Commonwealth v. Severance

91 Va. Cir. 23, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 89
CourtFairfax County Circuit Court
DecidedJune 22, 2015
DocketCase No. FE-2015-430
StatusPublished

This text of 91 Va. Cir. 23 (Commonwealth v. Severance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Fairfax County Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Severance, 91 Va. Cir. 23, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 89 (Va. Super. Ct. 2015).

Opinion

By Judge Jane Marum Roush

This matter came before the Court on April 23, 2015, for a hearing on the Defendant’s Motion To Sever and the Commonwealth’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion To Sever. At that time, I took the motion under advisement. I have since fully considered the motion, the opposition, and the arguments of counsel. For the reasons stated below, the Motion To Sever will be denied.

I. Background

Charles S. Severance was indicted on September 8, 2014, in the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria. Venue was subsequently changed to Fairfax County by an order entered on April 23, 2015. The indictment consists of the following counts: Count 1: Capital murder of Ruthanne Lodato on February 6, 2014; Count 2: Use of a firearm while committing murder on February 6, 2014, a second or subsequent offense; Count 3: Malicious wounding of J.F. on February 6, 2014; Count 4: Use of a firearm while committing malicious wounding on February 6, 2014, a second or subsequent offense; Count 5: Capital murder of Ronald Kirby on November 11, 2013; Count 6: Use of a firearm while committing murder on November 11, 2013, a second or subsequent offense; Count 7: First degree murder of Nancy Dunning on December 5, 2003; Count 8: Use of a firearm while committing murder on December 5, 2003; Count 9: Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon on February 6, 2014; and Count 10: Possession of a firearm by a convicted [24]*24felon onNovember 11, 2013. Counts 7 and 8 will be referred to collectively as the “2003 Charges.” Counts 5, 6, and 10 will be referred to as the “2013 Charges.” Counts 1,2,3,4, and 9 will be referred to as the “2014 Charges.”

The Commonwealth has declared in writing that it will not seek the death penalty for either of the capital murder charges.

In his Motion To Sever, the Defendant requests that Counts 7 and 8, relating to the murder of Nancy Dunning on December 5,2003, be severed from the remaining counts and that he be granted a separate trial on those charges.

II. Discussion of Authority

Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia

Rule 3A:10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia provides, in pertinent part:

(c) An Accused Charged with More Than One Offense. The court may direct that an accused be tried at one time for all offenses then pending against him, if justice does not require separate trials and (i) the offenses meet the requirements of Rule 3A:6(b) or (ii) the accused and the Commonwealth’s Attorney consent thereto.

Rule 3A:6(b) provides:

(b) Joinder of Offenses. Two or more offenses, any of which may be a misdemeanor, may be charged in separate counts of an indictment or information if the offenses are based on the same act or transaction, or on two or more acts or transactions that are connected or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.

Summarizing, unless justice requires separate trials, offenses may be joined for trial over the objection of the Commonwealth or the accused if the offenses are: (1) based on the same act or transaction, (2) multiple acts that are connected, (3) multiple acts that are parts of a common scheme, or (4) multiple acts that are parts of a common plan.

In his Motion To Sever, the Defendant argues that the 2003 Charges are not “based on the same act or transaction” as the 2013 Charges or the 2014 Charges, nor are the 2003 Charges “part of a common scheme or plan” together with the 2013 Charges or the 2014 Charges. Further, the Defendant contends justice requires a separate trial on the 2003 Charges.

The Commonwealth responds that all of the charges in this case are “connected,” part of a “common scheme,” and part of a “common plan” within the meaning of Rules 3A:10(c) and 3A:6(b). The Commonwealth maintains that justice does not require separate trials.

[25]*25 Case Law

The Court will not address the “same act or transaction” prong of Rule 3A:6(b) because the Commonwealth makes no argument that the 2003 Charges are part of the “same act or transaction” as the 2013 Charges and the 2014 Charges.

A. Multiple Acts That Are Connected

To be “connected” for the purposes of Rules 3A: 10(c) and 3A:6(b), “two or more crimes ... must be so intimately connected and blended with the main facts adduced in evidence that they cannot be departed from with propriety.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 263 Va. 13, 17, 557 S.E.2d 223 (2002), quoting Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 273, 176 S.E.2d 802 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The abstruse phrase that the offenses must be “so intimately connected and blended with the main facts adduced in evidence that they cannot be departed from with propriety” is first found in Walker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 574 (1829). That case did not, however, involve a joint trial for two offenses. Rather, the issue was whether, in Walker’s prosecution for stealing a watch, evidence was admissible that he had once stolen a coat.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) is similar to Rule 3 A:6(b). The federal rule provides:

(a) Joinder of Offenses. The indictment or information may charge a defendant In separate counts with two or more offenses if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a).

In interpreting that rule, “federal courts ask whether commission of one of the offenses either depended upon or necessarily led to the commission of the other.” Walker v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 410, 418, 770 S.E.2d 197, 200 (2015) (internal ellipses and alterations omitted).

B. Multiple Acts That Are Part of a Common Scheme

A “common scheme” means “a particular act done multiple times in a similar way.” Walker, 770 S.E.2d at 200, n. 4.

If the similarity between the offenses is sufficiently distinctive, this is consistent with our definition in Scott that the term “common scheme” describes crimes that share features idiosyncratic in character, which permit an inference that each individual offense was committed by the same [26]*26person or persons as part of a pattern of criminal activity involving certain identified crimes.

Id., citing Scott v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 636, 651 S.E.2d 630 (2007) (internal alterations omitted).

C. Multiple Acts That Are Part of a Common Plan

In Scott v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 636, 651 S.E.2d 630

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Related

Scott v. Com.
651 S.E.2d 630 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2007)
Commonwealth v. Minor
591 S.E.2d 61 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2004)
Commonwealth v. Smith
557 S.E.2d 223 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2002)
Long v. Commonwealth
456 S.E.2d 138 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1995)
Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth
176 S.E.2d 802 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1970)
Satcher v. Commonwealth
421 S.E.2d 821 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1992)
Spence v. Commonwealth
407 S.E.2d 916 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1991)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
91 Va. Cir. 23, 2015 Va. Cir. LEXIS 89, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-severance-vaccfairfax-2015.