Commonwealth v. Sharpless

2 Serg. & Rawle 91
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 20, 1815
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Commonwealth v. Sharpless) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815).

Opinion

Tilghman C. J.

This is an indictment against Jesse Sharpless and others, for exhibiting an indecent picture to divers persons for money. The defendants consented, that a verdict should go against them, and afterwards moved in arrest of judgment for several reasons.

1. “That the matter laid in the indictment is not an in- “ dictable offence.” It was denied, in the 'first place, that even a public exhibition of an indecent picture was indictable; but supposing it to be so, it was insisted, that this indictment contained no charge of a public exhibition. In England, there are some acts of immorality, such as adultery, of which the ecclesiastical courts have taken cognisance from very ancient times, and in such cases, although they tended to the corruption of the public morals', the temporal courts have not assumed jurisdiction. This occasioned some uncertainty in the law; some difficulty in discriminating between the offences punishable in the temporal and ecclesiastical courts. Although there was no ground for this distinction in a country like ours, where there was no ecclesiastical jurisdiction, yet the common law principle was supposed to be in force, and to get rid pf it, punishments were inflicted by act of assembly. There is no act punishing the offence charged against the defendants; and therefor^ the case must be decided upon the principles of the common law. That actions of public indecency, were always indictable, as tending to corrupt the public morals, I can have no doubt ; because, even in the profligate reign of Charles II. Sir Charles Sedley was punished by imprisonment and a heavy fine, for standing naked in a balcony, in a public part of the city of London. It is true, that, besides this shameful exhibition, it is mentioned in some of the reports of that case, that he threw down bottles; containing offensive liquor, among the people; but we have the highest authority for saying, that the most criminal part of his conduct, and that which principally drew upon him thfe vengeance of the law, was the exposure-of his person. For this I refer to the opinion of the judges in the Queen v. Curl, (2 Str. 792.) Lord Mansfield, in the King v. Sir Francis Blake Delaval, &c. 3 Burr. 1438, and of Blackstone in the 4th volume of his Commentaries, page 64. Neither is [102]*102there any doubt, that the publication of an indecent book is indictable, although it was once doubted by the Court of King’s Bench, in the Queen v. Reed, (in the sixth year of Queen Anne.') But the authority of that case was destroyed, upon great consideration, in the King v. Curl, (1 George II.) 2 Str. 788. The law was in Curl’s case established upon true principles. . What tended to corrupt society, was held to be a breach of the peace and punishable by indictment. The Courts are guardians of the public morals, and therefore have jurisdiction in such cases. Hence it follows, that an offence may be. punishable, if in its nature and by its example, it tends to the corruption of morals ; although it be not committed in public. In the King v. Delaval, &c. there was a conspiracy, and for that reason alone, the Court had jurisdiction ; yet Lord Mansfield expressed his opinion, that they would have had jurisdiction, from the nature of the offence, which was the seduction of a young woman, under the age of twenty-one, and placing her'in the situation of a kept mistress, under the pretence of binding her as an apprentice to her keeper; and he cited the opinion of Lord Hardwicke, who ordered an information to be filed against a man.- who had made a formal assignment of his wife to another person. In support of this we find an indictment in Trem. Pl. 213, (The King v. Dingley) for seducing a married woman to elope from her husband. Now to apply these principles to the present case. The defendants are charged with exhibiting and shewing to sundry persons, for money, a lewd, scandalous,, and obscene painting. A picture tends to excite lust as strongly as a writing; and the shewing of a picture, is as much a publication, as the selling of a book. Curl was convicted of selling a book. It is true, the indictment charged the act to have been in a public shop, but that can make no difference. The mischief was no greater than if he had taken the purchaser into a private room, and sold him the book there. The law is not to be- evaded by an artifice of that kind. If the privacy of the room was a protection, all the youth of the city might be corrupted by taking them one by one into a chamber, and there inflaming their, passions by the exhibition of lascivious pictures. In the eye. of the law, this would be a publication, and a most pernicious one. Then, although it- is not said in the indictment, in express terms, that the defendants published the painting, yet the averment is [103]*103substantially the same, that is to -say, that they exhibited it to sundry persons for money; for that in law is a publication.

2., The second reason in arrest of judgment is, that the picture is not sufficiently described in the indictment. It is described as a lewd and obscene painting, representing a man in an obscene, impudent, and indecent posture -with a woman. We do not know^ that the picture had any name, and therefore it might be impossible to designate it by name. What then is expected ? Must the indictment describe minutely, the attitude and posture of the figures ? I 'am for paying some respect to the chastity of our records. These are circumstances which may be well omitted. Whether the picture was really indecent, the jury might judge from the evidence, or if necessary from' inspection. The witnesses could identify it. I am of opinion^that the description is sufficient.

3. The third and last reason is,- that the indictment does not lay the defendants’ house to be a nuisance, nor the act of the defendants to be to the common nuisance of all the citizens, &c. The answer is plain. It is not an indictment for a nuisance, but for an action of evil example, tending to the corruption of the youth, and other citizens of the commonwealth, and against the peace, &c. In describing an offence of this kind, the technical word nuisance would have been improper. My opinion is,' that the indictment is good, and therefore, the judgment should not be arrested.

Ye ates J.

I perfectly concur in the sentiments expressed by Sir Philip Torke, in the case of the King v. Curl, (2 Stra. 790,) that although every immoral act, such as lying, &c. is not indictable, yet where the offence charged, is destructive of morality in general; where it does or may affect every member of the community, it is punishable at common law. The destruction of morality renders the power of the government invalid, for government is no more than public order. It weakens the bands by which society is kept together. The corruption of the public mind in general, and debauching the manners of youth in-particular by lewd and obscene pictures exhibited to view, must necessarily be attended with the most injurious consequences, and in such instances Courts of Justice are, or ought to be, the schools of morals. So far from the law of England being changed on this point by modern decisions, we find in the case of the King v. Wilkes

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Bluebook (online)
2 Serg. & Rawle 91, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-sharpless-pa-1815.