Commonwealth v. Jose Correa.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: June 30, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0010
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-10

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JOSE CORREA.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

On March 28, 2024, a jury found the defendant guilty of all

twelve charges relating to the distribution of controlled

substances and unlawful possession of firearms leveled against

him. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the judge erred

in allowing an officer's narration describing the content of a

video recording in evidence, (2) the judge erred in allowing an

expert police witness's testimony regarding characteristics of

drug distribution, and (3) the testimony of a Department of

Criminal Justice Information Systems (DCJIS) employee was

insufficient to establish that the defendant did not have a

firearm license. We affirm. Discussion. 1. Video recording testimony. At trial, the

Commonwealth entered into evidence two video recordings of the

defendant running away after the police arrived at 23 King

Street to execute a search warrant, and three photographs taken

of images depicted in the second video recording.1 The second

video recording, at issue here, shows the defendant running

through an alley. Over the defendant's objection, the

prosecutor asked Officer Anthony Correa to describe the three

images taken from the second video. Officer Correa had been

chasing the defendant but did not personally witness him running

through the alley. Officer Correa testified that the first

image depicted a pathway between 53 Queen Street and 55 Queen

Street with the defendant as he appeared shortly before and

after the events of the video recording. He testified that the

second image depicted the same pathway, and "the defendant with

his hand kind of motioning up." Finally, he testified that the

third image depicted the defendant's "hand returning back to

that same position" and "some sort of object falling on the

other side of that fence." Later, the police found plastic

baggies that contained heroin and fentanyl on the other side of

the fence in the area depicted in the video.

1 We have viewed both video recordings.

2 The defendant contends that Officer Correa's testimony

regarding the images was impermissible lay opinion because the

jury were capable of viewing the images and drawing their own

conclusions regarding what was depicted. We disagree.

Because the defendant objected to the testimony regarding

the content of the second video recording, we review the

testimony for prejudicial error. See Commonwealth v. Pina, 481

Mass. 413, 429 (2019).

A lay witness's opinion testimony "is admissible only where

it is '(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness;

(b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony

or the determination of a fact in issue; and (c) not based on

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge'"

(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 541

(2013). "Where the jury are capable of viewing video or

photographic evidence and drawing their own conclusions

regarding what is depicted, a lay witness's testimony about the

content of the video or photographs is admissible only if it

would assist the jury in reaching more reliable conclusions."

Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass. 455, 476 (2022).

Here, Officer Correa's testimony about what he believed the

images depicted was permissible lay opinion because it was

rationally based on his perception, helpful to a clear

understanding of a fact in issue by connecting the baggies found

3 over the fence to the defendant, and was not based on

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. See

Canty, 466 Mass. at 541. Though the jury were capable of

viewing the video recording and images and drawing their own

conclusions, Officer Correa's testimony assisted the jury by

drawing their attention to a small object appearing briefly in

the second video recording, which the jury could have otherwise

overlooked. See Grier, 490 Mass. at 476. Importantly, Officer

Correa did not express an opinion regarding what the object was

or whether the defendant had thrown the object.2 See id. at 477

(that detective did not state opinion whether photograph

depicted defendant or defendant's jacket was factor weighing

toward admissibility of detective's description of photograph

also available to jury). Finally, we note that the judge twice

instructed the jury that notwithstanding the testimony about the

video recordings and images, in the end the jury are responsible

for determining what they believe the video recordings and

images depicted. See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 443 Mass. 502, 508

(2005) ("The jury are presumed to follow the judge's

instructions"). Accordingly, it was not error to allow Officer

2 Indeed, the judge had ruled on a pretrial motion that Officer Correa could not refer to the defendant's actions as a "drug toss."

4 Correa's testimony regarding the images taken from the video

recording. See Pina, 481 Mass. at 429.

2. Drug distribution expert testimony. Evidence at trial

showed that while searching 23 King Street, police found a bag

containing 196.9 grams of fentanyl and a cutting agent in the

front hallway of the first floor of the building and a knotted

baggie containing cocaine under the building's stairs. Outside

of the second-floor apartment, police found a firearm, firearm

magazines, and loose ammunition.3 Police also seized plastic

wrap and two digital scales from the defendant's second-floor

apartment. Notably, the police did not find any controlled

substances in the defendant's apartment.

Officer Michael Ryder testified at trial as the

Commonwealth's expert witness regarding the characteristics of

drug distribution. The prosecutor showed Officer Ryder the

plastic wrap seized from the second-floor apartment, and asked,

"In your training and experience, would this have any

significance to you?" Officer Ryder answered, "Yes," and

subsequently explained that drugs "would be wrapped several

times in [plastic wrap], and the reason is people believe that

3 An officer working for the Worcester Police Department's Latent Print Unit analyzed latent fingerprints recovered from both plastic bags containing the firearm and ammunition and testified that it was her expert opinion that each bag bore a fingerprint belonging to the defendant.

5 it'll throw a narcotic dog off from getting the scent of it."

Officer Ryder further testified that it was common for drug

dealers to possess firearms because "they're afraid of getting

robbed from other drug dealers" and "to use against the police

if they had to flee." He also testified regarding drug dealers'

use of drug "stashes," that "if . . . we do a search warrant on

a three-decker, apartment 2, and the stash is found in the

basement, they're hoping that we can't tie it to the second

floor."

The defendant contends that it was error to allow Officer

Ryder's testimony regarding plastic wrap and the location of

drug stashes, arguing that the testimony was not based on a

hypothetical, and rather was a judgment of the defendant's

guilt. Further, he contends that Officer Ryder's testimony

regarding firearms was "too broad" and unfairly inflamed the

jury. We disagree with both contentions.

We review the judge's decision to admit expert testimony

for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Hinds, 487 Mass.

212, 218 (2021). "Questions grounded in previously admitted

evidence may be posed to an expert witness calling for an

opinion within the expert's field of expertise, even if the

witness's reply thereby touches on the ultimate issue of the

case." Commonwealth v. Tanner, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 579

(1998). However, the subject matter of the testimony must "be

6 within the witness's field of expertise" and "the witness may

not directly express his views on the defendant's guilt." Id.

"Hypothetical questions to a police officer are not per se

impermissible," but a line is crossed where "the hypothetical

question was transmuted into a nonhypothetical comment on the

actual actors." Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 198,

204 (2015).

To begin, the judge instructed the jury that they could

decide whether to accept the testimony of an expert witness and

may reject part of or all of an expert's testimony. See Gomes,

443 Mass. at 508. Further, and most significantly, the

Commonwealth's expert's testimony did not stray beyond what is

permissible. See Tanner, 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 579. Officer

Ryder's testimony regarding plastic wrap and drug stashes was

properly admitted as it was within his field of expertise and

did not directly express a view on the defendant's guilt. See

Tanner, 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 579. In contrast to DeJesus, 87

Mass. App. Ct. at 203-204, on which the defendant relies,

wherein the prosecutor posed the exact facts of the drug

transaction at issue as a hypothetical and an expert witness

testified that in his opinion the person described was acting as

a middle person for an individual in the shoes of the defendant,

Officer Ryder's testimony did not opine as to whether the

defendant committed the charged offenses. What is more, in

7 DeJesus the witness's answer to the subsequent question, which

asked whether the hypothetical circumstances were "a common

method for drug deals to take place," was admissible because it

"was not an opinion on the defendant's guilt and also related to

the common practice of drug dealers." See id. at 204 n.9.

Officer Ryder's testimony likewise related to the common

practices of drug dealers rather than stating an opinion on the

defendant's guilt. See id.

We also discern no error in Officer Ryder's testimony

regarding the relationship between drug dealers and firearms,

which was within his field of expertise and also did not comment

on the defendant's guilt.4 See Tanner, 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 579.

While the defendant relies on Commonwealth v. Ashford, 486 Mass.

450, 455 (2020), to contend that Officer Ryder's testimony was

"too broad," the claim is unavailing as Ashford is easily

distinguished from the expert testimony here. In Ashford, the

expert testimony was introduced to "support the required element

of knowledge that a specific gun was loaded," while here the

expert testimony was introduced to relate a defendant's possible

4 We note that Officer Ryder was not a percipient witness to the pursuit or arrest of the defendant; instead, Officer Ryder's testimony was properly confined to his explanations and opinions based on his experience investigating illegal drug distribution. See Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 459 Mass 148, 163-164 (2011).

8 access to or ownership of firearms to his possible involvement

in drug distribution. Id.

Even if Officer Ryder's testimony that a drug dealer might

have a weapon "to use against the police if they had to flee"

had some unfairly prejudicial effect, that testimony need not be

excluded unless any unfair prejudice substantially outweighed

the testimony's probative value. See Mass. G. Evid. § 403

(2026). Officer Ryder's testimony was probative of the reason

certain items were found outside the defendant's apartment. See

Mass. G. Evid. § 401. And, to the extent that Officer Ryder's

testimony may have unfairly played to the jury's emotions by

evoking violence against the police, such evocation was brief

and indirect by suggesting a person fleeing the police might

"use" the firearm against police. Therefore, it was not an

abuse of discretion by the judge to conclude that the

testimony's probative value was not substantially outweighed by

any unfair prejudice. See Hinds, 487 Mass. at 218; Mass.

G. Evid. § 403.

3. Evidence of nonlicensure. The defendant contends that

(1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove

that the defendant did not have a firearm license for purposes

of the unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunitions charges,

where the DCJIS employee did not testify how he spelled the

defendant's name when performing the query; (2) the DCJIS

9 employee's testimony was inadmissible hearsay; and (3) the

defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him was

violated because the DCJIS employee lacked the requisite

personal knowledge of the firearm license database. We are not

persuaded.

a. The defendant's name. We review a challenge for

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction for

whether "there was enough evidence that could have satisfied a

rational trier of fact of each . . . element beyond a reasonable

doubt." Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678

(1979).

A DCJIS employee testified that he was asked to perform a

search of the firearm license database for "a person by the name

of Jose Correa." He also testified that the database operates

on a "soundex" system, "[s]o if there was anything close to what

you put in, same name, date of birth,5 first three letters the

same, it would give you a list of choices that would match up to

that."

To be sure, testimony that a DCJIS employee searched for a

particular name and date of birth may not suffice to establish

5 The Commonwealth acknowledges that the firearm license database will not return a record if the incorrect date of birth is entered. However, because the defendant concedes that the evidence of his identification was sufficient to establish his date of birth, it is of no moment to our analysis.

10 that the defendant does not have a firearm license without some

other evidence establishing the defendant's birth date. See

Commonwealth v. Smith, 496 Mass. 304, 305-306 (2025). However,

while there was no evidence in Smith that the birth date used to

query the firearm license database was Smith's birth date, here,

the defendant does not dispute whether his name is Jose Correa.

See id. Instead, the defendant speculates that the DCJIS

employee may have misspelled his name. Because "[p]roof beyond

a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible

doubt," without some basis to believe the defendant's name was

misspelled,6 we are satisfied that there was no error.

Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 477 (2015).

Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the

defendant did not possess a firearm license. See Latimore, 671

Mass. at 677-678.

b. Hearsay. Testimony "that a diligent search failed to

disclose a public record . . . is admissible" as an exception to

the rule against hearsay if offered to prove that the record

does not exist. Smith, 496 Mass. at 310, quoting Mass. G. Evid.

6 Indeed, as noted supra, the DCJIS employee testified that the database would return a record if the first three letters entered are correct. Additionally, the Commonwealth entered into evidence both a satchel taken from the defendant when he was arrested that contained the defendant's Massachusetts identification card, and the Massachusetts identification card itself, which established the defendant's name and date of birth.

11 § 803(10) (2025). To establish the requisite foundation that a

diligent search failed to disclose a public record, "it is

'sufficient' if a witness is 'familiar with both the process of

searching the records and the government's recordkeeping

practices with regard to the database'" (citation omitted). Id.

at 311.

Here, the DCJIS employee testified regarding the process a

person undergoes to apply for and obtain a firearm license,

including how that license is transmitted to the Firearms Record

Bureau, as well as how the employee would perform a search of

the database. This established the required foundation, under

the relevant hearsay exception, for the DCJIS employee to

testify that a search of the firearm license database found no

record that the defendant possessed a firearm license. See

Smith, 496 Mass. at 311. See also Mass. G. Evid. § 803(10)

(2026).

c. Confrontation clause. The Supreme Judicial Court

concluded in Smith that "because the contents of DCJIS's

database were not created with the 'primary purpose' of creating

evidence for use at trial, . . . [a DCJIS employee's] testimony

regarding the result of his search of the database did not

violate the defendant's right to confront the witnesses against

him." Smith, 496 Mass. at 315. Because the defendant

challenges testimony regarding the very same database, the DCJIS

12 employee's testimony did not violate the defendant's right to

confront the witnesses against him. See id.

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Desmond, D'Angelo & Smyth, JJ.7),

Clerk

Entered: June 30, 2026.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.