Commonwealth v. Reid, A., Aplt.

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 16, 2022
• Docket: 784 CAP
• Status: Published

Opinion

[J-117-2020] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT

BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 784 CAP : Appellee : Appeal from the Order entered on : July 29, 2019 in the Court of : Common Pleas, Franklin County, v. : Criminal Division at No. CP-28-CR- : 0000382-1997. : ALBERT E. REID, : SUBMITTED: December 11, 2020 : Appellant :

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: August 16, 2022 A jury convicted Albert Reid (“Appellant”) of two counts of first-degree murder for

the killings of his estranged wife, Carla Reid, and her fourteen-year-old daughter, D.M.

He received two death sentences, and this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence.

Commonwealth v. Reid, 811 A.2d 530 (Pa. 2002) (“Reid I”). Appellant subsequently filed

a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

The PCRA court denied the petition, and Appellant appealed to this Court, which affirmed

in part the PCRA court’s order but remanded the matter, while retaining jurisdiction,

directing the PCRA court to provide a supplemental opinion addressing why it denied

relief on the following issue: “Was the defendant incompetent to proceed to trial and

represent himself; were prior counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and effectively litigate this issue before trial and failing to raise it on appeal?”1 Commonwealth v. Reid,

259 A.3d 395, 444 (Pa. 2021) (“Reid II”) (quoting Appellant’s Initial Brief at 3).

The PCRA court complied with our directive, and we have received the parties’

responses to the PCRA court’s supplemental opinion. Thus, this remaining matter is ripe

for review. As explained in detail infra, we respectfully find that the PCRA court erred in

the manner in which it assessed Appellant’s claim that he was incompetent to stand trial,

as the court’s reasoning, inter alia, failed to account for new, post-conviction evidence

that potentially demonstrates that Appellant was incompetent to stand trial. Accordingly,

we are constrained to vacate in part the PCRA court’s order and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A thorough recitation of the factual and procedural backgrounds underlying this

matter is unnecessary. We, however, recount that Appellant’s competency to stand trial

was litigated prior to his murder trial. On April 9, 1998, a court-appointed psychiatrist, Dr.

Abraham Martin Hostetter, conducted an in-court competency examination of Appellant.

As part of this examination, Dr. Hostetter questioned several persons, including Appellant,

regarding Appellant’s mental health. Appellant’s expert, psychiatrist Dr. Neil Blumberg,

and the Commonwealth’s expert, psychiatrist Dr. Robert Davis, participated in the

examination. Notably, the trial court appointed special counsel, Michael Toms, Esquire,

for the purpose of representing Appellant during the competency examination.

Notwithstanding his appointment, Attorney Toms was not present during Appellant’s

examination.

1 We took this action because Appellant raised this issue in the PCRA court, and while

that court denied relief on the issue, the court did not address it in an opinion. We, however, affirmed the remainder of the PCRA court’s order, which denied relief on Appellant’s other various issues.

[J-117-2020] - 2 On May 13, 1998, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether Appellant

was competent to stand trial. At the beginning of that hearing, Attorney Toms stated that

he did not receive notice of the aforementioned in-court competency examination and

that his absence from that examination violated Appellant’s right to due process. The

court nonetheless continued with the hearing, where Dr. Hostetter diagnosed Appellant

with paranoid personality disorder but ultimately concluded that Appellant was competent

to stand trial. Dr. Davis also diagnosed Appellant with a personality disorder and,

consistent with Dr. Hostetter, determined that Appellant was competent to stand trial. Dr.

Blumberg diagnosed Appellant with delusional disorder and stated his belief that

Appellant was not competent to stand trial.

To assure that Appellant received the process he was due, the trial court ordered

Appellant to undergo another in-court competency examination, followed by a

competency hearing, both of which were held on July 14, 1998. Attorney Toms was

present for these proceedings. The examination again was led by Dr. Hostetter, and Drs.

Davis and Blumberg participated. During the course of the examination and the

subsequent hearing, it was revealed that Appellant refused to undergo any additional

physical testing, including a neurological examination and an MRI. At the competency

hearing, Drs. Hostetter and Davis again stated that Appellant was competent to stand

trial, but Dr. Blumberg continued to disagree. On August 27, 1998, the trial court entered

an order finding Appellant competent to stand trial.

Around this same time, Appellant requested to represent himself. After conducting

a colloquy, the trial court entered an order on September 4, 1998, allowing Appellant to

proceed pro se but with standby counsel. Appellant represented himself at a September

15, 1998 evidentiary hearing concerning the admissibility of, inter alia, photographs that

the Commonwealth wished to present at trial. We note, however, that soon after this

[J-117-2020] - 3 hearing, Appellant decided to allow his standby counsel to represent him moving forward.

As noted supra, in due course, a jury eventually found Appellant guilty of murdering his

estranged wife, Carla Reid, and her fourteen-year-old daughter, D.M. Appellant received

two death sentences.

After this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, Appellant filed a PCRA petition

and several supplements, raising a multitude of issues. Among those issues and relevant

to this opinion, Appellant “launched a multifaceted, complex, and somewhat confusing,

challenge to his competency to stand trial and represent himself.” Reid II, 259 A.3d at

424. Two of Appellant’s claims were most prominent: (1) a substantive claim that

Appellant was incompetent to stand trial (“substantive competency claim”); and (2) a claim

that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate and present a more robust

pretrial claim that Appellant was incompetent to stand trial and to represent himself.

The focus of Appellant’s substantive competency claim concerning his ability to

stand trial centered on newly discovered historical aspects of Appellant’s physical, social,

and mental health. For example, Appellant averred that, during the course of

investigating his PCRA claims, PCRA counsel discovered that Appellant suffered head

injuries earlier in his life, which led to brain damage. Dr. Hostetter, the court-appointed

psychiatrist that previously found Appellant competent to stand trial, was informed of this

fact during the PCRA process.

Dr. Hostetter provided Appellant with a declaration, which Appellant attached to

one of his PCRA filings. In that declaration, Dr. Hostetter stated that he previously was

unaware of Appellant’s history of head injuries and that, upon learning of this background,

he believed that that the organic nature of Appellant’s brain damage precluded him “from

fully cooperating with his counsel and participating in preparations for his own trial[.]”

Second Supplement to Appellant’s PCRA Petition, 2/19/2010, Exhibit L at ¶9. Thus, Dr.

[J-117-2020] - 4 Hostetter dramatically altered his previous conclusion, stating in his PCRA declaration

that Appellant, in fact, “was not competent to stand trial under the applicable legal

standard.” Id.

Appellant’s related claim regarding trial counsel’s stewardship generally alleged

that counsel were ineffective for failing to discover and present the background evidence

uncovered by PCRA counsel, such as Appellant’s history of head injuries. In other words,

Appellant contended that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present the

substantive competency claim that his PCRA counsel raised in his PCRA petition.

Along with Appellant’s other claims, the PCRA court rejected Appellant’s

substantive competency claim, as well as his related claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel. The court, however, did not provide a rationale for doing so, and Appellant

raised this failure in the brief that he filed in this Court in support of his appeal from the

PCRA court’s order. While we rejected Appellant’s other PCRA claims, given the

circumstances, we remanded the matter to the PCRA court, directing the court to provide

a supplemental opinion addressing why it rejected the substantive competency claim and

related claims.

The PCRA court subsequently submitted to this Court an opinion outlining its

reasons for denying Appellant relief on this issue. Unfortunately, as we will explain below,

the court’s rationale for rejecting Appellant’s substantive competency claim is inadequate,

as it, inter alia, failed to account for the new, post-conviction evidence, such as Appellant’s

prior head injuries and Dr. Hostetter’s revised opinion, that potentially demonstrates that

Appellant was incompetent to stand trial. We now will summarize the court’s

supplemental opinion.2

2 The PCRA court intermingled Appellant’s substantive competency claim with his related

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

[J-117-2020] - 5 Initially, the PCRA court reported that Appellant’s competency was litigated

vigorously before the trial judge, the Honorable John R. Walker. After detailing the history

of that litigation, the PCRA court stated that Judge Walker only explained his reasons for

finding Appellant competent to stand trial in his May 27, 1999, opinion addressing

Appellant’s post-sentence motions. In short, Judge Walker found Appellant competent to

stand trial primarily based upon the competency hearing testimony of Drs. Hostetter and

Davis. According to the PCRA court, Judge Walker allowed Appellant to represent

himself after conducting a lengthy colloquy and concluding that Appellant knowingly and

voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

After summarizing Judge Walker’s opinion, the PCRA court embarked on an

independent review of Appellant’s claims and the certified record. In so doing, the court,

inter alia, reiterated that Judge Walker found Appellant to be competent to stand trial in

1998 based upon the findings of the aforementioned experts, as well as his personal

observations of Appellant. The PCRA court acknowledged that it obviously did not have

the benefit of observing Appellant at the competency hearings; however, the court

nonetheless agreed “upon review of the cold record that Judge Walker’s findings were

reasonable” because Appellant failed to meet his burden of proving that he was

incompetent. PCRA Court Supplemental Opinion, 12/22/2021, at 8.

The PCRA court supplemented its conclusion by observing that Appellant “was

considerably more cooperative at his second competency hearing on July 14, 1998.” Id.

The court suggested that Appellant’s change in demeanor was due to the appointment of

Attorney Toms. According to the PCRA court, the record reflects that Appellant

cooperated with Attorney Toms, which supports “Judge Walker’s initial finding that

Appellant was capable of cooperating with his counsel when he chose to do so.” Id.

(emphasis omitted).

[J-117-2020] - 6 In a footnote, the PCRA court stated that, in his second supplement of his PCRA

petition, Appellant referenced a declaration from Dr. Hostetter “claiming that he had not

been provided with evidence of Appellant’s past head injuries and that, if he had access

to that information, he would have found Appellant incompetent.” Id. at 6-7 n.18.

Germane to our present inquiry, the PCRA court did not assess that information as part

of Appellant’s substantive competency claim; rather, the court highlighted that there is

nothing in the record to suggest that trial counsel had any information regarding

Appellant’s alleged head injuries. The court observed that, through the litigation of

Appellant’s competency, he refused to share his medical history, even with his own

expert. Thus, the PCRA court concluded, “Appellant’s attorneys cannot be ineffective for

failing to supply Dr. Hostetter with information they were not supplied by their client.” Id.

Turning to whether counsel were ineffective for failing to litigate whether Appellant

was competent to represent himself at the aforementioned evidentiary hearing, the PCRA

court stated that Judge Walker already had found Appellant competent to stand trial when

Appellant sought to represent himself. The PCRA court further noted that the record of

Appellant’s colloquy concerning his self-representation does not suggest that Appellant

was incapable of proceeding pro se. Indeed, the court concluded that Appellant

“competently represented himself at [the] September 15, 1998, evidentiary hearing, at

which time he successfully examined and cross-examined witnesses.” Id. at 10. For

these reasons, the PCRA court asked this Court to affirm, in full, its order denying

Appellant’s PCRA petition.

In his supplemental brief, Appellant argues, inter alia, that the PCRA court erred

by denying him relief, or at least an evidentiary hearing, on his substantive competency

claim. In support of his position, Appellant asserts that the PCRA court found that he was

competent to stand trial based solely on the information presented in his 1998 pretrial

[J-117-2020] - 7 competency hearing. In other words, the PCRA court’s present day assessment of

Appellant’s competency to stand trial in 1998 failed to account for the new, post-conviction

evidence that demonstrates that he was not competent to stand trial. See, e.g.,

Appellant’s Supplemental Brief at 42 (“The PCRA court also erred by focusing on the

1998 pre-trial competency findings. The trial court’s 1998 competency determination

cannot be dispositive of Appellant’s current competency claim because the new evidence

in support of his current competency claim was not considered by the trial court.”)

(emphasis in original).3 We, in part, agree with Appellant’s assessment of the PCRA

court’s analysis.

In so doing, it is important to explain that, pursuant to the PCRA, a petitioner is

ineligible for relief if an allegation of error has been waived. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). An

issue is waived under the PCRA “if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so

before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction

proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). Appellant obviously did raise a competency claim

pretrial, and he could have raised such a claim on direct appeal from his judgment of

sentence, but he did not. Thus, on the surface, Appellant’s substantive claim appears to

be waived. However, our case law holds otherwise.

This Court has determined that substantive claims regarding PCRA petitioners’

competency to stand trial cannot be “waived,” as that term is defined in the PCRA. See

Commonwealth v. Brown, 872 A.2d 1139, 1153 (Pa. 2005) (plurality) (holding “that the

failure to raise on direct appeal a claim that the appellant was incompetent at the time of

trial does not constitute a waiver of that claim for purposes of the PCRA”); see

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 751 (Pa. 2014) (explaining that, while Brown

3 The Commonwealth filed a letter in this Court stating that it agreed with the PCRA court’s

supplemental opinion and that it would not be filing a rebuttal to Appellant’s supplemental brief.

[J-117-2020] - 8 was a plurality opinion, it nonetheless garnered a majority view for the proposition that

the failure to raise on direct appeal a claim that the appellant was incompetent at the time

of trial does not constitute a waiver of that claim for purposes of the PCRA). Thus,

Appellant’s new substantive competency claim was a permissible, stand-alone claim for

purposes of his PCRA, and the PCRA court should have, but did not, evaluate it as such

a claim.4 Most obviously, as Appellant highlights, the PCRA court’s assessment failed to

account for the post-conviction, newly discovered evidence that Appellant proffered to

establish that he was incompetent to stand trial.

In terms of how the PCRA court should have evaluated Appellant’s current

substantive competency claim, we find guidance from this Court’s plurality opinion in

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682 (Pa. 2004) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment

of the Court (“OAJC”)).5 Initially, the OAJC explained that “whenever a court can conduct

4 We further observe that Appellant did not previously litigate his substantive competency

claim. For purposes of the PCRA, an issue has been previously litigated if, inter alia, “the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as of right has ruled on the merits of the issue[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(a)(2). Here, although Appellant litigated his competency to stand trial in the trial court, this Court has yet to rule on the merits of that issue. Thus, the issue has not been “previously litigated,” as that phrase is defined in the PCRA. 5 The OAJC was authored by then-Chief Justice Cappy and joined by Justice Newman

and this author. It held, inter alia, that the appellant did not waive a claim that he raised for the first time in his PCRA petition that he was incompetent to stand trial; in addition, the OAJC addressed the manner in which a court should assess such a claim in the context of the PCRA. Santiago, 855 A.2d at 691-94 (OAJC). Justice Castille joined the OAJC save for its decision regarding the appellant’s competency claim. He would have concluded that the appellant waived the claim pursuant to the plain language of the waiver provision of the PCRA. Id. at 704-11 (Castille, J., concurring). Justice Eakin joined Justice Castille’s concurring opinion. Justice Saylor concurred in the result and shared several observations, including the fact that he was “able to join the [OAJC’s] affirmation of the PCRA court’s retrospective competency assessment because [the appellant] has not demonstrated that the trial court improperly failed to make a determination of his competency in the course of the

[J-117-2020] - 9 a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the competency of the defendant, such

a hearing is permissible.” Santiago, 855 A.2d at 693. In examining this possibility, a

PCRA court first “must determine whether the defendant’s PCRA petition raises a material

issue of fact concerning whether he was competent at the time of trial such that he would

be entitled to a hearing on the claim.” Id.

“Next, the PCRA court must decide whether there exists sufficient evidence of [the]

defendant’s mental status at the time of trial such that a hearing would be adequate to

address the issue of competency, or whether the evidence is so lacking that a new trial

must be awarded.” Id. The OAJC stated that, in determining whether a meaningful

retrospective competency hearing can take place, the PCRA court should consider, inter

alia, “the passage of time since the trial, statements made by the defendant at trial, the

availability of contemporaneous medical and psychiatric evidence, and the availability of

witnesses - both expert and nonexpert - who could offer testimony regarding the

defendant’s mental status at the time of trial.” Id. The OAJC emphasized that this list of

factors is not exhaustive and expressly stated that if the PCRA court “finds some other

type of evidence helpful in resolving whether a retrospective hearing may be held, the []

court may receive such evidence.” Id.

Because the PCRA court erred by failing to examine properly Appellant’s stand-

alone substantive competency claim and given the newly proffered evidence in support

thereof, we vacate the portion of the court’s order that denied relief on the claim. We

remand the matter to the PCRA court to consider the claim in light of the framework

announced by the OAJC in Santiago. While we acknowledge that this opinion does not

address Appellant’s related claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we need not

proceedings on his second trial.” Id. at 712 (Saylor, J, concurring). Justice Nigro concurred in the result without authoring an opinion.

[J-117-2020] - 10 address those claims currently, given the undecided nature of his substantive

competency claim.

Order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition vacated in part. Case remanded with

instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Justices Todd, Donohue, Dougherty and Wecht join the opinion.

Justice Mundy files a dissenting opinion.

Former Justice Saylor did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

matter.

[J-117-2020] - 11