Commonwealth v. James M. Murphy, Third.
This text of Commonwealth v. James M. Murphy, Third. (Commonwealth v. James M. Murphy, Third.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
21-P-831
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
JAMES M. MURPHY, THIRD. 1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
On October 28, 2014, the defendant pleaded guilty in the
District Court to a complaint charging him with vandalizing with
a "noxious or filthy substance" in violation of G. L. c. 266,
§ 103. 2 The charge arose from the defendant's urinating through
the door of his jail cell while he was being held at the Quincy
police department. He subsequently filed a motion for a new
trial seeking to vacate his plea and now claims that because of
the Supreme Judicial Court's recent decision in Commonwealth v.
1 We use the spelling of the defendant's name as it appears in the criminal complaint and the court docket. 2 The defendant was also charged with disorderly conduct in
violation of G. L. c. 272, § 53; and intimidation of a witness in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B. The intimidation of a witness charge was dismissed at the request of the Commonwealth prior to the date of the plea hearing. The disorderly conduct charge was placed on file without a change of plea. We note there was no "guilty finding" as the Commonwealth states in its brief. Perez Narvaez, 490 Mass. 807 (2022), wherein the court held that
urine does not constitute a noxious or filthy substance within
the meaning of G. L. c. 266, § 103, there was no factual basis
for the charge. The Commonwealth concedes that the plea must be
vacated, and we agree. 3
The underlying facts presented by the Commonwealth at the
change of plea hearing are as follows. 4 On July 17, 2013, the
defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct outside the United
First Parish Church in Quincy. He was transported to the police
station and placed in a holding cell where he was observed on
video surveillance urinating through an opening in the door of
the jail cell onto the floor.
As previously noted, the defendant pleaded guilty in 2014,
and seven years later, on August 4, 2021, he filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied. The defendant
appealed, and on July 20, 2022, the appeal was stayed pending
the issuance of the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Perez
Narvaez, 490 Mass. at 807.
There is no question that the outcome of this appeal is
controlled in all respects by the court's decision in Perez
3 Notwithstanding the Commonwealth's concession, we have conducted our own independent review of the issue. See Commonwealth v. Poirier, 458 Mass. 1014, 1015 (2010). 4 We have not been provided with a transcript of the change of
plea hearing. The facts as described are taken from the parties' submissions and are not disputed.
2 Narvaez. It is well settled that a judge may only accept a
guilty plea if there are "sufficient facts on the record to
establish each element of the offense." Commonwealth v. Hart,
467 Mass. 322, 325 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. DelVerde, 398
Mass. 288, 297 (1986). Here, the Commonwealth was required to
allege sufficient facts to show that the defendant intentionally
threw or placed "oil of vitriol, coal tar, or other noxious or
filthy substance" on or in a building, office, shop, dwelling,
or vessel with the intent to injure, deface, or defile said
structure. G. L. c. 266, § 103. Because the Supreme Judicial
Court has squarely held that urine is not a noxious or filthy
substance under c. 266, § 103, the facts presented in support of
the guilty plea were insufficient. Consequently, the order
denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is
reversed and the judgment is vacated.
So ordered.
By the Court (Vuono, Singh & Englander, JJ. 5),
Clerk
Entered: November 6, 2023.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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