NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-813
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
JHEREMY N. SANCHEZ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a jury trial in the Lawrence District Court, the
defendant was convicted of carrying a firearm without a license,
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); carrying a loaded firearm without a
license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); and discharging a firearm
within 500 feet of a building, G. L. c. 269, § 12E.1 Because we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the
convictions and any error in the admission of that evidence does
not require us to disturb the jury's verdicts, we affirm.
Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. "Challenges
to the sufficiency of the evidence are evaluated under the
1The defendant was tried with a codefendant, Angel Pimental. Only the defendant's appeal is before us. Latimore standard, that is, whether, 'after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Commonwealth v. Witkowski,
487 Mass. 675, 679 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378
Mass. 671, 677 (1979). After careful review, we are satisfied
that the evidence here was sufficient to show that the car
pictured in a video recording of the shooting at issue was the
gray Nissan in which the defendant was later seen, that the
defendant was seated in the front passenger's seat of that
Nissan at the time of the shooting, and that he discharged a
"firearm" as that term is defined for the purposes of G. L.
c. 269, §§ 10 and 12. See G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (prohibiting
unlicensed possession of "a firearm . . . as defined in [G. L.
c. 140, § 121]"); G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n) ("Whoever violates
paragraph (a) . . . , by means of a loaded firearm, . . . shall
be further punished" by consecutive sentence of incarceration);
G. L. c. 269, § 12E (criminalizing discharge of "a firearm as
defined in [G. L. c. 140, § 121] within 500 feet of a . . .
building in use"); G. L. c. 140, § 121 (defining "firearm" as
including "a pistol, revolver or other weapon of any
description, loaded or unloaded, from which a shot or bullet can
2 be discharged and of which the length of the barrel or barrels
is less than [sixteen] inches").
Viewed under the Latimore standard, the evidence was that,
at approximately 9:20 A.M. on March 5, 2022, shots were fired
from the passenger's side of a moving car on Pearl Street in
Lawrence. A security camera on a neighboring home created a
video recording of the shooting, and the police took a still
photograph of the car from a different video recording. Based
on these and other video recordings that the police collected
from municipal and private video cameras throughout the city,
and the testimony of the Commonwealth's witnesses, the jury
could have concluded that the car involved in the Pearl Street
shooting was a gray four-door Nissan sedan with New Hampshire
license plates, lowered windshield visors, a distinctive pair of
decals in the front window, and wheel rims of a particular
style.
The jury could also have found that, after leaving the
scene of the shooting, the same gray Nissan drove from Pearl
Street to Melrose Court, where it stopped behind the building at
6 Hancock Street -- the home of codefendant Angel Pimental. The
Nissan's driver briefly left the car, went into 6 Hancock Street
through the back door, and then returned to the Nissan and drove
away. The Nissan then continued to Gigante Meat Market (market)
3 where the driver, whom the jury could have found was Pimental,
parked.
At that point, the defendant got out of the Nissan's front
passenger seat.2 From the time of the shooting to the Nissan's
arrival at the market, approximately fifteen minutes had
elapsed. The jury could have concluded that no one got in or
out of the passenger's side of the Nissan between the time of
the shooting and the time the Nissan stopped at the market.
Taken together, this evidence was sufficient to establish that
the Nissan in which the defendant was riding when he arrived at
the market was the same one from which the shots were fired on
Pearl Street, and that the defendant was in the seat from which
those shots were fired. See Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 495
Mass. 300, 309 (2025), quoting Commonwealth v. Shakespeare, 493
Mass. 67, 80 (2023) ("The inferences a fact finder may draw from
the evidence 'need only be reasonable and possible and need not
be necessary or inescapable'").
Even though the weapon used in the shooting was never
recovered, the evidence was likewise sufficient to allow the
jury to conclude that the shots were fired from a "firearm" -- a
2 Video recordings made inside the market included images of the faces, clothing, and hairstyles of all three occupants of the Nissan, and permitted the jury to find that Pimental was the driver, and the defendant was the front seat passenger.
4 handgun having a barrel length under sixteen inches long.
Although we agree with the defendant that the video of the
shooting is too grainy and the resolution of that video is too
poor to allow a reasonable juror to determine the barrel length
of the weapon used, the video was not the only evidence on that
point. The police found nine-millimeter shell casings at the
scene of the shooting and a Glock magazine containing nine-
millimeter shells in Pimental's home, where the gray Nissan
stopped very shortly after the shooting. It was "reasonable and
possible," even if not "necessary," Spaulding, 495 Mass. at 309,
quoting Shakespeare, 493 Mass. at 80, for the jury to infer that
the Glock magazine found at the codefendant's home was used in
the discharge of nine-millimeter ammunition during the Pearl
Street shooting, and that Pimental stopped at his home minutes
after the shooting to leave the magazine there for safekeeping.
See Commonwealth v. Thevenin, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 822, 827 (2012),
quoting Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 778 (1997) (it is
reasonable to believe that defendant would seek to hide evidence
of criminal activity in his home, "particularly those items that
were 'durable, [and] of continuing utility to [him]'").
Moreover, although there was testimony at trial that nine-
millimeter rounds could be used in both rifles and handguns, and
that Glock makes both rifles and handguns, Detective Alexander
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-813
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
JHEREMY N. SANCHEZ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a jury trial in the Lawrence District Court, the
defendant was convicted of carrying a firearm without a license,
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); carrying a loaded firearm without a
license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); and discharging a firearm
within 500 feet of a building, G. L. c. 269, § 12E.1 Because we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the
convictions and any error in the admission of that evidence does
not require us to disturb the jury's verdicts, we affirm.
Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. "Challenges
to the sufficiency of the evidence are evaluated under the
1The defendant was tried with a codefendant, Angel Pimental. Only the defendant's appeal is before us. Latimore standard, that is, whether, 'after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Commonwealth v. Witkowski,
487 Mass. 675, 679 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378
Mass. 671, 677 (1979). After careful review, we are satisfied
that the evidence here was sufficient to show that the car
pictured in a video recording of the shooting at issue was the
gray Nissan in which the defendant was later seen, that the
defendant was seated in the front passenger's seat of that
Nissan at the time of the shooting, and that he discharged a
"firearm" as that term is defined for the purposes of G. L.
c. 269, §§ 10 and 12. See G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (prohibiting
unlicensed possession of "a firearm . . . as defined in [G. L.
c. 140, § 121]"); G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n) ("Whoever violates
paragraph (a) . . . , by means of a loaded firearm, . . . shall
be further punished" by consecutive sentence of incarceration);
G. L. c. 269, § 12E (criminalizing discharge of "a firearm as
defined in [G. L. c. 140, § 121] within 500 feet of a . . .
building in use"); G. L. c. 140, § 121 (defining "firearm" as
including "a pistol, revolver or other weapon of any
description, loaded or unloaded, from which a shot or bullet can
2 be discharged and of which the length of the barrel or barrels
is less than [sixteen] inches").
Viewed under the Latimore standard, the evidence was that,
at approximately 9:20 A.M. on March 5, 2022, shots were fired
from the passenger's side of a moving car on Pearl Street in
Lawrence. A security camera on a neighboring home created a
video recording of the shooting, and the police took a still
photograph of the car from a different video recording. Based
on these and other video recordings that the police collected
from municipal and private video cameras throughout the city,
and the testimony of the Commonwealth's witnesses, the jury
could have concluded that the car involved in the Pearl Street
shooting was a gray four-door Nissan sedan with New Hampshire
license plates, lowered windshield visors, a distinctive pair of
decals in the front window, and wheel rims of a particular
style.
The jury could also have found that, after leaving the
scene of the shooting, the same gray Nissan drove from Pearl
Street to Melrose Court, where it stopped behind the building at
6 Hancock Street -- the home of codefendant Angel Pimental. The
Nissan's driver briefly left the car, went into 6 Hancock Street
through the back door, and then returned to the Nissan and drove
away. The Nissan then continued to Gigante Meat Market (market)
3 where the driver, whom the jury could have found was Pimental,
parked.
At that point, the defendant got out of the Nissan's front
passenger seat.2 From the time of the shooting to the Nissan's
arrival at the market, approximately fifteen minutes had
elapsed. The jury could have concluded that no one got in or
out of the passenger's side of the Nissan between the time of
the shooting and the time the Nissan stopped at the market.
Taken together, this evidence was sufficient to establish that
the Nissan in which the defendant was riding when he arrived at
the market was the same one from which the shots were fired on
Pearl Street, and that the defendant was in the seat from which
those shots were fired. See Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 495
Mass. 300, 309 (2025), quoting Commonwealth v. Shakespeare, 493
Mass. 67, 80 (2023) ("The inferences a fact finder may draw from
the evidence 'need only be reasonable and possible and need not
be necessary or inescapable'").
Even though the weapon used in the shooting was never
recovered, the evidence was likewise sufficient to allow the
jury to conclude that the shots were fired from a "firearm" -- a
2 Video recordings made inside the market included images of the faces, clothing, and hairstyles of all three occupants of the Nissan, and permitted the jury to find that Pimental was the driver, and the defendant was the front seat passenger.
4 handgun having a barrel length under sixteen inches long.
Although we agree with the defendant that the video of the
shooting is too grainy and the resolution of that video is too
poor to allow a reasonable juror to determine the barrel length
of the weapon used, the video was not the only evidence on that
point. The police found nine-millimeter shell casings at the
scene of the shooting and a Glock magazine containing nine-
millimeter shells in Pimental's home, where the gray Nissan
stopped very shortly after the shooting. It was "reasonable and
possible," even if not "necessary," Spaulding, 495 Mass. at 309,
quoting Shakespeare, 493 Mass. at 80, for the jury to infer that
the Glock magazine found at the codefendant's home was used in
the discharge of nine-millimeter ammunition during the Pearl
Street shooting, and that Pimental stopped at his home minutes
after the shooting to leave the magazine there for safekeeping.
See Commonwealth v. Thevenin, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 822, 827 (2012),
quoting Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 778 (1997) (it is
reasonable to believe that defendant would seek to hide evidence
of criminal activity in his home, "particularly those items that
were 'durable, [and] of continuing utility to [him]'").
Moreover, although there was testimony at trial that nine-
millimeter rounds could be used in both rifles and handguns, and
that Glock makes both rifles and handguns, Detective Alexander
5 Ovalles testified that "[the Glock magazine] could be inserted
into a [nine-millimeter] Glock firearm;" that a nine-millimeter
Glock firearm was a handgun; and that the barrel of the nine-
millimeter Glock firearm was shorter than the average rifle's
barrel length of sixteen inches.3 We conclude that the evidence
was therefore sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions.
See G. L. c. 140, § 121; Commonwealth v. Sperrazza, 372 Mass.
667, 670 (1977) (testimony that witness saw defendant "draw a
revolver" and that weapon "was a 'handgun'" was sufficient to
establish that gun was "firearm").
2. "BOPFI" evidence. At trial, the Commonwealth called
Kevin Scaplen, a retired member of the Massachusetts State
police then working for the Department of Criminal Justice
Information Services (DCJIS), to prove that, at the time of the
shooting, the defendant did not possess a license to carry
firearms. To do so, Scaplen described his own search of certain
firearms licensing databases (BOPFI search), testifying that,
when he input the defendant's name and date of birth, the result
3 None of the witnesses was asked whether the Glock magazine recovered from Pimental's home was compatible with any Glock rifles. As a result, the jury heard only that the magazine was compatible with a nine-millimeter Glock handgun.
6 was "No Records Found."4 According to Scaplen, that result
indicated that the defendant did not have a license to carry
firearms.
Even assuming that the record supports the defendant's
contention that Scaplen obtained the defendant's name and
birthdate from a DCJIS colleague, Amy Conway, we are not
persuaded that Scaplen's testimony violated the confrontation
clause. "The confrontation clause bars the admission of
testimonial hearsay by a declarant who does not appear at trial,
unless the declarant is unavailable to testify as a matter of
law and the defendant had an earlier opportunity to cross-
examine [that declarant]." Commonwealth v. McGann, 484 Mass.
312, 316 (2020). Here, the declarant, Scaplen, did testify, and
the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine him (although
he opted not to do so). We therefore discern no confrontation
clause issue stemming from Scaplen's testimony about his own
BOPFI search. Cf. Commonwealth v. Encarnacion, 105 Mass. App.
Ct. 46, 52-53 (2024).
We are likewise unpersuaded that, if Conway provided
Scaplen with the name and birthdate he used for his BOPFI
4 Counsel appear to have agreed on this procedure before trial as a way of ensuring that the jury did not hear evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts.
7 search, the search results would be inadmissible hearsay.
Scaplen was available to testify about the name and date of
birth he used in his BOPFI search, and no viable hearsay
argument grows out of the fact that the source of this
information was a nontestifying witness.5 See Commonwealth v.
Randall, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 26, 27-28 (2000); Mass. G. Evid.
§ 801(c) (2024). Contrast Encarnacion, 105 Mass. App. Ct. at 51
(testimony was hearsay where witness stated that, based on
results of search run by another person, defendant was not
licensed to carry firearms).
We reach a different conclusion as to the admission of
exhibit 10, which Scaplen testified was a copy of the results of
a separate BOPFI search that Conway ran. Where Conway ran the
search, did not testify at trial, and was not (so far as the
record reveals) "unavailable" to testify, the results of the
BOPFI search that she conducted should not have been admitted.
See Encarnacion, 105 Mass. App. Ct. at 53-55. Considering "the
totality of the record before us," however, including that (1)
5 In his brief, the defendant cites to Commonwealth v. Trotto, 487 Mass. 708, 731-732 (2021), to support his argument that, because Conway obtained the defendant's name and date of birth by conducting a "name search" of an unspecified database, the results of the search constituted testimonial hearsay. The citation is unavailing, however, because there was no evidence that Conway obtained the defendant's name and date of birth through a database.
8 the defendant's identity as the shooter, and not his licensure,
was "the premise of the defense," and (2) the result of Conway's
search -- the single statement, "No Records Found" -- was
identical to the result of the BOPFI search that Scaplen ran, we
conclude that the error in admitting exhibit 10 was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt (citations omitted). Id. at 53-55.
3. Conditional relevance determination. As we have noted,
the jury heard evidence that, after the shooting, a Glock
magazine was discovered in Pimental's home.6 The defendant had
moved in limine to exclude that evidence as irrelevant, however.
After a hearing, the judge concluded that the evidence was
conditionally relevant and denied the motion on that basis. The
judge then instructed the jury that they could consider the
evidence of the magazine if, and only if, they found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the magazine was used in the shooting.
There was no abuse of discretion in the judge's handling of
this conditional relevancy determination. See Commonwealth v.
Meola, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 303, 308-309 (2019). "[T]he judge has
a gatekeeper role, which requires the judge to assess the
evidence and determine whether the jury or judge, acting as the
fact finder, could find that the item in question is what its
6 The police found the magazine in a safe belonging to Pimental's brother.
9 proponent claims it to be." Id. at 308. Here, the jury could
have inferred, without engaging in improper speculation, that
the magazine holding nine-millimeter bullets was used in the
shooting on Pearl Street and was left by Pimental at his home
several minutes afterward. Where the jury were properly
instructed on their obligation to decide first whether "the
magazine and the ammunition that were recovered from the
apartment at 6 Hancock Street was the magazine that was inserted
into a firearm that was alleged to be discharged on March 5th,
2022," and on their ability to consider the magazine as evidence
"only . . . if [they] find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it
was the magazine that was in the firearm that was allegedly
discharged on that date," the judge correctly addressed the
conditional relevance question. See Meola, supra at 308-309.
If, as we presume was the case, the jury did make those
findings, then the magazine was one link in the chain of
evidence connecting the defendant to the crimes with which he
was charged, and so was relevant. See id. at 307.
4. Fingerprint analyst's testimony. The Commonwealth
called State police Sergeant Gary Comeau, a member of the crime
scene services section (CSSS), to testify about his role in
photographing and "processing" the gray Nissan for fingerprints
after the defendant's arrest. Comeau found three latent
10 fingerprint impressions in the front passenger seat area. He
compared those latent prints to the defendant's known prints and
found "no conflicts." He then developed an opinion that those
three impressions were "identified to" the defendant's known
prints.7
On cross-examination, defense counsel pressed Comeau about
whether investigative techniques other than fingerprinting,
including tests for the presence of gunshot residue, were
"typically" used in investigations of shooting crimes. Comeau
demurred, testifying that "every situation is a little bit
different." Explaining that the decision whether to include
additional scientific investigations "would vary [based] on the
severity" of the situation, he added, "[o]ftentimes, a
fingerprint identification stops that process because you have
[one hundred] percent of an identification completed." Although
the defendant did not object to this testimony at trial, he
argues on appeal that it amounted to an improper opinion on
Comeau's level of certainty about his fingerprint
identifications. See Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715,
729 n.22 (2010) ("Testimony to the effect that a latent print
7 Comeau was not asked on direct examination to testify to his opinion with any particular degree of certainty, and he did not do so. He declined to use the term "match," and instead used "identification."
11 matches, or is 'individualized' to, a known print, if it is to
be offered, should be presented as an opinion, not a fact, and
opinions expressing absolute certainty about, or the
infallibility of, an 'individualization' of a print should be
avoided").
The challenged statement was not directly responsive to the
question defense counsel asked; when Comeau made the statement,
he was responding to a line of questioning designed to establish
a Bowden defense about the investigators' failure to perform
gunshot residue testing, not to challenge the reliability of his
own fingerprint individualization opinion. See Commonwealth v.
Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980). Additionally, on direct
examination, Comeau expressed his individualization conclusions
as an opinion, and did not express a level of certainty, much
less "absolute certainty" or the "infallibility of" his
opinions. See Gambora, 457 Mass. at 729 n.22. He stated only
that he had "identified" the latent prints "to" the defendant's
known prints.
Still, even reading Comeau's statement elicited on cross-
examination as an impermissible opinion that he was one hundred
percent certain about his fingerprint identification, see id. at
726 (recognizing "the need to prevent overstatement of the
accuracy of fingerprint comparisons"), we discern no substantial
12 risk that justice miscarried because of its admission. See
Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 686 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass.
72 (2005) (unpreserved errors reviewed for substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice). The jury saw video footage from the
market showing the defendant as he left the front passenger's
side of the gray Nissan, and they heard that the defendant was
again in that seat when police stopped the gray Nissan later
that day. See Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 23 (1999)
(error must be serious when considered in terms of its injurious
effect or influence on jury's verdict). Accordingly, Comeau's
testimony did no more than corroborate other, properly admitted
evidence showing that the defendant had likely been in the front
passenger's seat of the Nissan at some time before the car was
processed.
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Hand, Grant & Wood, JJ.8),
Clerk
Entered: June 30, 2025.
8 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.