NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-279
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
HAROLD NUNEZ REYES.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Harold Nunez Reyes, appeals from a
conviction, after a bench trial in the District Court, of
malicious destruction of property, G. L. c. 266, § 127. The
defendant's conviction was based on damage to the apartment he
rented from the victim. Concluding that the testimony that the
defendant and the victim had an acrimonious relationship and
that the defendant's apartment was substantially damaged once
the defendant was required to move out provided sufficient
evidence to establish identity and malicious destruction of
property, we affirm.
1. Standard of Review. "When reviewing the denial of a
motion for a required finding of not guilty, 'we consider the evidence introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, and determine whether a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.'" Commonwealth v. Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct.
156, 162 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Faherty, 93 Mass. App.
Ct. 129, 133 (2018). "The inferences that support a conviction
'need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be
necessary or inescapable.'" Commonwealth v. Sabin, 104 Mass.
App. Ct. 303, 305 (2024), quoting Commonwealth v. Howe, 103
Mass. App. Ct. 354, 357 (2023). "Each inference drawn from the
evidence must be a reasonable and logical conclusion, and the
[factfinder] may not rely upon conjecture, guesswork, or
speculation to choose between alternate inferences."
Commonwealth v. MacCormack, 491 Mass. 848, 860 (2023).
For the crime of malicious destruction of property, the
Commonwealth must prove "that (1) the defendant injured or
destroyed the personal property, dwelling house, or building of
another; (2) he did so wilfully; (3) he did so with malice; and
(4) the property damaged or destroyed had a value greater than
$[1,200]." Commonwealth v. Chambers, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 141
(2016). The crime "requir[es] proof that the defendant's
actions were both 'wilful' and 'malicious.'" Commonwealth v.
Redmond, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 3-4 (2001). The second and third
2 elements, along with the identity of the defendant, are at issue
in this appeal.
2. Identity. "[I]t is basic law . . . that an essential
element to be proved by the Commonwealth is that the individual
who appears before the court as the defendant is the same person
who is the subject of the indictment or complaint then on trial
and the same person referred to in the evidence." Commonwealth
v. Blackmer, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 474, 483 (2010), quoting
Commonwealth v. Davila, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 511, 512 (1984). The
Commonwealth does not need to prove, however, "that no person
other than the defendant could have committed the crime."
Commonwealth v. Shakespeare, 493 Mass. 67, 81 (2023), quoting
Commonwealth v. Morgan, 449 Mass. 343, 349 (2007). "Proof of
the identity of the person who committed the offense may be
established in a number of ways and '[i]t is not necessary that
any one witness should distinctly swear that the defendant was
the man.'" Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 162, quoting
Blackmer, supra at 483.
Here, the evidence was sufficient for a factfinder to
conclude that the defendant committed the damage. The victim
testified that, upon negotiating a lease with the defendant,
their relationship "kind of turned." The defendant had been
"living there far below fair market rental rate" for several
years. The victim testified that he and the defendant "had some
3 animosity apparently towards one another," and that he was "at
housing court many times with [the defendant]." The defendant
"denied [the victim] access repeatedly" when he would attempt
"to go through [the defendant's apartment] with a worker" to fix
reported issues with the apartment. When the victim would "make
a plan [with] 24-hour notice," which the defendant would confirm
"multiple times," the defendant would still "come out and say,
Nope, you can't come in."
Evidence of the ongoing dispute between the defendant and
the victim was supported by testimony from other witnesses. An
official from the Salem Board of Health (board) testified that
the defendant would "continually complain about the same issues
that [were] raised in the report" to the board. A police
officer corroborated the health official's report and testified
that "[t]here was some other type of civil court issue that they
had where [the defendant] was having to remove himself from the
apartment."
Our conclusion is bolstered by the defendant's repeated
false statements that the damage had been there from before the
tenancy. Although the health official had personally observed
the apartment "in relatively good condition" between April and
June 2019, the defendant stated to the official that the "damage
had been there all along" and that "it was already there, it
wasn't new." The trier of fact could infer from the defendant's
4 false statements that he was trying to hide his own
responsibility for the damage. See Commonwealth v. Vega, 54
Mass. App. Ct. 249, 253 (2002).
Although the evidence established that the defendant's
girlfriend also had some issues with the defendant, there is
little evidence of the girlfriend's involvement. 1 The board
received the complaint from the defendant, not the girlfriend.
The housing inspection report does not list the girlfriend, but
only the defendant. The girlfriend was not present at the final
inspection. "In order to convict on circumstantial evidence, it
is not necessary to show that it was not in the power of any
other person than the defendant to commit the crime."
Commonwealth v. Winfield, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 716, 721 (2010),
quoting Commonwealth v. Fancy, 349 Mass. 196, 200 (1965). The
Commonwealth's evidence, "when taken together, 'formed a
"mosaic" of evidence such that [a factfinder] could conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt'" that it was indeed the defendant who
destroyed the victim's property. Commonwealth v. Pardee, 105
Mass. App. Ct. 496, 503 (2025), quoting Quinones, 95 Mass. App.
Ct. at 162.
1 The evidence showed that the girlfriend exchanged text messages with the landlord and filed a lawsuit regarding a broken ceiling tile in the apartment's kitchen.
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-279
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
HAROLD NUNEZ REYES.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Harold Nunez Reyes, appeals from a
conviction, after a bench trial in the District Court, of
malicious destruction of property, G. L. c. 266, § 127. The
defendant's conviction was based on damage to the apartment he
rented from the victim. Concluding that the testimony that the
defendant and the victim had an acrimonious relationship and
that the defendant's apartment was substantially damaged once
the defendant was required to move out provided sufficient
evidence to establish identity and malicious destruction of
property, we affirm.
1. Standard of Review. "When reviewing the denial of a
motion for a required finding of not guilty, 'we consider the evidence introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, and determine whether a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.'" Commonwealth v. Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct.
156, 162 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Faherty, 93 Mass. App.
Ct. 129, 133 (2018). "The inferences that support a conviction
'need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be
necessary or inescapable.'" Commonwealth v. Sabin, 104 Mass.
App. Ct. 303, 305 (2024), quoting Commonwealth v. Howe, 103
Mass. App. Ct. 354, 357 (2023). "Each inference drawn from the
evidence must be a reasonable and logical conclusion, and the
[factfinder] may not rely upon conjecture, guesswork, or
speculation to choose between alternate inferences."
Commonwealth v. MacCormack, 491 Mass. 848, 860 (2023).
For the crime of malicious destruction of property, the
Commonwealth must prove "that (1) the defendant injured or
destroyed the personal property, dwelling house, or building of
another; (2) he did so wilfully; (3) he did so with malice; and
(4) the property damaged or destroyed had a value greater than
$[1,200]." Commonwealth v. Chambers, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 141
(2016). The crime "requir[es] proof that the defendant's
actions were both 'wilful' and 'malicious.'" Commonwealth v.
Redmond, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 3-4 (2001). The second and third
2 elements, along with the identity of the defendant, are at issue
in this appeal.
2. Identity. "[I]t is basic law . . . that an essential
element to be proved by the Commonwealth is that the individual
who appears before the court as the defendant is the same person
who is the subject of the indictment or complaint then on trial
and the same person referred to in the evidence." Commonwealth
v. Blackmer, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 474, 483 (2010), quoting
Commonwealth v. Davila, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 511, 512 (1984). The
Commonwealth does not need to prove, however, "that no person
other than the defendant could have committed the crime."
Commonwealth v. Shakespeare, 493 Mass. 67, 81 (2023), quoting
Commonwealth v. Morgan, 449 Mass. 343, 349 (2007). "Proof of
the identity of the person who committed the offense may be
established in a number of ways and '[i]t is not necessary that
any one witness should distinctly swear that the defendant was
the man.'" Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 162, quoting
Blackmer, supra at 483.
Here, the evidence was sufficient for a factfinder to
conclude that the defendant committed the damage. The victim
testified that, upon negotiating a lease with the defendant,
their relationship "kind of turned." The defendant had been
"living there far below fair market rental rate" for several
years. The victim testified that he and the defendant "had some
3 animosity apparently towards one another," and that he was "at
housing court many times with [the defendant]." The defendant
"denied [the victim] access repeatedly" when he would attempt
"to go through [the defendant's apartment] with a worker" to fix
reported issues with the apartment. When the victim would "make
a plan [with] 24-hour notice," which the defendant would confirm
"multiple times," the defendant would still "come out and say,
Nope, you can't come in."
Evidence of the ongoing dispute between the defendant and
the victim was supported by testimony from other witnesses. An
official from the Salem Board of Health (board) testified that
the defendant would "continually complain about the same issues
that [were] raised in the report" to the board. A police
officer corroborated the health official's report and testified
that "[t]here was some other type of civil court issue that they
had where [the defendant] was having to remove himself from the
apartment."
Our conclusion is bolstered by the defendant's repeated
false statements that the damage had been there from before the
tenancy. Although the health official had personally observed
the apartment "in relatively good condition" between April and
June 2019, the defendant stated to the official that the "damage
had been there all along" and that "it was already there, it
wasn't new." The trier of fact could infer from the defendant's
4 false statements that he was trying to hide his own
responsibility for the damage. See Commonwealth v. Vega, 54
Mass. App. Ct. 249, 253 (2002).
Although the evidence established that the defendant's
girlfriend also had some issues with the defendant, there is
little evidence of the girlfriend's involvement. 1 The board
received the complaint from the defendant, not the girlfriend.
The housing inspection report does not list the girlfriend, but
only the defendant. The girlfriend was not present at the final
inspection. "In order to convict on circumstantial evidence, it
is not necessary to show that it was not in the power of any
other person than the defendant to commit the crime."
Commonwealth v. Winfield, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 716, 721 (2010),
quoting Commonwealth v. Fancy, 349 Mass. 196, 200 (1965). The
Commonwealth's evidence, "when taken together, 'formed a
"mosaic" of evidence such that [a factfinder] could conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt'" that it was indeed the defendant who
destroyed the victim's property. Commonwealth v. Pardee, 105
Mass. App. Ct. 496, 503 (2025), quoting Quinones, 95 Mass. App.
Ct. at 162.
1 The evidence showed that the girlfriend exchanged text messages with the landlord and filed a lawsuit regarding a broken ceiling tile in the apartment's kitchen. Although the victim was unsure who called the board of health for the final inspection, the health official testified that he "believe[d] it was defendant" who called for the final inspection.
5 3. Intent. Again, the Commonwealth had to prove that the
defendant acted willfully and with malice. "The word 'wilful'
means intentional and by design in contrast to that which is
thoughtless or accidental. Malice, on the other hand, refers to
a state of mind of cruelty, hostility or revenge." Commonwealth
v. Woods, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 761, 769 (2019), quoting J.R. Nolan
& L.J. Sartorio, Criminal Law § 427, at 438 (3d ed. 2001).
"However, the wilful doing of an unlawful act does not, by
itself, suffice to prove malice under G. L. c. 266, § 127."
Commonwealth v. Morris M., 70 Mass. App. Ct. 688, 692 (2007).
Malice may be shown with evidence that "the defendant was
motivated by animus or hostility" and that the defendant's
actions were not merely "an incidental consequence" of some
other enterprise. Woods, supra at 766.
Here, the trier of fact could find that the defendant's
actions were beyond "thoughtless or accidental." Commonwealth
v. Lauzier, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 626, 634 (2002). The health
official testified that "[t]he bathroom had been ripped out,"
"the toilet was broken," "pipes had been drilled into," "the
shower surround was ripped out to the studs," "the radiator
valves had appeared to have been loosened . . . to create [a]
leak," the "vanity was missing," and "the toilet . . . looked
6 like it had been smashed." The defendant was not acting in a
merely casual or reckless manner when he "deliberately destroyed
a considerable amount of his landlord's property." Commonwealth
v. Gordon, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 227, 233 (2012).
The trier of fact could reasonably find that the damage to
the apartment was "gratuitous, excessive," and "hostile to the
owner of the property." Commonwealth v. Doyle, 83 Mass. App.
Ct. 384, 388 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Redmond, 53 Mass.
App. Ct. at 5. This property damage, which occurred just prior
to the defendant's eviction, was not a "deliberate condition
precedent to effectuating" any goal of the defendant other than
pure destruction. Commonwealth v. Wynn, 42 Mass App. Ct. 452,
456 (1997). Contrast Redmond, supra at 4 ("While the evidence
was sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant's
principal goal was theft of the computers, it was insufficient
to establish that the destruction of a door was more than a
means to that end"). The trier of fact could reasonably
conclude "that by design [the defendant] purposefully destroyed
[much of the apartment] motivated by hostility, cruelty, or
vengeance toward [the victim] as opposed to the resulting damage
being occasioned by, or incidental to" any other desire.
Gordon, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 232. Accordingly, the judge
7 properly denied the defendant's motions for a required finding
of not guilty. 2
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Ditkoff, D'Angelo & Wood, JJ. 3),
Clerk
Entered: November 12, 2025.
2 The evidence did not deteriorate during the defendant's case. "Deterioration does not occur merely because the defendant contradicted the Commonwealth's evidence," but rather when the Commonwealth's evidence "is later shown to be incredible or conclusively incorrect." Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 381 (2017), quoting Kater v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 17, 20 (1995). That did not occur here. Indeed, the defendant testified that his girlfriend did not cause the damage, thus providing further evidence of his identity as the perpetrator.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.