[J-63-2023] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 6 EAP 2023 : Appellee : Appeal from the Judgment of : Superior Court entered on : February 24, 2022, at No. 1595 v. : EDA 2020 quashing the Order : entered on July 17, 2020, in the : Court of Common Pleas, WILLIAM SMITH, : Philadelphia County at : No. CP-51-CR-0004759-2015 Appellant : : SUBMITTED: September 25, 2023
OPINION
JUSTICE BROBSON DECIDED: February 21, 2024 Appellant William Smith (Appellant) filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9541-9546, in the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County (trial court or PCRA court, when appropriate). The PCRA court
entered an order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition based solely on the fact that his
facially untimely direct appeal from his judgment of sentence was pending in the Superior
Court. Appellant appealed the PCRA court’s order, and, relying on Commonwealth v.
Smith, 244 A.3d 13 (Pa. Super. 2020), the Superior Court quashed that appeal,
essentially agreeing with the PCRA court’s decision to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition
due to his pending direct appeal. We granted allowance of appeal to examine whether
the lower courts erred in the way they disposed of Appellant’s PCRA petition. For the
reasons that follow, we hold that the courts did err. I. INTRODUCTION
To facilitate a better understanding of the instant appeal, we find it helpful to begin
by summarizing the pertinent sections of the PCRA, this Court’s opinion in
Commonwealth v. Brown, 943 A.2d 264 (Pa. 2008), and the Superior Court’s decision in
Smith, supra. Generally, a person seeking collateral relief from his conviction or sentence
must file a PCRA petition “within one year of the date that the judgment becomes final,”
subject to certain statutory exceptions. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (emphasis added). “[A]
judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review
in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at
the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (emphasis added).
In Brown, this Court considered the question of whether an untimely filed notice of
appeal “displaces the statutory one-year period for filing a state post-conviction petition.”
Brown, 943 A.2d at 265. By way of background, Devon Brown (Brown) appealed his
judgment of sentence, and the Superior Court ultimately quashed that appeal on the basis
that Brown untimely pursued appellate relief. Nearly three years after the trial court
sentenced Brown but only nine months following the Superior Court’s quashal of his direct
appeal, Brown filed a PCRA petition seeking the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights
and presenting substantive challenges to his judgment of sentence. The PCRA court
granted Brown collateral relief by reinstating his direct appeal rights but ruled against him
on the substantive challenges to his judgment of sentence.
Brown appealed, and a fractured three-judge panel of the Superior Court quashed
the appeal. The court concluded that Brown untimely filed his PCRA petition and that, as
a result, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to grant any collateral relief to Brown. In doing
so, the court noted that Brown did not file a written post-sentence motion following the
imposition of his judgment of sentence. Under those circumstances, the court opined,
[J-63-2023] - 2 Brown’s judgment of sentence became final 30 days after the trial court sentenced him.
Consequently, to be timely, Brown had to file his PCRA petition within one year thereafter.
In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected any argument that the PCRA’s one-year
time bar should be calculated from the date that the Superior Court determined that Brown
untimely pursued his direct appeal. Under this articulation, Brown’s PCRA petition was
clearly untimely.
This Court granted Brown’s petition for allowance of appeal to resolve a
discrepancy in Superior Court decisions relative to the timeliness of PCRA petitions filed
after the Superior Court quashes direct appeals as untimely filed. Rejecting dictum to the
contrary in Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201 (Pa. 2000), the Court in Brown
observed that, under Section 9545(b)(3) of the PCRA, “a judgment of sentence is final for
purposes of the one-year time bar upon the expiration of the time for seeking review in
circumstances in which direct appellate review is unavailable.” Brown, 943 A.2d at 267.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, holding: [I]n circumstances in which no timely appeal is filed relative to a judgment of sentence, and direct review is therefore unavailable, the one-year period allowed for the filing of a post-conviction petition commences upon the actual expiration of the time period allowed for seeking direct review, as specified in the PCRA. Id. In other words, the Brown Court concluded that a direct appeal from a judgment of
sentence that is quashed because the defendant untimely filed his notice of appeal does
not toll the PCRA’s one-year time bar for seeking collateral relief.
Regarding the Superior Court’s decision in Smith, after the trial court convicted and
sentenced Shaheed Smith, he timely filed a notice of appeal, and the Superior Court
affirmed his judgment of sentence. Smith, 244 A.3d at 15. Shaheed Smith then timely
filed a petition for allowance of appeal in this Court. While that petition was awaiting this
Court’s review, Shaheed Smith filed a PCRA petition. The PCRA court acknowledged
[J-63-2023] - 3 that Shaheed Smith prematurely filed his PCRA petition insomuch as he timely pursued
his direct appeal but had not exhausted that path before filing his petition. The PCRA
court chose to accept and hold the PCRA petition. The PCRA court later treated Shaheed
Smith’s PCRA petition as if it had been filed on the date that this Court denied his petition
for allowance of appeal. Thereafter, the PCRA court dismissed the PCRA petition without
a hearing, and Shaheed Smith appealed that order to the Superior Court.
Before addressing the merits of Shaheed Smith’s claims, the Superior Court stated
that it must first assess whether Shaheed Smith timely filed his PCRA petition and, thus,
invoked the PCRA court’s jurisdiction. Noting the well-settled proposition that “[a] PCRA
petition may only be filed after an appellant has waived or exhausted his direct appeal
rights[,]” the Superior Court found no authority to support the PCRA court’s actions.
Smith, 244 A.3d at 16 (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted). The
court stated that “the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to ‘hold’ the premature filing until the
appeal was denied.” Id.
In support, the Superior Court explained that, after an appeal is taken, absent
limited exceptions, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to proceed further in a matter. Id. at 17
(citing Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a) (providing that “[e]xcept as otherwise prescribed by these rules,
after an appeal is taken . . . , the trial court . . . may no longer proceed further in the
matter”)). Thus, the Superior Court concluded that, if a defendant prematurely files a
PCRA petition while his direct appeal is pending, then the PCRA court should dismiss it
without prejudice to the defendant’s right to file a petition after he has exhausted his direct
appeal rights. Id. at 16-17 (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 215 A.3d 1019, 1023
(Pa. Super. 2019)).
In this matter, we consider our holding in Brown as applied to so-called “premature”
PCRA petitions—i.e., PCRA petitions filed while a direct appeal from a judgment of
[J-63-2023] - 4 sentence is pending. We do so in the context of the single issue we accepted for review,
as phrased by Appellant: Should Commonwealth v. Smith, 244 A.3d 13 (Pa. Super. 2020), which was never reviewed by this Court but bound the panel below, be overruled (at least to the extent that it applies to prophylactic petitions like the present one) and should Pennsylvania instead recognize and adopt the superior procedure of “stay and abey” used by federal courts under the analogous deadlines of 28 U.S.C. § 2254? Commonwealth v. Smith, 293 A.3d 563, 563-64 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam).1
II. BACKGROUND
A jury convicted Appellant of, inter alia, rape of a child. The trial court imposed
sentence on March 29, 2018. Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions on
April 9, 2018. Citing Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720(B)(3)(b), the trial court
entered an order that extended the 120-day time period for ruling on the post-sentence
motions by 30 days—i.e., until September 6, 2018. One day later, on September 7, 2018,
the trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motions. Appellant did
not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of this order. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(a)
(requiring defendant to file notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of order ruling on
post-sentence motions).
Instead, over a year later—on October 4, 2019—Appellant filed a notice of appeal,
indicating that he was appealing his judgment of sentence. In his notice of appeal,
Appellant contended that his appeal was timely because he was never properly served
with notice of the September 7, 2018 order denying his post-sentence motions. That
same day, Appellant filed a praecipe in the trial court, essentially contending that the
September 7, 2018 order denying his post-sentence motions was a nullity because it was
1 This issue presents a question of law. “Like all questions of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Skotnicki v. Ins. Dep’t, 175 A.3d 239, 247 (Pa. 2017).
[J-63-2023] - 5 not properly served and that, as a result, he was entitled to the entry of a new order
reflecting the deemed denial of his post-sentence motions, from which he could timely file
a notice of appeal. The trial court struck the praecipe as unauthorized on
October 9, 2019.
In the interim, on October 7, 2019, Appellant filed his PCRA petition that he
characterized as “prophylactic.” (PCRA Petition, 10/7/2019, at ¶1.) Apparently
understanding the potential impact that this Court’s decision in Brown may have on his
future ability to timely file a PCRA petition, he explained that, on October 4, 2019, he filed
the above-described praecipe and notice of appeal and that, in the alternative event that a court of competent jurisdiction later rules, in a final and nonappealable order, that those documents were not timely filed, this petition (filed on Monday, October 7, 2019 [within one year after 30 days after September 7, 2018]) is filed to protect [Appellant’s] right to reinstatement of his appellate rights. [Appellant] respectfully requests that the court take no action on this petition as long as his direct appeal is pending in any court, or could be the subject of a further appeal, application for reargument, petition for allowance of appeal, or petition for certiorari. (Id. (one alteration in original).) In the body of his PCRA petition, Appellant claimed that
his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to preserve his direct appellate
rights by filing a notice of appeal in October of 2018.
On June 8, 2020, the PCRA court, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 907, notified Appellant of its intent to dismiss his PCRA petition without
prejudice because of Appellant’s pending, albeit facially untimely, direct appeal in the
Superior Court. The PCRA court did not engage in any other analysis regarding the
timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant responded to the Rule 907 notice by
again asking the PCRA court not to dismiss his PCRA petition out of concern that if the
Superior Court quashed his direct appeal as untimely, a PCRA petition filed thereafter
likely would be out of time under the PCRA’s statutory one-year time bar. To address his
concern, rather than dismiss the petition, Appellant asked the PCRA court to hold his
[J-63-2023] - 6 petition in abeyance, pending the Superior Court’s ruling on the timeliness of his direct
appeal. Despite Appellant’s concern, the PCRA court dismissed the PCRA petition
without prejudice, and Appellant appealed that order to the Superior Court as well.
Importantly, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court (Direct Appeal Panel), by
unpublished memorandum dated February 12, 2021, quashed Appellant’s direct appeal
from his judgment of sentence, concluding that he untimely filed his notice of appeal.
Commonwealth v. Smith (Pa. Super., No. 3158 EDA 2019, filed Feb. 12, 2021). This
Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on October 18, 2021.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 265 A.3d 194 (Pa. 2021) (per curiam). Appellant did not seek
further review in the United States Supreme Court.
By unpublished memorandum dated February 24, 2022, a different three-judge
panel of the Superior Court (PCRA Appeal Panel) quashed Appellant’s appeal from the
PCRA court’s order dismissing his PCRA petition as premature. Commonwealth v. Smith
(Pa. Super., No. 1595 EDA 2020, filed Feb. 24, 2022). Relying on its decision in Smith,
the PCRA Appeal Panel concluded that the PCRA court did not err when it dismissed
Appellant’s PCRA petition as premature in light of Appellant’s then-pending direct appeal.
Like the PCRA court, the PCRA Appeal Panel did not engage in any other analysis of the
timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA petition. Instead, finding that the PCRA court did not
commit any error in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition, the PCRA Appeal Panel
quashed the appeal, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction. This Court subsequently
granted Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal.
III. ARGUMENTS
Appellant initially submits that we have held that PCRA courts generally must
dismiss untimely filed PCRA petitions that follow direct appeals that ultimately were
quashed as untimely filed. (Appellant’s Brief at 5 (relying on Brown, supra).) Appellant
[J-63-2023] - 7 believes that this case law should have prompted the PCRA court to hold his
“prophylactic” PCRA petition in abeyance while his direct appeal was pending in the
Superior Court. Appellant asserts that, “if the precautionary PCRA petition’s dismissal is
not reversed, and because the then-pending direct appeal was quashed as untimely, then
[he] will be deprived of any appeal at all.” (Id. at 6.)
According to Appellant, in habeas litigation, “[t]he federal courts have dealt with
the conundrum posed by the mid-1990s imposition of one-year limits on [federal]
collateral petitions through the use of the ‘stay and abey’ procedure.”2 (Id.) Appellant
further states that, because of “the adoption of the one-year limit, there would be no
jurisdiction if a petition were filed after the eventual completion of state-court proceedings,
because the one-year limit would not have been tolled in the meantime.” (Id.) Proceeding
to apply this federal approach, Appellant recounts the procedural history of the case. Of
note, he suggests that, after the Direct Appeal Panel concluded that he untimely pursued
his direct appeal, the PCRA’s one-year time period for filing a petition already had passed,
meaning that he could not timely seek PCRA relief. Thus, in his view, the PCRA court
2 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) describes the federal “stay and
abey” practice as follows: A defendant has one year from his final judgment date to file for federal habeas relief, a limitations period that is tolled by a “properly filed” PCRA petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). When a defendant is unsure whether his PCRA petition will be accepted as timely, he may file a “protective” habeas petition and “ask[] the federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416-17 (2005). This preserves his federal filing date in the event that the state petition is ultimately deemed untimely, meaning it is not properly filed and does not toll the limitations period. Indeed, where “an outright dismissal could jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack, a stay is the only appropriate course of action.” Crews v. Horn, 360 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 2004). (Commonwealth’s Brief at 8 (alteration in original).)
[J-63-2023] - 8 should have held his PCRA petition in abeyance, making it “imperative” for this Court to
reverse the PCRA court’s order dismissing his PCRA petition. (Id. at 7.)
Next, Appellant offers a truncated argument concerning the validity of the Superior
Court’s decision in Smith. Appellant appears to argue that, because this Court has held
that PCRA courts ordinarily must dismiss untimely filed PCRA petitions that follow
Superior Court decisions quashing direct appeals from judgments of sentence as untimely
filed, the Court should embrace his attempt to avoid that result by filing a “prophylactic”
petition while his direct appeal was pending.
The Commonwealth takes a position that is favorable to Appellant. The
Commonwealth submits that, if a defendant files a PCRA petition while his direct appeal
from his judgment of sentence is pending and the defendant may have untimely pursued
that appeal, then the PCRA court should stay the PCRA litigation until the appellate courts
resolve the timeliness of his direct appeal. Addressing the Superior Court’s decision in
Smith, the Commonwealth points out that Shaheed Smith filed a PCRA petition while his
indisputably timely filed direct appeal was pending. The Commonwealth reports that the
Smith court quashed the PCRA appeal because: “(1) a PCRA petition may be filed only
after a defendant waives or exhausts his direct appeal rights[;] and (2) [Pennsylvania Rule
of Appellate Procedure 1701 (Appellate Rule 1701)] prohibits a trial court from proceeding
once an appeal has been taken.” (Commonwealth’s Brief at 6-7.) The Commonwealth
insists that neither of these grounds warrant the dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA petition.
First, the Commonwealth distinguishes the present circumstances from those in
Smith. In the Commonwealth’s view, unlike Appellant’s PCRA petition, Shaheed Smith’s
PCRA petition truly was premature because he filed it when his timely-filed direct appeal
was pending. In other words, Shaheed Smith filed his PCRA petition before he exhausted
his direct appeal rights. Here, the Commonwealth suggests, “[r]ather than filing a
[J-63-2023] - 9 premature petition while a timely direct appeal was pending, as [Shaheed Smith] did,
[Appellant] filed a timely PCRA petition while a facially untimely direct appeal was
pending.” (Id. at 7.)
Second, the Commonwealth argues that Appellate Rule 1701 does not prohibit
PCRA courts from staying matters such as Appellant’s attempt to pursue PCRA relief.
Appellate Rule 1701 provides, in relevant part, that, after an appeal is taken, “the trial
court . . . may no longer proceed further in the matter.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). Relying on
Black’s Law Dictionary, the Commonwealth maintains that a stay is the “postponement or
halting of a proceeding.” (Commonwealth’s Brief at 7 (quoting Stay, Black’s Law
Dictionary 1709 (11th ed. 2019).) The Commonwealth argues that “[p]ostponing or
halting a matter is the opposite of ‘proceed[ing] further.’” (Id. (second alteration in
original).)
Like Appellant, the Commonwealth finds guidance from the federal courts. The
Commonwealth explains that, “[w]hen a defendant is unsure whether his PCRA petition
will be accepted as timely, he may file a ‘protective’ habeas petition and ‘ask[] the federal
court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are
exhausted.’” (Id. at 8 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 416-17) (latter alteration in original).)
According to the Commonwealth, “[t]his preserves his federal filing date in the event that
the state petition is ultimately deemed untimely, meaning it is not properly filed and does
not toll the limitations period.” (Id.) The Commonwealth advocates that this Court should
adopt a similar practice when, as here, a defendant is unsure whether he timely sought
to appeal his judgment of sentence and fears that he will be time-barred from filing a
PCRA petition if the appellate courts conclude that he, in fact, untimely commenced his
direct appeal.
[J-63-2023] - 10 The Pennsylvania Attorney General and the Pennsylvania District Attorney
Association (DA Association) filed amici briefs in support of the Commonwealth. While
the Attorney General’s position largely aligns with the Commonwealth’s stance, the DA
Association has an entirely different take on the matter. In addition to averring that the
Superior Court properly decided Smith and that the PCRA Appeal Panel correctly applied
that decision in quashing Appellant’s appeal, the DA Association argues that Appellant is
misguided in suggesting that this Court should adopt the federal stay-and-abey
procedure. (DA Association’s Brief at 12-15.) As to this argument, it is sufficient for
present purposes to note that the DA Association believes that, because federal habeas
litigation is entirely distinct from PCRA litigation, the stay-and-abey procedure is an ill fit
to remedy the problem that Appellant has created. This conclusion is particularly
accurate, the DA Association argues, given that the PCRA provides exceptions to its
one-year jurisdictional time bar, which the DA Association appears to believe were
available to Appellant.3 See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).
3 The DA Association also advocates that this Court should dismiss this appeal as improvidently granted or deny Appellant relief on other grounds. The gist of the DA Association’s arguments is that Appellant’s post-sentence motions should have been deemed denied by operation of law at a date significantly earlier than September 7, 2018, and, therefore, Appellant untimely filed his PCRA petition on October 7, 2019. (DA Association’s Brief at 3-7.) By advancing these arguments, the DA Association, a non-party to this litigation, is attempting to inject issues into this appeal that are outside the scope of the issue we granted allowance of appeal to consider. We, therefore, decline to address these issues. See Marion v. Bryn Mawr Tr. Co., 288 A.3d 76, 93 (Pa. 2023) (declining to address issue because it was outside scope of Court’s limited grant of allowance of appeal). For purposes of the issue now before this Court, we accept the Direct Appeal Panel’s determination that September 7, 2018, is the operative date on which the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions. See Smith, slip op. at 13 (Direct Appeal Panel Decision) (holding that, because trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions on September 7, 2018, he was required to file notice of appeal by October 7, 2018). We do so without rendering any opinion as to whether the DA Association’s arguments to the contrary have merit.
[J-63-2023] - 11 IV. DISCUSSION
It is well-settled that, relative to PCRA petitions, questions of timeliness are
jurisdictional in nature; therefore, courts must address these questions as threshold
issues. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morris, 822 A.2d 684, 692 (Pa. 2003) (stating that
“questions of timeliness [of PCRA petitions] are jurisdictional threshold questions”). Here,
despite Appellant clearly placing the PCRA court on notice of valid concerns regarding
the timeliness of his PCRA petition, the PCRA court failed to engage in a meaningful
analysis of that issue and to consider how to proceed in the matter. Instead, the court
dismissed the petition based solely upon Appellant’s pending, facially untimely attempt to
appeal his judgment of sentence. Yet, given our holding in Brown, a pending, facially
untimely direct appeal does not per se render a PCRA petition untimely filed as
premature.
On appeal, the PCRA Appeal Panel repeated the PCRA court’s mistake of failing
to engage in a meaningful timeliness analysis. Indeed, the court characterized
Appellant’s PCRA petition as “premature,” equating it with Shaheed Smith’s PCRA
petition. See Smith, slip op. at 5 n.3 (PCRA Appeal Panel Decision). Yet, Shaheed
Smith’s PCRA petition truly was premature and, thus, untimely because he filed it while
his indisputably timely-filed direct appeal was pending; in other words, he filed his PCRA
petition without first exhausting his direct appeal rights. Here, however, by the time the
PCRA Appeal Panel issued its decision, the Direct Appeal Panel, almost a year earlier,
had determined that Appellant untimely pursued his direct appeal, and this Court had
denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal from the Direct Appeal Panel’s
decision over four months prior. Although acknowledging this change in the posture of
the case on appeal, the PCRA Appeal Panel rotely applied its decision in Smith, ignored
this Court’s precedent in Brown, and erroneously characterized Appellant’s PCRA petition
[J-63-2023] - 12 as premature. Indeed, under Brown, as a result of the Direct Appeal Panel’s decision
quashing Appellant’s direct appeal as untimely and this Court’s denial of Appellant’s
petition for allowance of appeal from that decision, it became clear that Appellant timely
filed his PCRA petition.
Specifically, although Appellant’s facially untimely direct appeal was pending when
he filed his PCRA petition, that appeal process resulted in a determination that, because
Appellant had to commence his direct appeal by October 8, 2018, he untimely pursued
his direct appeal by filing a notice of appeal on October 4, 2019—i.e., nearly a year late.
Stated differently, the outcome of Appellant’s direct appeal dictated that, for purposes of
the PCRA, Appellant’s judgment became final on October 8, 2018, when his time expired
for seeking review of his judgment of sentence. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Brown, supra.
Thus, pursuant to the plain language of the PCRA and consistent with this Court’s
decision in Brown, Appellant timely filed his PCRA petition on October 7, 2019.
See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
Having reached this conclusion, we express our agreement, at least in part, with
the suggestion of Appellant, the Commonwealth, and the Attorney General that the PCRA
court should have delayed ruling on the timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA petition until his
direct appeal ran its course. If, as occurred here, a petitioner files a PCRA petition while
his facially untimely direct appeal is pending, the PCRA court should delay a definitive
ruling on the timeliness of the petition until it has all the facts necessary to make such an
assessment, because, before that time, it is not yet clear whether jurisdiction rests with
the PCRA court. Hence, the dismissal of a PCRA petition under these circumstances
would, itself, be premature. This procedure is faithful to our holding in Brown and protects
eligible defendants’ statutory right to pursue collateral relief within the general time
restrictions of the PCRA.
[J-63-2023] - 13 We further concur with the Commonwealth and the Attorney General that Appellate
Rule 1701(a) does not impede such a procedure.4 Again, that rule provides: “Except as
otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken . . . , the trial court . . . may
no longer proceed further in the matter.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). This rule does not entirely
prevent a trial court from acting after an appeal is taken. Indeed, Appellate Rule 1701(b)
enumerates several actions that trial courts can take after a defendant files a notice of
appeal. Pertinent to this matter, that rule provides: (b) Authority of a trial court or other government unit after appeal.--After an appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other government unit may: (1) Take such action as may be necessary to preserve the status quo, correct formal errors in papers relating to the matter, cause the record to be transcribed, approved, filed, and transmitted, grant leave to appeal in forma pauperis, grant supersedeas, and take other action permitted or required by these rules or otherwise ancillary to the appeal or petition for review proceeding. Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(1) (emphasis added).
When a defendant lodges an appeal from his judgment of sentence and he
otherwise may be eligible for PCRA relief, in our view, the status quo includes the
defendant’s statutory right to seek collateral review through the PCRA, if necessary.
Thus, pursuant to Appellate Rule 1701(b)(1), if a defendant files a PCRA petition during
the pendency of a facially untimely direct appeal that may impact the timeliness of his
PCRA petition, then the PCRA court is empowered to maintain the status quo by entering
an order postponing a ruling on the timeliness of the petition. We also are of the view
that a PCRA court’s decision to delay ruling on the timeliness of a PCRA petition is an
action “otherwise ancillary” to the pending, facially untimely direct appeal. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(1). Consequently, this portion of Appellate Rule 1701(b)(1) also
4 To the extent that this appeal requires the Court to interpret the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, generally speaking, we accomplish such a task consistent with the provisions of the Statutory Construction Act. See Pa.R.A.P. 107.
[J-63-2023] - 14 allows PCRA courts to enter orders postponing rulings on the timeliness of PCRA
petitions under circumstances like those in the present matter.5
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we conclude that the PCRA Appeal Panel erred by quashing
Appellant’s appeal from the PCRA court’s order dismissing his PCRA petition. We,
therefore, vacate the PCRA Appeal Panel’s quashal of Appellant’s appeal, as well as the
PCRA court’s order dismissing his PCRA petition. Further, we remand the matter to the
PCRA court to proceed in a manner consistent with this opinion.
Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht, Mundy and
McCaffery join the opinion.
5 Having reached these conclusions, we do not need to overrule or otherwise address the
validity of the Superior Court’s opinion in Smith. The circumstances that animated that decision clearly are distinguishable from those underlying the present matter. Most notably, Shaheed Smith’s PCRA petition truly was premature as his indisputably, timely filed direct appeal was pending when he filed the petition. In addition, because we can resolve the ultimate question in this matter without delving into the particulars of the federal stay-and-abey practice, we need not venture further into that practice to address the issue.
[J-63-2023] - 15