Commonwealth v. Ramon Rodriguez.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: November 25, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-1476
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1476

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

RAMON RODRIGUEZ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Ramon Rodriguez appeals his conviction of indecent assault

and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, second

offense, arguing that a Superior Court judge erred in denying

his motion for a required finding of not guilty. Because we

conclude that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the Commonwealth, a rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,

we affirm.

Background. In 2012, the defendant sexually assaulted the

victim, A.R., when A.R. was nine years old. In 2018, a grand

jury indicted the defendant on a charge (among others not

relevant here) of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, second offense, pursuant to G. L. c. 265, §§ 13B,

13B 3/4. The defendant waived his right to a jury, and a judge

found him guilty after a trial in 2023. The defendant

subsequently pleaded guilty to the second offense portion of the

indictment. The judge sentenced the defendant to the mandatory

minimum sentence of fifteen years, with a maximum term of

fifteen years and one day.

At trial, A.R. testified that, when she was about nine

years old, she occasionally went with her half-brother (R.R.,

the defendant's son with A.R.'s mother) to the home of the

defendant's then-girlfriend. On these occasions, R.R. would

visit the defendant, and A.R. would play with the girlfriend's

daughter. A.R. recounted being at this house, playing a video

game alone in the daughter's bedroom, when the defendant came

into the room, closed the door, and sexually assaulted her. He

first put his hand on her thigh under her skirt, then rubbed his

hand inside her underwear, and finally removed her underwear and

continuously touched her vaginal area for about fifteen minutes.

A.R. further testified to being scared to tell her mother what

had happened, fearing getting in trouble or not being believed.

When she did tell her mother shortly after the incident, the

mother repeatedly asked A.R. if she was telling the truth, to

the point where A.R. "backtracked" and "just said it didn't

2 happen" because she felt that "all the adults" did not believe

her.

A.R.'s mother also testified, corroborating that A.R. and

R.R. would visit the defendant together when the defendant was

living with his then-girlfriend. The Commonwealth's final

witness, an expert research psychologist, testified as to

factors that affect children in disclosing, not disclosing, or

recanting their accounts of sexual abuse. After the

Commonwealth rested, the defendant moved for a required finding

of not guilty, which the judge denied.

The defendant -- the only witness for the defense --

testified that he never lived with his then-girlfriend, that

A.R.'s mother never brought either A.R. or R.R. to visit him,

and that he never assaulted A.R. The defendant then renewed his

motion for a required finding, which the judge again denied.

Throughout the trial, the defendant attempted to discredit the

Commonwealth's witnesses, arguing that the allegations against

him were fabricated, possibly with the encouragement of A.R.'s

mother, perhaps to gain leverage in a dispute over child

support. Despite these efforts and arguments, the judge found

the defendant guilty.

Discussion. We review the denial of a motion for a

required finding of not guilty to determine "whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

3 prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In making this

determination, we keep in mind that "[t]he weight and

credibility of the evidence is the province of the [finder of

fact]." Commonwealth v. Dubois, 451 Mass. 20, 28 (2008).

Here, the victim testified to facts that corresponded to

each element of the offense; the defendant does not argue

otherwise, and he acknowledges that the judge credited the

victim's testimony. The decision to do so belongs to the judge,

not to us. The defendant already argued at trial that the

victim should not be credited, because of possible parental

manipulation, her allegations not initially being believed, and

the absence of certain corroborating evidence. The judge was

not persuaded, and we will not second guess his determination.

Although the defendant further argues that "other

incriminating evidence beyond that presented in this case is

necessary" to prove his guilt, he cites no supporting authority.

"[T]o the contrary, the victim's testimony, as credited by the

[trier of fact] and evidenced by the[] verdict[], suffices to

support the defendant's convictions." Commonwealth v. Gonzalez

Santos, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 3 (2021). Additional evidence,

including expert or third-party witness testimony, "may

4 corroborate the victim's testimony, but it is not required to

sustain a conviction."1 Id.

Nor do we find persuasive here the defendant's due process-

based argument that the delay between the alleged offense and

the indictment made it more difficult to mount a defense. The

defendant does not provide any examples of specific prejudice

that he suffered from the passage of time here, arguing instead

in hypotheticals. He does not demonstrate, or even argue, that

any specific evidence was lost or that any witnesses were

unavailable because of the passage of time. Cf. Commonwealth v.

George, 430 Mass. 276, 281 (1999) ("to be entitled to dismissal

of the indictments due to a preindictment delay, the defendant

must demonstrate that he suffered substantial, actual prejudice

to his defense, and that the delay was intentionally or

recklessly caused by the government"). In G. L. c. 277, § 63,

the Legislature has set outer limits on the passage of time

between offenses and prosecutions for those offenses. Those

limits were not exceeded here.

Equally unavailing is the defendant's argument that the

delay "significantly weakens the ability to establish the

1 The defendant also fails to mention that A.R. was not the only witness for the Commonwealth. A.R.'s mother provided corroborating testimony, and the expert's testimony about disclosure and recantation of abuse allegations assisted the judge in assessing A.R.'s credibility.

5 truth." Certainly, evidence can be lost with time. This is,

however, as much a problem for the Commonwealth as it is for the

defendant. It is the Commonwealth that bears the burden of

proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which remains unchanged

regardless of the passage of time. See Barker v. Wingo, 407

U.S. 514, 521 (1972). Here, the judge as the finder of fact was

free to consider the passage of time in his determination of

each witness's credibility; due process requires nothing more in

these circumstances. Taking the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, a rational trier of fact could

find the victim credible and her testimony sufficient to prove

all of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt, even when taking into account the amount of time between

the alleged offense and the trial.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Massing, Sacks & Allen, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: November 25, 2025.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.