Commonwealth v. Matthew Pye.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: August 19, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-0296
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-296

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

MATTHEW PYE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In 2018, the defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter,

armed assault with intent to murder, and a firearm violation as

a level two armed career criminal. In 2022, the defendant filed

motions to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that the

prosecution improperly withheld evidence and that his plea

counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain that evidence.

After a hearing, a judge of the Superior Court denied the

defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. We affirm.

Background. At the defendant's plea hearing, he admitted

to the following facts. Just before 11:00 P.M. on August 16,

2015, Simon Holley and Jeffery Johnson arranged for Holley to

sell one pound of marijuana to the defendant for $2,600. Holley wrapped up a laundry bag to make it appear that it contained

marijuana, though it contained only clothing. Holley recruited

the victim to assist with the deal. The victim and Holley met

the defendant and Johnson in a yard adjacent to Newbury Street

in Worcester. The victim and Holley pulled handguns on the

defendant. While the victim and Holley searched the defendant's

wallet and took the money that the defendant had brought to buy

marijuana, the defendant pulled a handgun and fired at least one

shot. The gunfire left Holley with a gunshot wound to the hand

and the victim with a gunshot wound to the back, which struck

his aorta. The victim died a short time later at the hospital.

The defendant and Holley fled, but Johnson stayed at the

scene. After the police arrived, Johnson told a detective that

the person responsible was "right there," and gestured toward a

wallet on the ground near where the victim's body had been. The

wallet contained the defendant's identification. On August 20,

2015, the defendant admitted to police that he was on Newbury

Street on the night of the shooting. The defendant said that he

heard shots fired, ran, and dropped his wallet. He said that he

did not know who did the shooting or why.

The defendant was indicted for murder, armed assault with

intent to murder, and a firearm violation as a level three armed

career criminal. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant

pleaded guilty to manslaughter, a firearm violation as a level

2 two armed career criminal, and armed assault with intent to

murder. The defendant was sentenced, based on an agreed

recommendation, to concurrent terms of from fifteen to seventeen

years in State prison for manslaughter and armed assault with

intent to murder, and from twelve to fifteen years in State

prison for the firearm violation.1

On May 23, 2022, the defendant filed a motion for post-

conviction discovery and, on July 12, 2022, a supplemental

request for the unredacted copy of a letter Johnson provided to

the Commonwealth (Johnson letter). Also on July 12, 2022, the

defendant filed a motion to vacate his convictions and withdraw

his plea. In his affidavit in support of the motion, the

defendant described seeing a redacted copy of the letter prior

to pleading guilty. He stated that plea counsel told him that,

according to the prosecution, the redacted portion was

irrelevant to the defendant's case. The affidavit further

stated that in December 2018, while serving his sentence, the

defendant heard that Johnson made statements about Johnson's

willingness to testify against Peter Jasper, who was involved in

a different murder, as part of a plea deal in connection with

Johnson's armed robbery charges stemming from the defendant's

1 The defendant also admitted to prior convictions constituting qualifying convictions for serious, violent crimes for the purposes of enhanced penalties. See G. L. c. 269, § 10G.

3 case. Jasper gave the defendant two other letters written by

Johnson (Jasper letters), one of which referenced the

defendant's case's docket number and stated that Johnson would

testify against the defendant if Johnson were released. When

plea counsel read the Jasper letters, he stated that, "although

[he was] not sure exactly how [the Jasper letters] would have

played out in [his] analysis and recommendation[,] . . . it is

likely that the Jasper letters could have contributed to a

recommendation" that he ultimately made to the defendant.

On March 3, 2023, after reviewing an unredacted copy of the

Johnson letter in camera, the judge ordered the Commonwealth to

provide defense counsel with a copy of the letter. On August

17, 2023, the defendant filed a supplemental motion to vacate

convictions and withdraw his guilty plea. In the newly

unredacted Johnson letter, Johnson wrote to request leniency in

his own case in exchange for his testimony in the defendant's

case, as well as Jasper's and Holley's cases.

Discussion. 1. Nondisclosure of the Johnson letter. "A

motion to withdraw a guilty plea is treated as a motion for a

new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b)" (citation

omitted). Commonwealth v. Henry, 488 Mass. 484, 490 (2021).

"[W]e review the denial of a motion for a new trial for a

'significant error of law or other abuse of discretion.'"

Commonwealth v. Diaz, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 588, 592 (2022),

4 quoting Commonwealth v. Duart, 477 Mass. 630, 634 (2017), cert.

denied, 584 U.S. 938 (2018). "Particular deference is to be

paid to the rulings of a motion judge who served as the [plea]

judge in the same case" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v.

Lastowski, 478 Mass. 572, 575 (2018).

"To obtain a new trial on the grounds that the Commonwealth

failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence, a defendant

must establish (1) that the evidence [at the time of the plea]

was in the possession, custody, or control of the prosecutor or

a person subject to the prosecutor's control, (2) that the

evidence is exculpatory, and (3) prejudice" (quotation and

citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Pope, 489 Mass. 790, 798

(2022). There is no dispute in this case that the Commonwealth

was in possession of the unredacted Johnson letter at the time

of the guilty plea. The defendant contends that the judge erred

by finding that the redacted portions of the Johnson letter were

not exculpatory. We need not resolve whether those portions

were exculpatory, however, because we conclude that the

defendant was not prejudiced by their nondisclosure. See id.

Whether the defendant was prejudiced by the nondisclosure

of the unredacted portions of the Johnson letter rests on his

demonstrating a reasonable probability that he would not have

pleaded guilty had he known of the undisclosed information. See

Commonwealth v. Hallinan, 491 Mass. 730, 750 (2023).

5 "Establishing such a reasonable probability requires examining

the totality of circumstances, guided by a number of specific

factors." Id. Those factors include:

"(1) whether evidence of the government misconduct could have detracted from the factual basis used to support the guilty plea, (2) whether the evidence could have been used to impeach a witness whose credibility may have been outcome-determinative, (3) whether the evidence is cumulative of other evidence already in the defendant's possession, (4) whether the evidence would have influenced counsel's recommendation as to whether to accept a particular plea offer, and (5) whether the value of the evidence was outweighed by the benefits of entering into the plea agreement."

Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 355-356

(2014).

The defendant argues that the unredacted Johnson letter

would have diminished the Commonwealth's case against him

because it showed that Johnson sought leniency in his own case

in exchange for testifying against the defendant. We disagree.

It is mere speculation that the prosecution would have called

Johnson to testify against the defendant. Notably, the

unredacted Johnson letter also included Johnson's offer to

testify against Jasper, but he did not testify at Jasper's

trial. In addition, there was no evidence that Johnson was

offered leniency in exchange for testifying in the defendant's

case, or even that the prosecutor responded to Johnson's

overtures at all. See Commonwealth v. Bateman, 492 Mass. 404,

421 (2023) (fact that witness provided information to police

6 years earlier in different case not exculpatory where witness

was never offered promises, rewards, or inducements). Moreover,

the unredacted Johnson letter, if provided to the defendant and

if Johnson were called as a witness, would only have been

admissible at trial to impeach Johnson on whether he sought

leniency in exchange for his willingness to testify as opposed

to the substance of his observations of the defendant's role in

the crimes. See Commonwealth v. Drayton, 479 Mass. 479, 490

(2018) ("evidence that tends merely to impeach the credibility

of a witness will not ordinarily be the basis of a new trial"

[citation omitted]).

Nor are we persuaded by the defendant's assertion that the

unredacted portions of the Johnson letter were "critical"

because the only evidence against him was the testimony of his

codefendants. The defendant's wallet and identification were

found near the victim's body, the defendant acknowledged in his

initial statement to the police that he was present at the time

of the shooting and dropped his wallet at the scene, and an

eyewitness identified a photograph of the defendant as "being

most similar" to the person who shot the victim.2

2 The defendant contends that the witness's "testimony . . . was ultimately refuted." It is not clear from the record whether any such issues with the witness occurred before or after the defendant's plea.

7 The defendant does not specifically argue here that

disclosure of the unredacted portions of the Johnson letter

would have influenced his plea counsel's recommendation for him

to plead guilty. Plea counsel acknowledged that he was "not

sure exactly how [the unredacted letters] would have played out

in [counsel's] analysis and recommendation." In any event, the

defendant has not shown that the value of the redacted

information outweighed the benefits of the plea agreement. As

discussed, the relevance of Johnson's overtures to the

Commonwealth was largely speculative. In contrast, the

defendant received significant charge concessions in exchange

for his guilty plea and mitigated the risk of longer prison

sentences than he would have faced had he gone to trial.3

Furthermore, the defendant admitted under oath to facts that

supported his involvement in the victim's killing. "The plea

proceeding is not some frivolous exercise, where words have no

meaning and answers are of no consequence. Nor is it a game

where a defendant enters a plea to test the weight of potential

punishment as a prelude to a postconviction challenge"

3 As indicted for felony murder, the defendant faced a mandatory term of life in State prison, but he was sentenced to fifteen to seventeen years on the reduced charge of manslaughter. See G. L. c. 265, § 2 (murder); G. L. c. 265, § 13 (manslaughter). The reduction of his firearm charge from level three to level two reduced his maximum exposure from twenty to fifteen years with a minimum sentence of ten years instead of fifteen. See G. L. c. 269, § 10G (b) & (c).

8 (quotation and citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Williams, 71

Mass. App. Ct. 348, 355 (2008). "The defendant's sworn

statements must not be discarded on the later assertion that he

had his fingers crossed." Commonwealth v. Hiskin, 68 Mass. App.

Ct. 633, 640 (2007).

Ultimately, we conclude that the defendant failed to

demonstrate prejudice and thus discern no error or abuse of

discretion in the judge's denial of the defendant's motion to

withdraw his pleas based on the nondisclosure of the unredacted

portions of the Johnson letter.

2. Ineffective assistance of counsel. When the basis for

a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, "the defendant must show that the

behavior of counsel fell measurably below that of an ordinary,

fallible lawyer and that such failing 'likely deprived the

defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of

defence.'" Commonwealth v. Prado, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 255

(2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96

(1974). The defendant "has the burden of demonstrating a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's ineffective

assistance, he or she would not have pleaded guilty and instead

would have insisted on going to trial." Henry, 488 Mass. at

495-496. The defendant argues that plea counsel was ineffective

for failing to obtain the unredacted Johnson letter, and asserts

9 that, had counsel obtained the letter, the defendant would have

gone to trial.

The defendant contends that the only potential evidence

against him at trial was the testimony of his codefendants,

Johnson and Holley. As previously discussed, other evidence

linked the defendant to the shooting, including the presence of

his wallet at the scene, his own statement that he was present

at the time of the shooting, and a potential eyewitness. Plea

counsel reasonably accepted the Commonwealth's representation

that the redacted portions of the Johnson letter were irrelevant

to the defendant's case, and the defendant offers no argument as

to why plea counsel should have doubted the Commonwealth's

representation or how counsel could have obtained the unredacted

Johnson letter. Plea counsel was thus not ineffective for not

obtaining the unredacted Johnson letter. See Commonwealth v.

Miller, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 344, 349 (2022) (defendant "failed to

detail how [plea] counsel's alleged shortcomings fell measurably

below the standard of an ordinary fallible lawyer").

Regardless, the defendant offers only conclusory assertions

that, had counsel obtained the unredacted Johnson letter, he

could have negotiated a more favorable sentence. "The record in

this case suggests that the driving factor in the defendant's

decision to plead guilty was the avoidance [of substantially

more incarceration]. The defendant has not shown that it would

10 have been a more rational decision to go to trial, where he was

facing a likely conviction [and] far more committed time"

(quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Chleikh, 82

Mass. App. Ct. 718, 729 (2012). Thus, the judge properly denied

the motion for a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472

Mass. 587, 604 (2015) (defendant failed to show that plea

outcome "would have been different with competent advice").

Order denying motion for new trial affirmed.

By the Court (Desmond, Sacks & Brennan, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: August 19, 2025.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.