Commonwealth v. Keith A. Brugnani.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: June 15, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0344
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-344

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

KEITH A. BRUGNANI.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

A jury found the defendant, Keith A. Brugnani, guilty of

assault and battery on a correctional facility employee in

violation of G. L. c. 127, § 38B (b). The defendant appeals,

contending that one of the judge's instructions to the jury

relieved the Commonwealth of its burden to prove an essential

element of the crime charged. We affirm.

Discussion. "The Commonwealth has the burden of proving

every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 217 (2007). Where a jury

instruction relieves the Commonwealth of this burden or shifts

it to the defendant, the defendant's due process rights have

been violated, and reversal may be required. See Commonwealth v. Pickles, 393 Mass. 775, 778 (1985). "Our review of claimed

jury instruction errors requires us to 'evaluate the

instructions as whole, looking for the interpretation a

reasonable juror would place on the judge's words.'"

Commonwealth v. Arias, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 465 (2013),

quoting Commonwealth v. Trapp, 423 Mass. 356, 361, cert. denied,

519 U.S. 1045 (1996).

To convict the defendant of assault and battery on an

employee of a correctional facility, the Commonwealth was

required to prove five elements, including that the defendant

was a "person in the custody of a correctional facility" at the

time the crime was committed. G. L. c. 127, § 38B (b). The

defendant argues for the first time on appeal that one sentence

from the judge's instructions to the jury -- "You have heard

that the defendant was in custody of a correctional

facility" -- relieved the Commonwealth's burden of proving the

"in custody" element of the crime.

We discern no error. "We do not consider bits and pieces

of the instruction in isolation." Commonwealth v. Young, 461

Mass. 198, 207 (2012). The judge properly instructed the jury

that the Commonwealth was required to prove "five elements

beyond a reasonable doubt," including "[f]ourth, that the

defendant was in custody of the correctional facility at the

time." The judge then defined each element in detail. When

2 explaining the fourth element, the judge repeated the

Commonwealth's burden: "To prove the fourth element, the

Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant was in custody of a correctional facility." The judge

then defined "correctional facility" and "custody." Concluding

the instructions on the elements of the crime, the judge

repeated that the Commonwealth had to prove each element beyond

a reasonable doubt, and further instructed that the jury had to

acquit if the Commonwealth "failed to prove one or more of the

elements beyond a reasonable doubt."

The judge followed these instructions with a limiting

instruction, given for the defendant's benefit, to prevent the

jury from improperly using the evidence of the defendant's

incarceration for propensity purposes. Specifically, the judge

instructed the jury that, having "heard" that the defendant was

in custody, they were not to use this evidence for any of the

following purposes: "as a substitute for proof that the

defendant committed the crime charged"; "as proof that the

defendant has a criminal personality or a bad character"; or "to

conclude that if the defendant committed the other act, they

must also have committed this offense." The judge concluded by

stressing that the jury could consider evidence of the

defendant's incarceration "solely on the limited issue of

whether the defendant was in the custody of a correctional

3 facility," but that they "may not consider this evidence for any

other purpose" (emphasis added). This language conveyed that

the issue of the defendant's custody was still for the jury to

determine.

The instruction complained of, and the language surrounding

it, was a correct statement of the law that followed the model

jury instructions verbatim. See Instruction 6.215 of the

Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court

(2022) (supplemental instruction on "other bad acts").

"Instructions that convey the proper legal standard,

particularly when tracking model jury instructions, are deemed

correct." Green, petitioner, 475 Mass. 624, 629 (2016). An

instruction such as the one given here does not create, but

rather minimizes, prejudice to the defendant. See Commonwealth

v. Brown, 462 Mass. 620, 628 (2012). Defense counsel did not

object, suggesting that the judge's phrasing was not confusing

or problematic at the time and in the context it was given.

Finally, less than an hour into their deliberations, the

jury requested and received "a written description of the five

elements of the charge that the prosecution needs to prove,"

which both parties agreed was appropriate and which the

defendant has not challenged on appeal. See Young, 461 Mass. at

210 (contents of written copy of jury instruction relevant to

challenge of prior oral instruction). This document was the

4 last substantive statement of the law provided to the jury

before they returned a verdict. "Because the judge repeated the

correct instruction, and the correct instruction was part of the

last statement of law the jury heard, we conclude that, on the

whole, a reasonable juror would not have misunderstood" that the

Commonwealth bore the burden of proving all the elements of

assault and battery on a correctional facility employee,

including that the defendant was in custody at the time of the

crime. Id. at 211. See Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792,

806 (1996) (no reversible error where "the charge as a whole

repeatedly and clearly emphasized the Commonwealth's burden of

proof beyond a reasonable doubt on every element of [the crime

charged]").

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Massing, Ditkoff & Hand, JJ. 1),

Clerk

Entered: June 15, 2026.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.