NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1150
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
ISAIAH JAMOL EDMONDS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a bench trial in the District Court, the
defendant was convicted of violating an abuse prevention order.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred in ruling
on a motion in limine which sought a remedy for the
Commonwealth's loss of exculpatory evidence. Discerning no
error, we affirm.
Background. The defendant was charged with violating an
abuse prevention order by placing a telephone call to the victim
who had sought the order of protection. On the day of trial,
the defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude lost
exculpatory evidence. According to the motion, a police report
stated that an officer had gone to the victim's apartment where she made statements regarding the telephone call incident. The
motion asserted that, "[b]y policy, the statements made by the
witness should have been recorded by body worn camera," but that
the Commonwealth later reported that "[b]ody worn camera footage
is unavailable" for the case. The motion sought to "exclude all
testimony by witnesses whose recorded statements were lost or
destroyed" and stated that "any testimony or evidence restating
the lost or destroyed evidence should be excluded."
During hearing on the motion, the prosecutor confirmed that
the police department does have a "policy for body worn
cameras," and that police reports typically state that the "body
worn camera was affixed on" but no such notation was made with
respect to this incident. He explained that he always requests
body worn camera recordings "as a failsafe" and that this was
the first time that he had received a letter stating that the
recording was unavailable. In response to the prosecutor's
suggestion that a recording may not have been made, defense
counsel argued that the incident occurred months after the body
worn camera policy went in effect.1 As a remedy for the alleged
lost recording, counsel asked "that any testimony that might --
that refers to something that may have been captured on that
body cam be excluded."
1 It is unclear what the policy required because the policy was not submitted to the court.
2 The judge allowed the motion. He explained that, as a
remedy, he probably would have precluded the police officer from
testifying but the officer was not present and so would not be
testifying anyway. He also stated that he probably would have
given an instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379
Mass. 472, 485 (1980), but there was no jury to instruct. He
allowed defense counsel to argue the issue in closing.
The victim testified at trial regarding the telephone call
she received from the defendant and added that she subsequently
"filed the report." Defense counsel "renew[ed her] objection
from [her] motions in lim regarding testimony -- again,
regarding the entirety of her testimony as to what she
reported." The objection was overruled.
Discussion. On appeal, the defendant contends that the
"trial court committed reversible error when the court denied in
part, the defendant's motion in-limine to preclude [the victim]
from testifying about anything she said to the police or
anything that may have been recorded on the officer's lost body
cam while the officer was present at her address." Yet, the
judge did not deny the defendant's motion; the motion was
allowed. The defendant further argues that the "trial court
erred in failing to allow the requested remedy," yet the
requested remedy was the exclusion of evidence that may have
been captured on the body worn camera recording. There was, in
3 fact, no evidence introduced at trial regarding the officer's
visit to the victim's home after the incident.
On appeal, the defendant claims that "any of the [victim's]
testimony that could have been impeached by the contents of the
lost video footage should have been excluded at trial." Yet,
the record does not reflect that the defendant was seeking to
preclude the victim from testifying as to the restraining order
violation itself. Rather, in repeated references, throughout
the record, the defendant sought to exclude evidence of what
would have been captured by a police body worn camera when the
victim reported the incident to the police, after the
restraining order violation. As the judge allowed the motion
and the trial proceeded in conformity with that ruling, the
defendant has no basis to complain.
Even if the defendant had clearly requested the exclusion
of the victim's testimony regarding the restraining order
violation itself, the judge would have been well within his
discretion in denying such a remedy. See Commonwealth v.
Harwood, 432 Mass. 290, 302 (2000) (absent clear abuse of
discretion, appellate court will not disturb trial judge's
determination as to remedy). When faced with a claim of lost or
destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence, a judge must balance
the Commonwealth's culpability, the materiality of the evidence,
4 and the prejudice to the defendant. See Commonwealth v.
Williams, 455 Mass. 706, 718 (2010).2
With respect to the Commonwealth's culpability, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that the failure to record or
preserve any video recording was anything other than negligent.
See Commonwealth v. Heath, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 328, 337 (2016)
(failure to preserve video recording of crime allegedly
committed by defendant in booking area of police department was
negligent). As to materiality, the defendant speculates that a
body worn camera may have captured what was on the victim's cell
phone and statements and demeanor of the victim. But there is
nothing in the police report relied on by the defendant to
suggest that the officer ever looked at the victim's cell phone
or that she may have said anything apart from what she testified
to at trial. See Id. at 338 (materiality established if there
is substantial basis for claiming prejudice from loss of
evidence). Likewise, there is no basis to conclude that the
absence of any body worn camera recording prejudiced the
defendant's case. Cf. Id. at 335 (lost video recording could
have supported defendant's claim that officer assaulted him and
2 The defendant has the initial burden of showing that the Commonwealth lost or destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence. See Williams, 455 Mass. at 718.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1150
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
ISAIAH JAMOL EDMONDS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a bench trial in the District Court, the
defendant was convicted of violating an abuse prevention order.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred in ruling
on a motion in limine which sought a remedy for the
Commonwealth's loss of exculpatory evidence. Discerning no
error, we affirm.
Background. The defendant was charged with violating an
abuse prevention order by placing a telephone call to the victim
who had sought the order of protection. On the day of trial,
the defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude lost
exculpatory evidence. According to the motion, a police report
stated that an officer had gone to the victim's apartment where she made statements regarding the telephone call incident. The
motion asserted that, "[b]y policy, the statements made by the
witness should have been recorded by body worn camera," but that
the Commonwealth later reported that "[b]ody worn camera footage
is unavailable" for the case. The motion sought to "exclude all
testimony by witnesses whose recorded statements were lost or
destroyed" and stated that "any testimony or evidence restating
the lost or destroyed evidence should be excluded."
During hearing on the motion, the prosecutor confirmed that
the police department does have a "policy for body worn
cameras," and that police reports typically state that the "body
worn camera was affixed on" but no such notation was made with
respect to this incident. He explained that he always requests
body worn camera recordings "as a failsafe" and that this was
the first time that he had received a letter stating that the
recording was unavailable. In response to the prosecutor's
suggestion that a recording may not have been made, defense
counsel argued that the incident occurred months after the body
worn camera policy went in effect.1 As a remedy for the alleged
lost recording, counsel asked "that any testimony that might --
that refers to something that may have been captured on that
body cam be excluded."
1 It is unclear what the policy required because the policy was not submitted to the court.
2 The judge allowed the motion. He explained that, as a
remedy, he probably would have precluded the police officer from
testifying but the officer was not present and so would not be
testifying anyway. He also stated that he probably would have
given an instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379
Mass. 472, 485 (1980), but there was no jury to instruct. He
allowed defense counsel to argue the issue in closing.
The victim testified at trial regarding the telephone call
she received from the defendant and added that she subsequently
"filed the report." Defense counsel "renew[ed her] objection
from [her] motions in lim regarding testimony -- again,
regarding the entirety of her testimony as to what she
reported." The objection was overruled.
Discussion. On appeal, the defendant contends that the
"trial court committed reversible error when the court denied in
part, the defendant's motion in-limine to preclude [the victim]
from testifying about anything she said to the police or
anything that may have been recorded on the officer's lost body
cam while the officer was present at her address." Yet, the
judge did not deny the defendant's motion; the motion was
allowed. The defendant further argues that the "trial court
erred in failing to allow the requested remedy," yet the
requested remedy was the exclusion of evidence that may have
been captured on the body worn camera recording. There was, in
3 fact, no evidence introduced at trial regarding the officer's
visit to the victim's home after the incident.
On appeal, the defendant claims that "any of the [victim's]
testimony that could have been impeached by the contents of the
lost video footage should have been excluded at trial." Yet,
the record does not reflect that the defendant was seeking to
preclude the victim from testifying as to the restraining order
violation itself. Rather, in repeated references, throughout
the record, the defendant sought to exclude evidence of what
would have been captured by a police body worn camera when the
victim reported the incident to the police, after the
restraining order violation. As the judge allowed the motion
and the trial proceeded in conformity with that ruling, the
defendant has no basis to complain.
Even if the defendant had clearly requested the exclusion
of the victim's testimony regarding the restraining order
violation itself, the judge would have been well within his
discretion in denying such a remedy. See Commonwealth v.
Harwood, 432 Mass. 290, 302 (2000) (absent clear abuse of
discretion, appellate court will not disturb trial judge's
determination as to remedy). When faced with a claim of lost or
destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence, a judge must balance
the Commonwealth's culpability, the materiality of the evidence,
4 and the prejudice to the defendant. See Commonwealth v.
Williams, 455 Mass. 706, 718 (2010).2
With respect to the Commonwealth's culpability, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that the failure to record or
preserve any video recording was anything other than negligent.
See Commonwealth v. Heath, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 328, 337 (2016)
(failure to preserve video recording of crime allegedly
committed by defendant in booking area of police department was
negligent). As to materiality, the defendant speculates that a
body worn camera may have captured what was on the victim's cell
phone and statements and demeanor of the victim. But there is
nothing in the police report relied on by the defendant to
suggest that the officer ever looked at the victim's cell phone
or that she may have said anything apart from what she testified
to at trial. See Id. at 338 (materiality established if there
is substantial basis for claiming prejudice from loss of
evidence). Likewise, there is no basis to conclude that the
absence of any body worn camera recording prejudiced the
defendant's case. Cf. Id. at 335 (lost video recording could
have supported defendant's claim that officer assaulted him and
2 The defendant has the initial burden of showing that the Commonwealth lost or destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence. See Williams, 455 Mass. at 718. Assuming without deciding the defendant met that burden, we review only the remedy which is disputed by the defendant on appeal.
5 thereby provide theory of defense that charge was fabricated to
cover up police assault).
As the judge stated, any missing body worn camera recording
of the plaintiff reporting the restraining order violation to
the police was largely "a nonissue" where the Commonwealth had
no plan to offer the police officer's testimony. Moreover,
where it was a bench trial, the judge could instruct himself on
the missing evidence and its impact on reasonable doubt. See
Commonwealth v. Batista, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 648 (2002)
(trial judges sitting without jury presumed to have correctly
instructed themselves). Cf. Heath, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 338-339
(lack of jury instruction on how to treat lost evidence created
jury confusion). Under the circumstances, there was no abuse of
discretion in fashioning a remedy where the victim was
prohibited from testifying to anything about the police
officer's visit and defense counsel would be able to argue the
point in closing. See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185
n.27 (2014) (abuse of discretion is clear error of judgment in
6 weighing factors relevant to decision, such that decision falls
outside range of reasonable alternatives).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Singh, D'Angelo & Hodgens, JJ.3),
Clerk
Entered: August 12, 2025.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.