Commonwealth v. Hoffman

52 Pa. Super. 272, 1912 Pa. Super. LEXIS 162
Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided October 14, 1912·No. Appeal, No. 3·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinion

Opinion by

Orlady, J.,

On August 12, 1911, a barn of Lewis Hoffman located in Venango county was feloniously burned. Lowrey [276] Hoffman, a brother of this defendant, was tried and convicted as a principal in the burning, and this appellant as an accessory before the fact to the felonious arson. The assignments of error raise but two questions, (1) The general character of the charge, in not adequately presenting the defendant’s theory of the case, and in not sufficiently commenting on the testimony adduced in his behalf. This is without merit, as an examination of the charge in connection with the evidence shows clearly, that the trial judge was specially careful in presenting every material phase of the case in a clear and impartial manner, and stated, There is such a want of harmony in the testimony of the witnesses, that it appears not to be possible for you to reach the conclusion, that they are all testifying honestly and truly, as they remember the facts. It is your duty as jurors to reconcile the testimony of all these various witnesses, if you can reach a conclusion that all are honest, that they may differ in their recollections, and may not remember things alike, but all are telling the truth as they understand it. If you can, you should do so; if you cannot, then you must determine wherein the truth lies, and you must necessarily reach a conclusion as to which of the witnesses are testifying honestly and those who are not.”

The trial of the case occupied nearly five days, and the testimony taken covers 530 printed pages. It would not' be possible, nor is it expected of the trial judge, that he should do more than fairly summarize such a mass of testimony. The defendant presented nine points for special instructions, seven of which were affirmed and two were refused. No just complaint can be made of this phase of the case.

The other contention is, that the court erred in admitting in evidence the conduct of a bloodhound in following a trail, and identifying the principal offender, and thus associating him with this defendant. The preliminary examination was exhaustive and after full consideration the evidence was received.

[277] The question is a new one in this state though it has been frequently presented in others. The record shows, that about one hour and a half after the fire was discovered, a female bloodhound of pure strain and breeding about five years old, was brought to the scene of the crime, at the instance of the prosecution and taken to a point as near to the burning building as the heat would permit, and at a place from which all persons had been excluded, and where there was reason to believe from surrounding circumstances that the felon had been when the fire started, and where circumstances indicated that the party who had started the fire had been; that the bloodhound there took up a trail or scent, and followed it by tortuous windings, for a considerable distance, when the dog met Walter Hoffman in the line of the trail she was following, smelled at him, and quit working, by manifesting the usual signs that she had successfully run down the object of the search. It was further shown that the dog had been carefully trained by persons skilled in such work, to follow human tracks, and that in at least 100 tests she was found to run true to scent, and had never failed to locate the object of her pursuit, and that the person who had her in charge had owned her for over two years, and had frequently tried her out, so as to be competent to manage her in securing an initial scent, and following its trail.

It is a matter of common knowledge of which the courts are authorized to take notice, that many animals have a special innate propensity, or sagacity, which transcends the general experience of human beings. It is called a natural intuitive power; perception, or instructive quality; due to effects of habits in successive generations, or original intelligence, special to a class, in which the choice of means suitable to each particular instance is unconsciously made.

The migration of birds and fish; dread of animals of prey; invariable habits of many animals in their natural, or_a domesticated state are so frequently and vividly [278] brought to our notice, that the existence of these special endowments cannot be ignored. We know that certain breeds of dogs are invested with special traits and gifts, peculiar to their respective kind,—the pointer and setter take instinctively to hunting birds, the hound, to foxes, deer, and rabbits. While there is no breed of dogs that instinctively hunts mankind, yet we do know that dogs are capable of being trained, or acquire the habit of their own elective preference, to follow the tracks of human beings. It is a well-known fact that bloodhounds can be trained to follow or run the track of strangers. The gift or power or instinct being already inherent in the animal, he may be induced by special training to exercise it, under the persuasive influence and training of a skilled master. Being once accurately trained in this pursuit, we may presume that his exactness depends on the capacity bestowed upon him by nature, and developed by intelligent training. All are not equally unerring, and each may fail at times in being truthful. It is a novel feature of evidence in our jurisprudence, and is attended with some danger, against which courts must guard as the occasion arises, and when the circumstances are at all doubtful.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 52 Pa. Super. 272, 1912 Pa. Super. LEXIS 162 (Pa. Ct. App. 1912).

52 Pa. Super. 272 (Commonwealth v. Hoffman) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

State v. Buller
517 N.W.2d 711 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1994)
State v. Streeper
747 P.2d 71 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1987)
Commonwealth v. Michaux
520 A.2d 1177 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1987)
People v. Malgren
139 Cal. App. 3d 234 (California Court of Appeal, 1983)
People v. Centolella
61 Misc. 2d 723 (New York County Courts, 1969)
Terrell v. State
239 A.2d 128 (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 1968)
Ruse v. State
115 N.E. 778 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1917)
Commonwealth v. Nace
59 Pa. Super. 210 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1915)