NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1253
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
KAMIYA SANTOS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a traffic stop in the early morning hours, the
defendant was charged with various firearms violations and a
civil motor vehicle infraction. A jury convicted him of
carrying a firearm without a license (G. L. c. 269, § 10 [a]),
carrying a loaded firearm without a license (G. L. c. 269,
§ 10 [n]), defacement of a serial number on a firearm (G. L.
c. 269, § 11C), and possession of ammunition without a firearm
identification card (G. L. c. 269, § 10 [h] [1]). The defendant
raises two issues in this appeal. First, he contends that State
troopers unreasonably prolonged the length of time he spent
sitting near the stopped car, effecting an unreasonable seizure.
Second, he contends that the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 496 Mass. 483, 488 (2025), requires
a judgment of acquittal on the charge of defacement of a serial
number on a firearm. We affirm.
Background. The defendant was a rear-seat passenger in a
car that was stopped on Massachusetts Avenue in Boston by a
State trooper in the early morning hours. The trooper stopped
the car after noticing that one headlight was not functioning
and then discovering that the car had failed inspection. The
driver immediately pulled over, stopping on Massachusetts Avenue
approximately two car lengths before the entrance to the South
Bay Plaza. Three people were in the car: the driver, a front-
seat passenger, and the defendant in the back seat. Seeing that
the front-seat passenger and the defendant did not have their
seatbelts fastened, the trooper asked all three for their names
and dates of birth to permit him to check their driver's license
status and issue written warnings for the failure to wear
seatbelts.
After returning to his cruiser, the trooper discovered that
none of the three had a valid driver's license. The same check
revealed that none of them had a firearm license. The trooper
returned to the car and let the driver know that none of the
three could drive the car away, but that a licensed driver could
come pick up the car. At that point, the trooper intended to
2 issue written warnings to both the defendant and the front-seat
passenger for their failure to wear a seatbelt.
The driver was unable to find someone to retrieve the car,
so the trooper returned to his cruiser to request that the car
be towed. At or around this time, two more troopers arrived and
began to assist the first trooper. The first trooper returned
to the car and told all three occupants to get out, taking their
personal belongings, and sit on the sidewalk. The second and
third trooper were in the vicinity while the first trooper began
an inventory search of the car pursuant to the State police
inventory policy, which was admitted in evidence at the
suppression hearing. The policy requires that closed and
unlocked containers be opened and examined.
After completing the inventory of the driver's side of the
car, the trooper moved to the passenger's side, where he had
already spied a plastic bag on the floor in front of the front
passenger seat. After opening the front passenger door, the
trooper bent over and saw that the plastic bag was open; inside,
the trooper saw what he believed to be the butt end of a
firearm.
The trooper returned to the three men and, saying something
about a gun, told the front-seat passenger to stand up,
instructing that the passenger be handcuffed. The defendant got
up and started running into the South Bay parking lot with the
3 second and third troopers in pursuit. The defendant fell and
the troopers caught up with him. A trooper patted him down,
found a gun in his waistband, and removed it.
Discussion. The defendant challenges the length of time he
spent sitting at the curb before the trooper found the firearm
in the passenger seat of the car. Asserting that the proper
stop of the car was a "routine traffic stop" whose duration was
bounded by reasonableness, the defendant asserts that the
trooper should have written the defendant a warning for his
seatbelt infraction before performing the inventory search. 1
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, "[w]e
accept the motion judge's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous . . . ." Commonwealth v. Bell, 473 Mass. 131,
138 (2015), cert. denied, 579 U.S. 906 (2016). Where, as here,
we find no clear error of fact, "our legal analysis focuses on
'the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found.'" Commonwealth v. Depina, 456
Mass. 238, 241 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass.
642, 646 (2004).
"A valid investigatory stop 'cannot last longer than
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop'"
1 The defendant does not challenge the lawfulness of the traffic stop, the trooper's decision to tow the car, the subsequent exit order, the inventory search, or the defendant's initial detention on the curb.
4 (quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Tavares, 482 Mass. 694,
703 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 151
(2016). "The scope of a stop may only extend beyond its initial
purpose if the officer is confronted with facts giving rise to a
reasonable suspicion that 'further criminal conduct is afoot.'"
Tavares, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237,
243 (2017).
In the circumstances of this case, the trooper was not
obligated to issue the seatbelt warning before beginning the
inventory search, and the brief delay that followed, lasting
until the trooper discovered the firearm in the car, was not
unreasonable. See Commonwealth v. Moore, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 334,
340 (2002) ("ultimate touchstone of art. 14 and the Fourth
Amendment is whether a search or seizure was reasonable in the
circumstances"). The trooper reasonably asked the defendant and
his companions to sit on the curb after determining that the car
needed to be towed. As the defendant concedes, the tow required
the trooper first to conduct an inventory search, since the car
could have contained valuable or important personal property.
Although the defendant was detained on the side of the road, it
was nearly 2 A.M. and he was seated along a private parking lot
for a store that was closed at that time, thus mitigating
concerns about the effect of a public detention on the
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1253
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
KAMIYA SANTOS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a traffic stop in the early morning hours, the
defendant was charged with various firearms violations and a
civil motor vehicle infraction. A jury convicted him of
carrying a firearm without a license (G. L. c. 269, § 10 [a]),
carrying a loaded firearm without a license (G. L. c. 269,
§ 10 [n]), defacement of a serial number on a firearm (G. L.
c. 269, § 11C), and possession of ammunition without a firearm
identification card (G. L. c. 269, § 10 [h] [1]). The defendant
raises two issues in this appeal. First, he contends that State
troopers unreasonably prolonged the length of time he spent
sitting near the stopped car, effecting an unreasonable seizure.
Second, he contends that the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 496 Mass. 483, 488 (2025), requires
a judgment of acquittal on the charge of defacement of a serial
number on a firearm. We affirm.
Background. The defendant was a rear-seat passenger in a
car that was stopped on Massachusetts Avenue in Boston by a
State trooper in the early morning hours. The trooper stopped
the car after noticing that one headlight was not functioning
and then discovering that the car had failed inspection. The
driver immediately pulled over, stopping on Massachusetts Avenue
approximately two car lengths before the entrance to the South
Bay Plaza. Three people were in the car: the driver, a front-
seat passenger, and the defendant in the back seat. Seeing that
the front-seat passenger and the defendant did not have their
seatbelts fastened, the trooper asked all three for their names
and dates of birth to permit him to check their driver's license
status and issue written warnings for the failure to wear
seatbelts.
After returning to his cruiser, the trooper discovered that
none of the three had a valid driver's license. The same check
revealed that none of them had a firearm license. The trooper
returned to the car and let the driver know that none of the
three could drive the car away, but that a licensed driver could
come pick up the car. At that point, the trooper intended to
2 issue written warnings to both the defendant and the front-seat
passenger for their failure to wear a seatbelt.
The driver was unable to find someone to retrieve the car,
so the trooper returned to his cruiser to request that the car
be towed. At or around this time, two more troopers arrived and
began to assist the first trooper. The first trooper returned
to the car and told all three occupants to get out, taking their
personal belongings, and sit on the sidewalk. The second and
third trooper were in the vicinity while the first trooper began
an inventory search of the car pursuant to the State police
inventory policy, which was admitted in evidence at the
suppression hearing. The policy requires that closed and
unlocked containers be opened and examined.
After completing the inventory of the driver's side of the
car, the trooper moved to the passenger's side, where he had
already spied a plastic bag on the floor in front of the front
passenger seat. After opening the front passenger door, the
trooper bent over and saw that the plastic bag was open; inside,
the trooper saw what he believed to be the butt end of a
firearm.
The trooper returned to the three men and, saying something
about a gun, told the front-seat passenger to stand up,
instructing that the passenger be handcuffed. The defendant got
up and started running into the South Bay parking lot with the
3 second and third troopers in pursuit. The defendant fell and
the troopers caught up with him. A trooper patted him down,
found a gun in his waistband, and removed it.
Discussion. The defendant challenges the length of time he
spent sitting at the curb before the trooper found the firearm
in the passenger seat of the car. Asserting that the proper
stop of the car was a "routine traffic stop" whose duration was
bounded by reasonableness, the defendant asserts that the
trooper should have written the defendant a warning for his
seatbelt infraction before performing the inventory search. 1
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, "[w]e
accept the motion judge's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous . . . ." Commonwealth v. Bell, 473 Mass. 131,
138 (2015), cert. denied, 579 U.S. 906 (2016). Where, as here,
we find no clear error of fact, "our legal analysis focuses on
'the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found.'" Commonwealth v. Depina, 456
Mass. 238, 241 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass.
642, 646 (2004).
"A valid investigatory stop 'cannot last longer than
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop'"
1 The defendant does not challenge the lawfulness of the traffic stop, the trooper's decision to tow the car, the subsequent exit order, the inventory search, or the defendant's initial detention on the curb.
4 (quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Tavares, 482 Mass. 694,
703 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 151
(2016). "The scope of a stop may only extend beyond its initial
purpose if the officer is confronted with facts giving rise to a
reasonable suspicion that 'further criminal conduct is afoot.'"
Tavares, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237,
243 (2017).
In the circumstances of this case, the trooper was not
obligated to issue the seatbelt warning before beginning the
inventory search, and the brief delay that followed, lasting
until the trooper discovered the firearm in the car, was not
unreasonable. See Commonwealth v. Moore, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 334,
340 (2002) ("ultimate touchstone of art. 14 and the Fourth
Amendment is whether a search or seizure was reasonable in the
circumstances"). The trooper reasonably asked the defendant and
his companions to sit on the curb after determining that the car
needed to be towed. As the defendant concedes, the tow required
the trooper first to conduct an inventory search, since the car
could have contained valuable or important personal property.
Although the defendant was detained on the side of the road, it
was nearly 2 A.M. and he was seated along a private parking lot
for a store that was closed at that time, thus mitigating
concerns about the effect of a public detention on the
defendant's liberty interests. Given these circumstances, the
5 judge committed no error in denying the defendant's motion to
suppress. Cf. Commonwealth v. Catanzaro, 441 Mass. 46, 56
(2004) ("There is no ready test for reasonableness [under art.
14] except by balancing the need to search or seize against the
invasion that the search or seizure entails").
The defendant also maintains that the defacement conviction
was inconsistent with Ferrara and therefore must be reversed.
As it appeared at the time of the offenses in both this case and
in Ferrara, G. L. c. 269, § 11C, required the Commonwealth to
prove "either that the defendant defaced the firearm or that he
or she knowingly received a firearm so defaced." Ferrara, 496
Mass. at 488. Under the statute, "'possession or control of a
[defaced] firearm' constitute[d] prima facie evidence of a
violation," but the statute allowed that presumption to be
"rebutted by evidence that such person had no knowledge whatever
that such number had been removed . . . or by evidence that he
had no guilty knowledge thereof." Id., quoting G. L. c. 269,
§ 11C.
The defendant asserts that his case was "indistinguishable
from Ferrara," and that therefore he is entitled to a judgment
of acquittal on the charge of defacement of a serial number on a
firearm. We are not persuaded. In Ferrara, 496 Mass. at 488-
498, the judge did not instruct the jury that possession of a
firearm with a defaced serial number created a rebuttable
6 presumption that the defendant had violated the statute, and the
Commonwealth proved only that the defendant possessed a firearm
with a defaced serial number. Because there was no evidence
"proving the theory upon which the jury were instructed, i.e.,
that the defendant knowingly and intentionally defaced the
firearm," the conviction was reversed. Id. at 489.
Here, by contrast, the judge did instruct the jury on
possession as prima facie evidence of a violation. After
instructing that the jury must determine "whether the
Commonwealth has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a serial
number or identification number on the firearm was removed,
defaced, altered, obliterated, or mutilated by the defendant,"
the judge instructed first on intentional defacement: the
Commonwealth "must prove that some part of the number was
intentionally removed, defaced, altered, obliterated, or
mutilated, or to use other words, damaged, scratched out, or
destroyed by the defendant." He then continued:
"You have also heard some evidence in this case suggesting that the defendant possessed a firearm with a defaced, altered, or obliterated serial number.
"If you find that fact that he was in possession of such a firearm, you are permitted to accept it also as sufficient proof that the defendant was the person who removed, defaced, altered, obliterated, or mutilated the serial number or identification number on that firearm.
"If there is contrary evidence about whether it was the defendant who caused the damage, you are to treat any testimony about possession like you would any other piece of
7 evidence, and you should weigh it along with the rest of the evidence on the issue of who caused the damage."
Those instructions distinguish this case from Ferrara. In
this case, the trial evidence established that the serial number
was defaced or obliterated. The firearm was taken from the
defendant's person and was introduced in evidence along with the
trooper's testimony that it was seized from the defendant's
person. The trooper testified that this type of firearm would
have a serial number on the butt, "and that this firearm had no
visible serial number when he found it." The "prima facie
evidence of a violation" was established by the evidence that
the defendant had possession of the firearm with a blank space
instead of a serial number, and no contrary evidence was
introduced. See Ferrara at 488-489. This was enough to sustain
the verdict.
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Neyman, Hershfang & Toone, JJ. 2),
Clerk
Entered: July 6, 2026.
2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.