Commonwealth v. Patrick G. Dooley.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: May 13, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0609
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-609

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

PATRICK G. DOOLEY.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a bench trial, a District Court judge found the

defendant, Patrick G. Dooley, guilty of operating a motor

vehicle after his license had been suspended for having operated

a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol (OUI), G. L.

c. 90, § 23, but not responsible for the civil infraction of

speeding, G. L. c. 90, § 17. The defendant appeals, arguing

that the Commonwealth did not prove that he had notice that his

license had been suspended, and that, because the judge found

him not responsible for speeding, the judge should have ordered

suppression of all evidence gleaned from the traffic stop. We

affirm. Background. On January 24, 2024, at around 5 P.M., a

Bedford police officer saw a car that appeared to be traveling

faster than the posted twenty-five mile per hour limit. Using a

radar gun, the officer clocked the car as traveling at forty-one

miles per hour. The officer stopped the car, which was being

driven by the defendant. When the officer asked for his license

and registration, the defendant replied that his license had

been suspended for OUI, and it was still suspended. From a

criminal records database, the officer confirmed that the

defendant's license was suspended for OUI. The officer arrested

the defendant.

At trial, the Commonwealth introduced certified copies of

the defendant's Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) records, which

showed that his driver's license had been suspended for two

years because of a conviction for OUI. Arguing that the RMV

records did not show that a suspension notice had been mailed to

him, the defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty,

which the judge denied. The judge found the defendant guilty of

operating a motor vehicle after his license was suspended for

OUI, but not responsible for the speeding infraction. The

present appeal followed.

Discussion. The defendant first contends that there was

insufficient evidence to prove that, at the time of the traffic

stop, he had notice that his license was suspended. Notice can

2 be proven by evidence of proper mailing of a notice of

suspension by the RMV. Commonwealth v. Deramo, 436 Mass. 40,

51-52 (2002). In addition, "[t]he element of notice can be

proved by evidence showing that the defendant had actual (or

constructive) knowledge of the suspension." Commonwealth v.

Cueva, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 780, 787 (2019).

To support his argument that the Commonwealth did not prove

he had notice of his license suspension, the defendant relies on

Commonwealth v. Oyewole, 470 Mass. 1015, 1016 (2014). In that

case, "[t]here was [] no evidence that the defendant

acknowledged, at the time of the stop or at any other time, that

he was aware of the suspension." Id. Here, in contrast, the

officer testified that during the stop the defendant admitted he

knew his license was suspended for OUI. The officer's testimony

to the defendant's admission proved the defendant's knowledge

that his license was suspended for OUI. See Deramo, 436 Mass.

at 51 (notice of license revocation proven by defendant's

"admission that he knew that his license had been revoked").

Contrast Cueva, 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 788 (no admission by

defendant). We discern no error in the judge's denial of the

motion for a required finding of not guilty.

The defendant next contends, for the first time on appeal,

that because the judge found him not responsible for speeding,

she should have, sua sponte, suppressed as "fruits" of an

3 illegal stop all evidence gathered from the stop -- including

the defendant's admission that he knew his license was suspended

for OUI, the information the officer learned from the criminal

records database, and the RMV records. The argument is

unavailing. The judge's finding that the Commonwealth had not

proven the speeding infraction by a preponderance of the

evidence did not mean that the officer lacked the requisite

basis to stop the defendant's car. See Commonwealth v.

Teixeira-Furtado, 474 Mass. 1009, 1011 (2016) (stop for speeding

must be "supported by articulable facts sufficient to warrant a

reasonably prudent person in the police officer's position in

forming [the] conclusion" that violation had occurred). Here,

the officer saw the defendant's car moving at a high speed,

confirmed with a radar gun that the car was traveling nearly

twenty miles per hour over the posted speed limit, and then

pulled over the car.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Grant, Walsh & Brennan, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: May 13, 2026.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.