NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-1424
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
ROBERT BLANCHETTE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After the defendant, Robert Blanchette, was charged with
carrying a loaded firearm without a license, he moved to
suppress evidence seized from the vehicle that he was driving at
the time of his arrest. The defendant argued that the search of
his car was unlawful because police officers failed to follow
the inventory policy. After an evidentiary hearing, a judge of
the District Court denied the motion to suppress. The defendant
also filed a separate motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds,
which was also denied.1 Thereafter, the defendant entered into a
1The defendant also filed a motion for reconsideration of his motion to suppress and motion to dismiss. A hearing was held, and the motion was denied. The defendant did not appeal from the motion for reconsideration and it is not before us. conditional plea agreement, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P.
12 (b) (6), as appearing in 482 Mass. 1501 (2019), pleading
guilty to possession of a loaded firearm without a firearm
identification (FID) card, in violation of G. L. c. 269,
§ 10 (n), and carrying a firearm without a FID card in violation
of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), while reserving his right to appeal
from the denial of both his motion to suppress and his motion to
dismiss.
Background. We summarize the facts as they could have been
found by the judge after an evidentiary hearing on the motion to
suppress, reserving certain facts for later discussion. See
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 344 (2025).
On December 16, 2021, at approximately 10:00 A.M., a
Haverhill police officer pulled over the defendant after
receiving a "be on the lookout" (BOLO) for the defendant in
response to a reported incident of domestic violence. The BOLO,
which had been issued approximately thirty minutes prior to the
stop, named the defendant, described the model and registration
of the vehicle he was likely driving, and stated that there was
probable cause to arrest the defendant. It also warned that the
defendant likely had a firearm in the vehicle. Once backup
officers arrived, they approached the vehicle with weapons drawn
out of concern for their safety. The defendant, who was seated
2 in the driver's seat, was ordered out of the vehicle, pat
frisked, and placed under arrest for domestic assault and
battery. During the patfrisk, keys were seized from the
defendant's pocket. The passenger of the vehicle was also
removed and placed under arrest after police learned that he had
outstanding warrants.
Because the vehicle was partially blocking a busy road with
no driver available, police decided to have it towed and,
pursuant to the Haverhill police vehicle inventory policy
(inventory policy), conducted a search of the vehicle. During
the inventory search, a police officer used a key seized from
the defendant's pocket to unlock and open the glove box where he
located a loaded firearm.
After the testimony was completed, the motion judge
provided detailed oral findings of fact on the record,
concluding that the stop of the defendant's car was consistent
with the information provided in the BOLO, that the defendant
was lawfully arrested for a charge of domestic violence, and
that his passenger was also arrested on outstanding warrants.
The judge found that the defendant's car was partially blocking
the roadway, and that the officers acted lawfully when, before
having it towed, they inventoried the defendant's vehicle and
discovered a loaded firearm in the locked glovebox. In a
3 separate ruling, the motion judge denied the defendant's motion
to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial.
Discussion. 1. Motion to Suppress. "In reviewing a
decision on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's
subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error but conduct an
independent review of his [or her] ultimate findings and
conclusions of law" (quotation and citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Goncalves-Mendez, 484 Mass. 80, 83 (2020).
a. The stop of the defendant's vehicle and the seizure of
the defendant's keys. First, the defendant argues that, when
the officers approached his vehicle with guns drawn, they used a
degree of force disproportionate to the circumstances
precipitating his arrest. We are not persuaded. "[A]n approach
with drawn guns is generally thought excessive in the absence of
any suggestion that the defendant is armed or other
circumstances suggesting the possibility of violence."
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 792, 795 (2018),
quoting Commonwealth v. Fitzgibbons, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 301, 308
(1986). Here, the officers were responding to a report of
domestic violence and were made aware that the defendant was
believed to be carrying a firearm. Given that the police
suspected the defendant of committing a violent crime less than
an hour before the stop, and that they were aware that the
4 defendant was likely carrying a firearm, the circumstances
justified their approach of the defendant's vehicle with guns
drawn.
Second, the defendant argues that the judge erred in
finding that the seizure of the keys located during the patfrisk
was lawful. Pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 1, a search incident to
arrest can be made for the purpose of removing any weapon an
arrested person might use to resist arrest or to escape. The
defendant does not challenge that probable cause existed to
place him under arrest. Rather, he contends that the judge
committed clear error because the key fob found on his person
was not a potential weapon. A review of the motion hearing
transcript does not support the defendant's contention. Here,
the officer testified that a key or a set of keys were seized
from the defendant. There is no testimony from any witness to
support the defendant's contention that the police seized a
plastic key fob rather than a set of keys.2 The seizure of the
2 Neither the direct testimony nor cross-examination of the police officer elicited evidence that the item was a key fob, rather than a set of keys. At one point during the officer's testimony, the defendant argued to the judge that, when the police officer took the keys from his person, "[t]hat's why I think Terry came into play." The judge explained to the defendant that she would hear the evidence and decide the case, but that keys could be used to stab a person.
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-1424
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
ROBERT BLANCHETTE.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After the defendant, Robert Blanchette, was charged with
carrying a loaded firearm without a license, he moved to
suppress evidence seized from the vehicle that he was driving at
the time of his arrest. The defendant argued that the search of
his car was unlawful because police officers failed to follow
the inventory policy. After an evidentiary hearing, a judge of
the District Court denied the motion to suppress. The defendant
also filed a separate motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds,
which was also denied.1 Thereafter, the defendant entered into a
1The defendant also filed a motion for reconsideration of his motion to suppress and motion to dismiss. A hearing was held, and the motion was denied. The defendant did not appeal from the motion for reconsideration and it is not before us. conditional plea agreement, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P.
12 (b) (6), as appearing in 482 Mass. 1501 (2019), pleading
guilty to possession of a loaded firearm without a firearm
identification (FID) card, in violation of G. L. c. 269,
§ 10 (n), and carrying a firearm without a FID card in violation
of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), while reserving his right to appeal
from the denial of both his motion to suppress and his motion to
dismiss.
Background. We summarize the facts as they could have been
found by the judge after an evidentiary hearing on the motion to
suppress, reserving certain facts for later discussion. See
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 344 (2025).
On December 16, 2021, at approximately 10:00 A.M., a
Haverhill police officer pulled over the defendant after
receiving a "be on the lookout" (BOLO) for the defendant in
response to a reported incident of domestic violence. The BOLO,
which had been issued approximately thirty minutes prior to the
stop, named the defendant, described the model and registration
of the vehicle he was likely driving, and stated that there was
probable cause to arrest the defendant. It also warned that the
defendant likely had a firearm in the vehicle. Once backup
officers arrived, they approached the vehicle with weapons drawn
out of concern for their safety. The defendant, who was seated
2 in the driver's seat, was ordered out of the vehicle, pat
frisked, and placed under arrest for domestic assault and
battery. During the patfrisk, keys were seized from the
defendant's pocket. The passenger of the vehicle was also
removed and placed under arrest after police learned that he had
outstanding warrants.
Because the vehicle was partially blocking a busy road with
no driver available, police decided to have it towed and,
pursuant to the Haverhill police vehicle inventory policy
(inventory policy), conducted a search of the vehicle. During
the inventory search, a police officer used a key seized from
the defendant's pocket to unlock and open the glove box where he
located a loaded firearm.
After the testimony was completed, the motion judge
provided detailed oral findings of fact on the record,
concluding that the stop of the defendant's car was consistent
with the information provided in the BOLO, that the defendant
was lawfully arrested for a charge of domestic violence, and
that his passenger was also arrested on outstanding warrants.
The judge found that the defendant's car was partially blocking
the roadway, and that the officers acted lawfully when, before
having it towed, they inventoried the defendant's vehicle and
discovered a loaded firearm in the locked glovebox. In a
3 separate ruling, the motion judge denied the defendant's motion
to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial.
Discussion. 1. Motion to Suppress. "In reviewing a
decision on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's
subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error but conduct an
independent review of his [or her] ultimate findings and
conclusions of law" (quotation and citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Goncalves-Mendez, 484 Mass. 80, 83 (2020).
a. The stop of the defendant's vehicle and the seizure of
the defendant's keys. First, the defendant argues that, when
the officers approached his vehicle with guns drawn, they used a
degree of force disproportionate to the circumstances
precipitating his arrest. We are not persuaded. "[A]n approach
with drawn guns is generally thought excessive in the absence of
any suggestion that the defendant is armed or other
circumstances suggesting the possibility of violence."
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 792, 795 (2018),
quoting Commonwealth v. Fitzgibbons, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 301, 308
(1986). Here, the officers were responding to a report of
domestic violence and were made aware that the defendant was
believed to be carrying a firearm. Given that the police
suspected the defendant of committing a violent crime less than
an hour before the stop, and that they were aware that the
4 defendant was likely carrying a firearm, the circumstances
justified their approach of the defendant's vehicle with guns
drawn.
Second, the defendant argues that the judge erred in
finding that the seizure of the keys located during the patfrisk
was lawful. Pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 1, a search incident to
arrest can be made for the purpose of removing any weapon an
arrested person might use to resist arrest or to escape. The
defendant does not challenge that probable cause existed to
place him under arrest. Rather, he contends that the judge
committed clear error because the key fob found on his person
was not a potential weapon. A review of the motion hearing
transcript does not support the defendant's contention. Here,
the officer testified that a key or a set of keys were seized
from the defendant. There is no testimony from any witness to
support the defendant's contention that the police seized a
plastic key fob rather than a set of keys.2 The seizure of the
2 Neither the direct testimony nor cross-examination of the police officer elicited evidence that the item was a key fob, rather than a set of keys. At one point during the officer's testimony, the defendant argued to the judge that, when the police officer took the keys from his person, "[t]hat's why I think Terry came into play." The judge explained to the defendant that she would hear the evidence and decide the case, but that keys could be used to stab a person. The defendant interrupted the judge and stated that the keys had a plastic housing on the key fob. This statement was not supported by evidence at the hearing.
5 defendant's keys was proper because keys can be used as
potential weapons that an arrested person might use to resist
arrest or to escape. In Commonwealth v. Blevines, 438 Mass. 604
(2003), the defendant was informed that he was being placed
under arrest and keys were discovered in his pocket during a
patfrisk. Id. at 605. At the motion to suppress hearing,
officers did not testify that they were concerned that a key
might be used as a weapon to resist arrest. The court stated
that "[w]e deem such a matter self-evident and conclude that
[the trooper], discovering a hard object in the defendant's rear
pocket, was justified in retrieving that object as a potential
weapon." Id. at 608. "A hard object found, such as keys, may
be seized." Id. See Goncalves-Mendez, 484 Mass. at 83. The
keys were properly seized during the patfrisk as potential
weapons.
b. Inventory search. We now examine whether the inventory
search of the vehicle was lawful. The defendant argues that the
police officers exceeded the lawful scope of their inventory
policy by using the keys obtained from the patfrisk to unlock
the glove box. An inventory search can serve three legitimate,
noninvestigatory purposes. A legitimate search can "protect the
vehicle and its contents from the threat of theft or vandalism;
. . . protect the police and the tow company from false claims;
6 and . . . protect the public from dangerous items that might
have been left in a vehicle." Commonwealth v. Davis, 481 Mass.
210, 218 (2019). "Unlike other types of searches, an inventory
search is administrative, and the decision to conduct an
inventory search must not be for investigatory purposes; the
decision must be objectively reasonable, and the search must be
conducted according to standard written procedures." Id. at
219.
At the motion to suppress stage, the Commonwealth has the
burden to prove that the inventory search was done for a
legitimate purpose and not for an investigatory purpose. See
Commonwealth v. Rosario-Santiago, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 175
(2019). At the motion hearing, the Commonwealth introduced a
written copy of the Haverhill police inventory policy, which
directs that officers are to complete an inventory of "[t]he
passenger compartment, including the glove box, center console,
and any unlocked freestanding containers found therein." It
further provides that a "locked, attached container, glove box,
or trunk may be opened and inventoried if there is a key
available or the opening can be obtained without causing damage
to the vehicle."
The defendant contends that even if the keys were properly
removed from the defendant's person during the patfrisk, the
7 glove box could not be opened because the keys cannot be
considered "available" for purposes of the Haverhill inventory
policy. The defendant offers no authority to support his
contention that the inventory policy should be so narrowly
construed. Officer Graham testified that he retrieved the key
that was obtained from the patfrisk and unlocked the glove box
where the loaded firearm was located. Where the defendant was
lawfully arrested and his keys lawfully seized during a search
incident to that arrest, we cannot say that the keys were not
"available" during the inventory search. Accordingly, the
evidence supported the judge's finding that the search was
performed properly in accordance with the inventory policy.
2. Motion to dismiss based on constitutional right to a
speedy trial. "Both the Sixth Amendment [to the United States
Constitution], incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment [to
the United States Constitution], and art. 11 [of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights] guarantee criminal
defendants the right to a speedy trial. We interpret art. 11
through the lens of Sixth Amendment analysis." Commonwealth v.
McNair, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 750, 754 (2020), quoting Commonwealth
v. Dirico, 480 Mass. 491, 505 (2018). "[T]o trigger a speedy
trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between
accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary
8 from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay." Commonwealth v.
Wallace, 472 Mass. 56, 60 (2015), quoting Doggett v. United
States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-652 (1992). "Once a defendant has
established presumptive prejudice, courts apply the four-factor
Barker test to evaluate whether the defendant's constitutional
right to a speedy trial has, in fact, been violated."
Commonwealth v. Butler, 464 Mass. 706, 710 (2013). "Under the
Barker test, a reviewing court weighs the length of the delay,
the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right
to a speedy trial, and prejudice to the defendant." Dirico,
supra at 506, citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
Here, as to the first factor, the length of the delay was
just over one year, weighing slightly in the defendant's favor.
The docket entries reflect that both the Commonwealth and the
defendant contributed to the pretrial delay. The time period
between the defendant's arraignment and trial totaled 386 days
and the defendant does not challenge that twenty-three days of
delay are attributable to him. As to factor two (the reason for
the delay), there is no evidence to support, nor does the
defendant allege, that the Commonwealth intentionally sought to
delay the trial. Although the Commonwealth did fail to
affirmatively request a ballistician report, thereby causing
some delay, this amounts to negligence at worst. As to factor
9 three, the record does not support a finding that the defendant
pressed heavily for the case to go to trial. Finally, there has
been no showing by the defendant that he suffered prejudice as
to his inability to "adequately . . . prepare his case," and
factor four is accordingly unsatisfied. Dirico, 480 Mass. at
508, quoting Barker, 407 Mass. at 532. Considering the Barker
factors as a whole, we discern no violation of the defendant's
constitutional right to a speedy trial.3
Orders denying motion to suppress and motion to dismiss affirmed.
By the Court (Walsh, Hershfang & D'Angelo, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: July 15, 2026.
3 We note that the defendant submitted additional materials after argument. The panel rejects the submission for failure to comply with Mass. R. A. P. 16, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). It contains argument, and we do not consider it except for the portion which states, "The Appellant would also like to direct the court to pp. 42-43, of his brief, which presents the argument relative to the BOLO as the basis of the stop of Mr. Blanchette's vehicle, an issue that arose during oral argument."
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.