Commonwealth v. Jennifer S. Lalanne.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: May 2, 2025
• Docket: 23-P-1293
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1293

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JENNIFER S. LALANNE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The defendant was initially charged with leaving the scene

of personal injury, in violation of G. L. c. 90,

§ 24 (2) (a 1/2) (1), operating under the influence of liquor,

in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1), negligent

operation of a motor vehicle, in violation of G. L. c. 90,

§ 24 (2) (a), and a marked lanes violation, in violation of

G. L. c. 89, § 4A. The Commonwealth proceeded to trial only on

the operating under the influence charge. The other three

charges were dismissed with the consent of the Commonwealth.

After a bench trial, the defendant was convicted. She now

appeals.

The defendant's primary argument is that the evidence was

insufficient to support her conviction. We agree with the defendant that there was insufficient evidence to support a

finding a beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated

a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

The Commonwealth attempted to put in evidence indicating

that the defendant had been involved in a two-car accident and

had proceeded from there to a McDonald's parking lot. However,

the judge excluded all evidence of the defendant's involvement

in, or relationship to, the accident, on hearsay grounds. As a

consequence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, the car was parked at a McDonald's with a

"bent" front tire. There was no evidence how the vehicle got

there, that the engine was warm, or of when it had last been

driven.

The full scope of the evidence is well known to both

parties and will not be repeated here, but its thinness is

reflected in the Commonwealth's argument. It asserts that it

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated a

motor vehicle while intoxicated because "[a]t the McDonald's,

the defendant admitted that the disabled vehicle was hers. . . .

She was also the only one standing near it and she did not

mention anyone else being in the car with her. . . ." There was

also evidence, the Commonwealth points out, that the defendant

had the keys to the car. Although Trooper Mastromattei, one of

2 the testifying witnesses, did not see the defendant with any car

keys, the defendant repeatedly told Trooper Mastromattei that

she wanted to drive her damaged car to a babysitting job. A

rational trier of fact could infer that she had the keys to be

able to do so.

The Commonwealth argues that, "[v]iewed together and in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this evidence is

sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

operated a motor vehicle."

It is not sufficient to demonstrate that, assuming the

defendant was intoxicated at the time the police encountered

her, of which there was strong evidence, she had operated the

motor vehicle while intoxicated. Owning a car, standing next to

the car, having keys to a car, and insisting that one wants to

drive away in the car while intoxicated do not demonstrate

beyond a reasonable doubt that one has already driven the car

while intoxicated. There was no evidence presented as to when

the car had been driven or by whom.

In each of the cases cited by the Commonwealth, there was

evidence of immediately recent operation of the vehicle. In

Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 18, 22 (1996), the

vehicle was involved in an accident and was on an island in the

middle of a roadway still smoldering. Likewise, in Commonwealth

3 v. Petersen, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 52 (2006), the engine of the

car was still warm.

To be sure, the defendant was in a parking lot of a

McDonald's next to her car. It must have gotten there somehow,

but there was no evidence as to when or who may have driven it.

That the defendant was in the parking lot is not sufficient to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she had operated the motor

vehicle. Even if it were, it is not enough to show that she did

so while intoxicated, even though she was intoxicated at the

time of the police encounter.

Likewise, there was evidence that the car was disabled

because the "tire" was "bent". But this is inadequate to

establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the car was operated

by an intoxicated person. (We note that there was no testimony

that the wheel was bent, only the tire.)

There being an intoxicated owner of a vehicle immediately

next to her car wanting to drive it, despite it being inoperable

due to a bent tire, is not sufficient to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that she operated the vehicle while

intoxicated, in the absence of any evidence as to when the car

was most recently operated or by whom.

In light of our conclusion, we need not reach any of the

defendant's other arguments. The judgment is reversed, the

4 finding is set aside, and judgment shall enter for the

defendant.

So ordered.

By the Court (Rubin, D'Angelo & Smyth, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: May 2, 2025.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.