NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1285
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
RAYCHA MOJICA.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Raycha Mojica, was charged in the District
Court with several drug and firearms offenses, including
carrying a loaded firearm without a license in violation of
G. L. c. 269, §§ 10 (a) and 10 (n). The firearm in question was
recovered during the execution of a warrant to search the
defendant's car. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence
seized from her car on grounds that the warrant was issued
without probable cause and lacked particularity. A District
Court judge allowed the defendant's motion, and the Commonwealth
obtained leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We affirm the
order granting the motion to suppress. Discussion. "Whether a search warrant is supported by
probable cause 'is a question of law that we review de novo.'"
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 482 Mass. 850, 866 (2019), quoting
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 102 (2017). "That review
begins and ends with the four corners of the affidavit"
(quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Defrancesco,
99 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 211 (2021). "The basic question for the
magistrate, when evaluating an affidavit supporting an
application for the issuance of a search warrant, is whether
there is a substantial basis on which to conclude that the
articles or activity described are probably present or occurring
at the place to be searched." Commonwealth v. Spano, 414 Mass.
178, 184 (1993). Where, as here, the search warrant pertains to
a vehicle, the supporting affidavit must establish "a timely
nexus" between the criminal activity and the vehicle, such that
evidence of that activity "reasonably could be expected to be
found there." Commonwealth v. Wade, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 651
(2005).
Here, the police applied for warrants to search the
defendant's residence and car for evidence that the defendant
was selling crack cocaine.1 The applications were supported by
1 The defendant does not challenge the issuance of the warrant to search her residence.
2 the same affidavit. The affidavit described an investigation
into suspected drug distribution out of the defendant's
residence in Springfield, based on reports from a confidential
informant that he had purchased crack cocaine from the defendant
through the second-floor bathroom window on the back side of the
house "on multiple occasions." The informant also stated that
the defendant drove a black Acura MDX. Police conducted
surveillance of the house and saw a black Acura MDX parked in
the driveway. It was registered to the defendant at that
address, and the informant identified the defendant as the
person who sold him drugs, presumably from a photograph that the
affiant obtained from the Registry of Motor Vehicles.
The affidavit described three controlled buys of crack
cocaine from the defendant, all arranged by the informant by
placing a telephone call to the defendant. The first and third
buys were conducted out of the second-floor rear bathroom window
of the residence. The second controlled buy, which took place
about three weeks before the police applied for the search
warrants, was the only transaction that involved the defendant's
car. When the informant telephoned the defendant to arrange a
purchase, she told him she was not home but would arrive
shortly. When she arrived in the Acura and pulled into the
3 driveway, the informant approached the driver's side of the car
and bought crack cocaine from the defendant through the window.
The Commonwealth argues that the description of this second
buy permits a reasonable inference that the defendant kept a
ready supply of crack cocaine in her car. We disagree.
Generally, "[a] controlled purchase of narcotics, supervised by
the police, provides probable cause to issue a search warrant."
Commonwealth v. Warren, 418 Mass. 86, 89 (1994). However, the
circumstances of the controlled buy must support an inference
that contraband will be found in the particular location to be
searched, at the time the warrant is executed. To establish
probable cause to search a car, the supporting affidavit must
contain evidence establishing a pattern of drug distribution and
specific facts demonstrating the car's involvement in the drug-
related activity. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Staines, 441 Mass.
521, 526 (2004) (undercover officer conducted six controlled
narcotics buys, all from defendant's car, and defendant appeared
to stash additional drugs in car); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 66
Mass. App. Ct. 515, 524 (2006) ("extensive drug operation"
involved multiple sites of sale; car served as meeting place for
defendant and cohort; defendant returned to car to retrieve
drugs during sale, suggesting "drugs were kept and ready in the
car"; and defendant used car during drug sale within seventy-two
4 hours of issuance of warrant); Commonwealth v. Dion, 31 Mass.
App. Ct. 168, 174 (1991) ("connection between the automobile and
the contraband was established by the defendant's suspicious
behavior in attempting to hide the automobile key while he was
being booked on a drug charge," plus recent break-ins at
defendant's apartment permitted "inference that the defendant
was storing drugs in the automobile as a safer depository").
See also Commonwealth v. Burt, 393 Mass. 703, 716 (1985)
(probable cause to search car where defendants accused of
larceny were observed moving packages between cars and
residences, and where "hasty disposal of [contraband] could have
been risky"). The affidavit in this case contained no evidence
suggesting that "the defendant used the vehicle to store drugs,"
"that the defendant routinely carried an inventory of drugs
ready for delivery," or that the car was otherwise integral to
the defendant's drug distribution operation. Wade, 64 Mass.
App. Ct. at 651-652. We are left to rely on the informant's
description of just one controlled buy involving the defendant's
car, approximately three weeks before the warrant application
was submitted.
At best, the facts in the affidavit permitted an inference
that the defendant engaged in drug distribution out of her house
and, on one occasion, conducted a transaction from her car upon
5 her return to her house. That is inadequate to establish
probable cause to search the car. See Commonwealth v. Pina, 453
Mass.
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1285
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
RAYCHA MOJICA.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Raycha Mojica, was charged in the District
Court with several drug and firearms offenses, including
carrying a loaded firearm without a license in violation of
G. L. c. 269, §§ 10 (a) and 10 (n). The firearm in question was
recovered during the execution of a warrant to search the
defendant's car. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence
seized from her car on grounds that the warrant was issued
without probable cause and lacked particularity. A District
Court judge allowed the defendant's motion, and the Commonwealth
obtained leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We affirm the
order granting the motion to suppress. Discussion. "Whether a search warrant is supported by
probable cause 'is a question of law that we review de novo.'"
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 482 Mass. 850, 866 (2019), quoting
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 102 (2017). "That review
begins and ends with the four corners of the affidavit"
(quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Defrancesco,
99 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 211 (2021). "The basic question for the
magistrate, when evaluating an affidavit supporting an
application for the issuance of a search warrant, is whether
there is a substantial basis on which to conclude that the
articles or activity described are probably present or occurring
at the place to be searched." Commonwealth v. Spano, 414 Mass.
178, 184 (1993). Where, as here, the search warrant pertains to
a vehicle, the supporting affidavit must establish "a timely
nexus" between the criminal activity and the vehicle, such that
evidence of that activity "reasonably could be expected to be
found there." Commonwealth v. Wade, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 651
(2005).
Here, the police applied for warrants to search the
defendant's residence and car for evidence that the defendant
was selling crack cocaine.1 The applications were supported by
1 The defendant does not challenge the issuance of the warrant to search her residence.
2 the same affidavit. The affidavit described an investigation
into suspected drug distribution out of the defendant's
residence in Springfield, based on reports from a confidential
informant that he had purchased crack cocaine from the defendant
through the second-floor bathroom window on the back side of the
house "on multiple occasions." The informant also stated that
the defendant drove a black Acura MDX. Police conducted
surveillance of the house and saw a black Acura MDX parked in
the driveway. It was registered to the defendant at that
address, and the informant identified the defendant as the
person who sold him drugs, presumably from a photograph that the
affiant obtained from the Registry of Motor Vehicles.
The affidavit described three controlled buys of crack
cocaine from the defendant, all arranged by the informant by
placing a telephone call to the defendant. The first and third
buys were conducted out of the second-floor rear bathroom window
of the residence. The second controlled buy, which took place
about three weeks before the police applied for the search
warrants, was the only transaction that involved the defendant's
car. When the informant telephoned the defendant to arrange a
purchase, she told him she was not home but would arrive
shortly. When she arrived in the Acura and pulled into the
3 driveway, the informant approached the driver's side of the car
and bought crack cocaine from the defendant through the window.
The Commonwealth argues that the description of this second
buy permits a reasonable inference that the defendant kept a
ready supply of crack cocaine in her car. We disagree.
Generally, "[a] controlled purchase of narcotics, supervised by
the police, provides probable cause to issue a search warrant."
Commonwealth v. Warren, 418 Mass. 86, 89 (1994). However, the
circumstances of the controlled buy must support an inference
that contraband will be found in the particular location to be
searched, at the time the warrant is executed. To establish
probable cause to search a car, the supporting affidavit must
contain evidence establishing a pattern of drug distribution and
specific facts demonstrating the car's involvement in the drug-
related activity. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Staines, 441 Mass.
521, 526 (2004) (undercover officer conducted six controlled
narcotics buys, all from defendant's car, and defendant appeared
to stash additional drugs in car); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 66
Mass. App. Ct. 515, 524 (2006) ("extensive drug operation"
involved multiple sites of sale; car served as meeting place for
defendant and cohort; defendant returned to car to retrieve
drugs during sale, suggesting "drugs were kept and ready in the
car"; and defendant used car during drug sale within seventy-two
4 hours of issuance of warrant); Commonwealth v. Dion, 31 Mass.
App. Ct. 168, 174 (1991) ("connection between the automobile and
the contraband was established by the defendant's suspicious
behavior in attempting to hide the automobile key while he was
being booked on a drug charge," plus recent break-ins at
defendant's apartment permitted "inference that the defendant
was storing drugs in the automobile as a safer depository").
See also Commonwealth v. Burt, 393 Mass. 703, 716 (1985)
(probable cause to search car where defendants accused of
larceny were observed moving packages between cars and
residences, and where "hasty disposal of [contraband] could have
been risky"). The affidavit in this case contained no evidence
suggesting that "the defendant used the vehicle to store drugs,"
"that the defendant routinely carried an inventory of drugs
ready for delivery," or that the car was otherwise integral to
the defendant's drug distribution operation. Wade, 64 Mass.
App. Ct. at 651-652. We are left to rely on the informant's
description of just one controlled buy involving the defendant's
car, approximately three weeks before the warrant application
was submitted.
At best, the facts in the affidavit permitted an inference
that the defendant engaged in drug distribution out of her house
and, on one occasion, conducted a transaction from her car upon
5 her return to her house. That is inadequate to establish
probable cause to search the car. See Commonwealth v. Pina, 453
Mass. 438, 442 (2009) (search warrant for apartment not
supported by probable cause where based on "single observation"
of sale of cocaine from motor vehicle at another location three
days before warrant application); Commonwealth v. Reddington,
395 Mass. 315, 323 (1985) ("information as to a single
transaction [that] could be seen to describe no more than an
isolated event in the past . . . would not create probable cause
to believe that similar or other improper conduct is continuing
to occur" [citation omitted]).
Moreover, to the extent the single transaction established
a nexus between the defendant's drug distribution operation and
the Acura, it was not a timely nexus, having occurred three
weeks before the warrant was sought. The Commonwealth argues
that the affidavit provided evidence of an ongoing or continuous
drug distribution activity, curing any staleness problem. See
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 430 Mass. 838, 843 (2000) (ongoing
criminal activity cured staleness of warrant issued two weeks
after last controlled buy); Commonwealth v. Colon, 80 Mass. App.
Ct. 162, 170 (2011) (ongoing criminal activity cured staleness
of warrant issued four days after last controlled buy from
defendant and two days after defendant conducted "street-level
6 drug transactions"). However, here, the affidavit described a
continuing operation out of the defendant's house, not out of
her car. "Information establishing that a person is guilty of a
crime does not necessarily constitute probable cause to search"
a particular location. Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197,
213, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983). Evidence of continuing
criminal activity out of the defendant's house was not
sufficient to overcome the three-week gap between the single
transaction out of the defendant's car and the issuance of the
warrant. The motion judge correctly concluded that the warrant
application failed to establish a reasonable inference that
evidence of drug distribution would be found in the defendant's
car.
We also note that the warrant to search the car did not
provide any description of the items the police were authorized
to search for. The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights require that a warrant describe with particularity the
place to be searched and the items to be seized. See
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 138, 141 & n.3
(2024). "By defining and limiting the scope of the search,
these constitutional and statutory particularity requirements
prohibit general warrants amounting to 'exploratory rummaging in
7 a person's belongings.'" Commonwealth v. Molina, 476 Mass. 388,
394 (2017), quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467
(1971). Where the Commonwealth seeks to search two separate
locations, each warrant must independently satisfy the
particularity requirement. We emphasize that this
constitutional obligation applies regardless of whether related
warrants are sought in the same investigation. See Commonwealth
v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 521-529 (2017) (reviewing
particularity of each warrant independently where multiple
warrants issued). Because we conclude that the warrant
application did not establish probable cause to search the
Acura, we need not address whether the Commonwealth carried "its
burden of demonstrating that the affidavit was attached to the
search warrant or present at its execution." Padilla, supra at
143-144.
Order granting motion to suppress affirmed.
By the Court (Massing, Ditkoff & Hand, JJ.2),
Clerk
Entered: June 5, 2026.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.