial, and the jury was free to

agree or disagree. On appeal, however, we must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See

Baez, 494 Mass. at 400. Drawing inferences in favor of the

Commonwealth, a reasonable jury could have found, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the residents looking out their windows

and coming out of their homes onto the sidewalk were "victims"

7 as the defendant's behavior infringed upon their right to be

undisturbed. Accordingly, the evidence sufficed.

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Blake, Walsh & Hodgens, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: November 15, 2024.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.