Commonwealth v. Mark Melendez.

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedAugust 9, 2024
Docket23-P-0449
StatusUnpublished

This text of Commonwealth v. Mark Melendez. (Commonwealth v. Mark Melendez.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Mark Melendez., (Mass. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-449

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

MARK MELENDEZ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

A grand jury indicted the defendant for unlawful possession

of a firearm with one prior conviction for a violent crime or

serious drug offense, unlawful possession of a large capacity

weapon, and unlawful possession of a loaded firearm. After an

evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge suppressed the

firearm found in the defendant's vehicle and certain statements

made to police on the day of his arrest.1 The judge subsequently

denied the Commonwealth's motion to reconsider2 in a margin

1The Commonwealth did not appeal from the judge's suppression of the defendant's statements.

2The Commonwealth argued that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applied to the search, which it had failed to assert at the original motion hearing. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 443 Mass. 707, 708-709 (2005) (issue endorsement.3 The Commonwealth sought leave to pursue an

interlocutory appeal from the judge's orders, and a single

justice of the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave for an

appeal to this court. See G. L. c. 278, § 28E; Mass. R. Crim.

P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 476 Mass. 1501 (2017). Concluding

that the search was justified by the automobile exception to the

warrant requirement, we reverse.

Background. We recite the facts found by the motion judge,

supplemented by uncontroverted testimony of the witnesses and

our independent review of the video footage from the body-worn

camera. See Commonwealth v. Yusuf, 488 Mass. 379, 380–381

(2021). On September 23, 2020, at around 3:45 P.M., Springfield

police officers were dispatched to 15 Austin Street for reports

a person there had been shot. After arriving at the scene,

officers saw the defendant lying outside of the open front

driver's-side door of a blue four-door Acura sedan in the

parking lot of George's Auto Body. There were several men

standing in the lot near the Acura and one man reaching inside

the vehicle to retrieve a cell phone when police first

first raised in motion for reconsideration preserved for appellate review provided motion filed within period allotted for taking an appeal).

3 The endorsement states, "After hearing, I have reconsidered my ruling and reach the same result."

2 approached the defendant. The autobody shop was open to the

public and located on a busy city street. The defendant told

officers that he had been shot "down the street" and that he did

not know who did it. He appeared to have a gunshot wound to his

upper left thigh and was visibly bleeding. Witnesses told

officers that the defendant drove into the parking lot and said

that he had been shot. Police saw blood on the driver's seat of

the Acura. While the defendant was being medically treated on

the ground next to the Acura, an officer searched the vehicle

and found a firearm under the front passenger seat inside a

clear plastic bag. The engine of the vehicle was still running

until police turned it off during their search.

Discussion. "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress

evidence, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact

absent clear error" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v.

Daveiga, 489 Mass. 342, 346 (2022). "We review independently

the application of constitutional principles to the facts found"

(citation omitted). Id. The automobile exception to the

warrant requirement permits officers to conduct a warrantless

search of an automobile parked in a public place and apparently

capable of being moved where there is probable cause to believe

that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. See Commonwealth

v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 674, S.C., 491 Mass. 666 (2023);

3 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 49-50 (2011). The

existence of probable cause depends on whether the facts and

circumstances within the officers' knowledge at the time of the

search or seizure were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in

believing that evidence of a crime would be found within the

vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 624

(2008).

Here, the defendant does not dispute that the autobody

business's parking lot was open to the public or that the

defendant's vehicle was capable of being moved. We therefore

move to the question whether there was probable cause to believe

a crime was committed and that evidence would be found in the

Acura.

The defendant was actively bleeding when police first

encountered him, and he told officers he had been shot "down the

street." Thus, it was reasonable for them to conclude that the

defendant had been shot recently and nearby to the autobody shop

and parking lot. There was probable cause to believe that a

crime had occurred, whether the defendant's gunshot wound was

the result of another person shooting him (assault and battery

by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A,) or was

self-inflicted (discharge of a firearm within 500 feet of a

dwelling or other building, G. L. c. 269, § 12E). Witnesses

4 reported that the defendant drove into the parking lot before

falling out of his car, and the Acura's engine was still running

until an officer reached in to turn it off after retrieving the

firearm. Moreover, police saw blood on the driver's seat of the

vehicle. Based on this evidence, we conclude that there was

ample basis to support probable cause to believe that evidence

of the crime resulting in the defendant being shot would be

found inside the vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 102 Mass.

App. Ct. 359, 365-366 (2023) (search justified by observation of

used "crack" cocaine pipe in vehicle).4

Order allowing motion to suppress reversed.

By the Court (Meade, Blake & Brennan, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: August 9, 2024.

4 Because we conclude that the motor vehicle exception justified the warrantless entry and search, we need not address the Commonwealth's argument that the search was justified as a protective sweep of the vehicle.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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Related

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez
823 N.E.2d 1256 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2005)
Commonwealth v. Bostock
880 N.E.2d 759 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2008)
Commonwealth v. Johnson
958 N.E.2d 25 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2011)
Chace v. Curran
881 N.E.2d 792 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2008)

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