Commonwealth v. Schoener

• Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
• Decided: April 18, 2023
• Docket: SJC 13318
• Status: Published

Opinion

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557- 1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC-13318

COMMONWEALTH vs. MICHAEL SCHOENER.

Norfolk. January 4, 2023. - April 18, 2023.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

Kidnapping. Accessory and Principal. Evidence, Accomplice, Intent, Hearsay, State of mind, Verbal completeness. Intent. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Judicial discretion, Hearsay.

Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 5, 2014.

The case was tried before Robert C. Cosgrove, J., and a motion for postconviction relief was heard by him.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.

Erin R. Opperman for the defendant. Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

GEORGES, J. In the months leading up to New Year's Day,

2014, the defendant, Michael Schoener, then a Dedham police

officer, provided several specific items to his drug supplier, 2

James Feeney, at Feeney's request. These items included the

board of probation (BOP) records and driver's license

information of the victim, James Robertson, as well as the

defendant's Dedham police badge, gun holster, and handcuffs.

After having done so, the defendant continued his relationship

as a regular purchaser of Percocet pills from Feeney. Feeney

provided the victim's information and the defendant's items to

his associates, Scott Morrison and Alfred Ricci. As instructed

by Feeney, Morrison and Ricci used the police equipment and

their knowledge of the victim's personal information to

impersonate law enforcement officers and to convince the victim

that they were at his house to take him to complete a mandatory

drug test.1 They handcuffed the victim and drove him to Ricci's

garage, where they shackled him to a chair. Feeney directed

Ricci and Morrison to leave the garage; later that night, Feeney

called Ricci and Morrison to help him dispose of the victim's

body. One year later, the victim's remains were found in a

nearby wooded area.

The defendant was charged and convicted of being an

accessory before the fact to kidnapping, G. L. c. 265, § 26.

Feeney, Morrison, and Ricci were charged with kidnapping and

murder in the first degree, among other charges. On appeal, the

1 The victim was on probation and was required to take mandatory drug tests; Feeney was aware of this requirement. 3

defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove

that he knew that Feeney would use the items he provided to

kidnap the victim or that he intended the kidnapping to happen.

Accordingly, we must address in this case what constitutes

sufficient evidence of knowledge and intent to support a

conviction of accomplice liability to kidnapping. The defendant

also argues that there were numerous errors in the judge's

instruction on the elements of accessory to kidnapping. In

addition, the defendant contends that his statements in his

August 6, 2014, interview with police, following his indictment,

should have been admissible to impeach the testifying officer.

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to

find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly

participated in the kidnapping by providing the items to Feeney

and, in so doing, shared Feeney's intent that the kidnapping

take place. We reach this determination in part based on the

specific items provided by the defendant -- his police badge,

gun holster, and handcuffs -- and their nexus to the elements of

kidnapping. We also conclude that the judge's instructions to

the jury were not erroneous. Moreover, there was no abuse of

discretion in the judge's decision to exclude the defendant's

August 6 statements. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's

conviction and the order denying his motion for postconviction

relief. 4

1. Background. We recite the facts in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Kostka, 489

Mass. 399, 400 (2022). A conviction may rest exclusively on

circumstantial evidence, and in evaluating that evidence, we

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 32 (2017).

a. Events prior to the kidnapping. By the summer of 2013,

the defendant had been purchasing Percocet from Feeney for

almost two years. The defendant had been introduced to Feeney

through a mutual friend, who also had sold Percocet to the

defendant; eventually, the defendant switched to purchasing

Percocet directly from Feeney. At that time, the defendant had

been a patrol officer in the Dedham police department for eight

years. His patrol officer's uniform included four badges -- one

wallet badge, and three that he wore on his hat, shirt, and

jacket -- and two sets of handcuffs.

During the period from 2013 into 2014, the defendant went

to Feeney's Dedham apartment approximately two to three times

each week to purchase Percocet pills. On average, he spent

approximately $300 per week for about ten pills. The defendant

spent roughly fifteen minutes with Feeney during each visit. On

some occasions, the defendant was wearing his police uniform

pants when he came to make the purchase. 5

In the summer of 2013, the defendant had learned from

Feeney that there was a "love triangle" between Feeney, Andrea

Morse, and the victim. Morse had known Feeney since 2005, and

the two commenced a romantic relationship shortly before Morse

met the victim in 2013. On separate occasions, Feeney spoke to

the defendant about his animosity towards the victim and

referred to the victim as a "drunken piece of shit." The

defendant had seen Morse at Feeney's apartment. Additionally,

on at least one occasion while he was at Feeney's apartment, the

defendant briefly met Ricci, who was Feeney's cousin, and

Morrison.

At trial, Morse testified that at one point during the

summer of 2013, the victim, while intoxicated, drove to Feeney's

apartment and then attempted to break into Feeney's car, but

inadvertently broke into someone else's vehicle and was

arrested. Feeney was very angry at the victim for coming to his

house, and he believed that the victim had been there to assault

him. The victim was incarcerated briefly and then released on

probation. Feeney knew that, as a condition of his probation,

the victim was required to undergo drug testing.

Later that summer, Morse and the victim went to the Dedham

police station to retrieve Morse's impounded car. The defendant

was on duty, and Morse recalled that he looked "very nervous" at

the sight of the two. Morse believed this was because the 6

defendant recognized her from Feeney's apartment. The defendant

mentioned to Feeney that he had seen the victim and Morse at the

police station when they were picking up Morse's impounded

vehicle.

On separate occasions in the summer and fall of 2013,

Feeney requested that the defendant check the license plate

numbers of drivers who, among other things, Feeney thought had

"cut him off on the highway"; the defendant did as requested.

As a police officer, the defendant had the ability to check BOP

records and license plate numbers.

After the victim's arrest, Feeney requested the victim's

BOP record and license information, including a photograph.

When the defendant asked Feeney why he wanted the information,

Feeney replied that he had heard that the victim had been

incarcerated and wanted to know why. Feeney did not explain why

he wanted the license information or the photograph. Sometime

after Thanksgiving 2013, Feeney gave the defendant fifteen

Percocet pills as a "Christmas gift."

At some point between Thanksgiving and Christmas, Feeney

asked to borrow the defendant's police badge, handcuffs, and

holster. During a later interview with State police Trooper

Bruce Tobin and Lieutenant Gerard Mattaliano, the defendant said

that he did not ask Feeney why he wanted the items, because he

wanted to keep their relationship friendly. In his testimony 7

before the grand jury investigating the victim's disappearance,

when the defendant was asked why he thought that Feeney wanted

his police badge, he responded:

"I mean, I didn't really question it. I just said, what do you need it for. At first I was taken aback, you know. He goes, Oh, I just want to use it. And so me being naïve, I guess, I just gave it to him."

When the defendant was asked why he thought Feeney wanted

his handcuffs, the defendant said, "I think he just implied

that it might have been, I didn't really ask him. I

thought they were for his girlfriend or something, you

know." Even though he thought that Feeney already owned

handcuffs, the defendant gave the handcuffs to Feeney.

When Feeney asked for the holster, the defendant explained

that he thought that Feeney "was just kind of like joking

about it, you know. I mean, I didn't, I wasn't thinking

right. . . . I was addicted to pills so I just was trying

to keep my avenues of getting those open, I guess, and I

wasn't thinking right."

The defendant brought the items to Feeney the next

time that he was at Feeney's apartment, a few days before

New Year's Day 2014. Feeney did not mention his purpose in

requesting them and did not mention the victim. The

defendant explained before the grand jury that Feeney "said

he wasn't going to do, you know. He just didn't really 8

imply anything, so I didn't. I just wasn't thinking." The

defendant added that he did not receive anything, such as

Percocet pills or money, for allowing Feeney the use of the

equipment, but that he gave Feeney the items in an attempt

to protect his means for purchasing Percocet pills.

At some point prior to January 1, 2014, appearing

"disturbed," Feeney had mentioned to Ricci that Morse had chosen

the victim over Feeney. "A couple months before" January 1,

2014, Feeney approached Ricci and Morrison about posing as law

enforcement officers so they could pick the victim up and bring

him to Feeney, who said that he wanted to talk to the victim.

During the month of December 2013, Feeney discussed this plan

with increasing frequency; he told Ricci that he was "getting

stuff together." Feeney then showed Ricci a folder containing

the victim's BOP record and his registry of motor vehicles (RMV)

photograph that Feeney said he had obtained from his "cousin."

Feeney told Ricci that the police query was part of the plan and

showed Ricci a badge, a gun, a set of handcuffs, and a

nightstick, all of which he said he also had obtained from his

cousin. Feeney subsequently told Ricci and Morrison that they

were to go to the victim's house, show him a badge, a gun, his

BOP record, and his RMV photograph, and then handcuff him as if

they were transporting him to the office where he met his

probation officer, but instead bring him to Ricci's garage. 9

Ricci testified that Feeney only discussed the plan with him and

Morrison. Ricci did not speak with, call, or send text messages

to the defendant, and the defendant never communicated with

Ricci.

b. The kidnapping. On January 1, 2014, Morse dropped off

the victim at his parents' house at around 11:30 A.M. Morse

then called Feeney to let him know where the victim was.

Morrison received a telephone call from Feeney to go get the

victim, in the manner that Feeney had described. Morrison and

Ricci drove to the victim's parent's house and parked across the

driveway. Ricci testified that he and Morrison were dressed as

"probation officer[s] or constable[s]." Morrison had a police

badge on his belt and a gun in a holster, and he was holding

handcuffs in one hand and a folder with the defendant's records

in the other. Ricci also was carrying a gun and wearing a

badge.

The victim briefly went outside, came back into the house,

and told his parents that he had to go with the "constables" who

were outside in order to take a random drug test. When the

victim's father asked how the victim knew that the men were

constables, the victim said that they looked official, had the

correct documents with his name and photograph, and were wearing

police badges. Returning outside, the victim asked Morrison

where they were going, and Morrison replied that they were going 10

to Dedham. Ricci and Morrison then handcuffed the victim, who

got into the rear seat of their vehicle. The victim's family

never heard from him again.

Ricci and Morrison brought the victim to Ricci's house and

shackled him to a chair in the garage. Feeney told Ricci and

Morrison to leave the garage. At some point later that day,

after Ricci and Morrison left, Feeney killed the victim. Later

that night, Feeney then drove Ricci and Morrison to a wooded

area and directed them to dispose of the victim's body a few

hundred feet into the woods.

Earlier, at 3:31 P.M, Feeney had called the defendant; the

call went to voicemail. The defendant then drove to Feeney's

apartment, and Feeney returned the handcuffs, badge, and

holster. The items were in the same condition as they had been

when Feeney took them. Feeney made no mention of what he had

done with them.

c. Events after the kidnapping. Following the return of

his police equipment, the defendant continued to stay in contact

with Feeney in order to purchase pills. At some point, the

defendant saw the victim on a missing persons poster at the

Dedham police station. The poster had a description of two

suspects it said had impersonated constables. That evening, the

defendant called Feeney and asked him several times whether he

had had anything to do with the disappearance. Feeney said 11

repeatedly that "someone beat [him] to it." The defendant later

told Tobin and Mattaliano, and testified before the grand jury,

that he did not inquire further because he "didn't want to be

involved."

On February 27, 2014, following Feeney's arrest for drug

distribution, police executed a search warrant for his

apartment.2 The police found several firearms, including a

pistol, and a bag containing handcuffs, zip-ties, and a police

baton. The police baton and the packaging for the zip ties

tested positive for the presence of blood. Deoxyribonucleic

acid (DNA) testing indicated that the alternate major DNA

profile in the blood "matched" the victim's DNA profile. The

items that the defendant had lent to Feeney tested negative for

the presence of blood.

Also on February 27, 2014, Lieutenant David McSweeney and

Trooper Brian Tully, who were investigating the disappearance of

the victim, contacted the defendant after they learned that his

telephone number appeared in Feeney's cell phone records. When

McSweeney and Tully told the defendant that they were

investigating a missing person, he responded, "Is this about

Feeney?" The defendant said that he knew there was a missing

2 The search was paused so that police could obtain a search warrant for Feeney's apartment to search for evidence related to the victim's disappearance. Once the additional warrant was obtained, police resumed the search. 12

person who had dated Feeney's girlfriend. He also told the

officers that he had asked Feeney about the victim and that he

did not think Feeney had had anything to do with the

disappearance, or was capable of kidnapping the victim. This

belief was based in part on the defendant's understanding that

Feeney used a wheelchair and was unable to walk.

On July 24, 2014, the defendant was interviewed by Tobin

and Mattaliano,3 immediately prior to his testimony to the grand

jury that was investigating the victim's disappearance. The

defendant told the officers that he had purchased Percocet pills

several times a week at Feeney's apartment and that he had

obtained a motor vehicle crash report and checked a vehicle

registration through RMV records. The defendant described what

he knew of the animosity between Feeney and the victim and

explained that, after he saw a photograph of the victim on a

missing persons poster at the police station, he had asked

Feeney whether Feeney had had anything to do with the victim's

disappearance, and Feeney repeatedly had denied any involvement.

That same day, the defendant testified before the grand

jury investigating the victim's disappearance concerning his

knowledge of that disappearance. Before testifying, the

3 At the beginning of the conversation on July 24, 2014, the defendant signed a Miranda waiver form. At that point, no indictment had issued against him. 13

defendant was advised of his right to counsel and his right to

remain silent. At trial, Tobin testified to the substance of

his conversation with the defendant on July 24, 2014, and the

defendant's grand jury testimony was read in evidence.

On August 5, 2014, the grand jury returned an indictment

charging the defendant with one count of being an accessory

before the fact to the kidnapping of the victim; the indictment

was dated July 31, 2014. Tobin and Mattaliano interviewed the

defendant again on August 6, 2014. At the beginning of the

interview, the officers informed the defendant that he had been

indicted and a warrant had been issued for his arrest. The

defendant agreed to waive his Miranda rights and speak with the

officers, and he signed a Miranda waiver form.

At a joint trial with Morrison, Feeney was convicted of

murder in the first degree, aggravated kidnapping, and

conspiracy. Morrison was convicted of manslaughter, aggravated

kidnapping, and conspiracy. Ricci entered into a plea agreement

providing that, in exchange for testifying at his three

codefendants' trials, he would plead guilty to aggravated

kidnapping and conspiracy and would receive a sentence of eight

years of incarceration.4

4 As of this writing, Morrison's appeal remains pending before the Appeals Court, see Commonwealth vs. Morrison, No. 21- P-0699, and Feeney's appeal is pending before this court, see Commonwealth vs. Feeney, SJC-13163. 14

d. Prior proceedings. In February of 2016, a Superior

Court judge, who was not the trial judge, denied the defendant's

motion to dismiss. The Commonwealth then moved in limine to

exclude the defendant's August 6 statements to Tobin and

Mattaliano. The trial judge allowed the motion.

The defendant's trial on the charge of being an accessory

before the fact to kidnapping took place over ten days. His

motions for required findings at the close of the Commonwealth's

case, and again at the close of all the evidence, were denied.

The judge also declined to instruct on certain elements of the

offense using the specific language the defendant requested.

The defendant was convicted and sentenced to from six to

nine years in State prison. His sentence was stayed pending his

direct appeal. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion to

set aside the verdict and to enter a verdict of not guilty or to

grant a new trial, and the defendant filed a second notice of

appeal. The defendant's motion to consolidate his appeals was

allowed. We subsequently allowed the defendant's application

for direct appellate review.

2. Discussion. On appeal, the defendant argues that the

Commonwealth failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove

that he was a knowing participant in the kidnapping and intended

that it happen. The defendant also argues that the judge's

instructions on certain elements of the offense of being an 15

accomplice to kidnapping were erroneous and that the judge

abused his discretion in excluding the defendant's statements to

police concerning his knowledge of what Feeney intended to do

with the items he borrowed.

a. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant's arguments

as to why the evidence was insufficient focus on the lack of

evidence of his knowledge of the planned kidnapping, and of his

intent that it succeed. The defendant contends that his

unwitting assistance in lending the items to Feeney is

insufficient to show that he acted knowingly with the specific

intent of helping the kidnapping to succeed. He notes that the

nature of the police equipment lent does not, without more,

prove his knowledge of the planned kidnapping or an intent to

kidnap, as Feeney could have used the police equipment for

numerous other (and much more ordinary) purposes, rather than to

further a kidnapping. Sustaining his conviction in the absence

of direct evidence, the defendant argues, would require the jury

to speculate about his knowledge and intent and be based

primarily on character evidence.

"When reviewing a motion for a required finding of not

guilty, the 'question is whether, after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt'" (emphasis in original). 16

Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202, 207 (2017), S.C., 482

Mass. 1017 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass.

671, 677 (1979). "The relevant question is whether the evidence

would permit a jury to find guilt [beyond a reasonable doubt],

not whether the evidence requires such a finding." Commonwealth

v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747 (1988). Circumstantial evidence is

competent to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,

Commonwealth v. Nadworny, 396 Mass. 342, 354 (1985), cert.

denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986), and the reasonable inferences drawn

from such evidence "need not be necessary or inescapable," only

"reasonable and possible" (citation omitted), Commonwealth v.

Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007) and

460 Mass. 12 (2011). At the same time, a conviction may not

rest on the piling of inference upon inference or on conjecture

and speculation. Id.

General Laws c. 274, § 2, the statute under which the

defendant was convicted, provides that "[w]hoever aids in the

commission of a felony, or is accessory thereto before the fact

by counselling, hiring or otherwise procuring such felony to be

committed, shall be punished in the manner provided for the

punishment of the principal felon." Marshall v. Commonwealth,

463 Mass. 529, 536-537 (2012) (conduct that historically has

been described as accessory before fact "plainly falls under the

rubric of accomplice liability"). See Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 17

454 Mass. 449, 467 (2009) ("At its core, joint venture criminal

liability has two essential elements: that the defendant

knowingly participated in the commission of the crime charged,

and that the defendant had or shared the required criminal

intent"). To establish intent for purposes of accessory

liability, there must be "proof that the defendant

'consciously . . . act[ed] together [with the principals] before

or during the crime with the intent of making the crime

succeed'" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 475

Mass. 396, 414 (2016). To sustain a conviction of kidnapping

requires the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant "forcibly

or secretly confine[d] or imprisone[d] another person . . .

against his [or her] will" and "without lawful authority."

G. L. c. 265, § 26. Accordingly, to convict a defendant of

being an accessory before the fact to kidnapping, the

Commonwealth must prove that the defendant knowingly

participated in the confinement of another person, forcibly and

without lawful authority, and intended to do so. See

Commonwealth v. Fredette, 480 Mass. 75, 86 (2018).

"[A] person's knowledge or intent is a matter of fact which

is often not susceptible of proof by direct evidence, so resort

is frequently made to proof by inference from all the facts and

circumstances developed at the trial." Commonwealth v. Kilburn,

426 Mass. 31, 34 (1997), S.C., 438 Mass. 356 (2003), quoting 18

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 411 Mass. 345, 350 (1991). "Whether an

inference is warranted or is impermissibly remote must be

determined, not by hard and fast rules of law, but by experience

and common sense." Kilburn, supra at 34-35, quoting

Commonwealth v. Chay Giang, 402 Mass. 604, 609 (1988). Evidence

of a conditional or contingent intent may be sufficient to

uphold a conviction of being an accessory to a crime. See

Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 308 (1973) (defendant

provided guns that were intended for contingent use during

course of robbery "if the need should arise").

Here, evidence was introduced concerning the defendant's

and Feeney's interactions from which the jury could have found

that the defendant was well aware of the mutual hostility

between Feeney and the victim. There was evidence that the

defendant and Feeney had a friendly, mutually beneficial

relationship. The defendant regularly, and without question,

provided Feeney with driving records of individuals against whom

Feeney appeared to harbor animosity. The victim was arrested

while he was attempting to break into Feeney's car, an incident

that led Feeney to request that the defendant obtain the

victim's BOP and driver's license records, using the defendant's

access as a police officer. The jury also heard evidence that

the defendant was aware of the "love triangle" between the

victim, Feeney, and Morse, and also knew that Feeney was 19

"disturbed" by the victim, whom Feeney described as a "piece of

shit."

Given the evidence of the defendant's knowledge of Feeney's

animosity towards the victim, the jury could have inferred that,

by providing Feeney with the police badge, handcuffs, and

holster, the defendant was willing that the equipment be used

unlawfully to confine another using force, if necessary. See

Richards, 363 Mass. at 308 (to establish liability for being

accessory before fact, "it would suffice if the purpose to

[commit the crime] in the mind of the accessory was a

conditional or contingent one, a willingness to see [the act]

take place should it become necessary to effectuate [the motive

underlying the offense or] "make good an escape").

The primary function of a police badge is to identify its

holder as having lawful authority. See Commonwealth v. Gray,

423 Mass. 293, 296 (1996) ("Although the officer was not in

uniform, the flashing strobe lights on an automobile being

driven by a man displaying a badge gave the defendant sufficient

notice that he was being stopped by a person with authority").

"Symbolizing the power of the [S]tate, a badge invests its

possessor with control over people and access to places."

United States v. Foreman, 926 F.2d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1990).

Here, the jury heard testimony by a State police trooper that

his badge identified him as a police officer and gave him legal 20

authority. See id. ("A police officer knows the power of [his]

badge").

Moreover, the defendant had seen a number of guns,

including a small black pistol, at Feeney's apartment. See

People v. Majors, 33 Cal. 4th 321, 331 (2004) (implicit threat

of arrest satisfied force element of kidnapping, as defendant's

conduct and his statements caused victim to believe that unless

victim accompanied defendant, victim would be forced to do so).

The jury would have been warranted in inferring that, in lending

Feeney his police holster, the defendant intended that the

holster would be used with one of Feeney's guns so as to

impersonate an officer and intimidate the victim. See

Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 126 (2013) (presence of

gun may imply intent to frighten and deter); Commonwealth v.

Stout, 356 Mass. 237, 240 (1969) ("One does not transmit guns to

others without some purpose in mind . . .").

In the context of the offense of kidnapping, we have

interpreted the term "confinement" to mean "[a]ny restraint of a

person's liberty." Commonwealth v. Witkowski, 487 Mass. 675,

682 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Dykens, 438 Mass. 827, 841

(2003). See Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 548 (2017)

(confinement is "broadly interpreted to mean any restraint of a

person's movement" [citation omitted]). Handcuffs are "one of

the most recognizable indicia of a traditional arrest." See 21

United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1998).

See also Fisher v. Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888, 897 (10th Cir.

2009). "Common sense and experience teach that it is a normal

and regular as well as a highly desirable and necessary practice

to handcuff prisoners when they are being taken from one place

to another" (quotation and citation omitted). See E.W. v.

Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 193 (4th Cir. 2018) (Shedd, J.,

concurring). While not indisputable, the jury's inferences here

were rational. Our review is limited to determining whether the

loan of the handcuffs, taken together with the badge, the

holster, and the victim's BOP records and driver's license

information, provided sufficient evidence to support a finding

that the defendant intended the handcuffs be used to confine

another. See Winding v. State, 908 So. 2d 163, 171 (Miss. Ct.

App. 2005) (evidence of handcuffs was probative of testimony

that defendant masqueraded as police officer in order to

kidnap). We conclude that it did.

The defendant lent the police equipment to Feeney within a

few months of the victim's attempted break-in of Feeney's

vehicle and less than one month after the defendant's having

obtained the victim's BOP records. Moreover, the defendant lent

Feeney the police equipment soon after Feeney gave him free

Percocet pills. Where Feeney said that he "just want[ed] to use

[the items]," the jury reasonably could have concluded, from the 22

nature of the police equipment and Feeney's demonstrated

hostility to the victim, that the defendant provided those items

with a willingness that Feeney use them to restrain, unlawfully

and with force, a person he was targeting (as indicated by the

request for the victim's BOP and RMV records). See Commonwealth

v. Noble, 417 Mass. 341, 346 (1994) (circumstantial evidence was

sufficient to show that defendant knew of perpetrator's intent

to seek revenge against victim, and aided perpetrator's plan by

providing disguise).

We have limited the drawing of inferences concerning a

defendant's knowledge of a codefendant's knowledge and intent,

based on the nature of certain objects, to a narrow set of

circumstances. For instance, we have concluded that a jury

reasonably could have drawn an inference that a defendant knew

that a coventurer was armed, because the victim was a known drug

dealer who kept an unlicensed gun on the premises. See

Commonwealth v. Cannon, 449 Mass. 462, 470-471 (2007). We have

affirmed a conviction that rested on a conclusion that a

defendant intended a robbery, and did not simply purchase

illegal drugs, where the defendant proposed a plan for the

robbery and provided his codefendant with a gun. See

Commonwealth v. Benitez, 464 Mass. 686, 690 (2013).

Not infrequently, we have concluded that the evidence was

sufficient to sustain a conviction where the jury found that a 23

defendant intended to distribute illegal drugs, because the

drugs were present on the defendant's person, as were

significant amounts of cash, baggies, and multiple cell phones.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 452 Mass. 142, 147-149

(2008). We also have concluded that the provision of

accelerants, such as gasoline, in conjunction with other

evidence, may permit an inference that a defendant had the

requisite intent to commit arson. See Commonwealth v. Dung Van

Tran, 463 Mass. 8, 27 (2012) (evidence that defendant carried

can of gasoline into apartment, poured it on floor, and then

ignited it supported inference of intent to burn apartment);

Choy v. Commonwealth, 456 Mass. 146, 150 (2010) (gasoline on

defendant's sweatpants supported finding that fire was

intentionally set). By extension, the jury reasonably could

have drawn such an inference here, given the specific crime of

kidnapping, the defendant's knowledge of Feeney's hostility

toward the victim, and the combination of the particular items

provided by the defendant.

"There is a presumption that all men intend the natural and

probable consequences of their acts." Commonwealth v.

Asherowski, 196 Mass. 342, 348 (1907). While not the only

reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from this evidence,

the jury could have found the existence of a tacit understanding

on the part of the defendant that he was providing the requested 24

items to Feeney with the contingent intent that they be used as

Feeney saw fit, and that the defendant did so in order to

maintain access to Feeney's supply of Percocet pills. "The line

that separates mere knowledge of unlawful conduct and

participation in it, is 'often vague and uncertain. It is

within the province of the jury to determine from the evidence

whether a particular defendant [has] crossed that line.'"

Commonwealth v. Longo, 402 Mass. 482, 487 (1988), quoting

Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 387 Mass. 280, 287 (1982). See

Richards, 363 Mass. at 308. In determining whether the evidence

was sufficient to show that the defendant harbored such a

contingent intent, we do not reweigh the evidence in order to

decide whether the determination that the jury reached is

correct. Rather, after considering the evidence and the

inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, we decide only whether the jury made a

rational decision based on the evidence before them. See

Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677-678.

b. Jury instructions. The defendant also contends that

several of the judge's instructions on the elements of the

offense were erroneous and require a new trial.

i. Instruction on element of participation. The defendant

argues that the judge erred in describing "assistance," "aid,"

and "encouragement" as relevant conduct for the charge of 25

accessory before the fact. This alleged error improperly

expanded the scope of the crime to include acts that are

encompassed only in the crime of aiding and abetting, for which

the defendant was not indicted. The defendant also maintains

that the improper instruction allowed the jury to find guilt

without finding the required element of knowing participation.

The defendant submitted proposed jury instructions,

including the following proposed language on the element of

participation:

"To prove the defendant guilty of being an accessory before the fact to a felony, the Commonwealth must prove three things beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . Second: That the defendant was an accessory to that felony by counseling, hiring, or otherwise procuring that person to commit the felony . . . . [T]he Commonwealth must prove that this defendant participated in . . . committing the offense by counseling, hiring, or otherwise procuring the principal, or agreeing to stand by, at or near the scene to render aid, assistance and encouragement. . . . A conviction as an accessory before the fact requires not only knowledge of the crime and a shared intent to bring it about, but also some sort of act that contributes to its happening."

The portion of the judge's instruction on participation that the

defendant contested stated:

"To prove that [the defendant] is guilty of the crime of accessory before the fact to kidnapping, the Commonwealth must prove three things beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Second, that [the defendant] in some way assisted in that felony by hiring or procuring it to be committed or by providing counseling, assistance, aid of some sort or encouragement before the felony was actually committed. Third, that [the defendant] not only had knowledge of the crime, but shared [Feeney's] intent to bring it about." 26

Because the defendant objected, we review for prejudicial

error. See Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 490 Mass. 733, 742 (2022).

Thus, we analyze, first, whether there was error, and second, if

so, whether the defendant was prejudiced by the error. Id.,

citing Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005). "An

error is not prejudicial if it did not influence the jury, or

had but very slight effect; however, if we cannot find with fair

assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping

the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not

substantiality swayed by the error, then it is prejudicial."

Teixeira, supra, quoting Cruz, supra.

In Marshall, 463 Mass. at 535, quoting Zanetti, 454 Mass.

at 464, we held that the two prongs established under G. L.

c. 274, § 2,5 are a "false distinction[]," and instead endorsed a

long-standing "unified theory of joint venture liability."

Marshall, supra at 537 n.12. As the language of the instruction

set forth in Zanetti recognizes, "a wide range of conduct

underlying a person's liability for a criminal offense,

including that which had historically been described as

accessory before the fact to a felony or aiding and abetting a

5 As stated, G. L. c. 274, § 2, provides that "[w]hoever aids in the commission of a felony, or is accessory thereto before the fact by counselling, hiring or otherwise procuring such felony to be committed, shall be punished in the manner provided for the punishment of the principal felon." 27

felony, plainly falls under the rubric of accomplice liability."

Marshall, supra at 536-537.

Thus, the actions of one who "aids" in the commission of an

offense and the actions of "accessories before the fact" do not

constitute "separate and distinct offenses," Commonwealth v.

Rodriguez, 457 Mass. 461, 485 (2010), but, rather, represent

different routes to a determination of criminal liability for a

defendant who knowingly participates in a crime, see Marshall,

463 Mass. at 535 ("prosecut[ing] on a theory of aiding and

abetting . . . is not a lesser included offense of accessory

before the fact . . . . Rather, the two are different species

of the same crime"). The types of conduct specified in G. L.

c. 274, § 2 -- "aid[ing] in the commission of a felony" or

"counselling, hiring or otherwise procuring such felony to be

committed" -- represent equal and interchangeable grounds for

criminal liability to the extent that such actions constitute

"knowing participation," Marshall, supra, that is "significant,"

Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 424 Mass. 853, 856 (1997), quoting

Commonwealth v. Raposo, 413 Mass. 182, 185 (1992).

Given our continued endorsement of a unified theory of

joint venture liability, the judge did not err in referring to

the provision of "assistance," "aid," and "encouragement" as

relevant conduct to establish the offense of being an accessory

before the fact. The "practical framework" of our doctrine of 28

accomplice liability is "grounded in its 'essential elements' of

knowing participation and shared criminal intent." Marshall,

463 Mass. at 535, quoting Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 467. Although

the defendant is correct that "aid[ing]" is a different act from

"procuring" or "counselling," the jury would have found the

defendant to bear the same criminal liability if the defendant

undertook any of these actions. In its entirety, the judge's

instruction adequately conveyed that the defendant had to have

been a knowing participant in Feeney's crimes. There was no

error in the judge's decision not to adopt the requested

instruction, as "judges are not required to deliver their

instructions in any particular form of words" (citation

omitted). See Commonwealth v. Howard, 479 Mass. 52, 61 (2018).

ii. Instructions on elements of knowledge and intent. The

defendant also argues that the judge did not instruct adequately

on the elements of knowledge and intent in the offense of

accessory before the fact to kidnapping. The defendant

submitted requested instructions on these elements, but the

judge declined to use the specific requested language.

As an initial matter, while the defendant asserts that he

objected to the judge's instructions on these elements, the

transcripts do not support this contention. The instruction the

defendant proposed described knowledge and intent as one

element: 29

"Thirdly, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant had the same intent that the principal person is required to have had to be found guilty. The defendant must not only have had knowledge of what was being planned; he must have intended to be part of it."

In raising the issue immediately prior to the jury charge,

defense counsel maintained that "a conviction as an accessory

before the fact requires not only . . . knowledge of the crime

and a shared intent to bring it about but also some sort of act

that constitutes it's happening and [a] non-present joint

venturer must intentionally encourage or assist in the

commission of a crime." In support, counsel pointed to

Commonwealth v. Reveron, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 357 (2009). As

the defendant asserts, the instructions that the judge

ultimately provided used "different language" from what the

defendant had requested. Nonetheless, the proposed language was

substantially similar to the language the judge used. And,

importantly, the defendant's objection at trial did not concern

the adequacy of the judge's instructions on knowledge and

intent. Accordingly, we review for a substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 487 Mass.

602, 611 (2021). A substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice

exists if we have serious doubt whether the result of the trial

might have been different had the error not been made. Id. at

612, citing Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002),

S.C., 444 Mass. 72 (2005). 30

The defendant asserts that there were several errors in the

instructions on knowledge and intent. First, the defendant

argues that the judge's instructions gave rise to a substantial

risk of a miscarriage of justice because the judge did not

provide explicit instructions on the element of knowledge, as

required by Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 464, 467.

The judge instructed on the element of knowledge as

follows:

"[T]o prove that [the defendant] is guilty of the crime of accessory before the fact to kidnapping, the Commonwealth must prove three things beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Third, that [the defendant] not only had knowledge of the crime, but shared [Feeney's] intent to bring it about."

Shortly thereafter, the judge substantially repeated this

instruction when he explained, "Now, I said the third thing that

the Commonwealth must show is that [the defendant] not only had

knowledge of the crime but shared [Feeney's] intent to bring it

about." At that point, the judge did not give any further

explanation on the element of knowledge.

During deliberations, the jury asked the judge to clarify

the element of knowledge "in layman's language." After

conferring with counsel, the judge informed the jury:

"'Knowledge' and 'Intent' are two separate requirements. Knowledge is an awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance. In this case, the Commonwealth is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] knew, at the time he provided assistance to Feeney, [if you find that he did] that he had knowledge that Feeney intended a kidnapping. The Commonwealth is not required to 31

prove that Feeney told [the defendant] what his intentions were, but it is required to prove that [the defendant] understood that Feeney intended a kidnapping. Knowledge can be proven by direct evidence, or circumstantial evidence. As with intent, you may, but are not required, to determine the defendant's knowledge from his conduct, including any statement or act committed or omitted, and the reasonable inferences you may draw from them. You should consider all of the surrounding facts and circumstances, and weigh them in light of your common knowledge and experience, in order to determine whether or not to draw the inference that [the defendant] knew that [Feeney] intended a kidnapping."

Although the judge's initial instruction on knowledge was

brief, it adequately conveyed the critical information. As

discussed, to support a finding of joint venture criminal

liability, a defendant must "knowingly participate[]" in the

underlying offense. See Marshall, 463 Mass. at 535, quoting

Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 468. The judge's initial instruction

adequately conveyed this concept by explaining that the

Commonwealth had to prove that the defendant "had knowledge of

the crime," thus amounting to "knowing participation."

Moreover, the judge thereafter clarified his initial instruction

by distinguishing the element of knowledge from intent and

defining knowledge as "an awareness or understanding of a fact

or circumstance." See Ortiz, 487 Mass. at 612 (we consider

instructions "as a whole in the context of the totality of the

evidence and interpret the instructions as would a reasonable

juror" [quotations and citations omitted]). Although the

defendant maintains that the judge should have provided more 32

detailed guidance or examples of participation, the judge was

not required to do so.6 And, as stated, there was no error in

the judge's decision not to use the precise language the

defendant suggested, as we do not require a judge to use any

particular language, even if so requested by a defendant.

Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 697 (2015).

The defendant also argues that the judge improperly

referenced "trickery," with respect to kidnapping by trickery,

in describing the underlying crime that the jury were required

to find before the defendant could be convicted of being an

accessary before the fact to that offense. Because kidnapping

by trickery is a specific intent crime, and not a general intent

crime like kidnapping, the defendant contends that the

instruction likely confused the jury.

The judge first described the elements of kidnapping with

respect to the charges against Feeney. In order to convict the

defendant of being an accessory, he then explained, the jury

first would have to find that Feeney committed the underlying

offense of kidnapping. When instructing on the second element

6 The defendant asserts that the judge was required to instruct that the Commonwealth had to prove that the defendant knew there was a "substantial likelihood that [Feeney] would [kidnap the victim]." See Kilburn, 426 Mass. at 34, citing Commonwealth v. Walsh, 407 Mass. 740, 743 (1990). Such an instruction would have been an incorrect statement of law and would have reduced the Commonwealth's burden of proof from knowing participation. 33

of kidnapping, i.e., that the Commonwealth was required to prove

that Feeney forcibly seized and confined the victim, the judge

explained, "Against the alleged victim's will means without the

alleged victim's consent. Consent must be voluntary. If an

alleged victim is tricked into submitting to a defendant by a

pretense of lawful authority[,] that is not consent." The

defendant did not object to the language the judge employed.

Rather, the defendant offered to stipulate that a kidnapping had

taken place and suggested that the judge omit the detailed

instruction concerning the elements of kidnapping that the

Commonwealth was required to prove.

The judge properly instructed the jury that the

Commonwealth had to show that the defendant "shared [Feeney's]

intent to bring [the kidnapping] about. The intent to commit

kidnapping is the intent to confine or imprison another person

against his will." The defendant repeatedly offered to concede

that a kidnapping had occurred, in his opening statement, his

motion for a required finding, and in the final charge

conference. The evidence that the victim had been kidnapped was

overwhelming; while the reference to trickery was not required,

the entirety of the charge accurately conveyed what the jury had

to find concerning the defendant's intent. To the extent that

the jury misinterpreted the type of intent they were required to

find for the crime with which the defendant had been charged, 34

the reference to kidnapping by trickery would not have created a

substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, as the specific

intent of kidnapping by trickery requires a standard of intent

with a higher burden than the general intent to kidnap. See

Commonwealth v. Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. 110, 128-130, cert. denied,

140 S. Ct. 498 (2019) (jury instruction on specific intent was

error, but it skewed in favor of defendant).

The defendant also maintains that, in instructing on

contingent intent, the judge impermissibly reduced the

Commonwealth's burden to prove the element of intent beyond a

reasonable doubt. In his final charge, the judge told the jury

that the intent to commit kidnapping is the intent to confine or

imprison another person against the individual's will and that

this requirement is satisfied "even if the purpose to kidnap in

[the defendant's] mind was simply a conditional or contingent

one, a willingness to see the kidnapping take place should it

become necessary."

This instruction did not give rise to a substantial risk of

a miscarriage of justice. It was an accurate statement of law

and applicable to the case at hand. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 312 (2013), quoting Richards, 363 Mass.

at 308 (in accessory before fact prosecution, "it would suffice

if the purpose [to the crime] . . . in the mind of the accessory

was a conditional or contingent one, a willingness to see [a 35

crime] take place should it become necessary"). See also

Commonwealth v. Brea, 488 Mass. 150, 167 (2021). Contingent

intent is not limited to situations where the underlying crime

identified in the indictment differs from the original criminal

plan, as the defendant suggests.

As stated, in reviewing a judge's instruction for error, we

review the final charge as a whole, in the context of the

totality of the instructions given, and interpret the

instructions as would a reasonable juror. See Ortiz, 487 Mass.

at 612; Conners v. Northeast Hosp. Corp., 439 Mass. 469, 481

(2003). Trial judges have considerable discretion in framing

jury instructions, both in determining the precise language to

be used and in the appropriate degree of elaboration. See

Ortiz, supra. "The adequacy of instructions must be determined

in light of their over-all impact on the jury." Id., quoting

Commonwealth v. Blanchett, 409 Mass. 99, 103 (1991). Given that

the instruction adequately conveyed to the jury the requisite

legal components of the three elements of the offense with which

the defendant was charged, we discern no error in the judge's

instructions.

c. Exclusion of defendant's statements. The defendant

argues that the judge abused his discretion in excluding certain

of the defendant's statements to Tobin and Mattaliano. The

defendant was interviewed by Tobin and Mattaliano on July 24, 36

2014, immediately prior to his grand jury testimony concerning

the victim's disappearance. The defendant was interviewed again

on August 6, 2014, after a warrant for his arrest had been

issued. Before both interviews, the defendant was read the

Miranda warnings and signed a Miranda waiver form.

During the August 6 conversation, the defendant told Tobin,

"If I knew they were gonna do somethin' like this, I, I wouldn't

have done all that, obviously." Mattaliano then asked, "Well,

what did you think was gonna happen when you gave [the police

equipment] to [Feeney]?" to which the defendant answered:

"I, I don't know, if this guy's gonna play a joke on his buddy or what, what, how he got it out of me, you know. I, I didn't think [Feeney] was gonna kidnap a guy. I really didn't. . . . I swear to God I had no idea he was gonna kidnap, no idea."

Later, Mattaliano again asked the defendant, "[W]hat did you

think [Feeney] was using everything for?" The defendant

responded, "I don't know. . . . I thought he was playin' a joke

on a friend of his or something like that."7

The Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to exclude the

entirety of the defendant's August 6 interview as hearsay. At a

hearing on the motion, the discussion focused on whether the

August 6 statements were admissible under the doctrine of verbal

7 The record contains no audio or video recording of either the July 24 interview or the August 6 interview. See Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 425 (2004). 37

completeness. See Mass. G. Evid. § 106 (2022). Citing Mass. G.

Evid. § 106, the judge allowed the motion. At trial, Tobin

testified that, in the July 24 interview, he asked the defendant

what he believed Feeney was going to do with the items and the

defendant responded that he "didn't want to know." The

defendant impeached Tobin with his police report memorializing

the interview, which did not indicate that the defendant had

made such a statement. The defendant also attempted to impeach

Tobin with the August 6 statements; the defendant argued that,

through his testimony, Tobin had opened the door to their

admission. The judge did not agree that Tobin's testimony had

opened the door and again ruled that the statements were

inadmissible.

On appeal, the defendant maintains that the statements

should have been admitted. He contends that the statements were

not hearsay but, rather, were probative of the defendant's state

of mind and intent. Alternatively, the defendant argues that

the statements should have been admissible under the doctrine of

verbal completeness. The defendant also argues that the judge

should have permitted introduction of the statements in order

for the defendant to impeach Tobin once Tobin opened the door to

the topic of the defendant's knowledge of the use Feeney would

make of the items. 38

We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the

decision to exclude these statements. See Commonwealth v.

Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 414 (2020). "[A] defendant's statement,

when offered by the defendant to prove the truth of the

statement's contents, is inadmissible hearsay." Commonwealth v.

Eugene, 438 Mass. 343, 350 (2003). An out-of-court statement

may be admissible as nonhearsay if it is relevant to show the

speaker's state of mind in a manner separate and apart from the

truth of the statement. See Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460

Mass. 535, 550-551 (2011); Mass. G. Evid. § 801 note. However,

"[w]here the declarant asserts his or her own state of mind

(usually by words describing the state of mind), the statement

is hearsay and is admissible only if it falls within the [then-

existing state of mind] hearsay exception." Commonwealth v. Yat

Fung Ng, 491 Mass. 247, 259 (2023), quoting Mass. G. Evid. § 801

note, Evidence Admitted for Nonhearsay Purpose.

Here, the defendant's August 6 statements were not

admissible as nonhearsay state of mind. Those statements

directly described the defendant's state of mind, i.e., that at

the time the defendant provided the items to Feeney, he did not

know for what purpose Feeney would use them. As such, the

statements were hearsay. See Yat Fung Ng, 491 Mass. at 259.

Nor did the August 6 statements qualify under the state of

mind exception to the hearsay rule. Statements "purporting to 39

explain past conduct" are not admissible under this exception.

See id. at 260, quoting Commonwealth v. Bianchi, 435 Mass. 316,

327 (2001); Mass. G. Evid. § 803(3)(B)(ii). The August 6

statements sought to explain the defendant's prior actions,

i.e., why he gave the items to Feeney. "Statements of memory or

belief to prove the fact remembered or believed do not fall

within this exception." Mass. G. Evid. § 803(3)(B)(ii). As

such, the August 6 statements were properly excluded here.

Nor were the statements admissible under the doctrine of

verbal completeness. Under that doctrine, when a party

introduces a portion of a statement, "a judge has discretion to

allow admission of other relevant portions of the same statement

or writing which serve to clarify the context of the admitted

portion." Commonwealth v. Amaral, 482 Mass. 496, 503-504

(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 246

(2014). For a statement to be admissible under this doctrine,

an adverse party must show that the additional statements

concern the same subject as the admitted statement, are part of

the same conversation, and are necessary to the understanding of

the admitted statement. Amaral, supra at 504, quoting Crayton,

supra at 247. To be admissible, "[t]he proffered statement must

meet each component of the doctrine of verbal completeness."

Amaral, supra. 40

The defendant's August 6 statements were not part of the

"same conversation" as those on July 24. The two conversations

were "temporally separate." See Commonwealth v. Steeves, 490

Mass. 270, 278 (2022) (statements approximately two hours apart

were sufficiently distinct so as not to form part of same

conversation). The August 6 conversation took place after a

warrant had been issued for the defendant's arrest. This change

of circumstances further bifurcated the August interview from

the one in July. When speaking to Tobin and Mattaliano on

August 6, the defendant thought that he "already [had]" spoken

to them and wanted to know if there were additional subjects to

discuss.8 Because the proffered statement was not part of the

same conversation as the admitted statement, the judge did not

abuse his discretion by ordering it excluded.

Finally, the judge did not abuse his discretion in

concluding that Tobin's testimony at trial did not open the door

to the admission of the defendant's August 6 statements. An

out-of-court statement introduced to impeach a witness, and not

to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is not hearsay. See

8 The cases that the defendant cites in support of the admissibility of the statement on the doctrine of verbal completeness are inapposite. See Commonwealth v. Condon, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 27, 36 (2020) (considering text messages sent throughout one day); Commonwealth v. Gilman, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 752, 759-760 & n.9 (2016) (defendant did not claim that admitted social media messages were so misleading as to implicate doctrine of verbal completeness). 41

Commonwealth v. Denson, 489 Mass. 138, 149 (2022), citing

Commonwealth v. Niemic, 483 Mass. 571, 581 (2019). A trial

judge has discretion to determine the scope of cross-

examination, including the value, if any, of prior inconsistent

statements offered to impeach a witness. See Commonwealth v.

Caruso, 476 Mass. 275, 296 (2017). Where impeachment evidence

is cumulative, courts generally reject the argument that the

evidence is material, so long as the defendant had adequate

opportunity to impeach the witness by other means. See

Commonwealth v. Holbrook, 482 Mass. 596, 610-611 (2019), citing

Commonwealth v. Fuller, 394 Mass. 251, 264 (1985), S.C., 419

Mass. 1002 (1994).

Tobin testified that, on July 24, the defendant told him

that the defendant "didn't want to know what" Feeney's purposes

were in requesting the loan of the police equipment. The

defendant impeached this testimony by questioning Tobin about

his written report, which did not contain the defendant's

statement that he "didn't want to know." Evidence of the

defendant's later, contradictory statement on August 6 thus

would not have impeached Tobin's earlier testimony. There was

no abuse of discretion in the judge's determination that the

August 6 statements were not pertinent for impeachment purposes

and that the defendant instead was attempting to introduce them

for the impermissible purpose of their purported truth. 42

3. Conclusion. We affirm the defendant's conviction and

the order denying his motion for postconviction relief.

So ordered.