Commonwealth v. Osman, M., Aplt.

Opinions

[J-85-2025] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 81 MAP 2024 : Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the : Superior Court at No. 380 MDA : 2023 dated January 8, 2024, v. : Affirming and Remanding the : Judgment of Sentence of the : Dauphin County Court of Common MICHAEL DEAN OSMAN, : Pleas, Criminal Division, at No. CP- : 22-CR-0001818-2020 dated Appellant : November 30, 2022 : : ARGUED: October 8, 2025

OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE DECIDED: July 21, 2026 Under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 1 sex

offenses are “classified in a three-tiered system composed of Tier I sexual offenses, Tier

II sexual offenses and Tier III sexual offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(a). In this appeal,

we consider the application of Section 9799.14(d)(16), which assigns the most serious

tier classification under SORNA (Tier III) to an offender who accumulates “[t]wo or more

convictions of offenses listed as Tier I or Tier II sexual offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S. §

9799.14(d)(16). Tier III classification carries with it significant civil consequences in terms

of registration and reporting requirements. 2 Pertinent here, the Sentencing Code also

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.11-9799.75. 2 For example, commission of a Tier III offense requires the offender to register with the Pennsylvania State Police for life. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a)(3). By contrast, Tier I and (continued…) mandates a consecutive three-year term of probation on any individual who commits a

Tier III offense in addition to any other sentence imposed, including a statutory maximum

sentence. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9718.5(a), (b).

In this case, a jury convicted Appellant, Michael Dean Osman (“Osman”), of both

Tier I and Tier II offenses at the same trial. The trial court imposed a Section 9718.5(a)

sentence, reasoning that Section 9799.14(d)(16) applied although Osman had no record

of prior sexual offenses. The Superior Court affirmed, applying its own interpretation of

Section 9799.14(d)(16).

We reverse that aspect of the Superior Court’s decision. Consistent with our

precedent interpreting nearly identical language in A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 143

A.3d 896, 908 (Pa. 2016) (“A.S. v. PSP”), and the very same provision in Commonwealth

v. Lutz-Morrison, 143 A.3d 891 (Pa. 2016), we hold that to trigger Section 9718.5(a)’s

mandatory sentence by application of Section 9799.14(d)(16), there must be “an act, a

conviction, and a subsequent act[.]” A.S. v. PSP, 143 A.3d at 908; Lutz-Morrison, 143

A.3d at 895. Because Osman’s convictions did not trigger application of Section

9799.14(d)(16), his Section 9718.5(a) sentence is illegal.

Background

In August 2022, a jury convicted Osman of corruption of minors, unlawful contact

with a minor, and indecent assault. 3 Prior to sentencing, Osman was evaluated by the

Sexual Offender Assessment Board, which determined that Osman did not meet the

statutory criteria of a sexually violent predator. N.T., 11/30/2022, at 2. A sentencing

Tier II offenses require registration periods of ten and twenty-five years, respectively. Id. § 9799.15(a)(1), (2). 3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301, 6318, 3126. The jury acquitted Osman of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and indecent exposure stemming from the same criminal information. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123, 3127. The facts underlying Osman’s convictions are undisputed and irrelevant to this appeal.

[J-85-2025] - 2 hearing followed on November 30, 2022. For corruption of minors, the court imposed a

sentence of one to three years of incarceration. Id. at 13-14. For unlawful contact and

indecent assault, the court initially sentenced Osman to concurrent terms of one to three

years of incarceration and three to twelve months of incarceration, respectively. Id. at 14.

Immediately after that sentence was announced, however, the prosecutor advised the

court that Osman was also subject to a consecutive, three-year term of probation. 4 Id. at

15. The court agreed and orally amended the sentence for unlawful contact, replacing

the concurrent term of one to three years of incarceration with a three-year probation term

to run consecutive to the sentence for corruption of minors. 5 Id. at 16.

Osman filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court stated in its Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a) opinion that it was compelled to impose a consecutive three-year period of

probation for a Tier III offense. Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/2023, at 14 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. §

9718.5). The court noted that the text of Section 9799(d)(16) indicates that a Tier III

classification applies when a person is convicted of two or more Tier I or Tier II offenses.

Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799(d)(16)). It therefore concluded that Osman was correctly

sentenced to a mandatory period of probation because he was convicted of multiple Tier

I and Tier II offenses. 6 Id.

4 The prosecutor did not cite the applicable statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.5(a), nor did he accurately describe its terms. Instead, he stated that “when a[n] individual who has to register for Megan’s Law is sentenced to an incarceration sentence, they are required under the [s]tatute to have a minimum of three years consecutive probation.” N.T., 11/30/2022, at 15. 5 The Superior Court agreed with the trial court that the verbally amended sentence announced on November 30, 2022 is “the correct sentence.” Commonwealth v. Osman, 380 MDA 2023, 2024 WL 80951, at *1 (Pa. Super. Jan. 8, 2024) (non-precedential decision). It further directed that the trial court “correct the technical errors” in the written sentencing order upon remand. Id. at *3. 6 Under SORNA’s offense classification system, corruption of minors constitutes a Tier I offense. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(b)(8). Unlawful contact and indecent assault are Tier II offenses. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.14(c)(1.3), (c)(5).

[J-85-2025] - 3 Osman argued before the Superior Court that the trial court erred in applying

Section 9718.5(a). Osman, 2024 WL 80951, at *2. In a non-precedential decision, the

Superior Court agreed with the trial court’s analysis, holding that because Osman was

convicted of multiple Tier I or Tier II sexual offenses, the plain text of Section 9799(d)(16)

dictated that he was subject to the mandatory three-year sentence of probation under

Section 9718.5(a). Id. at *3. The Superior Court denied Osman’s timely application for

reargument, and Osman subsequently filed a petition for allowance of appeal.

Issue

We rephrased the sole question presented for our review as follows: Whether an offender convicted of Tier I and Tier II sexual offenses from a single charged information and who has no prior adjudications or convictions for sexual offenses is subject to the mandatory probation provision of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.5. Commonwealth v. Osman, 327 A.3d 616 (per curiam) (Pa. 2024).

Parties’ Arguments

Osman argues that the trial court illegally imposed a mandatory consecutive three-

year period of probation because he is not a Tier III registrant. Osman’s Brief at 15. He

acknowledges that the trial court must impose a consecutive three-year period of

probation pursuant to Section 9718.5(a) if an individual is convicted of a Tier III offense

under Section 9799.14(d). Id. at 16-17 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9718.5, 9799.14(d)). He

does not contest that he was convicted of both Tier I and Tier II sexual offenses. Id. at

18. He argues that there is ambiguity in Section 9799.14(d)(16), which states that a

person shall be classified as a Tier III registrant where he has “[t]wo or more convictions

of offenses listed as Tier I or Tier II sexual offenses.” Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9799.14(d)(16)). Osman notes that the statute does not specify whether “two or more

[J-85-2025] - 4 convictions” requires the convictions to stem from separate criminal informations, but he

argues that it must because of the surrounding statutory context. Id.

Osman first points to this Court’s ruling in A.S. v. PSP, where we addressed the

lifetime registration requirement in the prior Pennsylvania Registration of Sexual

Offenders Statute (“Megan’s Law II”), which provided that “[a]n individual with two or more

convictions of any of the offenses set forth in subsection (a)” shall be subject to lifetime

registration. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(b)(1) (superseded). Osman acknowledges that A.S. v.

PSP dealt with a superseded statute; however, Osman notes that A.S. v. PSP addressed

similar language in Megan’s Law II, and discusses Commonwealth v. Gehris, 54 A.3d

862 (Pa. 2012), upon which A.S. v. PSP relies. He observes that we held in A.S. v. PSP

that “two or more convictions” language requires the commission of “a conviction and

then a subsequent act to trigger lifetime registration.” Osman’s Brief at 19 (citing A.S. v.

PSP, 143 A.3d at 908). Osman avers we reached that conclusion after finding the

statutory text to be contextually ambiguous, a question that had divided the Gehris Court

evenly, and that the “two or more convictions” language required more than multiple

convictions stemming from a single criminal information. Id. at 19-23.

Osman then summarizes Commonwealth v. Lutz-Morrison, 143 A.3d 891 (Pa.

2016), which dealt with the similar statutory language of SORNA at issue today. Id. at

23-24 (citing Lutz-Morrison, 143 A.3d at 893-95). The Lutz-Morrison Court, following the

reasoning in A.S. v. PSP, determined that Section 9799.14(d)(16) likewise required “an

act, a conviction, and a subsequent act.” Id. at 24 (quoting Lutz-Morrison, 143 A.3d at

895).

Osman therefore contends that under A.S. v. PSP and Lutz-Morrison, he cannot

be considered a Tier III registrant for purposes of the three-year mandatory probation

requirement because those cases interpreted the “two or more convictions” language to

[J-85-2025] - 5 require “an act, a conviction, and a subsequent act.” Id. Thus, he argues that he is not

subject to Section 9718.5(a)’s mandatory sentence because all of his Tier I and Tier II

offenses stemmed from the same criminal information and trial, and he was not previously

convicted of any qualifying offenses for purposes of Section 9799.14(d)(16). Id.

Osman further argues that, as we held in Lutz-Morrison, the statutory language of

Section 9799.14(d)(16) is ambiguous and should be construed in his favor because it is

used in conjunction with Section 9718.5 to effectively increase the aggregate statutory

maximum sentence for Tier I and II convictions that trigger Tier III status. Id. at 25-27

(citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.5(b)). He argues that because Section 9718.5 is a penal statute,

it must be construed in his favor pursuant to the rule of lenity. Id. at 25-26. Osman further

contends that the rule of lenity requires this Court to read Section 9718.5 and Section

9799.14(d)(16) together such that a subsequent conviction is required to impose a

mandatory period of probation for a person who is classified as a Tier III registrant under

Section 9799.14(d)(16). Id. at 27-28.

Osman asserts that SORNA’s legislative history shows that the General Assembly

was concerned with recidivism and intended to punish more severely those who reoffend

by committing subsequent Tier I and II offenses rather than punishing those who commit

multiple simultaneous offenses. Id. at 29. He argues that the Legislature could have

amended Section 9799.14(d) before reenacting SORNA in 2018 if it did not agree with

this Court’s decision in A.S. v. PSP (and by extension, Lutz-Morrison). Id. at 29-30.

Osman contends that the General Assembly’s failure to do so demonstrates its intent to

give effect to Lutz-Morrison’s interpretation of Section 9799.14(d) as requiring an act, a

conviction and a subsequent act to trigger that provision. Id. at 30-31.

The Commonwealth asserts that Osman ignores SORNA’s unambiguous

language “that two or more SORNA offenses would trigger the application of the

[J-85-2025] - 6 mandatory probation period.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 7-8. Nonetheless, the

Commonwealth contends that even if Section 9799.14(d)(16) were ambiguous, his

resolution of that ambiguity would lead to an absurd result because “no reasonable

person could have intended” it, and “there is a nonabsurd reading that could be achieved

by modifying the enacted text in relatively simple ways.” Id. at 8 (citing Commonwealth

v. Green, 291 A.3d 317 (Pa. 2023)). 7

The Commonwealth asserts that the legislative intent of Section 9718.5 is reflected

in Representative Ron Marsico’s Co-Sponsorship Memo. Id. at 8-9 (citing Co-

Sponsorship Memo to H.B. 631, Printer’s No. 2992, 201st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa.

2017), https://www.palegis.us/house/co-sponsorship/memo?memoID=22358) (“Marsico

Memo”). 8 The Commonwealth states that the Legislature intended to punish more

severely an individual who engages in more instances of chargeable conduct than

someone who engages in less instances of chargeable conduct regardless of whether

7 In Green, this Court described the United States Supreme Court’s “absurdity doctrine.” We noted that in Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460, (1892), the High Court stated that “[i]f a literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity.” Green, 291 A.3d at 323 (quoting Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 460). We concluded in Green that the at-issue interpretation of the Juvenile Act was “not absurd” because “the application of the clear language of the statute does not cause results that were not contemplated,” and the application of the terms of the statute as written did not “offend common sense, although some might find the policy behind the statutory provision and rule offensive or overly harsh.” Id. at 330. 8 The Marsico Memo reflects Representative Marsico’s intention that Section 9718.5(a) imposes the mandatory probation period on Tier III sex offenders. See Marsico Memo (“I plan to introduce the attached legislation which will require the court to impose a mandatory three[-]year probation period consecutive to any term of total confinement for a person convicted of a Tier III sex offense[.]”). The Commonwealth fails to explain how Representative Marsico’s understanding of Section 9718.5(a) of the Sentencing Code informs the meaning of Section 9799.14(d)(16) of SORNA, when both the Marsico Memo and related passage of Section 9718.5(a) postdate our interpretation of Section 9799.14(d)(16) in Lutz-Morrison. Moreover, because neither party suggests that Section 9718.5(a) is ambiguous, its legislative history is irrelevant. Consequently, we will not address the Marsico Memo further as it has no bearing on our analysis of whether Section 9799.14(d)(16) applies to Osman.

[J-85-2025] - 7 the offenses were simultaneous or subsequent. Id. at 9-10. Moreover, the

Commonwealth avers that Section 9799.14(d)(16) does not require an act, a conviction

and a subsequent act because a person can commit multiple sex crimes at once. Id. at

9-10.

The Commonwealth concedes that A.S. v. PSP and Lutz-Morrison are adverse to

its position. Id. It agrees with Justice Wecht’s dissent in A.S. v. PSP finding that similar

language under Megan’s Law II was unambiguous. Id. at 10-14 (quoting A.S. v. PSP,

143 A.3d at 915-17 (Wecht, J., dissenting)). The Commonwealth also agrees with then-

Justice Todd’s dissent in A.S. v. PSP, finding that the language of the statute is

unambiguous and that it does not demonstrate a recidivist philosophy. Id. at 14-22

(quoting A.S. v. PSP, 143 A.3d at 910-15 (Todd, J., dissenting)). The Commonwealth

makes no effort to distinguish the statutes at issue in A.S. v. PSP and Lutz-Morrison from

the matter before the Court today.

The Commonwealth argues that Section 9718.5 does not concern a recidivist

philosophy because sex offenders ostensibly do not take advantage of opportunities for

rehabilitation while incarcerated. Id. at 8-9, 23 (citing Marsico Memo). It further contends

that probation is not punitive but instead is “actually a measure to rehabilitate the offender

and protect the public[.]” Id. at 24 (quoting Marsico Memo). The Commonwealth then

recites the underlying facts of this case and asserts that Osman’s conduct was

“sufficiently serious” to qualify as a Tier III offender. Id. at 23-24.

In his Reply Brief, Osman notes that the Commonwealth’s argument simply

reiterates then-Justice Todd’s and Justice Wecht’s dissenting opinions in A.S. v. PSP.

Osman’s Reply Brief at 2. In so doing, he argues that the Commonwealth ignores stare

decisis, which requires more than a belief that a decision was wrongly decided for the

court to overturn it. Id. at 2-3. Osman contends that there are no special reasons to

[J-85-2025] - 8 deviate from this Court’s holdings in A.S. v. PSP and Lutz-Morrison that the “two or more

convictions” language in Megan’s Law II, and now SORNA, requires “an act, a conviction,

and a subsequent act to trigger lifetime registration for multiple offenses otherwise subject

to a fifteen- or twenty-five-year period of registration.” Id. at 5 (quoting Lutz-Morrison, 143

A.3d at 895).

Osman avers that the Commonwealth’s reliance on the legislative history for a bill

that was passed after this Court’s decisions in A.S. v. PSP and Lutz-Morrison does not

support the Commonwealth’s arguments because the Legislature had the opportunity to

amend the disputed text since this Court decided those cases, and it has not done so. Id.

at 9-11. Osman explains that the Legislature has previously responded to this Court’s

rulings by amending SORNA; for example, the Legislature created Subchapter H and

Subchapter I to address this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189

(Pa. 2017). Id. at 7-9. Lastly, Osman asserts that the Commonwealth’s policy arguments

and appeal to emotion are unpersuasive because such arguments fail to address this

Court’s prior decisions and do not independently articulate why those decisions should

be overruled. Id. at 15-16.

Analysis

Osman challenges the legality of his Section 9718.5(a) sentence. A challenge to

the legality of a sentence is unwaivable. 9 Commonwealth v. Barnes, 151 A.3d 121, 124

(Pa. 2016). The challenge before us requires our interpretation of Section 9718.5(a) in

conjunction with Section 9799.14(d)(16). Interpretation of a sentencing statue is a “pure

9 Osman has always maintained that his Section 9718.5(a) sentence was illegal However, the specific nature of the challenge before us, which is grounded in our analyses in A.S. v. PSP and Lutz-Morrison, was first raised Osman’s brief to the Superior Court. See Osman’s Superior Court Brief at 28. Because Osman’s legality-of-sentence claim is unwaivable question of law, his failure to raise it with specificity before the trial court is no impediment to our review.

[J-85-2025] - 9 question of law” to which we apply a plenary scope of review and a de novo standard of

review. Commonwealth v. Weir, 239 A.3d 25, 30 (Pa. 2020).

Our goal in interpretating any statute is to “give full effect to the General Assembly's

intent.” Mimi Investors, LLC v. Tufano, 297 A.3d 1272, 1284 (Pa. 2023) (citing 1 Pa.C.S.

§ 1921(a)). The best evidence of legislative intent is found in a statute’s plain text. Id.

Thus, when a statute’s text is clear and unambiguous, we will not circumvent its text

“under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id. (quoting 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b)). Ambiguity

exists in a statute when its text is subject to “at least two reasonable interpretations[.]”

A.S. v. PSP, 143 A.3d at 906. After we identify such an ambiguity, we may then “go

beyond the text” to ascertain the General Assembly’s intent. Id. at 903. Generally, we

resolve ambiguity by considering, inter alia, the following: the occasion and necessity for the statute or regulation; the circumstances under which it was enacted; the mischief to be remedied; the object to be attained; the former law, if any, including other statutes or regulations upon the same or similar subjects; the consequences of a particular interpretation; and administrative interpretations of such statute. Freedom Med. Supply, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 131 A.3d 977, 984 (Pa. 2016)

(italics omitted) (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)).

Our resolution of textual ambiguities is further guided by the rules of strict and

liberal construction of statutes. Usually, statutes are to be “liberally construed to effect

their objects and to promote justice.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(c). However, we are obligated to

strictly construe several classes of statutes. Id. § 1928(b). For instance, penal provisions

must be strictly construed. Id. § 1928(b)(1). Strict construction of penal statutes—the

rule of lenity 10—is not merely commanded by the General Assembly under Section

10 See Rule of Lenity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (“The judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or (continued…)

[J-85-2025] - 10 1928(b)(1); it is grounded in due process, as “[n]o one may be required at peril of life,

liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes” and “[a]ll are entitled

to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.” Lanzetta v. State of N.J., 306

U.S. 451, 453 (U.S. 1939). However, the rule of lenity cannot serve to undermine the

plain text of a penal statute; it instead commands that a court’s interpretation of

ambiguous text in criminal statutes be resolved against the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 722 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. 1998) (stating “it is axiomatic that,

under the rule of lenity, penal statutes must be strictly construed, with ambiguities being

resolved in favor of the accused”).

The matter before us concerns the interaction between two statutes, but the parties

only dispute the meaning of one of them. The meaning and operation of Section

9718.5(a) is not in dispute. Under that provision, courts must impose a mandatory,

consecutive three-year term of probation under certain conditions. § 9718.5. Mandatory period of probation for certain sexual offenders

(a) Mandatory probation supervision after release from confinement.—A person who is convicted in a court of this Commonwealth of an offense under section 9799.14(d) (relating to sexual offenses and tier system) shall be sentenced to a mandatory period of probation of three years consecutive to and in addition to any other lawful sentence issued by the court.

(b) Imposition.—The court may impose the term of probation required under subsection (a) in addition to the maximum sentence permitted for the offense for which the defendant was convicted.

(c) Authority of court in sentencing.—There shall be no authority in a court to impose on an offender to which this section is applicable a lesser period of probation than

inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment.”).

[J-85-2025] - 11 provided for under subsection (a). Sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing shall not supersede the mandatory period of probation provided under this section.

* * * 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.5(a)-(c).

Subsection 9718.5(a) establishes the types of offenses that are subject to the

mandatory probation term—offenses listed under Section 9799.14(d)—and establishes a

mandatory term of probation of three years. Subsection 9718.5(b) gives express statutory

authorization to permit the three-year term of probation to exceed the statutory maximum

for the underlying offense. Somewhat redundant to Subsection 9718.5(a), Subsection

9718.5(c) declares that a trial court cannot impose a term of probation of less than three

years for a qualifying offense. It also states that the sentencing guidelines cannot

supersede the mandatory probation period.

At issue in this case is what qualifies as an offense under Section 9799.14(d).

Section 9799.14 provides in pertinent part as follows: § 9799.14. Sexual offenses and tier system

(a) Tier system established.—Sexual offenses shall be classified in a three-tiered system composed of Tier I sexual offenses, Tier II sexual offenses and Tier III sexual offenses.

* * *

(d) Tier III sexual offenses.--The following offenses, or an attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to commit any of the following offenses, shall be classified as Tier III sexual offenses:

(16) Two or more convictions of offenses listed as Tier I or Tier II sexual offenses.

[J-85-2025] - 12 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14.

As noted above, Osman was convicted at a single trial of corruption of minors,

unlawful contact with a minor, and indecent assault. Thus, he was convicted of two Tier

II offenses and one Tier I offense. This much is undisputed. The question before us

concerns whether those offenses trigger Section 9799(d)(16). As explained below, that

question was fully resolved by this Court in Lutz-Morrison.

We first addressed language similar to Section 9799(d)(16) in Gehris, where we

had been unable to reach a majority decision. Gehris engaged in explicit sexual

communications with an undercover state police officer posing as a thirteen-year-old girl.

Gehris, 54 A.3d at 862. He pled guilty to four offenses, none of which individually required

lifetime registration with the PSP. Gehris, 54 A.3d at 862-63. However, the trial court

determined, and the Superior Court agreed, that Gehris was nonetheless required to

register for life under Megan’s Law II, which mandated lifetime registration with the PSP

for an “individual with two or more convictions of any of the offenses set forth in subsection

(a).” Id. at 863-64 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(b)(1) (repealed 2012)). 11 Gehris asked

this Court to decide whether lifetime registration under subsection (b) of Section

9795.1(b)(1) applied “to those who plead guilty to two or more listed offenses when those

offenses arise out of one, non-violent criminal episode?” Id. at 872.

In the Opinion in Support of Affirmance (“OISA”) authored by then-Justice Todd,

half of this Court found that the “plain language” of Section 9795.1(b)(1) did not “require

any particular sequential or temporal ordering of the multiple convictions in order for the

lifetime registration requirements to apply.” Id. at 866 (Todd, J., OISA). Then-Justice

Todd concluded for the OISA, therefore, that “because the timing of the multiple

11 Subsection 9795.1(a) listed offenses that required a ten-year registration period with the PSP. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(a) (repealed 2012). Gehris pled guilty to at least two such offenses under the same criminal information. Gehris, 54 A.3d at 870-71.

[J-85-2025] - 13 convictions is irrelevant” under the statute, Section 9795.1(b)(1) compelled Gehris to

register for life. Id.

Chief Justice Castille wrote the Opinion in Support of Reversal (“OISR”) for the

remaining Justices in Gehris. Justice Castille acknowledged that Section 9795.1(b)(1)

was not “ambiguous or unclear” at first glance, but determined that it lacked “specificity”

when applied to “an offender who has committed ‘two or more’ subsection (a) offenses

during the course of a single continuous criminal episode or course of conduct.” Id. at

875 (Castille, C.J., OISR). He found that application of the provision in a “mechanical”

fashion “may not always be proper” considering the statutory scheme’s “recidivist

philosophy[.]” Id. Chief Justice Castille described that philosophy as follows: The essence of the recidivist philosophy is to afford first-time offenders (or offenders convicted of less serious offenses) some amount of time within which to modify their behavior away from criminality. Should they fail to take advantage of the opportunity, and transgress a second time or more, the next sentence will be more severe. The general concept has long been part of the common law. Id. (quotation marks indicating emphasis omitted).

Chief Justice Castille noted that this Court has considered a statute’s recidivist

philosophy in resolving questions of statutory interpretation in a variety of contexts. 12

Similarly, Chief Justice Castille believed it was “clear that the primary concern” of Section

9795.1 was sexually violent predators and repeat offenders who “pose a high risk of

engaging in further offenses even after being released from incarceration[.]” Id. at 879

(quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9791(a)(2) (repealed 2012)). In that regard, he believed that

lifetime registration requirements had been designed to capture “more serious (primarily

12 Gehris, 54 A.3d at 876-78 (discussing Commonwealth v. Jarowecki, 985 A.2d 955 (Pa.

2009); Commonwealth v. McClintic, 909 A.2d 1241 (Pa. 2006); Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 753 A.2d 807 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Williams, 652 A.2d 283 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 621 A.2d 990 (Pa. 1993)).

[J-85-2025] - 14 violent) offenders and ‘true’ recidivists who squander a given opportunity to reform[.]” Id.

By contrast, he stated that “first-time offenders” are provided an “opportunity for

rehabilitation and eventual freedom from the requirements[.]” Id. Consequently, Chief

Justice Castille would have held that under Section 9795.1(b), “a defendant convicted of

‘two or more’ subsection (a) offenses are subject to the lesser sanction of the ten-year

registration requirement so long as it is clear that the offenses were part of the same

course of criminal conduct.” Id.

Next, in A.S. v. PSP, we revisited Section 9795.1(b). When A.S. was twenty-one

years old, he engaged in a “series of sexual encounters” with a sixteen-year-old victim.

A.S. v. PSP, 143 A.3d at 899. Those encounters were not criminal because of the age

of consent, however, “during the course of the relationship, [A.S.] persuaded the victim to

take and transmit sexually explicit photographs of herself and he also photographed the

two engaging in sexual acts.” Id. Consequently, the Commonwealth charged A.S. with

“seven counts of sexual abuse of children …, twenty counts of sexual abuse of children

…, and single counts of unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of minors, and criminal

solicitation.” Id. A.S. ultimately pled guilty to “single counts of sexual abuse of children

and unlawful contact with a minor—each of which was an enumerated offense for

purposes of Megan's Law II reporting under Section 9795.1(a)—and corruption of minors,

which was not.” Id. After A.S. was deemed not to be a sexually violent predator, the court

imposed sentence under the assumption, uncontested at the time, that A.S. “was subject

to a ten-year registration period, not lifetime registration.” Id. However, after A.S.

completed his sentence and registered with the PSP for ten years, the PSP refused to

remove him from the registry, “claiming his guilty plea to both sexual abuse of children

and unlawful contact with a minor triggered lifetime registration under Section

9795.1(b)(1), because he was ‘an individual with two or more convictions’ of offenses

[J-85-2025] - 15 listed in subsection (a).” Id. at 900 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(b)(1) (repealed 2012)).

A.S. responded with a mandamus action seeking his removal from the registry. Id. A

divided Commonwealth Court granted A.S.’s motion for summary judgment and directed

the PSP to remove him from the registry, largely following the reasoning of the OISR in

Gehris. A.S. v. PSP, 87 A.3d 914, 922 (Pa. Commw. 2014) (en banc). We affirmed. A.S.

v. PSP, 143 A.3d at 897-98.

Interpreting Section 9795.1(b)(1), we found that Gehris’ OISA and OISR “each

offered a developed, reasoned expression concerning the meaning” of that provision. Id.

at 903. While both opinions had observed no facial ambiguity in the provision, we noted

that the Gehris OISA conceded that the Gehris OISR had presented “a reasoned,

plausible, policy-based rationale” for interpreting Section 9795.1(b)(1) “as reflecting a

recidivist philosophy.” Id. at 904 (quoting Gehris, 54 A.3d at 862 (OISA)). In A.S. v. PSP,

however, a majority of this Court reached a consensus that could not be reached in

Gehris. That consensus was “persuaded by the core” of the Gehris OISR’s analysis and

adopted much of it. Id. at 904-05.

Augmenting Chief Justice Castille’s analysis in the Gehris OISR, we first

addressed the lack of textual ambiguity of Section 9795.1(b)(1), noting that ambiguity

nonetheless arose when that provision was considered in the context of the overall

recidivist statutory scheme of Megan’s Law II. Id. at 905-06 (citing Yates v. United States,

574 U.S. 528 (2015)). 13 We faulted both the OISA and OISR for failing to “cite this precept

advising a contextual approach to assessing legislative intent and statutory ambiguity.”

Id. at 906. Nonetheless, we found that the “OISR’s approach in considering the overall

13 In Yates, the Supreme Court stated that ambiguity does not turn solely on dictionary definitions, but instead on “the specific context in which that language is used,” when placed in the “broader context of the statute as a whole[,]” noting that “[i]n law as in life, … the same words, placed in different contexts, sometimes mean different things.” Yates, 574 U.S. at 537 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

[J-85-2025] - 16 statute, including legislative policy findings, in ascertaining the legislative intent and

finding Section 9795.1[(b)(1)] to be ambiguous is consonant with that principle.” Id. at

906. We also found that the statute’s ambiguity was further demonstrated by the record

at A.S.’s sentencing, as “the prosecutor, [A.S.] and the trial judge all believed this first-

time offender, who was not a sexually violent predator, was subject to ten-year

registration.” Id. Third, although we recognized that Section 9795.1, as a registration

provision, was “not punitive for purposes of constitutional challenges,” we indicated that

rejection of the application of the rule of lenity for that reason alone was not

straightforward given the “complex and nuanced” circumstances in which Section 9795.1

applies. Id. at 907. This was because of the “obvious burden of registration and the

potentially serious criminal consequences of a lapse[.]” A.S. v. PSP, 143 A.3d at 907. 14

Having adopted the Gehris OISR’s analysis with those additional considerations, we

ultimately held that to trigger the two-or-more-convictions language of Section

9795.1(b)(1), “the statute requires an act, a conviction, and a subsequent act[.]” Id. at

908. 15

14 Nonetheless, we did not rely on the principle of lenity in interpreting Section 9795.1(b)(1). Id. at 907 n.13. 15 Then-Justice Todd dissented. Id. at 910-15 (Todd, J., dissenting). She would have found, as she had expressed in the Gehris OISA that she authored, that Section 9795.1(b)(1) was unambiguous. Id. at 910. She believed that the provision had no language suggesting temporal separation between the commission of offenses, and that such a reading was consistent with her understanding of the purpose of the registration requirement, which she believed was focused on protection of the public rather than punishment of sexual offenders. Id. at 912-13 (citing Gehris, 54 A.3d at 866-67 (OISA)). Then-Justice Todd further criticized the Majority’s reasons for finding ambiguity in Section 9795.1(b)(1) as being “unpersuasive[.]” Id. at 914. Although Justice Wecht joined then- Justice Todd’s dissent insofar as it held that the plain language of Section 9795.1(b)(1) required a different result than reached by the Majority, he wrote separately to emphasize that he shared “the concerns underlying the Majority’s reasoning” and that like the Majority, he believed “the statutory scheme should embody a recidivist philosophy.” Id. at 917 (Wecht, J., dissenting). However, Justice Wecht believed the Majority had altered (continued…)

[J-85-2025] - 17 We decided Lutz-Morrison on the same day. Lutz-Morrison, 143 A.3d at 892. Lutz-

Morrison decided a direct appeal from the imposition of sentence on Thomas Lutz-

Morrison after he pled guilty to three counts of possession of child pornography. Id. at

893. Because there were three counts of child pornography (each constituting a Tier I

offense), the trial court imposed lifetime registration requirements pursuant to the OISA’s

rationale in Gehris, and the Superior Court affirmed. Id. at 893-94. Lutz-Morrison

involved what we described as “nearly identical” language to that which we addressed in

A.S. v. PSP, language that remains in Section 9799.14(d)(16) to this day.

We reversed the Superior Court, applying A.S. v. PSP. Id. at 894-95. We held

that application of A.S. v. PSP was “straightforward[,]” and we dismissed two potential

bases for distinguishing the two cases. Id. at 895. First, we recognized a “textual

distinction” between the repealed Section 9795.1(b)(1) and new text of Section

9799.14(d)(16), in that lifetime registration applied under the former when an individual

had “two or more convictions of any of the offenses set forth in subsection (a)[,]” 42

Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(b)(1) (repealed 2012) (emphasis added), whereas lifetime registration

applied under Section 9799.14(d)(16) when an individual has “[t]wo or more convictions

of offenses listed as Tier I or Tier II sexual offenses[,]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(d)(16). Lutz-

Morrison, 143 A.3d at 895 n.2. No party had argued that the General Assembly’s deletion

of the emphasized language altered the meaning of the text, and this Court did not identity

a basis for distinction. Id. Second, after noting the similarities between the prosecutions

of A.S. and Lutz-Morrison, we did “not dispute the Commonwealth’s argument that each

image of child pornography possessed represents a separate, independent crime[.]” Id.

at 895 n.4. Despite this, “for reasons explained in” A.S. v. PSP, we viewed “the SORNA

registration question as distinct and deem[ed] it controlled by the recidivist philosophy

“the meaning of unambiguous statutory language in order to achieve what it perceives to be a preferable result.” Id.

[J-85-2025] - 18 animating this tiered scheme.” Id. We thus repeated our holding in A.S. v. PSP, now

applicable to the nearly-identical text of Section 9799.14(d)(16), that “the statute requires

an act, a conviction, and a subsequent act to trigger lifetime registration for multiple

offenses otherwise subject to a fifteen- or twenty-five-year period of registration.” Id. at

895.

Then-Justice Todd and Justice Wecht dissented. Although Justice Todd agreed

with the Majority that Lutz-Morrison was controlled by A.S. v. PSP, she reiterated her

rationale for dissenting in A.S. v. PSP. Id. at 895-96 (Todd, J., dissenting). Justice Wecht

joined then-Justice Todd’s dissent, “subject to the reservations” he expressed in A.S. v.

PSP. Id. at 896 (Wecht, J., dissenting). Neither dissenting Justice suggested that

questions before A.S. v. PSP and Lutz-Morrison were distinguishable on any basis.

This Court subsequently granted, vacated, and remanded three separate appeals

in light of our decision in Lutz-Morrison. 16 Lutz-Morrison was also subsequently applied

in two published opinions by the Superior Court. Commonwealth v. Sauers, 159 A.3d 1,

16 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding sua sponte that Lutz-Morrison presented “a non-waivable

legality-of-sentence issue” that required it to “vacate the lifetime registration portion of

[Sauer]’s sentence and remand for re-sentencing under SORNA”); Commonwealth v.

Leonard, 172 A.3d 628, 630-31 (Pa. Super. 2017) (stating that under Lutz–Morrison,

“Section 9799.14(d)(16) of SORNA requires an act, conviction, and subsequent act to

trigger lifetime registration for multiple” Tier I and II offenses). A.S. v. PSP and Lutz-

Morrison have also been applied in non-precedential decisions by that court. See, e.g.,

16 See Commonwealth v. Fox, 639 Pa. 314, 315 (Pa. 2016) (per curiam order); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 639 Pa. 313, 314 (Pa. 2016) (per curiam order); Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 639 Pa. 401, 402 (Pa. 2016) (per curiam order). In Reynolds, we specifically instructed the Superior Court to impose the lesser reporting requirement under SORNA. Reynolds, 639 Pa. at 402.

[J-85-2025] - 19 Commonwealth v. Keech, 371 WDA 2019, 2020 WL 86565 (Pa. Super. 2020) (non-

precedential decision).

Thus, since Lutz-Morrison was decided a decade ago, Section 9799.14(d)(16) has

been interpreted consistently by the courts of this Commonwealth as requiring an act, a

conviction, and a subsequent act to trigger its application. Lutz-Morrison applies directly

here, as it is undisputed that Osman had no prior qualifying offenses before his August

2022 convictions for purposes of Section 9799.14(d)(16). Thus, there was no legal

authorization for the trial court to impose the mandatory Section 9718.5(a) sentence

because Section 9799.14(d)(16) was not trigged by Osman’s August 2022 convictions.

Consequently, the trial court’s imposition of a Section 9718.5(a) sentence was unlawful.

See Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d 554, 55 (Pa. 2022) (stating that “a sentence is

unlawful if the sentencing court lacks the legal authority to impose that sanction”). The

Superior Court failed to consider Lutz-Morrison’s precedential interpretation of Section

9799.14(d)(16) when it determined that it applied to Osman based on the statute’s plain

text. Osman, 2024 WL 80951, at *3. The court’s interpretation of Section 9799.14(d)(16)

in contravention of Lutz-Morrison was clear error.

The Commonwealth endorses the Superior Court’s decision because it believes

“the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and thus demands literal application.”

Commonwealth’s Brief at 3. But this is not a new argument at all; it is precisely the

position of the dissenting Justices in A.S. v. PSP and Lutz-Morrsion. The Commonwealth

even concedes that those decisions control the outcome of this case. See

Commonwealth’s Brief at 10 (admitting the core issue in this case was decided in A.S. v.

PSP). Nonetheless, the Commonwealth argues that the dissenting Justices in A.S. v.

PSP and Lutz-Morrison were correct and relies on then-Justice Todd’s dissent in A.S. v.

PSP and portions of Justice Wecht’s dissent to argue that Osman is not entitled to relief

[J-85-2025] - 20 today. Id. at 14-22. The Commonwealth also argues that the record supports that

Osman’s offenses occurred over a period of years such that Osman should not be

“afforded a wholesale discount for his egregious conduct that spanned the course of

basically the victim’s entire[] adolescent life.” Id. at 23.

By relying on the dissenting opinions in A.S. v. PSP and Lutz-Morrison, the

Commonwealth implies that those precedential decisions were wrongly decided.

However, we did not grant allocatur to decide the continued validity of those decisions

and—oddly—the Commonwealth never explicitly asks this Court to overrule them. We

granted review solely to determine whether Section 9718.5(a) applies when an offender’s

Tier I and Tier II convictions for purposes of Section 9799.14(d)(16) all stem from the

same criminal information and trial. We did not grant review to reconsider Lutz-Morrison’s

interpretation of Section 9799.14(d)(16), which flowed directly from our analysis in A.S. v.

PSP.

Moreover, beyond endorsing the dissenting opinions in Lutz-Morrison and A.S. v.

PSP, the Commonwealth has made no discernable effort to challenge the application of

the principle of stare decisis to those now decade-old decisions. We follow our prior

decisions under that principle, even questionable ones, “because stare decisis ‘promotes

the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters

reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the

judicial process.’” Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177, 196 (Pa. 2020) (quoting

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (citation omitted)). Although we are not

barred from reconsidering our precedent, we do so only when there is a “special

justification” that exists “over and above the belief that the precedent was wrongly

decided—in matters involving statutory, as opposed to constitutional, construction.”

Yoder v. McCarthy Construction, Inc., 345 A.3d 668, 681 (Pa., 2025) (quoting

[J-85-2025] - 21 Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1168 (Pa. 2020)). 17 Stare decisis is afforded

“greater sanctity” in our interpretation of statutes “because the legislature can

prospectively amend the statute if it disagrees with a court’s interpretation.” Id. (quoting

Commonwealth v. Doughty, 126 A.3d 951, 955 (Pa. 2015)). The Commonwealth has

failed to advance any special justification to overrule Lutz-Morrison or A.S. v. PSP. See

Yoder, 345 A.3d at 681 (rejecting reconsideration of precedent where the petitioner

merely rehashed the same arguments that were advanced when the challenged

precedent was decided).

We also ascertain no independent basis upon which to revisit those decisions. The

General Assembly has repeatedly declined to revise Section 9799.14(d)(16) since Lutz-

Morrison and A.S. v. PSP were decided. The General Assembly has amended Section

9799.14 no less than six times since 2016, including in 2018 legislation 18 that also added

Section 9718.5(a) to the Sentencing Code. Furthermore, while A.S. v. PSP and Lutz-

Morrsion were solely concerned with statutory language controlling the application of

classification for the purpose of registration requirements under SORNA, the instant

matter involves application of Section 9799.14(d)(16) for sentencing purposes under

Section 9718.5(a). Once the contextual ambiguity of Section 9799.14(d)(16) is

recognized, this Court is obligated to strictly construe that provision in favor of Osman

under the principle of lenity given its direct impact on Section 9718.5(a). 19 Moreover,

17 As we have articulated previously, special justifications above and beyond the reasonableness of the prior decision must be advanced to reject application of stare decisis. Such considerations include the age of the precedent, any reliance interests at stake, and the precedent’s workability. Yoder, 345 A.3d at 681. 18 Act of Feb. 21 2018, P.L. 27, No. 10 (“Act 10”). Act 10 was the General Assembly’s prompt response to amend SORNA following our decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017). See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(b)(4). 19 The Commonwealth unconvincingly argues that Section 9718.5(a) is not punitive because it is not intended to “change an individual’s behavior through punishment, but to (continued…)

[J-85-2025] - 22 there is no evidence before this Court that our interpretation of Section 9799.14(d)(16) in

Lutz-Morrison has proved unworkable in the lower courts.

Penultimately, we reject the Commonwealth’s additional argument that enforcing

our precedent means that we are granting Osman a volume discount for his crimes. See

Commonwealth’s Brief at 23. Osman was convicted on multiple counts and exposed to

separate sentences on each count. Our decision today in no way affects the trial court’s

discretion to impose sentences commensurate with the gravity and frequency of a

defendant’s offenses. Section 9718.5(a) is a mandatory sentencing provision that, in

conjunction with Section 9799.14(d)(16), imposes an additional penalty for recidivists,

and so the unavailability of that additional penalty does not constitute a volume discount

for multiple crimes. Under Lutz-Morrison, Osman is not a recidivist warranting Tier III

classification under Section 9799.14(d)(16). Consequently, it was unlawful to sentence

him under Section 9718.5(a).

ensure that the person properly adjusts to life outside of prison.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 25; see also id. at 3 (stating that the “statute is not punitive as much as it is to ensure the protection of the public and the rehabilitation of the offender”). “A penal statute is one which imposes a penalty or forfeiture for transgressing its provisions, or for doing a thing prohibited, and it is none the less a penal statute because it is also remedial.” Nesbit v. Clark, 116 A. 404, 406 (Pa. 1922) (emphasis added). This Court has repeatedly recognized probation as a traditional method of punishment, regardless of whether it has a rehabilitative purpose. See Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 316 A.3d 77, 105 (Pa. 2024) (observing that “probation-like criminal penalties for noncompliance” weigh in favor of finding that a statute has a punitive effect); Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 622 (Pa. 2020) (recognizing that this Court has determined that probation “has historically been considered a traditional form of punishment”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747, 763 (Pa. Super. 2014) (Donohue, J., concurring)). This Court has also recently applied the principle of lenity to a probation statute. Commonwealth v. Rosario, 294 A.3d 338, 350 (Pa. 2023) (citing Nesbit and stating that “to the extent that [42 Pa.C.S. §] 9771 remains, after exhausting all other tools of statutory interpretation, hopelessly ambiguous as to whether it authorizes the anticipatory revocation of a probation, the rule of lenity calls for the conclusion it does not”).

[J-85-2025] - 23 Finally, because “our disposition disrupts the sentencing scheme” imposed by the

trial court, we vacate Osman’s judgment of sentence and “remand to the Superior Court

with instructions to remand for resentencing.” Commonwealth v. King, 234 A.3d 549, 552

(Pa. 2020).

Conclusion

Applying our holding in Lutz-Morrison to the facts of this case, Osman was illegally

sentenced under Section 9718.5(a). The Superior Court erred in concluding otherwise,

and we reverse that portion of its decision. However, because our disposition disrupts

the sentencing scheme imposed by the trial court, we remand to the Superior Court with

instructions to remand to the trial court for resentencing.

Chief Justice Todd and Justices Dougherty, Brobson and McCaffery join the

opinion.

Justice Dougherty files a concurring opinion.

Justice Brobson files a concurring opinion.

Justice Wecht files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Mundy joins.

[J-85-2025] - 24