Commonwealth v. Marder
This text of 193 N.E.2d 695 (Commonwealth v. Marder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The defendant was found guilty in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston of parking in Boston, on October 10, 1961, in violation of a city traffic rule. He was fined $25 and appealed to the Superior Court. There he filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, among others, (1) that under regulations of the Boston Traffic Commission he would be subjected to a maximum fine of $3 on a first offence in one calendar year if he accepted “noncriminal disposition” of his case, whereas, if he insisted on a judicial determination, he would be exposed to the possibility of a maximum fine of $25 or $50 on such a first offence, depending upon his total prior record of traffic violations in all years; (2) that if he insisted on a judicial determination of his guilt he would have a criminal record, whereas he would not have such a record if he acknowledged his violation; and (3) that the provisions of G. L. c. 90, §§ 20 and 20A, taken together, intimidate defendants and deter them from insisting upon a trial. The motion asserted that the statutes, permitting noncriminal disposition of parking of-fences on a potentially more favorable basis than disposition by judicial determination, unconstitutionally denied him the equal protection of the laws and due process of law. The defendant’s motion was denied. He again was found guihy and fined $25.
The pertinent statutes are set out in part in the margin. 1 General Laws c. 90, § 20A, is designed to establish a simple *410 and convenient procedure for the disposition, on essentially an administrative, basis, of charged violations of motor vehicle parking regulations. It was first adopted by St. 1934, c. 368, § 1, and has been frequently amended. Prior to its initial adoption there was prolonged legislative study and investigation by other responsible bodies. 2 Its legislative history shows that it was enacted to relieve the burden placed upon the courts and the police in disposing of minor traffic violations under the usual criminal procedure and to free violators, many of whose violations are trivial and in *411 advertent, from inconvenience disproportionate to the gravity of their offence.
Under the amended legislation, the right to a judicial determination whether an offence has been committed is carefully preserved. In the event of a finding of not guilty under § 20, of course, no penalty is imposed. If a defendant is found guilty, § 20 contains no requirement that the sentencing judge impose the maximum penalty. He may take into account the degree of seriousness of the violation and may place the case on file or impose a wide range of penalties up to the maximum, some of which may be less burdensome than the schedule of penalties available pursuant to § 20A. The noncriminal disposition under § 20A recognizes the fact, of ordinary experience in this motorized age, that most violators of such traffic regulations, even if the violations are inadvertent, recognize that they have committed a violation and prefer to pay a minor penalty without argument and inconvenience.
The noncriminal method of enforcement permitted by § 20A, as an alternative to criminal proceedings under § 20, is essentially a sensible, simple, administrative method of making necessary traffic rules effective, without clogging the courts, causing undue public inconvenience and resentment, or depriving any citizen of full opportunity at his option for a judicial determination of facts. It is open to all citizens on the same basis and constitutes a reasonable classification of minor offences for special administrative treatment. In the case of more serious offences, there might well be force to the defendant’s contention that the risks of a more serious penalty and criminal record upon a criminal disposition (as under § 20) would tend improperly to coerce admission, in an administrative proceeding (as under § 20A), of a guilt which did not exist. Compare, as to more serious offences, Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 104; Euziere v. United States, 249 F. 2d 293, 294-295 (10th Cir.); Heideman v. United States, 281 F. 2d 805, 808-809 (8th Cir.). Cf. also Letters v. Commonwealth, ante, 403; Teller v. United States, 263 F. 2d 871, 872 (6th Cir.). It *412 will be time enough to consider that question when and if the Legislature attempts to deal with more serious offences by a procedure similar to § 20A. We hold now (1) that the procedure with respect to parldng offences authorized by § 20A cannot be said to be unreasonable or discriminatory, either generally or as applied to this defendant, (2) that § 20A has not been shown to be an improper method of carrying out the obvious legislative purpose or beyond the powers of the Legislature (see General Elec. Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc. 333 Mass. 665, 675; Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 343 Mass. 49, 51; Hall-Omar Baking Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus. 344 Mass. 695, 700), and (3) that no facts appear indicating that by § 20A this defendant has been denied due process of law.
The defendant has invited our attention to Berger v. Denver, 142 Colo. 72, 75, in which, upon a somewhat different statute, a majority of the Colorado court (over a strong dissent) reached a conclusion in some respects inconsistent with the result reached in this opinion. We are not prepared to follow that decision.
Exceptions overruled.
General Laws c. 90, § 20 (as amended through St. 1956, c. 389, § 3), reads in part: “Any person convicted of a violation of any provision of this chapter the punishment for which is not otherwise provided . . . shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty-five dollars for-the first offence . . We assume, although the meager record does not clearly establish this, that the *410 defendant was fined $25 under § 20. General Laws e. 90, § 20A (as amended through St. 1961, e. 455, § 6), reads in part: “It shall be the duty of any police officer who takes cognizance of a violation of any provision of any rule, regulation, order, ordinance or by-law regulating the parking of motor vehicles established by any city . . . empowered ... to make such rules or regulations therein, forthwith to give to the offender a notice to appear before the clerk of the district court having jurisdiction ....
“Any person [so] notified to appear before the clerk of a . . . court . . . may appear before such clerk and confess the offence charged, either personally or through an agent duly authorized in writing or by mailing to such clerk, with the notice, the fine provided herein . . . [For the following sentences of § 20A, see St. 1961, c. 233, § 1. After a schedule of fines the following language appears.] provided, however, that . . . this sentence shall not apply to any offense . . .
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
193 N.E.2d 695, 346 Mass. 408, 1963 Mass. LEXIS 619, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-marder-mass-1963.