Commonwealth v. Pollins

10 Pa. D. & C.4th 530, 1991 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 298
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, York County
DecidedApril 15, 1991
Docketno. 1849-1990
StatusPublished

This text of 10 Pa. D. & C.4th 530 (Commonwealth v. Pollins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, York County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Pollins, 10 Pa. D. & C.4th 530, 1991 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 298 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).

Opinion

CASSIMATIS, J.,

The issue raised in the petition of the above-named defendants to compel ARD reconsideration is whether the district attorney may take into consideration in rejecting an ARD application that the applicant refuses to sign a waiver of expungement of the applicant’s record if he satisfactorily completes the ARD probation. Our conclusion is that the district attorney may not consider such refusal.

Testimony was taken concerning 17 of the 21 above cases.1 From the testimony we find the [531]*531following facts which are pertinent to our disposition of the issue before us.

On May 14, 1990, the district attorney of York County implemented a policy that added a waiver of expungement to the ARD application from York County defendants.2 He related this came as a result of attending a district attorney’s meeting in Philadelphia in February,' and the failure of an applicant to sign the waiver is a factor he considers in approving applications.

The district attorney acknowledged in his review of the 17 cases covered in the testimony that in four of them he also considered as a factor in approving ARD applications the failure of the defendant to sign the waiver of expungement.3 In one of these four [532]*532cases, he could not say without looking at the file if he would have approved the ARD application had the defendant signed the waiver of expungement.4 However, the district attorney acknowledges in his brief that “[he] admits that the waiver is one of the factors he considers in approving applications.”

In none of the letters of rejection to the petitioners does the district attorney enumerate as a reason for not presenting the- case for the ARD program the failure of the applicant to sign the waiver of ex-pungement.

A leading case in Pennsylvania on the district attorney’s role in the ARD process is Commonwealth v. Lutz, 508 Pa. 297, 495 A.2d 928 (1985). These principles are therein stated:

(1) “Admission to an ARD program is not a matter of right but a privilege.”

(2) “[T]he decision to submit the case for ARD rests on the sound discretion of the district attorney and absent an abuse of that discretion involving some criteria for admission to ARD wholly, patently, and without doubt unrelated to the protection of society and/or the likelihood of a person’s success in rehabilitation, such as race, religion, or other such obviously prohibited considerations, the attorney for the Commonwealth must be free to submit a case or not submit it for ARD consideration based on his view of what is most beneficial for society and the offender.”

(3) The district attorney must openly specify his “reasons for not submitting a case for ARD, and those reasons while they may be subject to disagreement as to their wisdom [must] not amount to an abuse of discretion.”

The case sub judice presents two anomalies:

[533]*533(1) The district attorney admits that the waiver of expungement is a factor considered in approving applications, yet in none of the writtep statements to the defendants is it stated as a reason for refusing to present the ARD application.

(2) The district attorney argues that the petitioners’ instant petition is not timely presented, as the issues of expungement may only properly be raised upon completion of the program. District attorney’s brief, at 4. The district attorney does not explain how a proper completion of the program can be reached if the petitioners are not admitted to the ARD program in the first instance.

Focusing on the issue before us, the propriety of the district attorney considering the failure to sign a waiver of expungement as a permissible factor in determining eligibility for participating in the ARD program, the district attorney argues that his “decision to consider the ‘expungement waiver’ is justified by his concern of undetected repeat offenders.5 While expungement after completion of the ARD program may grant the offender a ‘clean record,’ it opens the door for future offenses in which the person may make application in other counties, suggesting he has no prior record, and such a system could go undetected for a time indeterminate.” District attorney’s brief, at 5.

The district attorney is not asserting that as a matter of general policy he will refuse recommending for ARD every ARD applicant who refuses to [534]*534sign a waiver of expungement, only that it “is merely one consideration.” District attorney’s brief, at 6.

The district attorney’s expungement policy is thus grounded upon “the protection of society” areas of concern.

“Our Supreme Court in Lutz made it clear that the criteria for admission to an ARD program may relate to either one of two distinct areas of concern: ‘[1] the protection of society and/or [2] the likelihood of a person’s success in rehabilitation.’ Lutz, 508 Pa. at 310, 495 A.2d at 935, set forth in context, above. In fashioning his program for admission into ARD, the Bucks County district attorney has chosen to place the emphasis on the protection of society. We are not prepared to declare that the district attorney has abused the discretion lodged in that office when he suspends the prosecution of (and considers recommending for ARD) only that class of drivers not involved in an accident with another occupied vehicle:

“Once it is determined that the general policy bears some rational relationship to the protection of the public, it is improper to consider the manner in which or the degree to which that acceptable policy affects a specific driver.” Commonwealth v. Stranges, 397 Pa. Super. 59, 579 A.2d 930 (1990).

Applying the above principles to the district attorney’s questioned policy, two issues are raised:

(1) Does the district attorney’s considering an ARD applicant’s failure to sign an expungement waiver constitute a “general policy” so as to bring it within the scope of the Stranges case (where the district attorney had a per se rule of denying ARD to a DUI operator involved in a collision with another occupied vehicle). The answer is “no.” Instantly, there is obviously no such per se rule.

[535]*535(2) May the district attorney require or consider the failure of an ARD applicant to sign an expungement waiver in view of the fact that Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 189 provides for the court “automatic expungement of defendant’s arrest record upon the successful completion of the ARD program unless the district attorney objects and demonstrates overriding societal interest in retaining records of arrest.” The answer again is

Our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 495 Pa. 506, 434 A.2d 1205 (1981), stressed “the policies underpinning the concept of ARD weigh heavily in favor of expungement.” In Armstrong, the ARD probationer was a first offender charged with theft by deception.

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Related

Commonwealth v. Armstrong
434 A.2d 1205 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1981)
Commonwealth v. Stranges
579 A.2d 930 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1990)
Commonwealth v. Lutz
495 A.2d 928 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1985)
Commonwealth v. Wexler
431 A.2d 877 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1981)

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Bluebook (online)
10 Pa. D. & C.4th 530, 1991 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 298, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-pollins-pactcomplyork-1991.