Commonwealth v. Robinson Soto.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: January 31, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-0579
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-579

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ROBINSON SOTO.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a bench trial in Superior Court, the judge found

the defendant, Robinson Soto, guilty of three counts of indecent

assault and battery on a child under fourteen, G. L. c. 265,

§ 13B. The defendant argues that he was materially prejudiced

by certain unobjected-to testimony at trial. We affirm.

1. Testimony of K.R. In a pretrial motion in limine, the

Commonwealth stated that it expected one of the victims, K.R.,

to testify that the first person she told about the alleged

sexual abuse was her older sister, A.R. The defendant did not

object to the Commonwealth's motion, and it was allowed. At

trial, however, K.R. appeared to testify that she first told her

mother about the assault, her mother "kind of didn't believe" her, and "then" K.R. told A.R about it. Although the

Commonwealth asserts that "a fair reading" of K.R.'s testimony

is that she told her mother that the defendant had asked K.R. to

kiss him in exchange for ice cream, not about the defendant's

sexual assault, K.R. gave this testimony immediately after

recounting the details of the assault. Neither party sought to

clarify K.R.'s testimony on this point, and the defendant did

not object to the testimony or note any inconsistency with the

Commonwealth's motion in limine.

The first complaint doctrine "permits a judge to admit

testimony from the recipient of a complainant's initial report

of sexual assault." Commonwealth v. Rivera, 83 Mass. App. Ct.

581, 583 (2013), citing Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217,

218-219 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006). Unlike its

predecessor, the "fresh complaint" doctrine, first complaint

evidence has stricter limitations. Specifically, "we 'no longer

permit in evidence testimony from multiple complaint witnesses,

limiting the testimony to that of one witness' who, where

feasible, will be the first person told of the assault."

Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 67-68 (2011), quoting

King, supra at 242-243.

In the present case, to the extent that K.R. was understood

to have testified that she reported the defendant's assault to

2 both her mother and older sister, the admission of that

testimony was arguably inconsistent with the limitations on

first complaint testimony discussed supra. Because the

defendant did not object to this testimony, we review to

determine whether this potential error created a substantial

risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Almele,

474 Mass. 1017, 1019 (2016). That question turns on whether we

have "a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have

been different had the error not been made." Commonwealth v.

LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 174 (1999). We have no such doubt here.

K.R.'s testimony about what she told her mother was brief and,

as discussed, ambiguous. The defendant's contention that the

testimony was prejudicial because it "unfairly bolstered

[K.R.'s] credibility" is undermined by the fact that, according

to K.R. herself, her mother did not initially believe her.

Finally, in a bench trial, we presume that the judge "correctly

instructed [herself] on the law of evidence" (quotation

omitted). Commonwealth v. Sepheus, 468 Mass. 160, 170 (2014).

2. Testimony of Detective Lagoa. The defendant also

contends that the testimony of Boston police Detective Darlene

Lagoa was unfairly prejudicial and "improper backdoor first

complaint testimony." We disagree. "While the first complaint

doctrine prohibits piling on of additional complaint witnesses,

3 it does not exclude testimony that is otherwise independently

admissible and serves a purpose other than to repeat the fact of

a complaint and thereby corroborate the complainant's

accusations" (quotations omitted). Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 478

Mass. 804, 814 (2018). On direct examination, Lagoa testified

that she went to the hospital to speak to the two victims,

attended a sexual assault intervention network interview, and

took photographs of the victims' house for introduction in

evidence at trial. This testimony was limited in scope and did

not reiterate any accusations, enhance the victims' credibility,

or otherwise amount to the "piling on of additional complaint

witnesses" (quotation omitted). Id. Lagoa addressed the

substance of the victims' complaints and details of the police

investigation only in response to defense counsel's questions on

cross-examination.

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Neyman, Grant & Toone, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: January 31, 2025.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.