Commonwealth v. Martin E. Libby.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: October 22, 2024
• Docket: 23-P-0787
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-787

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

MARTIN E. LIBBY.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a bench trial in the District Court, the

defendant, Martin E. Libby, was found guilty of leaving the

scene of an accident involving personal injury, G. L. c. 90,

§ 24 (2) (a 1/2) (1), and negligent operation of a motor

vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). He was also found

responsible for a marked lanes violation. See G. L. c. 89,

§ 4A.1 On appeal, he argues that the Commonwealth's evidence was

insufficient to prove either that he was the operator of the

1The defendant was acquitted of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, G. L. c. 90, § 23; operating a motor vehicle under the influence, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1); and failing to stop for the police, G. L. c. 90, § 25. truck that crashed into a Toyota Avalon headed in the opposite

direction, or that he drove in a negligent manner. We affirm.

In our review of the denial of a motion for a required

finding of not guilty, "we consider the evidence introduced at

trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and

determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 378 (2017), quoting

Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 547 (2017). The relevant

question is whether the evidence would permit the trier of fact

to find guilt, "not whether the evidence requires such a

finding." Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747 (1988).

1. Operation of the motor vehicle. To establish the

defendant's guilt for both leaving the scene of an accident

involving personal injury and negligent operation, the

Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was

the operator of the vehicle at the time of the accident. See

Commonwealth v. Rijo, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 871, 873 (2020), quoting

G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a 1/2) (1) ("Whoever operates a motor

vehicle upon any way . . . and without stopping and making known

his name, residence and the registration number of his motor

vehicle, goes away after knowingly colliding with or otherwise

causing injury to any person not resulting in the death of any

2 person, shall be punished . . ."); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 62

Mass. App. Ct. 921, 921 (2004) ("To establish guilt under [G. L.

c. 90, § 24 (2) (a)], the Commonwealth must prove that the

defendant (1) operated the motor vehicle, (2) upon a public way,

(3) (recklessly or) negligently so that the lives or safety of

the public might be endangered").

The defendant contends the evidence presented at trial,

even when viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, was insufficient to prove that he was the operator

of the truck that caused the accident. We disagree. "Proof of

operation of a motor vehicle may rest entirely on circumstantial

evidence" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v.

Petersen, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 52 (2006). Here, the driver of

the Toyota Avalon testified that his car was hit by a white box

truck driven by a white man. The police detective who responded

to the accident transmitted by radio a description of the truck

and its license plate number, based on information provided by

witnesses to the accident. Ten to fifteen minutes later, a

patrol officer spotted a truck with that license plate number

and matching that description about a mile or two from where the

accident occurred. The defendant was driving the truck. After

being stopped, he told the officer that he had just been in an

accident. There was severe damage to the left, front side of

3 his truck. In addition, pink insulation foam, a white exterior

tool compartment panel, and various tools had been found at the

scene of the accident, and the defendant's truck had the same

pink insulation foam and its exterior tool compartment panel had

been ripped off.

Viewed as a whole, and in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, this evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was operating the truck at

the time of the accident. See Commonwealth v. Shea, 324 Mass.

710, 713 (1949). Even though there was a female passenger in

the truck when the police pulled it over, her presence was

inadequate to "undermine the probative value of the

corroborative evidence" showing the defendant was the driver.

Commonwealth v. Adams, 421 Mass. 289, 292 (1995). That

corroborative evidence included the Toyota Avalon driver's

statement that a man was driving the white box truck, the fact

that the defendant was driving the truck when it was stopped

shortly afterwards, and his admission that he had just been in

an accident. See Commonwealth v. Beltrandi, 89 Mass. App. Ct.

196, 201-202 (2016).

2. Negligent operation. The defendant also claims there

was insufficient evidence to prove that he operated the truck

negligently. Under G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), negligence "is

4 determined by the same standard that is employed in tort law."

Duffy, 62 Mass. App. Ct. at 922 n.2. At trial, the driver of

the Toyota Avalon testified that the truck crossed over the

double yellow lines and struck the front left side of his

vehicle. Because the truck was "way over the line," he had no

ability to avoid the collision. The officer who stopped the

defendant testified that he seemed "unsteady on his feet," had

"[s]lurred" and "delayed" speech, and, confusingly, stated that

he had already "called the hospital to let them know that an

accident had occurred." Because this evidence of the

defendant's marked lane violation and general disorientation was

sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

negligently operated his vehicle, the judge did not err in

denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty.

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Hershfang & Toone, JJ.2),

Clerk Entered: October 22, 2024.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.