NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1468
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
LUIS ALBERTO DELVALLE-RODRIGUEZ.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the
defendant, Luis Alberto Delvalle-Rodriguez, was convicted of
numerous crimes arising from a violent incident in the town of
Washington. On appeal, he argues that the judge erred in
denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty on
three charges of kidnapping under G. L. c. 265, § 26. We
affirm.
Background. "Because the defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence presented, we summarize the facts
the jury could have found in the light most favorable to the
1As is our custom, we set forth the defendant's name as it appears in the indictments. Commonwealth." Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 431
(2015).
On the night of August 20, 2018, and the early morning of
the next day, the defendant was at a party at a location
referred to as Washington Mountain. Dozens of young adults
gathered to drink, smoke, and socialize. They sat on wooden
pallets around a firepit and stood on a wall overlooking the
area. Carrying a firearm, the defendant arrived at the party
around 11:00 or 11:30 P.M.
Around 1:00 A.M., the three victims decided to leave the
party and got in the truck of the first victim, Nicholas
Carnevale. The truck was parked at the bottom of a muddy trail.
As the first victim started the truck in reverse, a group of
men, including the defendant, walked down the trail from the
firepit toward the truck. The first victim accelerated in an
attempt to get away, but the truck got stuck in the mud. When
the men reached the truck, they beat on it with their hands,
sticks, and slats from the pallets and tried to open its doors.
They shouted and yelled "fucking stab him" and "[g]et out before
we start shooting."
At some point, the truck's doors were unlocked and some of
the men, including the defendant, pulled out the first victim by
his leg. They punched the first victim and hit him with sticks
and slats. After the second victim got out of the truck through
2 the passenger side window to try and help the first victim, he
was also punched and hit with sticks and slats. Then, several
gunshots rang out. As the first victim ran away, the defendant
shot him in the head. Meanwhile, the third victim remained in
the backseat of the truck and took cover on its floor. Once the
incident was over, the second victim tried to move the truck,
but it remained stuck in the mud.
A grand jury indicted the defendant on eleven counts
arising from the incident: armed assault with intent to murder,
G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); assault and battery by means of a
dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, G. L. c. 265,
§ 15A (c) (i); assault and battery by means of a dangerous
weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); armed kidnapping causing
serious bodily injury as to the first victim, G. L. c. 265,
§ 26; two counts of kidnapping while armed with a firearm as to
the second and third victims, G. L. c. 265, § 26; two counts of
assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a); illegal possession
of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, G. L. c. 265, § 18B; and
malicious damage to a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 266, § 28 (a).
The Commonwealth entered nolle prosequis as to the two firearm
indictments. A jury trial was held on the remaining nine
counts. During the trial, the defendant filed a motion for a
required finding of not guilty as to all counts, which the judge
3 denied. After the close of evidence, the defendant renewed his
motion as to the two counts of kidnapping while armed with a
firearm, which the judge also denied. The jury convicted the
defendant on all nine remaining counts.
Discussion. The defendant contends that the judge erred in
denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty as to
the three kidnapping offenses because there was insufficient
evidence that he intended to or in fact did confine or restrain
the liberty of the victims. In reviewing the denial of a motion
for a required finding of not guilty, "we assess the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found each element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Robinson, 493
Mass. 303, 307 (2024), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378
Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979). "A conviction may rest exclusively
on circumstantial evidence, and, in evaluating that evidence, we
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth"
(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Bonner, 489 Mass. 268, 275
(2022). "The relevant question is whether the evidence would
permit a jury to find guilt, not whether the evidence requires
such a finding." Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747
(1988).
A person is guilty of kidnapping if they, "without lawful
authority, forcibly or secretly confine[] or imprison[] another
4 person . . . against [that person's] will." G. L. c. 265,
§ 26. "Confinement is broadly interpreted to mean any restraint
of a person's movement" (quotation and citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 548 (2017). Confinement
may be effectuated by actual force, but "if the victim is
subdued by the display of potential force, [that] is [also]
sufficient" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Fredette, 97
Mass. App. Ct. 206, 214 (2020). Because the Commonwealth
proceeded against the defendant both as a principal and as a
part of a joint venture, sufficient evidence as to either theory
is enough to sustain the convictions. Commonwealth v. Zanetti,
454 Mass. 449, 464 (2009).
Although the defendant maintains that his convictions
cannot be sustained because the muddy trail, not his actions,
prevented the victims from leaving the scene in the truck, that
is not the relevant inquiry. The question under the statute is
whether the defendant forcibly confined the victims inside the
truck. See Oberle, 476 Mass. at 548. The evidence here would
permit a rational trier of fact to find that he did. See Brown,
401 Mass. at 747. Multiple witnesses testified that the group
of men, including the defendant, banged on the truck with their
hands and objects. The men shouted and yelled threats at the
victims and threatened to shoot them. These facts, viewed in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, provided
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1468
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
LUIS ALBERTO DELVALLE-RODRIGUEZ.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the
defendant, Luis Alberto Delvalle-Rodriguez, was convicted of
numerous crimes arising from a violent incident in the town of
Washington. On appeal, he argues that the judge erred in
denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty on
three charges of kidnapping under G. L. c. 265, § 26. We
affirm.
Background. "Because the defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence presented, we summarize the facts
the jury could have found in the light most favorable to the
1As is our custom, we set forth the defendant's name as it appears in the indictments. Commonwealth." Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 431
(2015).
On the night of August 20, 2018, and the early morning of
the next day, the defendant was at a party at a location
referred to as Washington Mountain. Dozens of young adults
gathered to drink, smoke, and socialize. They sat on wooden
pallets around a firepit and stood on a wall overlooking the
area. Carrying a firearm, the defendant arrived at the party
around 11:00 or 11:30 P.M.
Around 1:00 A.M., the three victims decided to leave the
party and got in the truck of the first victim, Nicholas
Carnevale. The truck was parked at the bottom of a muddy trail.
As the first victim started the truck in reverse, a group of
men, including the defendant, walked down the trail from the
firepit toward the truck. The first victim accelerated in an
attempt to get away, but the truck got stuck in the mud. When
the men reached the truck, they beat on it with their hands,
sticks, and slats from the pallets and tried to open its doors.
They shouted and yelled "fucking stab him" and "[g]et out before
we start shooting."
At some point, the truck's doors were unlocked and some of
the men, including the defendant, pulled out the first victim by
his leg. They punched the first victim and hit him with sticks
and slats. After the second victim got out of the truck through
2 the passenger side window to try and help the first victim, he
was also punched and hit with sticks and slats. Then, several
gunshots rang out. As the first victim ran away, the defendant
shot him in the head. Meanwhile, the third victim remained in
the backseat of the truck and took cover on its floor. Once the
incident was over, the second victim tried to move the truck,
but it remained stuck in the mud.
A grand jury indicted the defendant on eleven counts
arising from the incident: armed assault with intent to murder,
G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); assault and battery by means of a
dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, G. L. c. 265,
§ 15A (c) (i); assault and battery by means of a dangerous
weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); armed kidnapping causing
serious bodily injury as to the first victim, G. L. c. 265,
§ 26; two counts of kidnapping while armed with a firearm as to
the second and third victims, G. L. c. 265, § 26; two counts of
assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a); illegal possession
of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, G. L. c. 265, § 18B; and
malicious damage to a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 266, § 28 (a).
The Commonwealth entered nolle prosequis as to the two firearm
indictments. A jury trial was held on the remaining nine
counts. During the trial, the defendant filed a motion for a
required finding of not guilty as to all counts, which the judge
3 denied. After the close of evidence, the defendant renewed his
motion as to the two counts of kidnapping while armed with a
firearm, which the judge also denied. The jury convicted the
defendant on all nine remaining counts.
Discussion. The defendant contends that the judge erred in
denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty as to
the three kidnapping offenses because there was insufficient
evidence that he intended to or in fact did confine or restrain
the liberty of the victims. In reviewing the denial of a motion
for a required finding of not guilty, "we assess the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found each element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Robinson, 493
Mass. 303, 307 (2024), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378
Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979). "A conviction may rest exclusively
on circumstantial evidence, and, in evaluating that evidence, we
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth"
(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Bonner, 489 Mass. 268, 275
(2022). "The relevant question is whether the evidence would
permit a jury to find guilt, not whether the evidence requires
such a finding." Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747
(1988).
A person is guilty of kidnapping if they, "without lawful
authority, forcibly or secretly confine[] or imprison[] another
4 person . . . against [that person's] will." G. L. c. 265,
§ 26. "Confinement is broadly interpreted to mean any restraint
of a person's movement" (quotation and citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 548 (2017). Confinement
may be effectuated by actual force, but "if the victim is
subdued by the display of potential force, [that] is [also]
sufficient" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Fredette, 97
Mass. App. Ct. 206, 214 (2020). Because the Commonwealth
proceeded against the defendant both as a principal and as a
part of a joint venture, sufficient evidence as to either theory
is enough to sustain the convictions. Commonwealth v. Zanetti,
454 Mass. 449, 464 (2009).
Although the defendant maintains that his convictions
cannot be sustained because the muddy trail, not his actions,
prevented the victims from leaving the scene in the truck, that
is not the relevant inquiry. The question under the statute is
whether the defendant forcibly confined the victims inside the
truck. See Oberle, 476 Mass. at 548. The evidence here would
permit a rational trier of fact to find that he did. See Brown,
401 Mass. at 747. Multiple witnesses testified that the group
of men, including the defendant, banged on the truck with their
hands and objects. The men shouted and yelled threats at the
victims and threatened to shoot them. These facts, viewed in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, provided
5 sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably infer that the
"threatening words [and] gestures" from the group of men,
including the defendant, were a display of force or potential
force that kept the victims confined inside the truck.
Commonwealth v. Trotto, 487 Mass. 708, 717 (2021). See
Fredette, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 214. Contrary to the defendant's
contention, whether the victims were physically able to remove
themselves from the truck is not dispositive of whether their
movement was restrained by the threat of harm. See Commonwealth
v. Lent, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 705, 710 n.5 (1999).
The Commonwealth did not have to prove that the defendant
had the specific intent to confine or imprison the victims. See
Commonwealth v. Saylor, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 121-122 (1989).
General Laws c. 265, § 26, sets forth three relevant clauses,
which read:
"Whoever, without lawful authority, [1] forcibly or secretly confines or imprisons another person within this commonwealth against his will, or [2] forcibly carries or sends such person out of this commonwealth, or [3] forcibly seizes and confines or inveigles or kidnaps another person, with intent either to cause him to be secretly confined or imprisoned in this commonwealth against his will, or to cause him to be sent out of this commonwealth against his will or in any way held to service against his will, shall be punished . . . ."
See Commonwealth v. Bibby, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 158, 160 (2002),
citing G. L. c. 265, § 26. Here, the relevant indictments
charged the defendant with all three theories of kidnapping, in
6 the alternative.2 At trial, the Commonwealth relied only on the
first theory under G. L. c. 265, § 26, and that is the theory on
which the jury was instructed. That theory does not require the
Commonwealth to prove that the defendant had a specific intent.
See Saylor, supra. Accordingly, it was enough for the
Commonwealth to prove that the defendant confined the victims
"by force and against [their] will, and that the sequence of
events [was not] accidental." Id. at 122. See Commonwealth v.
Traylor, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 239, 243 n.7 (1997). As discussed,
2 The indictments alleged that the defendant, "without lawful authority, did forcibly or secretly confine or imprison [victim] within this Commonwealth against such person's will, or did forcibly carry or send such person out of this Commonwealth, or did forcibly seize and confine or inveigle or kidnap such person, with intent either to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned in this Commonwealth against such person's will, or to cause such person to be sent out of this Commonwealth against such person's will or in some way held to service against such person's will . . ." (emphasis added).
7 the evidence was sufficient to support such a finding.3
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Henry, Shin & Toone, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: April 2, 2026.
3 Had the defendant been tried under the third theory, the Commonwealth would have had to prove that he had the requisite specific intent. See Commonwealth v. Ware, 375 Mass. 118, 120 (1978); Bibby, 54 Mass. App. Ct. at 160-161.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.