Commonwealth v. Ruben M. Corporan.

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedMarch 12, 2025
Docket23-P-1443
StatusUnpublished

This text of Commonwealth v. Ruben M. Corporan. (Commonwealth v. Ruben M. Corporan.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Ruben M. Corporan., (Mass. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1443

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

RUBEN M. CORPORAN.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a bench trial in the District Court, the

defendant was found guilty of negligent operation of a motor

vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). 1 The sole

issue on appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, as we must under Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378

Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), we conclude that the Commonwealth met

its burden of proof and affirm the conviction.

1The defendant was found not guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and not responsible for a marked lane violation and driving at a speed exceeding the speed limit. At around midnight on July 24, 2018, Weymouth police

officer, Joseph Sgambato, was in his cruiser observing traffic

from a parking lot at the intersection of Bridge Street and

Johnson Road when the defendant drove past him "at a very high

rate of speed." Officer Sgambato followed the car a short

distance and, based on his own speed, estimated the defendant

was driving at ninety miles per hour. At one point, the

defendant crossed over the road's double yellow line. Officer

Sgambato activated his blue lights and the defendant pulled over

into a nearby parking lot. Officer Sgambato approached the

defendant, who was sitting in the driver's seat and detected a

"strong odor" of alcohol. When asked to produce his license and

registration, the defendant was unable to do so. The defendant

"acknowledged that he was going very fast," and answered "[y]es"

when asked if he had anything to drink that night. There were

two passengers in the car, neither of whom has any interaction

with Officer Sgambato.

Discussion. To sustain its burden of proving negligent

operation of a motor vehicle, the Commonwealth must prove,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant "(1) operated a

motor vehicle, (2) on a public way, and (3) negligently, so that

the lives or safety of the public might be endangered."

Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 369 (2019).

The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's

2 evidence as to the third element only. He claims that because

he did not cause an accident, collision, or injury, the fact

that he was speeding or had consumed alcohol is inconsequential.

The defendant's argument is based on a misunderstanding of

the law. "The question is whether the defendant's driving had

the potential to cause danger to the public, not whether it

actually did." Commonwealth v. Sousa, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 47, 51

(2015). Thus, it matters not, as the defendant asserts, that

his speeding or drinking did not cause any harm. Nor was the

Commonwealth's evidence rendered insufficient due to the fact

that "the streets were devoid of people and traffic."

Here, evidence of speeding and crossing over a double yellow

line combined with evidence that the defendant had consumed

alcohol was sufficient to establish that the defendant's driving

had the potential to cause danger. This conclusion is bolstered

by the fact that there were two passengers in the defendant's

car.

3 See Commonwealth v. Kaplan, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 540, 544 (2020)

("public" may include persons inside car); Commonwealth v. Ross,

92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 380-381 (2017). Accordingly, the

Commonwealth met its burden of proving the defendant's guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono, Brennan & D'Angelo, JJ. 2),

Clerk

Entered: March 12, 2025.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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Related

Commonwealth v. Latimore
393 N.E.2d 370 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1979)
Commonwealth v. Sousa
88 Mass. App. Ct. 47 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2015)
Chace v. Curran
881 N.E.2d 792 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2008)
Commonwealth v. Teixeira
125 N.E.3d 80 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2019)

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Commonwealth v. Ruben M. Corporan., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-ruben-m-corporan-massappct-2025.