Commonwealth v. Ruben M. Corporan.
This text of Commonwealth v. Ruben M. Corporan. (Commonwealth v. Ruben M. Corporan.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-1443
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
RUBEN M. CORPORAN.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a bench trial in the District Court, the
defendant was found guilty of negligent operation of a motor
vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). 1 The sole
issue on appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, as we must under Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378
Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), we conclude that the Commonwealth met
its burden of proof and affirm the conviction.
1The defendant was found not guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and not responsible for a marked lane violation and driving at a speed exceeding the speed limit. At around midnight on July 24, 2018, Weymouth police
officer, Joseph Sgambato, was in his cruiser observing traffic
from a parking lot at the intersection of Bridge Street and
Johnson Road when the defendant drove past him "at a very high
rate of speed." Officer Sgambato followed the car a short
distance and, based on his own speed, estimated the defendant
was driving at ninety miles per hour. At one point, the
defendant crossed over the road's double yellow line. Officer
Sgambato activated his blue lights and the defendant pulled over
into a nearby parking lot. Officer Sgambato approached the
defendant, who was sitting in the driver's seat and detected a
"strong odor" of alcohol. When asked to produce his license and
registration, the defendant was unable to do so. The defendant
"acknowledged that he was going very fast," and answered "[y]es"
when asked if he had anything to drink that night. There were
two passengers in the car, neither of whom has any interaction
with Officer Sgambato.
Discussion. To sustain its burden of proving negligent
operation of a motor vehicle, the Commonwealth must prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant "(1) operated a
motor vehicle, (2) on a public way, and (3) negligently, so that
the lives or safety of the public might be endangered."
Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 369 (2019).
The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's
2 evidence as to the third element only. He claims that because
he did not cause an accident, collision, or injury, the fact
that he was speeding or had consumed alcohol is inconsequential.
The defendant's argument is based on a misunderstanding of
the law. "The question is whether the defendant's driving had
the potential to cause danger to the public, not whether it
actually did." Commonwealth v. Sousa, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 47, 51
(2015). Thus, it matters not, as the defendant asserts, that
his speeding or drinking did not cause any harm. Nor was the
Commonwealth's evidence rendered insufficient due to the fact
that "the streets were devoid of people and traffic."
Here, evidence of speeding and crossing over a double yellow
line combined with evidence that the defendant had consumed
alcohol was sufficient to establish that the defendant's driving
had the potential to cause danger. This conclusion is bolstered
by the fact that there were two passengers in the defendant's
car.
3 See Commonwealth v. Kaplan, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 540, 544 (2020)
("public" may include persons inside car); Commonwealth v. Ross,
92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 380-381 (2017). Accordingly, the
Commonwealth met its burden of proving the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Brennan & D'Angelo, JJ. 2),
Clerk
Entered: March 12, 2025.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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