Commonwealth v. Haugh

12 Pa. D. & C. 795, 1929 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 252
CourtCentre County Court of Quarter Sessions
DecidedMay 3, 1929
DocketNo. 23
StatusPublished

This text of 12 Pa. D. & C. 795 (Commonwealth v. Haugh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Centre County Court of Quarter Sessions primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Haugh, 12 Pa. D. & C. 795, 1929 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 252 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1929).

Opinion

Fleming, P. J.,

On Oct. 16, 1928, the defendant was arrested on information made by Game Protector Thomas Mozier, charging him with a violation of section 720 of the Act of May 14, 1925, P. L. 752, in that he had, after having killed a deer upon his property, failed to report the same to the nearest game protector or to the Game Commission at Harrisburg, Pa., within twenty-four hours after such killing. The defendant, upon being brought before a justice of the peace, admitted the killing of the deer in question as well as his failure to report the same, and also admitted the killing of ten or twelve additional deer and his similar failure to report them. The game protector entered into an agreement in writing with the defendant to pay the penalty stipulated by said act for five deer and costs, amounting in the aggregate to $515. On Oct. 18, 1928, an appeal was allowed by this court and the matter is now before us on appeal.

There is apparently no dispute existing as to the facts. The defendant frankly admits the killing, not alone of the one deer, upon which information was based, but of ten or twelve other deer. The Commonwealth admits that damage had been done by deer upon the farm of Harvey Haugh, where defendant resided as a tenant during the year 1928. The defendant contends that he is not guilty of any violation of law and raises a question as to the constitutionality of the act of assembly upon which the information is founded. This is our primary consideration herein. Should the act be found to contravene the provisions of our Constitution, then, of course, the defendant should be discharged. If not, we must proceed further and ascertain the validity of the fine imposed by the justice.

Section 720 of article VII of the Act of May 24, 1923, P. L. 359 [as amended by the Act of May 14, 1925, P. L. 752, 756], provides as follows:

“Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent any person actually residing upon or cultivating, as a means of gaining a livelihood, any lands for general farm crop purposes, commercial trucking or fruit orchard or nursery, being regularly maintained for commercial purposes, as either the owner or lessee, or any member of the family of such owner or lessee residing upon and assisting in the cultivation of such lands, or the employee of such owner or lessee who regularly assists in the cultivation of such lands, from [796]*796killing, in any manner except through the use of poison, at any time, any elk or deer, or bear, or rabbit, or squirrel, or raccoon, or the birds commonly known as blackbirds, regardless of sex or age, which he may find on such lands actually engaged in the material destruction of cultivated fruit trees, cultivated crops, vegetables, livestock, poultry or bee-hives, or in the case of red squirrels or blackbirds destroying either the eggs or young of protected or game birds; or from destroying such animals or birds anywhere on the property under their control immediately following such destruction, or where the presence of such bird or animal on any such aforesaid cultivated lands or in any such aforesaid fruit orchards is just cause for reasonable apprehension of additional imminent destruction. Any such person shall, upon request of any representative of the board, produce satisfactory evidence that material damage has been done within thirty days, and that there was just cause for reasonable apprehension of additional imminent destruction by the species of animal or bird killed, except in the case of red squirrels and blackbirds; and in the case of elk, deer or bears shall report such killing within twenty-four hours, either verbally or in writing, to the nearest game protector or the office of the board at Harrisburg, and shall immediately remove the entrails, hang up and care properly for the carcass of any such animal killed for delivery to anylcharitable institution designated by such officer or board. Failure to produce satisfactory evidence of material damage, or lack of reasonable cause for apprehension of additional imminent destruction, or failure to make the report herein required, or dress and care for such carcass properly, unless retained for food, or use, in the manner herein specified, all edible portions of a carcass retained for food, shall subject any person killing any animal or bird herein named, or using or having in possession any portion of the carcass in any manner contrary to this section, to the full fine hereinafter provided for unlawfully killing or having in possession such animal or bird, or part thereof.”

It is contended that the provisions of the above act are contrary to article x, section 1, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, which provides that “All men . . . have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property.”

When Judge Gillan wrote the opinion in Com. v. Gilbert, 5 D. & C. 443, the Act of May 24, 1923, P. L. 359, had not then been amended as is quoted above. The matter before him was an appeal from a conviction before a justice of the peace for having shot and killed a doe deer. The property therein alleged to have been defended against destruction by the deer killed was an apple orchard containing over 5009 trees, most of them in bearing condition. The subject for Judge Gillan’s consideration in the case cited was the killing of a deer by the owner of land alleged to have been damaged by such animal and not the failure to report such killing as is the subject in the instant case. We fully concur in the learned judge’s conclusions that “the owner of real estate has an indefeasible right to destroy a deer when necessary to protect his crop” and that “any legislation which undertakes to deprive him of that right contravenes the Constitution.”

The defendant in the instant case was not arrested for killing deer. It is for his failure to report such killing that he is now before us. The Act of May 14, 1925, P. L. 752, expressly allows the killing of deer which have been found destroying private property specifically mentioned therein. The property admitted to have been destroyed in this case comes within the kinds of property mentioned in such act. The right to kill is not confined to the owner [797]*797of the land, but has been extended to lessees, members of the family of such owners or lessees and to the employees of such owners or lessees. The fact that the defendant was a lessee of the owner has been admitted. That the Act of 1925 contravenes the Constitution by preventing or obstructing the enjoyment and defense of the life and liberty of our citizens or their right to acquire, possess and protect their property has not been and cannot be seriously contended. On the contrary, full and complete permission or authority so to act has been specifically ratified, confirmed and conferred by such legislation. The defendant now before us, however, contends that the provision in said act which requires such owner, lessee, member of the family of owner or lessee, or employee of owner or lessee, to report such killing to the nearest game protector or to the office of the Board of Game Commissioners at Harrisburg within twenty-four hours after such killing is an unreasonable exercise of the police power of the Commonwealth, and that it, therefore, contravenes the Constitution. With this contention we most emphatically disagree.

With the founding of our Commonwealth and its early settlement came the unrestricted right to hew from our hills and plains the virgin timber.

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Related

Commonwealth v. McComb
76 A. 100 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1910)
Commonwealth v. Papsone
44 Pa. Super. 128 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1910)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
12 Pa. D. & C. 795, 1929 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 252, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-haugh-paqtrsesscentre-1929.