[J-45-2019] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT
SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 68 MAP 2018 : Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the Superior : Court at No. 801 MDA 2017 dated : April 19, 2018 Affirming the Judgment v. : of Sentence of the Mifflin County : Court of Common Pleas, Criminal : Division, at No. CP-44-CR-0000506- MICHAEL A. MOCK, : 2016 dated May 1, 2017. : Appellant : ARGUED: May 14, 2019
OPINION
JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: November 20, 2019
The Vehicle Code mandates enhanced grading and sentencing penalties for
repeat driving under the influence (“DUI”) offenses committed within ten years of a “prior
offense.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806. We granted allocatur in this matter to address the relevant
date for determining whether an earlier offense constitutes a prior offense. We agree with
the Superior Court that the ten-year lookback period runs from the occurrence date of the
present offense to the conviction date of the earlier offense, rather than the occurrence
date of the earlier offense. We therefore affirm the Superior Court’s order.
The underlying facts of this case follow. Appellant, Michael Mock, committed DUI
on June 3, 2006, which resulted in a conviction on March 27, 2007. More than ten years
after committing this offense, but roughly nine years following his conviction, Appellant
committed another DUI. On July 10, 2016, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Corporal Arthur Stanton of the Mifflin County Police Department stopped Appellant after observing him
cross the fog and center lines several times while driving on the highway. He was
arrested on suspicion of DUI and transported to the hospital. Appellant consented to a
blood test, which revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.21%. He was later charged with
DUI ̶ highest rate of alcohol under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c). 1 The Commonwealth deemed
Appellant’s DUI a second offense and graded it as a misdemeanor of the first degree
subject to increased penalties. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3803(b)(4) (providing grading for
violation of Section 3802(c) where an individual has one prior offense); 75 Pa.C.S. §
3804(c)(2) (listing punishment for violation of Section 3802(c) as a second offense).
Before proceeding to trial, Appellant filed a motion to quash the information,
asserting that the Commonwealth improperly characterized the instant DUI as a second
offense because his earlier offense did not constitute a prior offense under Section 3806,
which provides as follows:
§ 3806. Prior offenses
(a) General rule. ̶ Except as set forth in subsection (b), the term “prior offense” as used in this chapter shall mean any conviction for which judgment of sentence has been imposed, adjudication of delinquency, juvenile consent decree, acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition or other form of preliminary disposition before the sentencing on the present violation for any of the following:
(1) an offense under section 3802 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance);
....
(b) Timing. ̶
1 “An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is 0.16% or higher within two hours after the individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c).
[J-45-2019] - 2 (1) For purposes of sections 1553(d.2) (relating to occupational limited license), 1556 (relating to ignition interlock limited license), 3803 (relating to grading), 3804 (relating to penalties) and 3805 (relating to ignition interlock), the prior offense must have occurred:
(i) within 10 years prior to the date of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced; or
(ii) on or after the date of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced[.]
(2) The court shall calculate the number of prior offenses, if any, at the time of sentencing.
(3) If the defendant is sentenced for two or more offenses in the same day, the offenses shall be considered prior within the meaning of this subsection.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3806. In support of this contention, Appellant primarily relied on this Court’s
decision in Commonwealth v. Haag, 981 A.2d 902 (Pa. 2009) (interpreting earlier version
of Section 3806 and finding the definition of “prior offense” in subsection (b) overrode the
definition of “prior offense” in subsection (a).
Accordingly, Appellant asserted that per Haag, “subsection (b) overrides the
application of subsection (a)” and the language used in subsection (b) signals that the
ten-year lookback period runs from the commission date of the present offense to the
occurrence date of the earlier offense. Motion to Quash, 10/25/16, at 3. He therefore
claimed that because his earlier DUI occurred more than ten years before the present
offense occurred, it was not a prior offense under Section 3806. Id.
The trial court rejected Appellant’s argument, explaining that the present offense
was properly characterized as a second offense because the previous conviction took
place less than ten years prior to the commission of the present offense. Trial Court
Order, 12/8/2016, at 1. Appellant proceeded to a stipulated bench trial and was convicted
[J-45-2019] - 3 of DUI ̶ highest rate of alcohol, as a second offense.2 The trial court sentenced Appellant
in accordance with the mandatory minimum to 90 days to five years of imprisonment, as
well as fines, costs, and related penalties. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(c)(2).
Appellant filed an appeal to the Superior Court. He continued to argue that the
Commonwealth improperly characterized the instant DUI as a second offense, subject to
enhanced grading and sentencing penalties, because the earlier offense was committed
outside of the ten-year lookback period. The Superior Court affirmed in a divided,
published opinion. See Commonwealth v. Mock, 186 A.3d 434 (Pa. Super. 2018).
The majority resolved Appellant’s claim by examining the plain language of Section
3806, explaining that subsection (a) contains a “general rule” applicable to all of Chapter
38, while subsection (b) contains a “specific rule” relevant only to the subsections
enumerated therein. Id. at 437. The majority recognized that the general rule defines
prior offense as “any” conviction, or other alternative disposition referenced in the statute,
“before the sentencing on the present violation.” Id. Accordingly, any conviction ̶
regardless of timing ̶ counts as a “prior offense” under subsection (a).
The majority explained, however, that subsection (b) places timing limitations, as
the heading suggests, on which prior offenses trigger enhanced grading and sentencing
penalties to those that “occurred . . . within [ten] years prior to the date of the offense for
which the defendant is being sentenced” or, alternatively, “on or after the date of the
offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.” Id. The majority therefore agreed
with the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant’s DUI was properly graded as a second
offense because his earlier conviction took place within ten years of his commission of
the present offense. Id. at 437-38. Accordingly, the majority rejected Appellant’s
2Appellantwas also charged with driving an unregistered vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1301, and DUI ̶ general impairment, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1). The Commonwealth later nolle prossed these charges.
[J-45-2019] - 4 argument that the phrase “[e]xcept as set forth in subsection (b)” contained in subsection
(a) altered the essential definition of prior offense. Id. at 437.
Senior Judge Eugene B. Strassburger authored a dissenting opinion. He agreed
with the majority’s conclusion that Section 3806 contains both a general and specific rule.
Id. at 438. However, in his view, the majority’s conclusion that subsection (b) only relates
to timing and does not alter the essential definition of the term “prior offense” set forth in
subsection (a) contravenes this Court’s decision in Haag. Id. at 439. He explained that
in Haag, this Court interpreted the phrase in subsection (a) “[e]xcept as set forth in
subsection (b),” to imply that “[subsection (a)] expressly yields to [subsection (b)] when
the latter is applicable” and that subsection (b) alters the general definition of prior offense
delineated in subsection (a). Id. (citing Haag, 981 A.2d at 906-07).
Senior Judge Strassburger next explained that although a court must apply
subsection (a) to determine whether an individual has “any conviction for which judgment
of sentence has been imposed,” it must then determine whether the offense meets the
criteria set forth in subsection (b). He reasoned that subsection (b)(1), which states that
the prior offense “must have occurred . . . within [ten] years prior to the date of the
offense for which the defendant is being sentenced,” limits offenses that qualify as a prior
offense to those that “the individual committed . . . sometime within the [ten] years before
the individual committed the subsequent offense.” Id. (emphasis supplied).
Senior Judge Strassburger further relied on the legislative history of Section 3806
to support his position. He noted that the legislature’s use of the word “occurrence” in
subsection (b) was “deliberate” considering it “has changed repeatedly the parameters
for the look[]back period in different revisions of [subsection (b)][.]” Id. at 440.
Accordingly, he found that although Appellant’s previous offense qualified as a prior
[J-45-2019] - 5 offense in subsection (a), the offense did not meet the more narrow criteria in subsection
(b) because it was not committed within ten years of the present offense. Id.
Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal. We granted allocatur to address
the following issue:
Did the Superior Court erroneously interpret 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806 as providing that an offender who commits a prior driving under the influence (“DUI”) offense more than ten years before his commission of a present DUI offense, but is convicted of the prior DUI offense within ten years of his commission of his present DUI offenses, has a “prior offense” for purposes of the grading of, and/or sentencing on, the present DUI offense?
Commonwealth v. Mock, 198 A.3d 1049 (Pa. 2018) (per curiam). Both parties contend that the plain language of the statute dictates the outcome in
this matter. Their readings, however, differ substantially. Appellant continues to maintain
that the ten-year lookback period referenced in Section 3806 runs from the occurrence
date of the present offense to the occurrence date of the earlier offense. Appellant’s Brief
at 17-18. His argument largely echoes the dissent’s reasoning by concentrating primarily
on Haag and, in part, the legislative history of Section 3806. Id. at 11-14.
Appellant asserts that based on Haag, the general rule in subsection (a), which
defines a prior offense as any conviction, yields to the entirely separate definition of prior
offense in subsection (b), which focuses on the occurrence date of the earlier offense. Id.
at 15-17. Appellant reasons that although the legislature twice amended Section 3806
since this Court decided Haag, the case nonetheless applies. Id. at 14-15. He specifically
maintains that the legislature’s decision to keep the exclusionary language in subsection
(a) post-Haag indicates that it intended subsection (a) to yield to subsection (b). Id.
Finally, Appellant posits that this interpretation is the easiest to apply and the least
susceptible to manipulation by the Commonwealth, in that the Commonwealth may not
prolong the ten-year lookback period by delaying convictions. Id. at 18. Accordingly,
[J-45-2019] - 6 Appellant asserts that because the present offense occurred more than ten years after
the commission of his earlier offense, it does not constitute a prior offense subject to
enhanced grading and sentencing penalties under subsection (b). Id. at 18-19.
The Commonwealth counters that Appellant’s reliance on Haag is misplaced.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 8. In Haag, this Court addressed an earlier version of Section
3806, which has since been twice amended. Id. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth
argues that Haag does not stand for the proposition that subsection (a) becomes
irrelevant when subsection (b) is applicable. Id. at 8-9. Rather, the Superior Court
properly concluded that the general definition provided in subsection (a) applies to
subsection (b) to limit which prior offenses subject an offender to the sentencing
enhancement from “any conviction” to only those that occurred “within ten years prior to
the current offense date.” Id. 9-10. As for Appellant’s reliance on the legislative history,
the Commonwealth responds that despite various changes to the lookback period, the
definition of prior offense has always been guided by the conviction date. Id. at 12.
Finally, the Commonwealth disagrees with Appellant’s contention that a lookback
period that runs from the occurrence date of the present offense to the conviction date of
the earlier offense is subject to manipulation. Id. at 13. To the contrary, it asserts that
Appellant’s preferred interpretation would allow offenders to control the lookback period
by delaying sentencing. Id. at 14. However, as currently written, the statute removes any
manipulation of timing. Id. at 13-14. Thus, the Commonwealth urges this Court to affirm
the Superior Court’s order.
The Pennsylvania District Attorney’s Association (“PDAA”) and the Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (“PennDOT”) submitted amicus
briefs in support of the Commonwealth. Both agree with the Commonwealth’s plain
meaning interpretation, but advance an additional argument focusing on the fact that
[J-45-2019] - 7 Section 3806 is a recidivist statute. PDAA’s Amicus Brief at 9-10; PennDOT’s Amicus
Brief at 12-13. In light of this, they argue that a prior offense is not established by a
violation, but rather requires a conviction. Id. For this reason, the conviction date must
control whether an earlier offense constitutes a prior offense. Id.
The Pennsylvania Association for Drunk Driving Defense Attorneys (“PADDDA”)
also submitted an amicus brief in support of Appellant. Similar to Appellant, it contends
that the plain language controls. PADDDA’s Amicus Brief at 5-6. However, in the event
this Court finds the statutory language ambiguous, it argues that the statute must be
construed in favor of the accused in accordance with the rule of lenity. Id. at 7-8.
Issues involving statutory interpretation present questions of law for which our
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v.
Giulian, 141 A.3d 1262, 1266 (Pa. 2016). When interpreting statutes, we are guided by
the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991, which directs us to ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The best indication
of legislative intent is most often the plain language of the statute. See Commonwealth
v. Kingston, 143 A.3d 917, 922 (Pa. 2016) (citing McGrory v. Dep’t of Transp., 915 A.2d
1155, 1158 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v. Gilmour Mfg. Co., 822 A.2d 676, 679 (Pa.
2003); Penna. Fin. Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan v. English, 664 A.2d 84, 87 (Pa.
1995) (“Where the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity the legislative
intent is to be gleaned from those very words.”)). “It is only when statutory text is
determined to be ambiguous that we may go beyond the text and look to other
considerations to discern legislative intent.” A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 143 A.3d
896, 903 (Pa. 2016)).
Preliminarily, Appellant and the Commonwealth agree that Section 3806 applies
in order to determine whether Appellant’s earlier DUI constitutes a “prior offense,” making
[J-45-2019] - 8 the present DUI a second offense. Both parties also agree that the starting point for the
ten-year lookback is the occurrence date of the present offense. They disagree with how
subsections (a) and (b) interact and, consequently, whether the end point for the ten-year
lookback period is the occurrence date or the conviction date of the earlier offense.
We agree with the Superior Court’s determination that the ten-year lookback period
in Section 3806 runs from the occurrence date of the present offense to the conviction
date of the earlier offense. We reach this conclusion based on the unambiguous
language of the statute. Section 3806 includes a “[g]eneral rule” and a specific rule
relating to “[t]iming.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806. The general rule in subsection (a), limited by
the phrase “[e]xcept as set forth in subsection (b),” defines prior offense as “any
conviction” or alternative disposition “before the sentencing on the present violation” for
offenses such as DUI and applies to the entirety of Chapter 38. Id. The specific rule in
subsection (b), relevant for grading and penalty purposes, states that a prior offense
“must have occurred . . . within [ten] years prior to the date of the offense for which the
defendant is being sentenced[.]” Id. Applying the definition of prior offense provided in
subsection (a), subsection (b) reads “the prior offense,” i.e., conviction or alternative
disposition, “must have occurred . . . within ten years prior to the date of the offense for
which defendant is being sentenced.” Id. This interpretation also gives effect to the
exclusionary phrase in subsection (a), which signals that subsection (b) limits the scope
of “prior offense” in subsection (a), defined as “any conviction,” to only those convictions
taking place within the timing confines of subsection (b). Id. Thus, the plain language of
the statute requires that the ten-year lookback period runs from the occurrence date of
the present offense to the conviction date of the earlier offense. Appellant was properly
sentenced as a second-time offender because his earlier conviction took place less than
ten years before he committed the present offense.
[J-45-2019] - 9 We disagree with Appellant’s assertion that Haag requires us to find that the
exclusionary phrase in subsection (a) signals that the definition of prior offense used in
that subsection does not apply to subsection (b). In Haag, this Court addressed whether
two DUIs occurring within one and one-half hours of each other and sentenced at the
same time should be considered first and second offenses subjecting the offender to
increased penalties under an earlier version of Section 3806. Haag, 981 A.2d at 903.
Similar to the current statute, that version contained a general rule in subsection (a) and
a specific rule in subsection (b). Id. at 905 (citing 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806 (eff. November 29,
2004 to December 25, 2014)). Subsection (a), which began with the phrase, “[e]xcept as
set forth in subsection (b),” defined prior offense as “a conviction . . . before the sentencing
on the present violation[.]” Id. at 904-05. Unlike the instant version, however, subsection
(b), which specifically addressed “[r]epeat offenses within ten years,” redefined prior
offense to mean “any conviction . . . within the ten years before the present violation
occurred[.]” Id.
Accordingly, although Haag’s earlier offense qualified as a prior offense under
subsection (a) because it resulted in a conviction prior to sentencing on the second
offense, it did not qualify as a prior offense under subsection (b) because the conviction
did not take place within ten years before the second violation occurred. Id. at 906. In
other words, although a conviction before sentencing of the present offense constituted
a prior offense in subsection (a), subsection (b) required that an offender be convicted of
the earlier offense at the time the subsequent offense was committed in order to trigger
increased grading and sentencing penalties. Due to the exclusionary phrase in
subsection (a) and the legislature’s inclusion of separate definitions of prior offense in
subsections (a) and (b), we found the legislature’s “deliberate use of a common exception
phrase” meant that subsection (b) overrode the application of subsection (a). Id. at 907.
[J-45-2019] - 10 Haag is not particularly instructive in interpreting the current version of the statute
in light of significant revisions to Section 3806 since that case was decided. In the present
version of Section 3806, the legislature eliminates this conflict between subsections (a)
and (b) and any need for one definition to completely override the other. The legislature
removed the extraneous language in subsection (b) redefining prior offense, and instead
provides a general definition of prior offense in subsection (a) applicable throughout the
remainder of the statute. Accordingly, subsection (b) must be interpreted as providing
time limits on the broad category of “any conviction” as referenced in subsection (a) to
those convictions occurring within ten years of the present offense. This prevents the
imposition of increased penalties for an offender whose earlier conviction took place, for
example, fifteen years before committing a subsequent offense. Even if applicable, Haag
makes clear that “subsection (a) is not the end of the inquiry as to how previous violations
are to be defined and utilized in making grading and sentencing determinations.” Id. at
907.
Moreover, Appellant’s interpretation of the term “prior offense” in subsection (b)
would produce an absurd result. Were we to interpret “prior offense” in subsection (b)(1)
to mean the occurrence date of the earlier offense, that same definition must apply not
only to subsection (b)(1)(i), the ten-year lookback period, but also to subsection (b)(1)(ii).
Subsection (b)(1)(ii) provides: “[T]he prior offense must have occurred . . . on or after the
date of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.” Appellant’s construction
of Subsection (b)(1)(ii) would create an untenable result considering that a “prior offense”
cannot occur after a subsequent offense. However, if we apply the definition of prior
offense in subsection (a), then subsection (b)(1)(ii) remains sound, providing as follows:
“[T]he prior offense [i.e., the conviction of the earlier offense] must have occurred on or
after the date of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.” This
[J-45-2019] - 11 interpretation addresses the situation where an earlier offense may not have resulted in
a conviction at the time a subsequent offense occurs but yet allows for the imposition of
increased penalties for the subsequent offense.
Appellant’s convoluted reading of the statute, focusing on the term “occurrence” in
subsection (b), is merely a means to a preferred end. We reject his contention that use
of the word “occurrence” in subsection (b) alters the essential definition of prior offense
set forth in subsection (a). Indeed, when analyzing the language of a statute “we should
not interpret statutory words in isolation, but must read them with reference to the context
in which they appear.” Giulian, 141 A.3d at 1267 (citing Roethlein v. Portnoff Law
Assocs., Ltd., 81 A.3d 816, 822 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted)).
Although both parties reference previous versions of Section 3806 to support their
preferred readings of the current version of the statute, we need not look beyond the
unambiguous language of the text in order to discern the legislature’s intent. A.S., 143
A.3d at 903. Nonetheless, an examination of the legislative history leads to an
interpretation consistent with our own. When Haag was decided, Section 3806 provided,
in relevant part, as follows:
(a) General Rule. ̶ Except as set forth in subsection (b) the term “prior offense” as used in this chapter shall mean a conviction, adjudication of delinquency, juvenile consent decree, acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition or other form of preliminary disposition before the sentencing on the present violation for any of the following:
(1) an offense under section 3802 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance);
(b) Repeat offenses within ten years. ̶ The calculation of prior offenses for purposes of sections 1553(d.2) (relating to occupational limited license), 3803 (relating to grading) and 3804 (relating to penalties) shall include any conviction, adjudication of delinquency, juvenile consent decree, acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition or other form of
[J-45-2019] - 12 preliminary disposition within ten years before the present violation occurred for any of the following:
(1) an offense under section 3802 . . .
75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(b) (amended, Oct. 27, 2014, P.L. 2905, No. 189, § 1) (emphasis
added). In this version of the statute, subsection (b) revised the definition of prior offense
by recounting nearly verbatim the language used in subsection (a) with the caveat that
the prior offense must have occurred “within the ten years before the present violation
occurred[,]” creating unintended consequences apparent in Haag. In particular, it did not
account for whether DUI offenses committed on the same day and sentenced
simultaneously qualified as prior offenses. Based on the plain language of this version,
Haag correctly interpreted the plain language of the statute.
In an apparent attempt to account for DUI offenses committed on the same date
and sentenced simultaneously, the legislature amended the statute. It left subsection (a)
unchanged and revised subsection (b) as follows:
(b) Repeated offenses within ten years. ̶ The calculation of prior offenses for purposes of sections 1553(d.2) (relating to occupational limited license), 3803 (relating to grading) and 3804 (relating to penalties) shall include any conviction whether or not judgment of sentence has been imposed for the violation, adjudication of delinquency, juvenile consent decree, acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition or other form of preliminary disposition within the ten years before the sentencing on the present violation for any of the following:
75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(b) (amended, May 25, 2016, P.L. 236, No. 33, § 5) (emphasis added).
Similar to the preceding version of subsection (b), this version also recounted the
language of prior offense used in subsection (a) with added caveats to account for
circumstances such as those in Haag. Notably, an offender was not required to have a
conviction at the time a subsequent offense occurred in order for the earlier offense to be
[J-45-2019] - 13 a “prior offense.” The statute merely required that a conviction take place before
sentencing on the present violation.
In 2016, the legislature amended Section 3806 yet again to its present form, which
provides as follows:
(a) General Rule. ̶ Except as set forth in subsection (b), the term “prior offense” as used in this subchapter shall mean any conviction for which judgment of sentence has been imposed, adjudication of delinquency, juvenile consent decree, acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition or other form of preliminary disposition before the sentencing on the present violation for any of the following:
(1) an offense under section 3802 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance);
(1) For purposes of sections 1553(d.2) (relating to occupational limited license), 1556 (relating to ignition interlock limited license), 3803 (relating to grading), 3804 (relating to penalties) and 3805 (relating to ignition interlock), the prior offense must have occurred:
(i) within [ten] years prior to the date of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced[.]
(ii) on or after the date of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.
(2) The court shall calculate the number of prior offenses, if any, at the time of sentencing.
(3) If the defendant is sentenced for two or more offenses in the same day, the offenses shall be considered prior offenses within the meaning of this subsection.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3806 (emphasis added). The current version of subsection (b) reveals
significant textual differences from its earlier versions. First, subsection (b) is now
explicitly limited to effects on timing, made apparent by its title. The legislature also
[J-45-2019] - 14 removed the excess language in subsection (b) present in earlier versions which
essentially redefined the term “prior offense.” In addition to removing this extraneous
language in subsection (b), the legislature clarified the general definition of prior offense
in subsection (a) by adding the language “for which judgment of sentence has been
imposed[.]” Based on these revisions, it is illogical to conclude that subsection (a) has no
bearing of the application of subsection (b). These revisions clearly signal that the
definition provided in subsection (a) is incorporated into the use of the term in subsection
(b), especially where such an interpretation gives effect to both subsections. See 1
Pa.C.S. § 1921(a) (“Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its
provisions.”). We find it unlikely that the legislature would use a previously defined term
in a different manner without explicitly providing a comprehensive definition as it did in
the previous versions of subsection (b).
Finally, we do not find persuasive Appellant’s unsupported assertion that this
interpretation of the ten-year lookback period is vulnerable to manipulation by the
Commonwealth. Even if this were the case, the plain language of a statute “cannot be
ignored in pursuit of the statute’s alleged contrary spirit or purpose.” Koken v. Reliance
Ins. Co., 893 A.2d 70, 82 (Pa. 2006).
In sum, the plain language of Section 3806 mandates that the ten-year lookback
period for DUI offenses, relevant for grading and penalty purposes, runs from the
occurrence date of the present offense to the conviction date of the earlier offense.
Appellant’s previous conviction occurred less than ten years prior to the commission of
the present offense. He was therefore properly convicted of DUI ̶ highest rate of alcohol,
[J-45-2019] - 15 as a second offense. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Superior Court affirming
Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer, Todd and Dougherty join the opinion.
Justices Donohue and Wecht file dissenting opinions.
[J-45-2019] - 16