Commonwealth v. Johnson

85 N.E. 188, 199 Mass. 55, 1908 Mass. LEXIS 783
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedMay 20, 1908
StatusPublished
Cited by56 cases

This text of 85 N.E. 188 (Commonwealth v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 85 N.E. 188, 199 Mass. 55, 1908 Mass. LEXIS 783 (Mass. 1908).

Opinion

Rugg, J.

This is an indictment charging the defendants with knowingly having in their possession burglarious implements and intending to use them as such. The exceptions relate to the admission of evidence and the charge.

1. Four types of cards, all mendicant in character, were received in evidence. They were found in the tenement, which the jury may have found to have been the home of the defendants, at the time of their arrest.. These had a slight tendency [59]*59tó show the apparent occupation of the defendants or some of them, and may well have a close relation to the preliminary preparations for burglary. They were properly received in evidence.

2. A sergeant of police was permitted to answer, after being cautioned to confine his testimony to particular instances, that a hall, near where the defendants were living, had been broken into and a safe blown about three weeks before, the judge saying that the evidence would be taken, and its competency ruled upon later. It is conceivable that, as bearing upon the intent with which the implements described in the indictment were in the defendants’ possession, it might have appeared that the defendants used the same implements in making another break. Commonwealth v. Day, 138 Mass. 186. Although the effect of this evidence would be to show the commission of another crime, it would not thereby be incompetent upon the issue raised by the plea to this indictment. Hence the judge cannot be said to have exceeded his discretion in permitting this evidence to be introduced conditionally. When it was not so connected with the defendants by other circumstances as to make it competent for any purpose, it was then the duty of the defendants to ask the judge to strike out the evidence and to instruct the jury that they were to disregard it. Their failure to do so gives them no ground upon which to support their earlier objection. Brady v. Finn, 162 Mass. 260, 267. Ellis v. Thayer, 183 Mass. 309. Williams v. Clarke, 182 Mass. 316. Putnam v. Harris, 193 Mass. 58, 62.

It is stated in the exceptions that, after one Gleavy testified that a burglary was committed at a certain hall about five minutes’ walk from where one of the defendants lived and the window forced, “ At this time counsel for the defense objected to the introduction of this testimony, and upon objection being overruled,” excepted. “The witness then proceeded to testify” further respecting this burglary, how chisels were used in effecting an entrance to the building and in opening the cash drawer, and soap put on the edges of the safe door. Another witness without objection testified that one of the ways of blowing open safes, common with burglars, was to pour nitro-glycerine into the crack around the door by means of a cup of soap, and causing it to explode by a fuse. It is doubtful if upon this record the [60]*60defendants have any exception. Apparently they permitted the testimony as to the fact of burglary, its time and place, to go in without saying anything, and at its close, objecting to it. It was then toó late to object, if the answers were responsive to the questions. If not, they should have moved to strike them out as irresponsive. The rest of the testimony of (Heavy went in without objection or exception. But the evidence was probably competent upon the single issue of how the chisel and fuse, found in the house of the defendants, which were lawful implements in themselves, might be used in combination with a common toilet article to effect a successful burglary. It was in the nature of an experiment observed as to its effects by the witness, and admissible within the discretion of the trial court. See Baker v. Harrington, 196 Mass. 339.

3. As the inspector and police officers were entering the tenement of the defendants on the day of their arrest, they met a man who apparently came from this tenement. After the defendants had been removed to the station house, the wife of the defendant Johnson being in the tenement, an envelope addressed to Johnson was brought by a messenger. It was opened by the wife and handed to Johnson when he came in later, who said he did not know about it. It was then read to him by the witness, a police officer, whereupon Johnson shook his head. The contents .of the telegram were not objected to on general grounds, nor as against other defendants than Johnson, but on the narrow ground that Johnson said he did not know anything about it. Manifestly this ground is untenable. Mere denial of knowledge by a defendant does not make evidence against him inadmissible. There was testimony tending to show that the paper was lost, and the Commonwealth was permitted to prove its contents through the witness who read it to Johnson and another who heard it read. To this form of proving the contents of the lost paper the defendants objected. It having appeared that it was impossible to produce the original writing at the trial, secondary evidence in the form of oral testimony of its contents was admissible.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
85 N.E. 188, 199 Mass. 55, 1908 Mass. LEXIS 783, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-johnson-mass-1908.