Commonwealth v. Jake M. Petrilli.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: March 13, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-0059
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-59

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JAKE M. PETRILLI.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury-waived trial in the District Court, the

defendant was convicted of negligent operation of a motor

vehicle pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). On appeal, he

challenges the denial of a motion for a required finding of not

guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case.1 We affirm.

"The standard for evaluating a motion for a required

finding of not guilty is 'whether, after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

1The defendant was acquitted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The judge found him not responsible on the speeding charge because that charge was "part of the negligent operation charge." beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass.

770, 784 (1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass.

671, 677 (1979). To establish guilt of the charge of negligent

operation of a motor vehicle pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2)

(a), the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant operated a

motor vehicle on a public way,2 recklessly or negligently "so

that the lives or safety of the public might be endangered."

Commonwealth v. Zagwyn, 482 Mass. 1020, 1021 (2019). "The

statute 'only requires proof that the defendant's conduct [in

operating the vehicle] might have endangered the safety of the

public, not that it in fact did.'" Id., quoting Commonwealth v.

Ferreira, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 35 (2007).

The Commonwealth presented the following evidence at trial.

On September 23, 2022, at 2:30 A.M., the defendant drove his car

at a speed of seventy-one miles per hour in a forty-five miles

per hour zone in Duxbury. A police officer was parked on the

side of the road in his marked cruiser when the defendant passed

by with such force that the cruiser shook. After the

defendant's car passed by, the officer activated his cruiser's

emergency lights, pulled onto the road, and followed the

defendant. At first, the defendant did not slow down; the

2 There was no dispute that the defendant was operating the vehicle on a public way.

2 defendant drove for "close to or more than a quarter of mile"

before he stopped.

Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer "was immediately

met with a strong odor of burnt marijuana emanating from inside

the vehicle." He also noted that the defendant's eyes were

"bloodshot and glassy, his speech was slurred, [and] his

movements were slow and lethargic." The officer asked the

defendant for his license and registration, but the defendant

only handed him his license. Upon a second request by the

officer, the defendant gave him a registration cancellation

receipt from the glove box. After the officer told him that it

was not the correct document, the defendant fumbled through the

glove box before finally providing the officer with his correct

registration.

The officer administered field sobriety tests after which

he formed the opinion that the defendant was under the influence

of alcohol. While being booked by a different officer, the

defendant was still unsteady on his feet and swaying. This

officer also formed the opinion that the defendant was under the

influence of alcohol.

Although "[e]xcessive speed, by itself, does not mandate [a

finding of negligent operation], . . . it can be considered in

combination with other evidence, in determining whether the

defendant's operation constituted negligent operation."

3 Commonwealth v. Duffy, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 922 (2004), citing

Commonwealth v. Campbell, 394 Mass. 77, 83 n.5 (1985). Evidence

of a defendant's intoxication is also relevant to a negligent

operation finding. See Commonwealth v. Daley, 66 Mass. App. Ct.

254, 256 (2006) (considering defendant's intoxication in finding

of negligent operation).

The excessive speed at which the defendant was driving at

night, coupled with his physical impairment as demonstrated by

his poor performance on the field sobriety tests is sufficient

to support a conviction of negligent operation of a motor

vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 380-

381 (2017) (combination of factors, including defendant's

driving well in excess of speed limit and intoxication,

supported conclusion defendant acted negligently).

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono, Brennan & D'Angelo, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: March 13, 2025.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.