Commonwealth v. Mark D. Eldridge.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: May 21, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0122
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-122

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

MARK D. ELDRIDGE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

A District Court jury convicted the defendant, Mark D.

Eldridge, of assault and battery on a family or household member

and assault by means of a dangerous weapon. On appeal, the

defendant argues that the trial judge erred in limiting his

cross-examination of the victim and in excluding certain

documents and the testimony of a U-Haul employee about the

victim's demeanor in a telephone call. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the facts, as the jury could have

found them, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth v. Tejada, 484 Mass. 1, 2, 4 (2020). On July 19,

2023, the victim and the defendant, who had been married for six

years but were recently separated, agreed to meet at a U-Haul storage facility so that the victim could obtain her personal

belongings. When the defendant arrived, he confronted the

victim regarding the fact that her new boyfriend had accompanied

her to the storage unit. The defendant said to the victim that

she had three seconds "to get rid of that turd" before the

defendant killed him. The defendant then walked back to his

truck, opened a toolbox, and grabbed a hammer. He charged at

the victim and pinned her against the passenger door of her car.

The defendant then smashed the windshield, the passenger window,

and the car door with the hammer and struck the victim's nose

with the hammer, grabbed her arm, and pushed her against the

car. When police officers arrived, the victim's face and arms

were covered in blood. The defendant told the police officers

that the victim had attacked him and when police asked the

defendant how the victim was injured, he responded that the

victim "probably hit herself."

At trial, the defendant was the sole witness for the

defense, presenting a theory of self-defense. He claimed that

the victim and her new boyfriend had arrived at the storage unit

as part of a preconceived plan to attack him. The defendant

testified that the victim had punched him in the face and chest,

kicked him, and spat at him. The defendant testified that he

was afraid of the victim's boyfriend, who had threatened to kill

him, so he picked up a hammer from his toolbox to defend

2 himself. Finally, the defendant denied hitting the victim but

admitted that he had smashed the windshield of the victim's car

to prevent her from driving away.

Discussion. 1. Cross examination of witness. The

defendant claims that the judge erred by not allowing him to

cross-examine the victim about an allegation that the defendant

had made in an application for a criminal complaint. In that

application, the defendant alleged that the victim had

threatened the defendant that if he did not meet her financial

demands in the divorce proceedings, she would testify against

him in the criminal trial.

At trial, the judge precluded defense counsel from

inquiring into this area, stating that he was not going to

permit the defendant to get "into collateral matters, and

matters which aren't relevant to what happened that day." At

sidebar, the judge further instructed that he would not allow

"character assassination," and that, while the witness could be

impeached if there was a conviction, the defendant's allegations

in an application for a private complaint were inadmissible.

Trial judges are afforded "broad discretion to limit cross-

examination of a witness." Commonwealth v. Mercado, 456 Mass.

198, 203 (2010). "If a defendant believes that the judge

improperly restrained his cross-examination of a witness, the

defendant must demonstrate that the judge abused his discretion

3 and that he was prejudiced by such restraint" (citation

omitted). Commonwealth v. Sealy, 467 Mass. 617, 624 (2014).

The defendant contends that, by limiting cross-examination

of the alleged victim regarding the defendant's allegations in

the complaint application, the judge improperly restricted his

right to present his theory of defense and to confront an

adverse witness at trial. Undoubtedly, the Sixth Amendment to

the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights give a defendant the right to cross-

examine prosecution witnesses on the issue of bias or prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Avalos, 454 Mass. 1, 6 (2009). This right,

however, is not absolute. Commonwealth v. Barnes, 399 Mass.

385, 393 (1987). The judge may not completely "bar all inquiry

into the subject" of bias. Avalos, supra at 7, quoting

Commonwealth v. Allison, 434 Mass. 670, 681 (2001). However, a

judge may "limit and 'control the scope of cross-examination

. . . once the jury have been "adequately exposed" to the

issue.'" Commonwealth v. Mountry, 463 Mass. 80, 86 (2012),

quoting Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 231 (1981). In

particular, a judge "has discretion to limit questions that

involve collateral issues and questions where the connection to

the evidence of bias is too speculative. 'A defendant must make

a "plausible showing" of alleged bias, with a factual basis for

support'; otherwise, the judge may restrict or entirely exclude

4 the inquiry" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Chicas, 481

Mass. 316, 320 (2019), quoting Sealy, 467 Mass. at 624.

A review of the trial transcript establishes that the judge

did not foreclose inquiry by the defendant into the issue of

bias. On the contrary, the jury was well aware that the

defendant and the victim were in the midst of a contentious

divorce and that the victim had moved out of the marital home to

live with her new boyfriend. The defendant testified that he

wished to remain married to the victim and that the new

boyfriend was the reason his marriage had ended. The judge did

not prevent cross-examination of the victim on any bias that she

may have harbored against the defendant, and the jury heard

ample evidence from which they could infer bias. Therefore, the

judge acted within his discretion in excluding the defendant's

unsubstantiated allegations in an application for a criminal

complaint regarding the pending divorce proceeding because it

was a collateral matter that would only have distracted the

jury. See Chicas, 481 Mass. at 320.

2. Exclusion of U-Haul receipt and testimony of U-Haul

employee. Next, the defendant contends that the judge abused

his discretion by refusing to allow the admission of U-Haul

documents of an unpaid storage bill. At trial, the defendant

sought to admit the documents for the purpose of establishing

that the victim had lied at a clerk-magistrate hearing when she

5 testified that she had paid for the storage unit. The defendant

also contends that the judge erred in precluding him from

calling a U-Haul employee as a witness. The U-Haul employee was

not a percipient witness to the assault, nor was he the keeper

of the records. Rather, at trial the defendant claimed that the

U-Haul employee would testify about the victim's alleged

demeanor during a telephone call before she arrived at the

facility.

The judge ruled that the unauthenticated U-Haul documents

were inadmissible. The judge correctly reasoned that this

evidence was not relevant and was not probative of the victim's

bias or motive to fabricate the charges against the defendant.

See Commonwealth v. Chase, 372 Mass. 736, 747 (1977) ("Extrinsic

evidence on a collateral matter may be introduced at trial for

the purposes of impeachment only in the discretion of the

judge"). We agree with the judge's conclusion that "whether she

paid [the] bill or not, is not relevant." We also note that,

despite this ruling, the judge gave the defendant wide leeway on

cross-examination of the victim, including by allowing him to

question the victim about whether she had paid the U-Haul bill.

It was also within the judge's discretion to exclude the

testimony of the U-Haul employee as to the victim's alleged

demeanor on the telephone at some point prior to the incident as

it was irrelevant and without a proper foundation. Even if we

6 were to consider that the proffered testimony could have been

marginally relevant to the defendant's self-defense claim, the

judge could have determined that the scant relevance of the

evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing

the issues and the waste of time of calling a new witness solely

for that limited purpose. See Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2026)

(court may exclude relevant evidence if probative value is

substantially outweighed by danger of confusing issues and

wasting time, among other things). Furthermore, even if the

testimony was excluded in error, the defendant was not

prejudiced, given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt,

including but not limited to the medical evidence of the

victim's injuries, testimony corroborating the victim's version

of events, and the lack of defensive injuries on the defendant.

See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 348 (1998) (no

prejudice where "the other evidence of [the defendant's] guilt"

was "overwhelming").

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Grant, Walsh & Brennan, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: May 21, 2026.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.