Commonwealth v. Ragnar Benson, Inc.

366 A.2d 596, 27 Pa. Commw. 226, 1976 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1347
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedNovember 24, 1976
DocketAppeal, No. 1124 C.D. 1974
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 366 A.2d 596 (Commonwealth v. Ragnar Benson, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Ragnar Benson, Inc., 366 A.2d 596, 27 Pa. Commw. 226, 1976 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1347 (Pa. Ct. App. 1976).

Opinions

Opinion by

Judge Crumlish, Jr.,

Ragnar Benson, Inc. (Appellant) is an engineering and construction firm which was engaged as a subcontractor to design and construct two natural draft cooling towers for the Limerick, Pennsylvania, generating station of Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO). On September 27, 1972, the Bureau of Sales and Use Tax (Bureau) assessed use tax against Appellant on tools, equipment and supplies used in connection with the Limerick construction project. On June 26, 1974, the Board of Finance and Revenue (Board) sustained that portion of the contested assessment which applied to Appellant’s use of materials and tools rented and purchased after March 4,1971.1 This appeal followed.

The contested use tax was assessed on items purchased or rented by Appellant after March 4, 1971. The items include: rock bolts for connecting the cooling towers’ legs to the bedrock (assessed tax is $13.91); certain equipment rented by Appellant, such as a pump, test jack and torque wrench (assessed tax is $25.29); surveying material consumed at the job site (assessed tax is $.60); covering material used at the job site to protect lumber, etc., from the weather [229]*229(assessed tax is $79.72); lumber and nails used to construct temporary weather protection sheds for tools, etc. (assessed tax is $11.80); and lumber and nails used to construct the form for the concrete forming the towers (assessed tax: is $289.68).

The issue is whether all or some of these items are within the “public utility” exemption from the use tax.

Section 201(o) (4) (B) of the Tax Reform Code of 1971 (Code)2 exempts from the definition of “use”, the use or consumption of tangible personal property in any of the operations of:

(iii) The producing, delivering, or rendering of a public utility service, or in constructing, reconstructing, remodeling, repairing, or maintaining the facilities which are directly used in such service, whether or not such facilities constitute real estate: Provided, however, ‘real estate’ shall not include buildings, roads, foundations, or similar facilities. (Emphasis added.)

The section goes on to provide limitations upon this general exemption:

The exclusions provided in subparagraph[s] . . . (iii) . . . shall not apply to . . . materials or supplies to be used or consumed in any construction ... of real estate other than machinery, equipment or parts therefor that may be affixed to such real estate. The exclusions provided in subparagraph[s] . . . (iii) . . . shall not apply to tangible personal property or services to be used or consumed in managerial sales or other nonoperational activities, nor to the purchase or use of tangible personal property by any person other than the person directly using the same in the aforesaid operations.
[230]*230The exclusion provided in subparagraph (iii) shall not apply to (A) construction materials used to construct, reconstruct, remodel, repair or maintain facilities not used directly in the production, delivering or rendition of public utility service, or (B) tools and equipment used but not installed in the maintenance of facilities used directly in the production, delivering or rendition of a public utility service.

It is undisputed that the cooling towers are facilities “directly used” in the rendering of the public utility service and are therefore within the general ambit of the public utility exemption of Section 201 (o) (4) (B) (iii) of the Code. The Commonwealth’s position, however, is that the Code changed the prior law so as to limit the exemption for tools, materials and supplies to only those purchased by the utility itself where the tools, supplies, etc., neither become part of the machinery or equipment transferred to the utility nor become a component part of the facility under construction.

Prior to the effective date of the Code, the applicable statute was the “Tax Act of 1963 for Education” (1963 Act).3 Section 2(n)(4)(c) of that act also exempted from the definition of “use,” the use or consumption of tangible personal property in any of the operations of:

(iii) The producing, delivering or rendering of a public utility service, or in constructing, reconstructing, remodeling, repairing or maintaining the facilities used in such service, whether or not such facilities constitute real estate: Provided, however, ‘real estate’ shall not include buildings. (Emphasis added.)

[231]*231The descriptive phrase “which are directly” was added by the 1971 Code to further modify the phrase “used in such service.” Also, the term “real estate” in the public utility exemption was further narrowed in the 1971 Code to exclude not only buildings but also “roads, foundations, or similar facilities.”

The language in Section 2(n)(4)(c) of the 1963 Act which limited the applicability of the public utility exemption stated:

The exclusions provided in subparagraph[s] . . . (iii) . . . shall not apply to tangible personal property or services to be . used or consumed in managerial sales or other nonoperational activities.
“The exclusion provided in subparagraph (iii) shall not apply to (a), construction materials used to construct, reconstruct, remodel, repair or maintain facilities not used directly in the production, delivering or rendition of public utility , service, or (b) tools and equipment used but not installed in the maintenance of facilities used in the production, delivering or rendition of a public utility service.

The cases which have construed the applicability of the public utility exemption to contractors were all decided prior to the enactment of the Code.

In Commonwealth v. Erie Excavating & Grading Co., 432 Pa. 593, 248 A.2d 191 (1968), the Supreme Court held that a contractor who is constructing facilities for direct use by a public utility in rendering public utility service need not pay tax on tangible personal property used directly in the construction even where his contract is not directly with the utility itself. The Court rejected the Commonwealth’s contention that only the public utility itself may claim the exemption. In so holding, the Court clarified its holding in Commonwealth v. Lafferty, 426 Pa. 541, 233 A.2d 256 (1967) by pointing out that Lafferty only construed the first portion of the public utility exemption, [232]*232i.e., “ [t]lie producing, delivering or rendering of a public utility service” when it held that only public utilities themselves could be exempt under this language. However, the Court, in Erie Excavating & Grading Co., supra, held that the second portion of the exemption, i.e., “or in constructing . . . the facilities used in such service” was not restricted to the utility itself and was therefore available to the contractor.

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Bluebook (online)
366 A.2d 596, 27 Pa. Commw. 226, 1976 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1347, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-ragnar-benson-inc-pacommwct-1976.