Commonwealth v. Kennedy

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Commonwealth v. Kennedy

277 N.E.2d 305, 360 Mass. 859, 1971 Mass. LEXIS 1029

CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

DecidedDecember 6, 1971

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 277 N.E.2d 305 (Commonwealth v. Kennedy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 277 N.E.2d 305, 360 Mass. 859, 1971 Mass. LEXIS 1029 (Mass. 1971).

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Opinion

The defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of an infernal machine in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 102A, and appeals under G. L. c. 278, §§ 33A-33G. A police officer and a Federal investigator testified that they saw the defendant hand “something” to one Labbe. Labbe fled, but was soon caught. In Labbe’s pockets were cartridges and a bottle of acid; on the ground near him were two guns, an automobile ignition key, and a “pyrotechnical bomb shell.” Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the jury could infer that the “something” was the “bomb shell” from testimony that Labbe ran, “holding whatever it was he had in front of him,” “with the objects at his chest,” and that the defendant later said he knew the device was a bomb. There was expert testimony that the device was explosive and would cause extensive property damage and personal injury. The judge properly instructed the jury that if they believed the prosecution witnesses they should conclude that the device was an infernal machine. The statute defines “infernal machine” to include “any device for endangering life or doing unusual damage to property, or both, by explosion.”

Judgment affirmed.

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The defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of an infernal machine in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 102A, and appeals under G. L. c. 278, §§ 33A-33G. A police officer and a Federal investigator testified that they saw the defendant hand “something” to one Labbe. Labbe fled, but was soon caught. In Labbe’s pockets were cartridges and a bottle of acid; on the ground near him were two guns, an automobile ignition key, and a “pyrotechnical bomb shell.” Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the jury could infer that the “something” was the “bomb shell” from testimony that Labbe ran, “holding whatever it was he had in front of him,” “with the objects at his chest,” and that the defendant later said he knew the device was a bomb. There was expert testimony that the device was explosive and would cause extensive property damage and personal injury. The judge properly instructed the jury that if they believed the prosecution witnesses they should conclude that the device was an infernal machine. The statute defines “infernal machine” to include “any device for endangering life or doing unusual damage to property, or both, by explosion.”

Judgment affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

277 N.E.2d 305, 360 Mass. 859, 1971 Mass. LEXIS 1029, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-kennedy-mass-1971.

Opinion

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