Commonwealth v. John Shelzi.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: February 19, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-0404
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-404

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JOHN SHELZI.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury trial in the District Court, the defendant,

John Shelzi, was convicted of negligent operation of a motor

vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). The jury

acquitted him of operating a motor vehicle while under the

influence of liquor (OUI).1 On appeal, he argues that the

evidence was insufficient to prove negligent operation. We

affirm.

1Prior to trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of operating a motor vehicle without a license; charges of leaving the scene after causing property damage and operating under the influence of drugs were dismissed. The trial judge found the defendant not responsible for a marked lanes violation. At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant

moved for required findings of not guilty, which the judge

denied. We will affirm the denial of a motion for a required

finding if, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, "any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979). See

Commonwealth v. Daley, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 256 (2006). "The

inferences that support a conviction 'need only be reasonable

and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable.'"

Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 413 (2023),

quoting Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 378 (2017).

To prove negligent operation, the Commonwealth must show

"that the defendant (1) operated a motor vehicle, (2) on a

public way, and (3) negligently, so that the lives or safety of

the public might be endangered." Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 95

Mass. App. Ct. 367, 369 (2019). The defendant contests only the

third element. "Negligence . . . in its ordinary sense, is the

failure of a responsible person, either by omission or by

action, to exercise that degree of care, vigilance and

forethought which . . . the person of ordinary caution and

prudence ought to exercise under the particular circumstances."

2 Commonwealth v. Howe, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 358 (2023),

quoting McGovern v. State Ethics Comm'n, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 221,

232 n.25 (2019). A conviction of negligent operation "only

requires proof that the defendant's conduct [in operating the

vehicle] might have endangered the safety of the public, not

that it in fact did." Commonwealth v. Zagwyn, 482 Mass. 1020,

1021 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 70 Mass. App. Ct.

32, 35 (2007). "Proof of [the defendant's negligent] operation

of a motor vehicle may 'rest entirely on circumstantial

evidence.'" Howe, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Petersen, 67

Mass. App. Ct. 49, 52 (2006).

Evidence that the defendant may have been drinking before

driving was relevant to the charge of negligent operation, even

though the jury acquitted him of OUI. See Zagwyn, 482 Mass. at

1021-1022; Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 380. Although the

defendant characterizes that evidence as "flimsy," it permitted

the jury to reasonably conclude that he had consumed alcohol

prior to driving. Two officers testified that the defendant

exhibited several telltale signs of intoxication, including

slurred speech, unsteadiness on his feet, and the smell of

alcohol. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 414 Mass. 343, 350 (1993)

(evidence that defendant had been drinking "patently relevant to

whether the defendant exercised reasonable care while driving").

3 While "a conviction of negligent operation requires

something more than just operating a motor vehicle while under

the influence of alcohol," Zagwyn, 482 Mass. at 1022, here there

was more. The officers also testified that the defendant's car

crashed "head on" into a cement wall in front of a house on a

narrow, windy road. The collision caused "heavy front-end

damage" to the car, rendering it "inoperable." The concrete

wall itself was "severed in the middle" and pieces were falling

off. See id. at 1021-1022, citing Woods, 414 Mass. at 344

(evidence of intoxication and that vehicle careened off road and

collided with tree supported conviction of negligent operation).

In Commonwealth v. Tantillo, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 20, 21-22,

26 (2023), we affirmed a conviction of negligent operation where

the driver struck a pole in a parking lot, was disoriented and

unsteady on her feet, and had consumed medication, even though

the judge acquitted her of driving under the influence of drugs.

Here too, "[t]he evidence was sufficient to prove that the

defendant's ability to control the vehicle was significantly

4 impaired, and as a result, the lives and safety of the public

might have been endangered." Id. at 26-27.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Massing, Walsh & Brennan, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: February 19, 2025.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.