Commonwealth v. Perry

710 A.2d 1183, 1998 Pa. Super. LEXIS 637
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 17, 1998
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 710 A.2d 1183 (Commonwealth v. Perry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Perry, 710 A.2d 1183, 1998 Pa. Super. LEXIS 637 (Pa. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

STEVENS, Judge:

This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County. Appellant Dodd Perry was found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving under suspension, DUI related. Appellant claims that the statements he made to Pennsylvania State Police Trooper, James McCormick, Jr., were the product of an illegal custodial interrogation, due, in part, to the fact that questioning occurred while Appellant was being treated in the emergency room. Therefore, Appellant asserts, the statements should have been suppressed. We affirm.

The standard of review in a motion to suppress is clear: When reviewing the suppression court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we must first ascertain whether the record supports the suppression court’s factual findings. See Commonwealth v. Dangle, 700 A.2d 538 (Pa.Super.1997). We are bound by the suppression court’s findings if they are supported by the record, and may only reverse the suppression court if the legal conclusions drawn from the findings are in error. Id.

*1185 With this standard of review in mind, the record reveals the following: Appellant was involved in an automobile accident on the morning of March 1, 1996. The trooper responded to the accident and noticed Appellant, but did not speak to him. The trooper did speak to an emergency medical technician (EMT) who was on the scene and who indicated to the trooper that he noticed the odor of alcohol on Appellant’s breath. Because Appellant suffered injury from the accident, he had been taken to an area hospital.

Trooper McCormick, following standard police procedure, proceeded to the hospital to further investigate the accident. Upon his arrival at the hospital, the trooper located Appellant and questioned him about the accident. During questioning, Appellant was lying on his back on a gurney, wearing a neck brace, and had intravenous tubes in his arms. Hospital staff, along with Appellant’s mother and fiance, were present intermittently during the questioning.

While questioning Appellant, the trooper noticed an odor of alcohol on Appellant’s breath. The trooper asked Appellant whether he was the driver of the automobile, to which he responded, “Yes.” Trooper McCormick then asked Appellant if he had been drinking, and Appellant responded that he had “five to six Molsen beers at the Pub” prior to the accident. The trooper then placed Appellant under arrest and read him Miranda 1 warnings. Subsequently, the trooper obtained a search warrant for Appellant’s blood alcohol test results. Appellant’s blood alcohol content was measured at .12 percent, which was greater than the legal limit.

On March 22, 1996, in connection with the accident of March 1, 1996, Appellant was charged with the offenses of driving under the influence of alcohol, 2 careless driving, 3 driving a vehicle at an unsafe speed, 4 and driving while operating privileges were suspended or revoked. 5 In pre-trial motions, Appellant moved to suppress the statements he had made to the trooper at the hospital because the questioning occurred during what Appellant termed “custodial interrogation” prior to him being properly read the required Miranda warnings.

As a result of the questioning, the trial court determined that the trooper had probable cause to obtain a search warrant for blood test results, from which Appellant’s blood alcohol content was determined. The trial court found that the trooper’s questioning of Appellant was proper and that the statements made by Appellant were admissible. On January 13, 1997, Appellant was tried in the Court of Common Pleas of Ly-coming County, and was found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving while his operating privileges were suspended or revoked, DUI related. This appeal followed.

The sole issue presented on appeal is whether Appellant was subject to “custodial interrogation” while questioned in the emergency room which would have triggered the need for Miranda warnings. Appellant argues that due to his immobilization in the hospital he was “in custody” when questioned by Trooper McCormick. 6 Additionally, Appellant asserts there were several indications that he did not want to answer the questions. Appellant further supports his claim of custodial interrogation via the testimony of his mother and fiance, who testified that they asked the trooper to leave Appellant alone several times.

The trooper testified as a “following up” to his automobile accident investigation, he proceeded to the hospital and questioned Appellant, which was standard practice by troopers. The trooper further testified that at no time during the questioning did Appellant ask for the questioning to stop or ask the trooper to leave prior to Miranda warnings *1186 being issued. Trooper McCormick testified that the arrest was incident to a routine traffic accident investigation.

The test for determining whether a suspect is “in custody” which necessitates Miranda warnings is whether he is physically deprived of his freedom in any significant manner or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by such interrogation. See Miranda, supra. Miranda warnings are necessary only when a suspect is subject to actual “custodial interrogation.” The fact that a defendant was the focus of an investigation is a relevant factor in determining whether he was “in custody.” However, the fact that a police investigation has focused on a particular person no longer automatically requires Miranda warnings. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1616-17, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976); Commonwealth v. Holcomb, 508 Pa. 425, 440, 498 A.2d 833, 840 (1985), cert.denied, 475 U.S. 1150, 106 S.Ct. 1804, 90 L.Ed.2d 349 (1986). However, a suspect may be “in custody” even in instances where the police have not taken him to a police station or formally arrested him. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 466 Pa. 216, 220, 352 A.2d 26, 28 (1976).

This Court, in Commonwealth v. Fento 363 Pa.Super. 488, 526 A.2d 784 (1984), found that an officer’s routine questioning of a driver, while the driver was being treated at the hospital, was not tantamount to custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. Fento, supra.

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Bluebook (online)
710 A.2d 1183, 1998 Pa. Super. LEXIS 637, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-perry-pasuperct-1998.