Commonwealth v. Lancaster Mills

98 N.E. 864, 212 Mass. 315, 1912 Mass. LEXIS 931
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedJune 18, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 98 N.E. 864 (Commonwealth v. Lancaster Mills) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Lancaster Mills, 98 N.E. 864, 212 Mass. 315, 1912 Mass. LEXIS 931 (Mass. 1912).

Opinion

Sheldon, J.

It is provided by St. 1911, c. 584, that “No employer shall impose a fine upon an employee engaged at weaving for imperfections that may arise during the process of weaving.” Looking at the earlier statute of 1891, c. 125, § 1, and at the decision in the case of Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, we are of opinion that the word “fine” in the later statute must be taken to mean merely the arbitrary imposition of a penalty for an imperfection in weaving by a deduction from the amount of the wages to which the employee is entitled by his contract of employment, whether that amount has been determined by a quantum meruit or by a stipulation for a fixed rate of compensation. It is intended to prevent the employer from imposing a penalty for an imperfection in the finished product, whether or not due to the fault of the employee, and enforcing its collection by deducting it from what has become due to the employee. . So construed, as was said by this court in Commonwealth v. Perry, ubi supra, on pages 120,121, it could perhaps be sustained as a valid police regulation. See Opinion of the Justices, 163 Mass. 589; Squire v. Tellier, 185 Mass. 18, 20; Commonwealth v. Strauss, 191 Mass. 545, 550, et seq.; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 200 Mass. 482, 484; Opinion of the Justices, 208 Mass. 619. But that question is not presented.

In the case at bar, it could at any rate have been found that the weaver had received exactly the wages for which he had contracted. The system adopted by the defendant was within the authority given by St. 1909, c. 514, §§ 114-116, and it is not contended that any of the requirements of those sections have been violated. The act of 1911 does not purport to repeal any of those provisions, and it is not necessary to construe it as having that effect.

If the present act did repeal the provisions of St. 1909, c. 514, above referred to, and went to the full extent for which the Com[318]*318monwealth has contended in this case, it would be difficult, without overruling Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, to maintain its constitutionality.

The rulings requested by the defendant should have been given. Gallagher v. Hathaway Manuf. Co. 172 Mass. 230.

Exceptions sustained.

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Related

Attorney General v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America
39 N.E.2d 664 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1942)
Foster v. Curtis
99 N.E. 961 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1912)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
98 N.E. 864, 212 Mass. 315, 1912 Mass. LEXIS 931, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-lancaster-mills-mass-1912.