Agnes, Peter W., J.
I.INTRODUCTION
1. The defendant, Alissa Pugh, is charged by an indictment in two counts with Manslaughter (G.L.c. 265, §13) and unlawfully conveying away a dead body (G.L.c. 272, §71).1 These criminal charges stem from the gruesome discovery of the mangled body of an infant boy in the “hopper” of a rubbish disposal truck on January 6, 2007. One of the truck personnel discovered the body as he was loading trash into the truck’s hopper as it made its rounds in the vicinity of Purchase and Camp streets in Milford. The child’s head was in a plastic shopping bag. The body appeared to have been partially compacted by the truck’s machinery. The ensuing police investigation led to a single-family home at 263 Purchase Street. The police learned (and there is no dispute), that the infant was born five days earlier to the defendant, who resided at that address with her boyfriend, her then 8 1/2-year-old son Colby, and her boyfriend’s aunt, while unattended and in her bathroom. The circumstances of the birth and the defendant’s conduct during and after the birthing process form the basis of the criminal charges.2
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
2. While it is not necessary for the court to make specific findings of fact in a jury-waived criminal case, I make such findings in this case as are necessary to resolve alternative theories of criminal liability presented by the evidence and to explain the reasoning of the court. Many of the facts are not in dispute. The court heard the testimony of nine witnesses including Dr. Henry Nields, Acting Chief Medical Examiner of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Dr. Drucilla Roberts, a Perinatal Pathologist at Massachusetts General Hospital, Dr. Richard T. Calleiy, Chief Medical Examiner of the State of Delaware, Trooper John Conron of the Massachusetts State Police, Detective Richard Belanger of the Milford Police Department, Christina Voss of Upton, Jacquelyn Meade of Mendon, Kathleen Clandyn of Fitchburg, and Erin Beech of Oakham. The following findings of fact are based on the court’s assessment of the credibility of each witness who testified. Additionally, the court has carefully examined the exhibits which consist of numerous photographs of injuries sustained by the child and video and audio recordings of three interviews of the defendant by the police in the days following discovery of the child’s body.3
3. The defendant did not testify. The only direct evidence of the events surrounding the birth of the child come from statements made by the defendant to the police. On the evening of January 6, 2007, the state and local police responded to the defendant’s home at 263 Purchase Street. The police spoke to Jason Schiappucci, the defendant’s boyfriend and Joanne Schiappucci, his aunt, and learned that the defendant was at her father’s home. The defendant was called and agreed to return home. The home had belonged to Jason’s mother. The defendant did not pay rent to anyone. After being informed of the discovery of the body of the baby boy, she told the police she had not given birth and was not pregnant, and that she was in her menstrual cycle. The defendant, Jason and his aunt all agreed to give the police samples of their DNA. No arrests were made at that time. The parties agree and have stipulated that lab tests of these DNA samples establish that the defendant and her boyfriend are the biological parents of the child.
4. Based on all of the credible evidence, I find that Alissa Pugh gave birth to a baby boy in the late afternoon or early evening hours of January 2, 2007 at 263 Purchase Street, Milford, Massachusetts while alone and inside her bathroom. During the birthing process, the child suffered a series of injuries described more fully below when the defendant pulled his foot and grabbed other parts of his body, including his abdomen, to forcibly release him from the breech position in which he presented. Certain other injuries were suffered by the child that were not established to be antemortem or that were established to be postmortem. There is no evidence that the child suffered from any anatomical anomalies or diseases at birth that could have accounted for or contributed to his death. The defendant gave birth to her first son in a hospital setting and while attended by physicians and nursing personnel on July 4, 1998. The defendant received prenatal care through the Fallon Clinic, including appointments with an OB/GYN physician which was covered as a result of Mass. Health Insurance. The defendant reduced her smoking and stopped drinking during her pregnancy. I do not credit the defendant’s statements to the police that she reduced her smoking and drinking as she had during her first pregnancy once she discovered she was pregnant in 2006. The defendant was about three days ahead of her due date [330]*330with her first child. She gave birth vaginally with the assistance of an episiotomy, a surgical enlargement of the vulval orifice to aid in the deliveiy process, due to the length of the labor. She was informed by the doctors that it may be necessary for her to have a Cesarean section, and then “bearing down” to push the baby out herself. Her “water” was broken by medical staff at the hospital.4 She also recalled that she had attended birthing classes during her pregnancy where she learned about various ways in which babies may be born, and, among other things, that a “breech birth” refers to when the baby is positioned feet first in the birth canal at the time of delivery. She also learned that a Cesarean section is commonly done when a baby presents itself in the breech position at the time of delivery, and that a baby should not be delivered when it is in the breech position because it involves a high degree of risk to the child.
5. Sometime in 2006 the defendant became aware that she was pregnant as a result, in part, of using a home pregnancy testing kit.5 Her last period before the birth of the baby in question was in April 2006. The defendant did not inform anyone else that she was pregnant. She has been in a monogamous relationship with her boyfriend except for a brief sexual relationship with another man in April-May 2006.6 Her relationship with her boyfriend in the fall of 2006 was not good. He was not working and she was supporting a household made up of four people. The defendant was in financial distress. She had only a high-school education. She was employed as a veterinary technician at an animal hospital. Her relationship with her boyfriend improved somewhat in December 2006 when he found part-time work at the post office.
6. The defendant was an occasional patron at a bar in Milford known as the Marchiegiano Club. The defendant’s boyfriend Jason was a regular patron at this bar. On several occasions, including a date in October 2006, December 9, 2006 and December 30, 2006, the defendant was observed to be drinking alcohol (on one occasion as much as six shots) and smoking cigarettes, and was intoxicated on at least one of those occasions. She was overheard by other patrons, including the bartender, to state that she and her boyfriend were not going to have any more children.7
7. During 2006 and until the day in question, the defendant did not have any health insurance. She had health insurance when her son was born in 1998 but it lapsed. She was reminded that she lacked insurance for her son when he attended kindergarten, but she took no steps to apply for Mass. Health insurance or any other such insurance coverage for herself or her son.
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Agnes, Peter W., J.
I.INTRODUCTION
1. The defendant, Alissa Pugh, is charged by an indictment in two counts with Manslaughter (G.L.c. 265, §13) and unlawfully conveying away a dead body (G.L.c. 272, §71).1 These criminal charges stem from the gruesome discovery of the mangled body of an infant boy in the “hopper” of a rubbish disposal truck on January 6, 2007. One of the truck personnel discovered the body as he was loading trash into the truck’s hopper as it made its rounds in the vicinity of Purchase and Camp streets in Milford. The child’s head was in a plastic shopping bag. The body appeared to have been partially compacted by the truck’s machinery. The ensuing police investigation led to a single-family home at 263 Purchase Street. The police learned (and there is no dispute), that the infant was born five days earlier to the defendant, who resided at that address with her boyfriend, her then 8 1/2-year-old son Colby, and her boyfriend’s aunt, while unattended and in her bathroom. The circumstances of the birth and the defendant’s conduct during and after the birthing process form the basis of the criminal charges.2
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
2. While it is not necessary for the court to make specific findings of fact in a jury-waived criminal case, I make such findings in this case as are necessary to resolve alternative theories of criminal liability presented by the evidence and to explain the reasoning of the court. Many of the facts are not in dispute. The court heard the testimony of nine witnesses including Dr. Henry Nields, Acting Chief Medical Examiner of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Dr. Drucilla Roberts, a Perinatal Pathologist at Massachusetts General Hospital, Dr. Richard T. Calleiy, Chief Medical Examiner of the State of Delaware, Trooper John Conron of the Massachusetts State Police, Detective Richard Belanger of the Milford Police Department, Christina Voss of Upton, Jacquelyn Meade of Mendon, Kathleen Clandyn of Fitchburg, and Erin Beech of Oakham. The following findings of fact are based on the court’s assessment of the credibility of each witness who testified. Additionally, the court has carefully examined the exhibits which consist of numerous photographs of injuries sustained by the child and video and audio recordings of three interviews of the defendant by the police in the days following discovery of the child’s body.3
3. The defendant did not testify. The only direct evidence of the events surrounding the birth of the child come from statements made by the defendant to the police. On the evening of January 6, 2007, the state and local police responded to the defendant’s home at 263 Purchase Street. The police spoke to Jason Schiappucci, the defendant’s boyfriend and Joanne Schiappucci, his aunt, and learned that the defendant was at her father’s home. The defendant was called and agreed to return home. The home had belonged to Jason’s mother. The defendant did not pay rent to anyone. After being informed of the discovery of the body of the baby boy, she told the police she had not given birth and was not pregnant, and that she was in her menstrual cycle. The defendant, Jason and his aunt all agreed to give the police samples of their DNA. No arrests were made at that time. The parties agree and have stipulated that lab tests of these DNA samples establish that the defendant and her boyfriend are the biological parents of the child.
4. Based on all of the credible evidence, I find that Alissa Pugh gave birth to a baby boy in the late afternoon or early evening hours of January 2, 2007 at 263 Purchase Street, Milford, Massachusetts while alone and inside her bathroom. During the birthing process, the child suffered a series of injuries described more fully below when the defendant pulled his foot and grabbed other parts of his body, including his abdomen, to forcibly release him from the breech position in which he presented. Certain other injuries were suffered by the child that were not established to be antemortem or that were established to be postmortem. There is no evidence that the child suffered from any anatomical anomalies or diseases at birth that could have accounted for or contributed to his death. The defendant gave birth to her first son in a hospital setting and while attended by physicians and nursing personnel on July 4, 1998. The defendant received prenatal care through the Fallon Clinic, including appointments with an OB/GYN physician which was covered as a result of Mass. Health Insurance. The defendant reduced her smoking and stopped drinking during her pregnancy. I do not credit the defendant’s statements to the police that she reduced her smoking and drinking as she had during her first pregnancy once she discovered she was pregnant in 2006. The defendant was about three days ahead of her due date [330]*330with her first child. She gave birth vaginally with the assistance of an episiotomy, a surgical enlargement of the vulval orifice to aid in the deliveiy process, due to the length of the labor. She was informed by the doctors that it may be necessary for her to have a Cesarean section, and then “bearing down” to push the baby out herself. Her “water” was broken by medical staff at the hospital.4 She also recalled that she had attended birthing classes during her pregnancy where she learned about various ways in which babies may be born, and, among other things, that a “breech birth” refers to when the baby is positioned feet first in the birth canal at the time of delivery. She also learned that a Cesarean section is commonly done when a baby presents itself in the breech position at the time of delivery, and that a baby should not be delivered when it is in the breech position because it involves a high degree of risk to the child.
5. Sometime in 2006 the defendant became aware that she was pregnant as a result, in part, of using a home pregnancy testing kit.5 Her last period before the birth of the baby in question was in April 2006. The defendant did not inform anyone else that she was pregnant. She has been in a monogamous relationship with her boyfriend except for a brief sexual relationship with another man in April-May 2006.6 Her relationship with her boyfriend in the fall of 2006 was not good. He was not working and she was supporting a household made up of four people. The defendant was in financial distress. She had only a high-school education. She was employed as a veterinary technician at an animal hospital. Her relationship with her boyfriend improved somewhat in December 2006 when he found part-time work at the post office.
6. The defendant was an occasional patron at a bar in Milford known as the Marchiegiano Club. The defendant’s boyfriend Jason was a regular patron at this bar. On several occasions, including a date in October 2006, December 9, 2006 and December 30, 2006, the defendant was observed to be drinking alcohol (on one occasion as much as six shots) and smoking cigarettes, and was intoxicated on at least one of those occasions. She was overheard by other patrons, including the bartender, to state that she and her boyfriend were not going to have any more children.7
7. During 2006 and until the day in question, the defendant did not have any health insurance. She had health insurance when her son was born in 1998 but it lapsed. She was reminded that she lacked insurance for her son when he attended kindergarten, but she took no steps to apply for Mass. Health insurance or any other such insurance coverage for herself or her son. From the time the defendant first became aware she was pregnant until the birth of the baby boy on January 2, 2007, the defendant did not seek or receive any prenatal care and had not seen a doctor in years.
8. On January 2, 2007, the defendant went to work at the Milford Animal Hospital at 12:00 p.m. At about 3:00 p.m., she began to feel pains in her abdomen which she recognized as contractions. From her experience with the birth of her first son, she understood that contractions were associated with the birth of a child. She reported only that she was not feeling well and went home at 4:00 p.m. The defendant told her boyfriend and her aunt that she did not feel well and they left her alone. The defendant went to her bedroom and lay down. She was in and out of the bathroom several times. The contractions continued. At some point, the contractions were about one minute apart. The defendant did not call for help to her boyfriend who was at home, to her aunt who was upstairs, or to anyone else. Although the home telephone was not working, there was at least one working cell phone in the home. At some point she went into the bathroom and her “water” broke. From the birth of her first son she understood that the discharge of “water” was a step in the birthing process. There was some additional discharge from her vagina. The defendant did not call for help to her boyfriend who was at home, to her aunt who was upstairs or to anyone else. An interval of time of at approximately forty-five minutes in duration passed from when the defendant arrived home until her water broke and all the while she was having contractions.
9. After her water broke and while in the bathroom, the defendant reached inside herself and felt a foot. The defendant pulled the baby’s foot and then a leg appeared. She pulled the baby’s legs and abdomen and other parts of the baby’s body to hasten the process of delivery. The defendant knew that it was dangerous to deliver a baby feet first. She had to push ten times in addition to pulling. At one point, the baby seemed to be stuck inside the defendant. The defendant remained conscious throughout this period of time. Eventually, after about six minutes of pulling coupled with pushing by the defendant, the baby emerged from the mother and fell into the toilet bowl. It is unclear what followed immediately after the actual birth of the baby and, therefore, I make no findings as to what the defendant did or did not do in the moments immediately following the delivery other than a finding that she did not call out for help or phone for help. The defendant was able to stand and move about while she was in the bathroom before the delivery and immediately thereafter. At some point shortly after the delivery, the defendant became aware that the baby was dead. The defendant put the baby in a plastic bag which she found in the bathroom and brought it outside and put it in a gray trash container. She then returned to the bathroom, cleaned herself and the bathroom, and took the baby outside and deposited it in a trash can behind the house. The defendant used pads to soak up her own blood and bodily discharges. The defendant said nothing to her boyfriend or his aunt that evening. She went to work the following day.
[331]*33110. Based on the testimony given by Dr. Nields, Dr. Roberts, and Dr. Callery, I find that on January 2, 2007, the baby in question was nearly full term at 36 1/2 weeks and viable, that is capable of living outside of the mother’s womb. I also find from all the evidence that the baby was viable during the birthing process and up to the point when the defendant began to pull it out. The baby was 21 3/4 inches long and weighed 6 1/2 pounds despite the fact that most of its brain was missing. There was no evidence of a diseased or abnormal placenta or umbilical cord, an infection, or the presence of illegal drugs in the baby’s system. I further find that apart from the postmortem injuries caused by the trash compactor into which the baby had been dumped along with other trash, and certain other injuries that the medical experts could not determine to be antemortem or postmortem, the baby suffered a series of injuries before death and during the birthing process which are depicted in exhibits la to lh. I credit the testimony of the expert witnesses who opined that injuries to the child’s body characterized by the presence of “abundant” amounts of blood or hemorrhaging in the areas of injury can be regarded as antemortem or prior to death. The areas of these prior-to-death injuries include the area underneath the scalp, the neck, the right and left lobes of the liver, and the tissue around the testicles. These antemortem injuries resulted in a substantial amount of bleeding into the abdominal cavity. I find that these injuries did not occur before birth and while the baby was in his mother’s uterus. From other findings made above, I infer that these prior-to-death injuries were caused by the defendant pulling at the baby boy’s legs and grabbing other parts of his body with significant force in an effort to accelerate the process of delivery. I find that at least some of these injuries required the application of a significant amount of force such as pressing down hard with a person’s thumb or a hard clamping down on the defendant’s abdomen. I find that the baby boy in question did not die of natural causes.
12. There are some facts that I conclude the Commonwealth has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the Commonwealth has not proved precisely when in 2006 the defendant first became aware she was pregnant. Second, the Commonwealth has not proved that the baby was alive, i.e., had a heart beat or was breathing on its own when it fully emerged from the defendant and was fully delivered. Third, it is left to speculation and thus not proved that the baby would have lived if the defendant had called for help when her water broke and she first felt the baby’s foot.8 Although there is evidence of some air in the baby’s lungs, it is left to speculation and thus not proved that it was the result of respiration on the part of the baby or due to some other cause.
13. Based on a consideration of all of the evidence, I find that the defendant caused the death of her baby boy on January 2, 2007 during the birthing process as a result of applying significant force to various parts of his body, that at the time of her acts she was aware that her conduct involved a high degree of risk to the life of the baby, that her conduct was not undertaken to save the life of the baby or her own life, and that her conduct was not the result of a mere mistake of judgment about what conduct was reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances.
RULINGS OF LAW Involuntary Manslaughter9
14. In a jury-waived trial, the rulings of law serve the purpose of instructions in a jury trial and explain the law applied by the court to the facts. The Commonwealth outlined three alternative theories of criminal liability for the offense of involuntary manslaughter in its closing argument. First, the Commonwealth alleges that the defendant is guilty because she failed to summon emergency medical assistance at least upon feeling the baby’s foot. Second, the Commonwealth alleges that the defendant is guilty because she acted to pull the baby out of her body without first requesting emergency medical assistance. Third, the Commonwealth alleges that the defendant is guilty because she did act reasonably to care for her newborn baby boy after delivery. The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the offenses charged against the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Harrington, 379 Mass. 446, 452-53 (1980), and cases cited.
15. Involuntary manslaughter is “an unlawful homicide, unintentionally caused ... by an act which constitutes such a disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to constitute wanton or reckless conduct.” Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779, 783 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell 352 Mass. 387, 397 (1967). “The essence of wanton or reckless conduct is intentional conduct, by way either of commission or omission where there is a duty to act, which conduct involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another.” Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399 (1944). “To constitute wanton or reckless conduct, as distinguished from mere negligence, grave danger to others must have been apparent, and the defendant must have chosen to run the risk rather than alter his conduct so as to avoid the act or omission which caused the harm.” Id. at 398.
15. “The words ‘wanton’ and ‘reckless’ constitute conduct that is ‘different in kind’ than negligence or gross negligence. It has been defined as ‘intentional conduct... involving] a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another.’ To constitute wanton or reckless conduct, ‘the risk of death or grave bodily injuiy must be known or reasonably apparent, and the harm must be a probable consequence of the defendant’s election to run that risk or of his failure reasonably to recognize it.’ Under Massachusetts law, [332]*332recklessness has an objective component as well as a subjective component. A defendant can be convicted of manslaughter even if he was ‘so stupid [or] so heedless . . . that in fact he did not realize the grave danger... if an ordinaiy normal man under the same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the danger.” Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 452 (2000). Although it is true that recklessness must involve an intentional act or omission, a finding of recklessness is grounded in intent to engage in the reckless conduct, and not intent to bring about the harmful result. Commonwealth v. Bouvier, 316 Mass. 489, 494 (1944) (“It is settled in cases of homicide that one who wantonly or recklessly does an act that results in the death of a human being is guilty of manslaughter although he did not contemplate such a result”).
16. A “viable fetus” is a fetus “so far formed and developed that if then born it would be capable of living.” Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. 683, 689 (2000), quoting Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 448 (1967). It is not necessaiy that the Commonwealth prove that the defendant is aware that a fetus is viable to be guilty of homicide. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. 683, 691 (2000). One who engages in wanton or reckless conduct and who thereby causes the death of a viable fetus is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. See id. at 689. See also Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 801 (1984) (“We look to the common law as to whether a viable fetus can be the victim of a homicide and conclude that it can”).10
17. When the defendant discovered she was having a baby on the afternoon of January 2, 2007 and later felt a protruding foot, she was aware that there was a substantial risk of harm to the child unless she sought professional assistance. There is no evidence that she believed that the baby was already dead. There is no evidence that her life was in danger. There is no evidence that she was too weak or disabled to call for help. There is no credible evidence that she acted in an effort to save the life of the child or that the delivery was nearly instantaneous. While it is true that the defendant could not possibly know how long it would take for emergency personnel to arrive if called, her decision to pull and grab the baby in an effort to dislodge its head and deliver the baby by using a significant amount of force to bring about the delivery constituted a wanton and reckless act.11
18. The court is mindful that the Massachusetts Constitution protects a person from unwarranted government interference into “protected spheres of life.” See Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 329 (2005). See also Moe v. Secretary of Administration and Finance, 382 Mass. 629, 648-49 (1981), and cases cited. In addition to the protections of Massachusetts law, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the United States Supreme Court “recognized the right of a woman to make certain [fundamental decisions] affecting her destiny and confirmed once more that the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003).12 However, there is no claim in this case that principles of substantive due process under either state or federal law forbid the Commonwealth from prosecuting a woman for inflicting fatal injuries on a viable and near-full-term fetus during the birthing process.13 Moreover, the defendant’s conduct in this case transgresses the public policy of the Commonwealth. See G.L.c. 112, §12M (an abortion involving a pregnancy that has existed for twenty-four weeks or more can only be performed by a physician “and only if it is necessaiy to save the life of the mother, or if a continuation of her pregnancy will impose on her a substantial risk of grave impairment of her physical or mental health”); 130 C.M.R. §484.005 (providing that abortions may only be performed by licensed and qualified physicians in either a clinic or hospital setting; and providing further that “[a] third trimester abortion must be performed only to save the life of the mother or to eliminate substantial risk of grave impairment to her physical or mental health”).14
19.This Court also is mindful that the Supreme Judicial Court has ruled that the special relationship that exists between a mother and a fetus in útero calls for different standards when assessing the potential civil liability of the mother for negligent behavior. See Remy v. MacDonald, 440 Mass. 675, 683 (2004) (“We conclude that there are inherent and important differences between a fetus, in útero, and a child already born, that permits a bright line to be drawn around the zone of potential tort liability of one who is still biologically joined to an injured plaintiff’). The Remy decision is based in part on other public policy concerns that in a myriad of situations courts are not equipped to formulate the duty that may be owed by a pregnant woman to her fetus. For example, imagine tort actions brought by children based on a claim that while their mothers were pregnant they did not obtain adequate prenatal care, did not refrain from the consumption of foods or the use of substances that could be harmful to a fetus, did not exercise enough and get sufficient sleep, or did not arrange for a medical person or other helper to be present during childbirth. The Remy case does not mean, however, that pregnant women are exempt from all potential criminal liability for their conduct with respect to their unborn children. Recognition that a legal duty exists on the part of a pregnant woman to refrain from wanton or reckless acts committed against her own viable fetus does not impermissibly intrude into “protected spheres of life.” Goodridge, supra, 440 Mass. at 329, involves the application of an ascertainable standard, and is consistent with the public policy of the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 414 Mass. 402, 406 [333]*333n.7 (1993) (Supreme Judicial Court reversed a trial judge for violating Article 30 of the Declaration of Rights (separation of powers) by dismissing a charge of unlawful possession of cocaine brought against a pregnant woman that was based on evidence gathered from tests of her infant’s urine. The test results indicated the presence of metabolites of cocaine suggesting mother had consumed it during her pregnancy. The Court specifically left open the question whether a newborn’s urinalysis revealing cocaine metabolites is enough evidence to support a conviction of the mother for possession of a controlled substance.).15
Unlawfully Conveying Away a Body
20. The defendant is charged in count two with unlawfully conveying away a body. G.L.c. 272, §71 provides, in part, that “(w]hoever, not being lawfully authorized by the proper authorities, wilfully .. . conveys away a human body, or the remains thereof or knowingly aids in such . . . conveying away . . . shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than three years or in jail for not more than two and one-half years or by a fine of not more than four thousand dollars.”
21. The court finds (and it was not contested at trial) that following the delivery of her baby on January 2, 2007, the defendant placed the body in a plastic bag, brought it outside the home, and placed it inside a trash receptacle. This conduct constitutes a violation of G.L.c. 272, §71.
ORDER
In a criminal case tried without a jury, the court’s responsibility is to apply the law to the facts it finds in order to reach a true and just verdict based solely on the law and the evidence. 16 Based on the above findings of fact and rulings of law, the court finds that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Alissa Pugh, is guilty of Manslaughter (involuntary) and of unlawfully conveying away a human body. The case will stand for sentencing in accordance with Mass.R.Crim.P. 28(b).