Commonwealth v. Morris

91 Pa. Super. 571, 1927 Pa. Super. LEXIS 239
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 3, 1927
DocketAppeals 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 & 27
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 91 Pa. Super. 571 (Commonwealth v. Morris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Morris, 91 Pa. Super. 571, 1927 Pa. Super. LEXIS 239 (Pa. Ct. App. 1927).

Opinion

Opinion by

Gawthrob, J.,

Appellants were convicted and are under sentence on an indictment charging that six of them, being duly qualified and acting school directors for the school district of the Township of Hanover in Luzerne County, and one Boyle, the other school director for the district, and the defendant Herr, who was employed as an architect by the school district, and the defendant Mailander, unlawfully conspired to cheat and defraud the school district out of a sum of money amounting to about $1,000, by fraudulently and dishonestly procuring the award to the defendant Mailander of a contract to do certain work at the Thomas Jefferson School at an excessive price, and by the fraudulent and dishonest performance of the same.

A motion was made in the court below to quash the indictment for the following reason: “Before the grand jury there was no testimony produced in support of the averments contained in the indictment. This reason defendant offers to sustain by the testimony of all the witnesses whose names are endorsed upon the indictment and by the testimony of the stenographer who took the notes of the proceedings before the grand jury. ’ ’ The court refused to permit appellants to produce such testimony and denied the motion to quash. This action is the subject of the first and second assignments of error.

*574 It should be observed that the contention made for appellants is not that they were not permitted to prove that no witnesses testified before the grand jury. They state in their brief “that testimony of the witnesses who testified, and the stenographerwho took their testimony, showing that the testimony given had no relation whatever to the averments in the indictment, was admissible and should have been heard.” Manifestly, the gravamen of the complaint is that the testimony of the witnesses whose names were endorsed upon the bill did not support the averments therein. Therefore, the question is whether a defendant has the right to allege and attempt to prove that the testimony given before a grand jury by witnesses legally competent to testify, whose names were duly endorsed upon the bill, was insufficient to make out a prima facie case. It is well settled in this State that an indictment may be quashed for matters not apparent upon the face of the record (Com. v. Bradney, 126 Pa. 199; Com. v. Green, 126 Pa. 531; and Com. v. Ross, 58 Pa. Superior Ct. 412), as where an outside party has interfered with the grand jury during its deliberations upon the case (Com. v. Bradney, supra); or where a presentment has been made upon the testimony of witnesses examined upon a different charge against another defendant and not from the personal knowledge or observation of the grand jurors (Com. v. Green, supra); or where no witnesses appear before the grand jury; or where the only witnesses who appeared before-them •were persons whose names were not endorsed upon the bill and therefore could not be sworn by the grand jury (Act of March 31, I860, P. L. 427); or perhaps where the only witnesses appearing before the grand jury were legally incompetent to testify. But none of the cases decides or even intimates that a defendant may call and examine the witnesses who testified before the grand jury to prove *575 that their testimony before that body was insufficient to warrant the return of a true bill. Such a practice would amount to an appeal from the finding of the grand jury to the court. It would introduce a practice in the criminal law which would be not only novel, but revolutionary. It is generally held that an indictment will not be quashed on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence where some witnesses were examined by the grand jury: 31 C. J. 808. We find no merit in these assignments.

When the case was called for trial, Boyle entered a plea .of nolo contendere, took the stand for the Commonwealth and testified in detail as to how his co-school directors and Herr and Mailander entered into a corrupt bargain to have the school board let a contract to Mailander to construct a sump near the Thomas Jefferson School, which had just been corn-completed, and make a fill in the front thereof, which work would cost him about $4,000', at a price which would give the parties to the bargain a “kick-back” of about $4,000;'that the contract was awarded to Mailander at $8,370; and that after the work was done and Mailander was paid, he put $4,000 into a pool made up from several sources, one of which was Herr, which was divided among the school directors. Other witnesses called by the Commonwealth testified that the contract price exceeded the fair market price of the work done by about $4,000'. By the third and fourth assignments of error there is presented the question whether the trial judge erred when he charged on the subject of the corroboration of the accomplice Boyle, as follows:

“Now, gentlemen of the jury, difficult though the task may be, it is of vital importance in this case that you should determine from this perplexing and confusing evidence, if you can, what was the fair worth of that work in 1925, in order to deter *576 mine whether Mailander’s hid of $8,370 was reasonable or excessive, honest or dishonest, because if you adopt the Commonwealth’s figures as against defendants ’ figures you might find that bid dishonestly excessive approximating $4,000, and you have a circumstance strongly corroborating the tale told by Boyle, upon which the Commonwealth must rely for conviction.”
“We have already said that if you adopt the Commonwealth’s figures as to the worth of the work, against the figures of the defendants on comparison of the contract figures showing excess approximating $4,000', you have in the case material indirect corroboration of Boyle’s testimony.”

Corroboration has been defined as testimony of some substantial fact or circumstance independent of the statement of the witness. (14A C. J. 1429.) The testimony of a witness who was present when the conspiracy was entered into or heard the conspirators admit the existence of the conspiracy is not the only testimony which could corroborate Boyle’s story. Corroborating testimony may be either direct or circumstantial. The evidence fully warrants a finding by a jury that Mailander’s bid was so grossly excessive that he could not reasonably expect the school board to award the contract to him at his bid, unless there had been collusion between him and the board. The award of the contract to him at a figure which not only was double a fair price for the work but would give him a profit of about the amount of the kick-back or graft which Boyle testified was to be divided, not only tended to excite suspicion in connection with the letting of the contract, but also tended to strengthen, and hence to corroborate, Boyle’s testimony to the effect that the school board conspired with the contractor to cheat and defraud the school district. We all agree that it was proper for the trial judge so to instruct the jury.

*577

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
91 Pa. Super. 571, 1927 Pa. Super. LEXIS 239, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-morris-pasuperct-1927.