Commonwealth v. Richards

18 A. 1007, 131 Pa. 209, 1890 Pa. LEXIS 1101

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 6, 1890
• Docket: No. 217
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion,

Mr. Justice Ot.abut:

This is a proceeding under the act of April 18, 1867, P. L. 78, brought by Emma Richards against her husband, Thomas Richards, to obtain an order upon him for her maintenance and support. The complaint is that on September 20, 1887, the defendant, residing in Allegheny city, “did then and there, without any cause or provocation, desert and abandon ” his wife, and since that day “ has failed and refused to provide anything toward her support and maintenance.” At the trial in the Quarter Sessions the defendant offered in evidence a deed of voluntary separation dated March 11, 1886, by the terms of which the parties, “ in view of divers disputes and unhappy differences ” which had arisen between them, had consented and agreed to live separate and apart from each other during their natural lives, etc. The husband agreed to, and actually did, place in the hands of his wife, “towards her better support and maintenance,” the sum of $50 in cash, household goods to the amount of $100, and four shares of stock in the Co-operative Foundry of Beaver Falls, Pa., of the par value of $100 each. In consideration thereof the wife agreed to discharge the said Thomas Richards, his heirs and assigns, and his estate, from all claims, etc.; the husband to have the custody of their child, William Emmett, etc. The question as to the effect of these articles of separation is brought upon the record by a formal bill of exceptions, and, as no question is raised as to the disposition of the ease on a certiorari, we will consider it as the parties have, presented it.

That a valid agreement may be made for separation between a husband and wife, and for an allowance for her support, where the separation is inevitable and immediate, is now too well settled to admit of discussion or require a citation of authorities. The validity of. such covenants, although exceptional in their status, has been established by repeated decisions of this court. Ordinarily these agreements, as in Dillinger’s App., 35 Pa. 357, have been carried into effect through the medium of a trustee ; but the undoubted weight of authority is that there may be a valid agreement for the separation directly between husband and wife, without the intervention of a trustee, which the courts will sanction: Hutton v. Hutton, 3 Pa. 100; Smith v. Knowles, 2 Gr. 413; Hitner’s App., 54 Pa. 110; Garver v. Miller, 16 Ohio ; Randall v. Randall, 37 Mich. 563; Dutton v. Dutton, 30 Ind. 452. In such cases the husband himself will be treated as a trustee for the specific purpose in view, and will be held accordingly. If the object of the agreement is actual and immediate, if the terms are reasonable, and it is actually carried into effect by both parties in good faith, it will be as binding upon the wife as upon her husband.

In the case at bar, we do not understand that there is any allegation of fraud or unfairness, or that the terms of the deed of separation were, in any respect, unreasonable. How, then, under such circumstances, can the husband, upon the complaint of the wife, be convicted of a crime in failing to do what he was under no legal obligation to do ? Can his wife, after having by a formal deed bound him to permit her to live separate and alone, and absolved him from her maintenance, immediately thereafter enter a criminal complaint, and procure his arrest and conviction, for doing what she had bound him both in law and in equity to do ? The proceedings are not under the act of 1836, but under the act of 1867; they are instituted by the wife, not by the children or by the overseers of the poor; and it is difficult to see how the wife, in such case, could at the same time hold her husband to perform the articles, and convict him of a crime for doing so. The absurdity of such a result is apparent. If the prosecution were in behalf of the children, or by the overseers of the poor, a question would bo presented which it is not necessary now to discuss. Certainly a husband, as between himself and his wife, cannot be said to have separated himself from her without reasonable cause, when she has by deed placed him under legal obligation “ not to visit her, or to enter any house where she may happen to be,” and “ to permit her to live separate from him,” and to carry on business on her own account as if she were a feme sole.

If a proper provision has been made for a wife, her husband is not liable even for necessaries furnished for her support: Cany v. Patton, 2 Ash. 140; Alley v. Winn, 134 Mass. 77; and a party dealing with a married woman, known to be living apart from her husband, is put upon inquiry as to the cause of the separation. If this be so, for much stronger reasons will the husband, under such circumstances, be relieved from a criminal prosecution, instituted by the wife herself, to obtain an order for her maintenance.

If the deed of separation was fraudulently procured and the terms were unreasonable, or if after its execution it had become null and void by the acts of the parties, these facts should have been shown; but, standing upon the deed alone, the conviction was unwarranted by the proofs, and must be set aside..

The judgment is therefore reversed, and a procedendo awarded.