MELINSON, Judge:
This is an appeal filed by the Commonwealth from an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County granting, in part, Appellee’s omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. Appellee (hereinafter “Slaton”) has cross-appealed the portion of the Order denying the suppression of other evidence. We affirm the portion of the trial court’s Order granting Slaton’s motion to suppress. Slaton’s cross-appeal is quashed as interlocutory.
On November 21, 1983, Agent Eugene C. Beard, Jr., of the Bureau of Narcotics of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, visited Lou’s Pharmacy in East Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The purpose of Beard’s visit was to search the “Schedule II file” 1 of the pharmacy in the course of an investigation into the activities of an individual referred to as “Merriweather.” This individual allegedly had been forging prescriptions in the general vicinity of Lou’s. Beard notified the pharmacist, Slaton, that he wished to look through his Schedule II file for information on Merriweather. Slaton responded by showing Beard the file.
During the course of searching the file for evidence against Merriweather, Beard found many other forged prescriptions, apparently unrelated to the Merriweather case. He removed these prescriptions from the Schedule II file [304]*304and, in accordance with Bureau of Narcotics policy, left receipts for the removed prescriptions in the file. Within the next few days, Beard contacted the doctors who, according to the confiscated slips, were purported to have written the prescriptions. He learned that the prescriptions were, indeed, forgeries.
On December 6, 1983, Beard, with another narcotics agent, returned to Lou’s Pharmacy and, again, notified Slaton that he wished to continue searching his Schedule II file. Beard did not state that he was looking for more information on Merriweather, but neither did he state that he was no longer looking for information on that individual. Read in its totality the record shows that Slaton, on the occasions of the latter two visits, was under the impression that the agents were searching for more information on Merriweather. Under those circumstances, Slaton again permitted Beard to search the file. Additional suspected forged prescriptions were removed by the agents on that date and on the following day, December 7, 1983.
Slaton was arrested on January 16, 1985, and was charged with sixty-one (61) counts of Violation óf the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act: Distribution by Practitioner in Bad Faith. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 35, Section 780-113(a)(14) (Purdon 1987 Supp.). Slaton filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, requesting, inter alia, that the prescription slips taken from the Schedule II file be suppressed on the grounds that his consent was improperly obtained.
The trial court denied the motion with regard to the prescription slips seized on Agent Beard’s first visit to Lou’s Pharmacy. The court found, however, that by December 6,1983, Slaton had become “the focus of the investigation and that, accordingly, a warrant to search was constitutionally required.” The trial court further found that the Commonwealth had not proved that Slaton knowingly and intelligently consented to a search of the premises. Thus, in the absence of a valid search warrant, the prescription slips seized on December 6 and 7 of 1983 were [305]*305illegally seized and, therefore, were inadmissible as evidence against Slaton.2 The Commonwealth has appealed this Order of the trial court. Slaton has cross-appealed, claiming that the prescription slips seized at the time of Beard’s first visit should also have been suppressed as the result of an illegal search.
I.
Appeal of the Commonwealth
No. 162 Pittsburgh, 1986
We shall first address the issues raised by the Commonwealth. Initially, the Commonwealth alleges that the trial court incorrectly concluded that Slaton was the focus of the investigation on December 6 and 7. Alternatively, it is asserted that, even if Slaton had been the focus of the investigation on those dates, he voluntarily consented to the search of the Schedule II file.
“[T]he Commonwealth’s appeal of a suppression order is proper as an appeal from a final order when the Commonwealth certifies in good faith that the suppression order terminates or substantially handicaps its prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 546-47, 486 A.2d 382, 386 (1985). The Commonwealth certified on the record in the trial court, and in the brief submitted on appeal, that the Order suppressing twenty-six (26) of the sixty-one (61) prescription slips “substantially handicaps its ability to prosecute all the instant charges based upon all available evidence.”3 Thus, we shall address the merits of this appeal.
[306]*306The trial court found that by the dates of the latter two searches (December 6th and 7th), Slaton had become the focus of the investigation. The record supports that factual finding. However, that finding is not dispositive of the constitutionality of the searches. The issue to be decided is whether Slaton's consent to the warrantless searches of December 6th and 7th was voluntary under Pennsylvania law.
Initially, we note that Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 35, Section 780-134 (Purdon 1977) governs the issues in this case. That section provides, in pertinent part:
(b)(1) For the purpose of inspecting, copying, and verifying the correctness of records, reports, or other documents required to be kept or made under this act and otherwise facilitating the carrying out of his functions under this act, the secretary is authorized, in accordance with this section, to enter controlled premises and to conduct administrative inspections thereof, and of the things specified in this section, relevant to those functions.
(2) Such entries and inspections shall be carried out through officers or employes (hereinafter referred to as “officers”) designated by the secretary. Any such officer upon stating his purpose and presenting to the owner, operator, or officer in charge of such premises (i) appropriate credentials and (ii) a written notice of his inspection authority ... shall have the right to enter such premises and conduct such inspection at reasonable times____
(c) A warrant under this section shall not be required for the inspection of books and records pursuant to any administrative subpoena issued in accordance with any provisions of any Act of Assembly nor for entries and administrative inspections (including seizures of property):
[307]*307(1) With the consent of the owner, operator, or officer in charge of the controlled premises;
(2) In situations presenting imminent danger to health or safety;
(3) In situations involving inspection of conveyances where there is reasonable cause to believe that the mobility of the conveyance makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant;
(4) In any other exceptional or emergency circumstance where time or opportunity to apply for a warrant is lacking; or
(5) In any other situations where a warrant is not constitutionally required.
Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 35, Section 780-124 (Purdon 1977) (emphasis added).
We are aware that there is federal case law which holds that statutes authorizing warrantless searches, in some instances, may be reasonable and necessary to further federal interests. Such statutes are not violative of the Fourth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (federally licensed firearms dealer is engaged in highly regulated industry; thus, is subject to warrantless searches under statutory scheme); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (holder of federal retail liquor dealer’s occupational tax stamp must pay fine for refusal to allow agents to conduct warrantless search under federal statute).
We are, however, not dealing with such a statute in this case. The statute with which we are concerned authorizes a search with, inter alia, the consent of the own@r/operator, with a warrant, or in any situation where a warrant is not constitutionally required. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 35, Section 780-124 (Purdon 1977). Although the pharmaceutical field is a highly regulated industry, the Pennsylvania legislature has not seen fit to authorize warrantless searches. The statute in question only authorizes warrantless [308]*308searches in specific instances, one of those being with the consent of the owner/operator. The statute further provides that the agent seeking to conduct such an inspection must identify himself and state his purpose. Finally, the statute provides a detailed procedure for obtaining a warrant, and a “probable cause” standard for the issuance of same. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 35, Section 780-124 (Purdon 1977). We find that the legislature has not authorized warrantless searches of pharmacies. Moreover, we find that, in this instance, absent any of the statutorily enumerated exceptions, such as consent, a search warrant was required.
The mere fact that Slaton permitted a search is not, however, determinative of the issue. The Supreme Court of this Commonwealth has held that “a mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority does not discharge the burden that consent must be freely and voluntarily given.” Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 505 Pa. 152, 162, 477 A.2d 1309, 1314, cert. denied 469 U.S. 971, 105 S.Ct. 370, 83 L.Ed.2d 306 (1984), citing Commonwealth v. Davenport, 453 Pa. 235, 308 A.2d 85 (1973), later app. aff'd. 462 Pa. 543, 342 A.2d 67 (1975). Thus, the answer to the suppression question raised in this appeal hinges on whether Slaton’s consent to the searches was voluntary. The trial court found that Slaton’s consent was not voluntary. There is ample support for this finding; hence, it should not be disturbed.
Our scope of review in a suppression case is a narrow one. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently spoken on this issue.
In reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, the reviewing court’s initial task is to determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record.
Commonwealth v. Monarch, 510 Pa. 138, 147, 507 A.2d 74, 78 (1986), citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 467 Pa. 146, 354 A.2d 886 (1976). The Supreme Court has further stated:
[W]here the Commonwealth is appealing the adverse decision of a suppression court, a reviewing court must consider only the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses [309]*309and so much of the evidence for the prosecution as read in the contest of the record as a whole remains uncontradicted.
Commonwealth v. James, 506 Pa. 526, 532-33, 486 A.2d 376, 379 (1985), quoting Commonwealth v. Hamlin, 503 Pa. 210, 216, 469 A.2d 137, 139 (1983).
The Commonwealth claims that the trial court erred when it found that Slaton was the focus of the investigation. Although the trial court incorrectly resolved the suppression issue on the basis of “focus,” we believe that the court’s supporting factual findings are relevant to our conclusion that the agent’s actions vitiated any consent. The trial court noted that “... Defendant was the focus of the investigation and that, accordingly, a warrant to search was constitutionally required.”4 The learned trial judge based this conclusion on his finding that the testimony of the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing, Commonwealth Narcotics Agent Eugene C. Beard, was not credible. There is ample evidence in the record to support this finding. It is well-settled in this Commonwealth that credibility findings are within the sole province of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 370 Pa.Super. 132, 535 A.2d 1186 (1988).
The most telling part of Agent Beard’s testimony was the following:
At this time [after November 21,1983] this agent [Beard] realized that the pharmacist, Louis Slaton, should have realized that the prescriptions were bad or at least had made an attempt to verify the prescriptions.
(N.T., November 27, 1985, p. 44.) Agent Beard also testified that:
[310]*310[I]t is generally common practice on Schedule II drugs that most pharmacists will call to verify a Schedule II drug, especially Percoset, Percodan, drugs like that. Number two, there were a lot of scratch outs. I mean, the copies looked like obvious copies from a mimeograph machine or a Xerox machine. Things had been written over, traced, even on the prescriptions themselves.
(N.T., November 27, 1985, p. 46.) He further stated that during the course of his first two visits to the pharmacy, he asked Slaton if he had called the “prescribing doctors” to verify any of the prescriptions in question. Slaton responded that he had not done so. (N.T., November 27, 1985, p. 45.)
Despite Agent Beard’s protestations to the contrary, the above-quoted testimony was certainly a sufficient basis for the trial court to find that Slaton had become the focus of the investigation after the November 21, 1983, visit. Beard’s testimony that Slaton was not a suspect was belied by his (Beard’s) testimony that the prescriptions were obvious forgeries and that he had learned, from the “prescribing doctors,” that they were forgeries.
If Slaton was suspected of wrongdoing, but was laboring under the misapprehension that his files were being searched for evidence against a person by the name of Merriweather, his consent was not voluntary. Consent to a search undertaken under false pretenses5 is not truly voluntary. Commonwealth v. Poteete, 274 Pa.Super. 490, [311]*311418 A.2d 513 (1980).6 Slaton could not voluntarily consent to something of which he was unaware, namely, a search of his Schedule II file for evidence against him.
In this case, as in Poteete, Slaton was misled by an officer of the law, who had identified himself and announced an official purpose for his visits. The officer did not disclose the full purpose of his visits and withheld information indicating that Slaton was suspected of criminal conduct. Whether or not Agent Beard intended to mislead Slaton is irrelevant. Consent turns on the state of mind of the citizen, not that of the officer. Commonwealth v. Poteete, 274 Pa.Super. at 498, 418 A.2d at 517. Although zeal in the performance of one’s duties as an officer of the law is generally commendable, such zeal should never be used to excuse a violation of an individual’s statutorily protected civil liberties. As that preeminent judicial scholar, Mr. [312]*312Justice Brandeis, counseled in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944, 957 (1928):
... [I]t is also immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law enforcement. Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent. Men bom to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning, but without understanding.
We, therefore, find that there was no informed, voluntary consent to the warrantless searches conducted on December 6 and 7,1983. We affirm the Order of the trial court which suppressed the evidence seized on those days.
II.
Appeal of Louis Slaton
No. 229 Pittsburgh, 1986
We now address Slaton’s cross-appeal. We find that there is a threshold issue raised by this cross-appeal. That issue is whether this court has the jurisdiction to hear a criminal defendant’s cross-appeal from the denial of a portion of a pretrial suppression motion when the Commonwealth has filed an appeal from the granting of another portion of that same motion. We hold that this court does not have such jurisdiction because such a cross-appeal is interlocutory. Hence, Slaton’s cross-appeal is quashed.
We have determined that this court has no jurisdiction to hear a cross-appeal by a criminal defendant from an order denying a motion to suppress. Jurisdiction, generally, is defined as follows:
The word is a term of large and comprehensive import, and embraces every kind of judicial action. It is the authority by which courts and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases. The legal right by which judges exercise their authority. It exists when court has [313]*313cognizance of class of cases involved, proper parties are present, and point to be decided is within powers of court. Power and authority of a court to hear and determine a judicial proceeding. The right and power of a court to adjudicate concerning the subject matter in a given case.
Black’s Law Dictionary 766 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted). Subject matter jurisdiction, specifically, is defined as:
Power of a particular court to hear the type of case that is then before it. Term refers to jurisdiction of court over class of cases to which particular case belongs, ...; jurisdiction over the nature of the cause of action and relief sought, or the amount for which a court of limited jurisdiction is authorized to enter judgment.
A court is without authority to adjudicate a matter over which it has no jurisdiction even though the court possesses jurisdiction over the parties to the litigation; ____
Black’s Law Dictionary 767 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
One of the most venerable and learned of our American jurists wrote extensively on the subject of jurisdiction. We can cite no more authoritative source than Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, who, over one hundred and eighty years ago, discussed the power of a court to hear cases that are brought before it. The words he wrote then should guide us today in our consideration of this significant issue:
Courts which originate in the common law possess a jurisdiction which must be regulated by the common law, until some statute shall change their established principles; but courts which are created by written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot transcend that jurisdiction____
This opinion is not to be considered as abridging the power of courts over their own officers, or to protect themselves, and their members, from being disturbed in the exercise of their functions. It extends only to the [314]*314power of taking cognizance of any question between individuals, or between the government and individuals.
To enable the court to decide on such question, the power to determine it must be given by written law.
Ex parte Bollman and Ex parte Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 2 L.Ed. 554 (1807) (emphasis added).
This court is a court “created by written law.” Pa. Const, art. 5, Sections 1, 3. “Exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas____” has been conferred upon this court by the legislative branch of the government of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Section 742 (Purdon 1981) (emphasis added). The Pennsylvania legislature has further provided that lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Section 704(b) (Purdon 1981).7 “An order is a ‘final order’, so as to be appealable, if it ends the litigation or disposes of the entire case.” Commonwealth v. Wise, 328 Pa.Super. 491, 477 A.2d 552 (1984), citing Esh v. Awglis, 291 Pa.Super. 528, 436 A.2d 242 (1981).
In Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that, where a motion to suppress has been granted, “the element of finality inherent in the order of the suppression is apparent and sufficient to render the order appealable,” for the purpose of an appeal by the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. at 63, 190 A.2d at 308. Where a motion to suppress has been denied, however, there is no element of finality present. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. at 64, 190 A.2d at 309. We find that the denial of a motion to suppress is not a final order within the meaning of 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Section 742 (Purdon 1981). There is no magic wand that this court can wave to transform an [315]*315interlocutory order into a final order thereby creating subject matter jurisdiction in this court.
The issue of cross-appeals by criminal defendants where the Commonwealth has appealed part of the trial court’s disposition of a motion to suppress was addressed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Fisher, 422 Pa. 134, 221 A.2d 115 (1966). In Fisher, the defendant gave three statements to the police. One of the statements was made during the preliminary stages of the investigation. As a result of that initial statement, the defendant was interrogated on two subsequent occasions and gave two additional inculpatory statements. The trial court suppressed the latter two statements but held the first statement to be admissible. The Commonwealth appealed and the defendant cross-appealed. The defendant’s cross-appeal was quashed. The Supreme Court held:
The defendant in a criminal case may not appeal from a pretrial order denying his motion for the suppression of evidence: Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963).
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 422 Pa. at 136, 221 A.2d at 116. In Bosurgi, cited in Fisher above, the Supreme Court stated:
The right of appeal by a defendant stands upon an entirely different footing. The denial of a defendant’s motion for the suppression of evidence does not deprive a defendant of an appellate review of the validity of that order. At trial, the defendant still has full opportunity to object to the introduction into evidence of the allegedly improper evidence and, in the event of his conviction, he will then have an opportunity to secure an appellate evaluation of the propriety and admissibility of such evidence. Therefore, unlike the Commonwealth, an adverse pretrial disposition of a motion to suppress evidence does not deprive the defendant of his only opportunity for appellate review. Under such circumstances, the element of finality, which is the basis of appealability, is [316]*316lacking in an order denying suppression and the defendant should have no right of appeal from such order.
Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. at 64, 190 A.2d at 308-309 (emphasis added).
Two years after Fisher, the Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968). In Bordner, the defendant made six incriminating statements to the police without the benefit of warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The trial court suppressed five of the six statements, holding that upon making the initial inculpatory statement (Statement Number 1), the defendant had become the focus of the police investigation and, thus, Miranda warnings should have been given prior to any questioning by the police. The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court in Bordner, with four Justices joining, discussed the trial court’s holding with regard to Statement Number 1, the non-suppressed statement:
Bordner was first interrogated on November 22nd and the early afternoon of November 23rd. The evidence indicates that during these interrogations the police were engaged in a general fact-finding process in that they were still questioning other members of Bordner’s family. Thus, Bordner was not entitled to any warning of his constitutional rights by the police at this stage and under these circumstances: Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491, 84 S.Ct. 1758 [12 L.Ed.2d 977] (1964). Bordner suddenly admitted on November 23rd that he had done it (the crime) and asked what would happen to him. This statement, made in the presence of a policeman and the county coroner, is captioned Statement No. 1 and, as found by the court below, is admissible into evidence even though he had not been given all the United States Supreme Court-mandated warnings as to his rights since the focus of the investigation had not yet settled upon Bordner as the accused at the time of the making of that [317]*317statement. Cf. Escobedo, supra [378 U.S.] p. 491 [84 S.Ct. at 1765].
Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. at 411-12, 247 A.2d at 615-16.
It should be noted that there was no cross-appeal by the defendant in Bordner. Thus, in the course of deciding an appeal by the Commonwealth of a suppression issue, the Court commented on the admissibility of evidence found to be admissible by the trial court even though that issue had not been appealed by either party. The Court, in passing on the admissibility of Statement Number 1, did not, however, cite to Fisher or Bosurgi.
We cannot assume, however, that the Supreme Court overlooked either Fisher or Bosurgi when Bordner was decided. Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberts, who concurred in the result in a separate opinion, wrote:
Since neither party can properly raise the issue of the admissibility of Statement No. 1, it is clear that this Court cannot decide that issue. Since the issue is not properly before the Court in this case, I must conclude that the Court’s discussion of the issue is merely unfortunate dictum. As a result, I find it unnecessary to posture this opinion as a dissent, although I am obligated to condemn the pursuit in dictum of an important issue not properly cognizable by the Court.
Commonwealth v. Bordner, 482 Pa. at 422, 247 A.2d at 621 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice Roberts, citing Bosurgi, noted that such an appeal by a defendant is interlocutory and, therefore, not in the proper posture for appellate review.
In Commonwealth v. Barnes, 307 Pa.Super. 148, 452 A.2d 1355 (1982), this court cited the Bordner case as authority for considering the cross-appeal of the defendant/appellee. The learned three-judge panel that decided Bournes, relying on judicial economy and consistency of treatment as rationale for its holding, found that “Bordner’s effect is to permit a criminal defendant to cross-appeal a denied suppression motion when the Commonwealth [318]*318appeals a granted suppression motion.” Commonwealth v. Barnes, 307 Pa.Super. at 146, 452 A.2d at 1356. That opinion states:
The opinion of the court in Bordner, with four Justices joining, reached the merits of the defendant’s as well as the Commonwealth’s appeal from pre-trial suppression rulings. The majority opinion did not make any reference to the fact that its consideration of defendant’s appeal on the merits was a departure from the rule in Fisher.
Commonwealth v. Barnes, 307 Pa.Super. at 146-47, 452 A.2d at 1356 (emphasis added). Our reading of Bordner shows, however, that there was no appeal, cross or otherwise, by the defendant/appellee in that case. We do not consider the majority’s silence in Bordner to be sufficient reason to overrule a line of cases dating back to 1963, particularly where the question was not properly before the Court. Further, the Supreme Court has warned this court against misinterpreting procedures previously established by that Court. In Commonwealth v. Dugger, Justice McDermott, writing for the Court, cautioned us that, “There is a grave and profound difference between our direction to the Superior Court to hear an appeal, and our reasons for disposing of an appeal in a specific case.” Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 543-44, 486 A.2d 382, 385 (1985) (footnote omitted).
Commonwealth v. Dugger was a companion case to Commonwealth v. Lapia, 311 Pa.Super. 264, 457 A.2d 877 (1983)8 when Dugger was initially decided by the Superior Court. The Superior Court opinion in that case held that Commonwealth v. Hill, 497 Pa. 230, 439 A.2d 1153 (1982), sub silentio, overruled the holding of Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963). In Hill, the Supreme Court declined to entertain an appeal by the Commonwealth, stating, “... we do not believe the order sup[319]*319pressing the weapon substantially impairs the Commonwealth’s case.” Commonwealth v. Hill, 497 Pa. at 230, 489 A.2d at 1153. In analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill, the Superior Court in Dugger found that the Supreme Court overruled its own directive to the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Bosurgi to hear appeals by the Commonwealth where it is certified that an order by a suppression court substantially handicaps the prosecution of the case. The Commonwealth appealed the Superior Court’s decision in Dugger to the Supreme Court.9 The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision and reminded this court of its duty to follow the directives of the Supreme Court.
We find that the situation currently before us presents a similar dilemma. We have a direct holding by the Supreme Court that a criminal defendant may not appeal a pretrial determination by a suppression court. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 422 Pa. 134, 221 A.2d 115 (1966); see also Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963). Later, in Commonwealth v. Bordner, 432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968), in the course of deciding an appeal by the Commonwealth of a suppression issue, our Supreme Court commented on the admissibility of evidence found to be admissible by the trial court, even though that issue had not been appealed by either party. While this may appear to be a departure from previous rulings, we believe that if the Supreme Court had intended to overrule Fisher and Bosurgi, it would have done so explicitly. As an intermediate appellate court, it is the duty of this court to follow the law as established by the Supreme Court, not to disregard such law without an express directive from that Court. See Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985); Commonwealth v. Hill, 497 Pa. 230, 439 A.2d 1153 (1982).
[320]*320Further, we do not find compelling the reasons relied upon by this court in Barnes for allowing cross-appeals by defendants when the Commonwealth has appealed from a suppression Order. The court cited judicial economy and consistency of treatment as advantages to be gained by hearing both appeals, stating:
The same basic fact situations will often be present in both appeals and there is an undeniable saving of time and expense for both parties and the court if the issues are not artificially separated.
There is an additional advantage of consistency of treatment to be had in permitting such cross-appeals. Results grounded in contradictory interpretations of the same facts might be obtained if one panel of this court treated the interlocutory appeal of the Commonwealth and another panel handled the post-conviction appeal of the defendant.
Commonwealth v. Barnes, 307 Pa.Super. at 146, 452 A.2d at 1357. However, if the same basic fact situations were present in these appeals, then, following the reasoning of Barnes, presumably the results of the suppression hearing would have been the same on all issues. In fact, it is precisely because the fact situations are different that part of a suppression motion would be denied while another part of the same motion would be granted.
For example, in the case at bar, clearly the trial court found that the fact situations were different. This finding explains the different results reached on separate facets of the motion to suppress. The court found that Agent Beard had information in his possession on the dates of the latter two searches which was different from that which he had on the date of his initial visit. Thus, as a result of this different information, something different was required of him, that is, he was required to notify Slaton of the information in his possession or, in the alternative, to obtain a search warrant.
Further, were we to rule that a cross-appeal will be allowed where the same basic fact situations are present, [321]*321this court would then become embroiled in the potentially arduous task of determining the threshold issue of whether the fact situations presented are indeed the same. Only then could it address the merits of the suppression issues on appeal. Thus, judicial economy and consistency of treatment would not necessarily be served by such a holding. In any event, even if we were to find that judicial economy and consistency of treatment would be served by allowing these cross-appeals, we find that we are powerless to hear them because this court does not have jurisdiction. The mere fact that a non-appealable order rides on the coattails of an appealable order does not confer jurisdiction on this court to review the non-appealable order.
In light of the long-standing rule of American jurisprudence that, except in extraordinary circumstances, an appeal may be taken only from a final order of the court, and in recognition of our responsibility to preserve the sanctity of the appellate process, we hold that a criminal defendant may not appeal from an order of a suppression court even in the posture of a cross-appeal.
Hence, Slaton’s cross-appeal is quashed as interlocutory. That portion of the trial court’s Order granting Slaton’s motion to suppress is affirmed. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
KELLY, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.
WIEAND and BECK, JJ., filed a concurring and dissenting statement.
POPOVICH, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.