NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-84
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
JAMES I. WILSON.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
On July 17, 2020, following a probation final surrender
hearing, a District Court judge found that the defendant had
violated the conditions of his probation, revoked the
defendant's probation, and imposed a nine-month committed
sentence.2 The defendant now appeals from the orders denying his
motion to withdraw his admission to sufficient facts to the
crime for which he was placed on probation, his motion to amend
1 Also known as James Lyons and Jamie Lyons.
2The defendant was charged with and admitted to sufficient facts for the offense of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b). On March 12, 2020, the District Court judge continued the case without a finding for one year with probationary conditions. his motion to withdraw his admission to sufficient facts, and
his motion for the court activity record information (CARI) of
the victim in the underlying offense, all of which were denied
by the same admission and probation revocation judge. The
defendant contends that plea counsel labored under a conflict of
interest in his representation of the defendant because plea
counsel had previously represented the victim in a criminal
matter some years earlier. The defendant also contends that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney
inadequately investigated how the defendant's posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis related to his self-defense
claim nor advised him accordingly. We affirm.
Discussion. "A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is treated
as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b)
. . . ." Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 47 (2015).3
That is, "[w]e examine the motion judge's conclusion only to
determine whether there has been a significant error of law or
other abuse of discretion" (quotation and citation omitted).
Id.
3"An admission to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty is treated as a guilty plea for the purposes of a motion for a new trial." Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 337 n.1 (2014).
2 1. Conflict of interest. a. Actual conflict of interest.
"[U]nder art. 12, if a defendant establishes an actual conflict
of interest, he is entitled to a new trial without a further
showing; he need not demonstrate that the conflict adversely
affected his lawyer's performance or resulted in actual
prejudice." Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 811, 819 (2010).
"An actual or genuine conflict of interest, however, must be one
in which prejudice is inherent in the situation, such that no
impartial observer could reasonably conclude that the attorney
is able to serve the defendant with undivided loyalty"
(quotation omitted). Id. at 819-820. "Courts frequently
consult standards laid out in applicable codes of professional
ethics in considering whether an actual conflict exists." Id.
at 820 n.19.
Here, the defendant argues his plea counsel labored under
an actual conflict of interest, because his plea counsel's prior
representation of the victim prevented plea counsel from
discovering and investigating criminal charges against the
victim to support the defendant's self-defense claim. The claim
is unavailing because, to the extent that plea counsel's prior
representation presented a potential conflict of interest, it
never manifested as an actual conflict of interest. See Mosher,
455 Mass. at 819-823. Discovering the victim's criminal
offender record information did not require plea counsel to
3 disclose confidential information he may have received during
his representation of the victim nor use any confidential
information to discover the victim's prior criminal history.
See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6, as amended, 490 Mass. 1302 (2022);
1.9 (c), as amended, 490 Mass. 1305 (2022).
The defendant further suggests that plea counsel was aware
of a conflict of interest and limited his representation of the
defendant only after he already began to investigate the
victim's prior criminal charges. This contention, however, not
only is unsupported by the record, but strains credulity where
plea counsel relied on the board of probation's report that the
victim did not have a criminal record.4 It therefore was not an
abuse of discretion for the judge to credit plea counsel's
account in concluding that there was no actual conflict of
interest. See Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. at 47.
4 While the judge was permitted to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether plea counsel did, in fact, subsequently remember confidential information regarding the victim that he abstained from using or disclosing, we cannot, however, say it was an abuse of discretion for the judge to have concluded that an evidentiary hearing would not have revealed an actual conflict of interest, based on plea counsel's representation by affidavit that he failed to recall his prior representation of the victim and indeed had received no evidence of his representation. See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 466 Mass. 141, 148 n.8 (2013) ("The decision to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion for a new trial is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge" [citation omitted]).
4 b. Potential conflict of interest. Assuming without
deciding that plea counsel's prior representation of the victim
presented a potential conflict of interest that prevented his
discovery of the victim's prior acts of violence, such a claim
would require that the defendant establish that he was
prejudiced by the conflict. See Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366
Mass. 89, 96 (1974) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
requires showing counsel's errors "likely deprived the defendant
of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence"). See
also Commonwealth v. Croken, 432 Mass. 266, 272 (2000) (adopting
same prejudice standard as Saferian in claims where defendant
shows potential conflict of interest). Here the defendant has
made no such showing and our review of the record evinces that
he was not.
If the defendant were able to examine the victim about
specific acts of violence allegedly initiated by the victim in
order to support the contention that the victim was the first
aggressor, such examination would have permitted the prosecution
to rebut the defendant's argument with the defendant's own past
acts of violence, to which there were several. See Commonwealth
v. Morales, 464 Mass.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-84
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
JAMES I. WILSON.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
On July 17, 2020, following a probation final surrender
hearing, a District Court judge found that the defendant had
violated the conditions of his probation, revoked the
defendant's probation, and imposed a nine-month committed
sentence.2 The defendant now appeals from the orders denying his
motion to withdraw his admission to sufficient facts to the
crime for which he was placed on probation, his motion to amend
1 Also known as James Lyons and Jamie Lyons.
2The defendant was charged with and admitted to sufficient facts for the offense of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b). On March 12, 2020, the District Court judge continued the case without a finding for one year with probationary conditions. his motion to withdraw his admission to sufficient facts, and
his motion for the court activity record information (CARI) of
the victim in the underlying offense, all of which were denied
by the same admission and probation revocation judge. The
defendant contends that plea counsel labored under a conflict of
interest in his representation of the defendant because plea
counsel had previously represented the victim in a criminal
matter some years earlier. The defendant also contends that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney
inadequately investigated how the defendant's posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis related to his self-defense
claim nor advised him accordingly. We affirm.
Discussion. "A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is treated
as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b)
. . . ." Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 47 (2015).3
That is, "[w]e examine the motion judge's conclusion only to
determine whether there has been a significant error of law or
other abuse of discretion" (quotation and citation omitted).
Id.
3"An admission to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty is treated as a guilty plea for the purposes of a motion for a new trial." Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 337 n.1 (2014).
2 1. Conflict of interest. a. Actual conflict of interest.
"[U]nder art. 12, if a defendant establishes an actual conflict
of interest, he is entitled to a new trial without a further
showing; he need not demonstrate that the conflict adversely
affected his lawyer's performance or resulted in actual
prejudice." Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 811, 819 (2010).
"An actual or genuine conflict of interest, however, must be one
in which prejudice is inherent in the situation, such that no
impartial observer could reasonably conclude that the attorney
is able to serve the defendant with undivided loyalty"
(quotation omitted). Id. at 819-820. "Courts frequently
consult standards laid out in applicable codes of professional
ethics in considering whether an actual conflict exists." Id.
at 820 n.19.
Here, the defendant argues his plea counsel labored under
an actual conflict of interest, because his plea counsel's prior
representation of the victim prevented plea counsel from
discovering and investigating criminal charges against the
victim to support the defendant's self-defense claim. The claim
is unavailing because, to the extent that plea counsel's prior
representation presented a potential conflict of interest, it
never manifested as an actual conflict of interest. See Mosher,
455 Mass. at 819-823. Discovering the victim's criminal
offender record information did not require plea counsel to
3 disclose confidential information he may have received during
his representation of the victim nor use any confidential
information to discover the victim's prior criminal history.
See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6, as amended, 490 Mass. 1302 (2022);
1.9 (c), as amended, 490 Mass. 1305 (2022).
The defendant further suggests that plea counsel was aware
of a conflict of interest and limited his representation of the
defendant only after he already began to investigate the
victim's prior criminal charges. This contention, however, not
only is unsupported by the record, but strains credulity where
plea counsel relied on the board of probation's report that the
victim did not have a criminal record.4 It therefore was not an
abuse of discretion for the judge to credit plea counsel's
account in concluding that there was no actual conflict of
interest. See Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. at 47.
4 While the judge was permitted to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether plea counsel did, in fact, subsequently remember confidential information regarding the victim that he abstained from using or disclosing, we cannot, however, say it was an abuse of discretion for the judge to have concluded that an evidentiary hearing would not have revealed an actual conflict of interest, based on plea counsel's representation by affidavit that he failed to recall his prior representation of the victim and indeed had received no evidence of his representation. See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 466 Mass. 141, 148 n.8 (2013) ("The decision to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion for a new trial is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge" [citation omitted]).
4 b. Potential conflict of interest. Assuming without
deciding that plea counsel's prior representation of the victim
presented a potential conflict of interest that prevented his
discovery of the victim's prior acts of violence, such a claim
would require that the defendant establish that he was
prejudiced by the conflict. See Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366
Mass. 89, 96 (1974) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
requires showing counsel's errors "likely deprived the defendant
of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence"). See
also Commonwealth v. Croken, 432 Mass. 266, 272 (2000) (adopting
same prejudice standard as Saferian in claims where defendant
shows potential conflict of interest). Here the defendant has
made no such showing and our review of the record evinces that
he was not.
If the defendant were able to examine the victim about
specific acts of violence allegedly initiated by the victim in
order to support the contention that the victim was the first
aggressor, such examination would have permitted the prosecution
to rebut the defendant's argument with the defendant's own past
acts of violence, to which there were several. See Commonwealth
v. Morales, 464 Mass. 302, 310-311 (2013) (defendant's prior
acts of violence admissible to rebut evidence of prior acts by
victim on first aggressor issue); Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443
Mass. 649, 650, 664 (2005) (victim's prior acts of violence
5 admissible to support defendant's claim of self-defense that
victim was first aggressor if probative value of said evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effects); Mass. G. Evid.
§ 404(a)(2)(B) (2025). Indeed, while plea counsel had assisted
the victim in having charges of crimes of violence dismissed in
2011, plea counsel had also previously assisted the defendant in
having charges of crimes of violence unrelated to this appeal
dismissed in 2019. Because both the victim's and the
defendant's prior acts of violence may have been admissible, it
is doubtful that presenting evidence of the victim's prior acts
of violence would have been to the defendant's advantage, let
alone provide a substantial ground of defense.5 See Morales,
supra; Adjutant, supra at 663-664; Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.
Moreover, the evidence in the underlying case did not
support a viable claim of self-defense. Both the defendant's
wife, a percipient witness to the offense, and the victim told
the responding officers that the defendant struck the victim
with a shovel and did not state the victim was armed.6 The
5 For the same reasons, we affirm the orders denying the defendant's motion for the victim's CARI and the defendant's motion to amend his motion to withdraw his admission to sufficient facts.
6 Plea counsel averred that the defendant's wife was cooperating with the Commonwealth at the time of plea discussions, noting that the defense strategy of accepting a plea took into consideration that she "had come to court to support [the victim] and to testify for the prosecution."
6 defendant's wife portrayed the defendant as the aggressor, and
attributed no aggression or acts of violence to the victim.
Although the defendant denied hitting the victim with a shovel,
the police recovered a shovel after the defendant's wife showed
the police where the defendant hid the shovel in her backyard.
The police also reported the victim's injuries as consistent
with being hit with a shovel. We thus discern no prejudice
stemming from plea counsel's prior representation of the victim.
See Croken, 432 Mass. at 272.
2. The defendant's PTSD. "Where an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim is brought, 'a particular decision not to
investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all
the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to
counsel's judgments.'" Commonwealth v. Tavares, 491 Mass. 362,
366 (2023), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691
(1984). "That is, although trial counsel need not descend into
every rabbit hole, he or she 'has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary.'" Tavares, supra,
quoting Strickland, supra.
Here, the defendant asserts that plea counsel was
constitutionally deficient because he should have investigated
7 and explained to the defendant that the defendant's PTSD
diagnosis could be presented to the court in support of the
defendant's self-defense claim.
We first note that plea counsel did indeed present facts
about the defendant's PTSD during the admission hearing to the
judge, and that the judge was seemingly already familiar with
the defendant's mental health issues. The judge subsequently
accepted the defendant's plea recommendation and sentenced him
to one year of probation with conditions7 over the Commonwealth's
recommendation of a six-month committed sentence.
Additionally, it was reasonable for plea counsel to have
concluded, based on the evidence available, that the defendant's
PTSD diagnosis would not have presented a sufficient basis for
his self-defense claim. See Tavares, 491 Mass. at 366-367.
Plea counsel appropriately averred that "nothing indicated to
[him] that [the defendant] had a PTSD-related incident." Both
counsel and the judge were familiar with the defendant and the
types of behavior that had brought him to court on previous
occasions. Plea counsel's decision to recommend tendering a
7 Namely, that the defendant enter into and complete a Department of Veterans Affairs dual diagnosis residential treatment program, remain drug and alcohol free, and not commit new criminal offenses.
8 plea without further investigation into the defendant's PTSD
diagnosis, was therefore reasonable. Cf. id. at 366-367.
Conclusion. The October 23, 2024 orders denying the
defendant's motion to withdraw his admission to sufficient
facts, denying the defendant's motion to amend the motion to
withdraw admission, and denying the defendant's motion for court
activity record information of a witness are affirmed.
So ordered.
By the Court (Desmond, D'Angelo & Smyth, JJ.8),
Clerk
Entered: April 7, 2026.
8 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.