Commonwealth v. Goldman

193 A. 112, 127 Pa. Super. 523, 1937 Pa. Super. LEXIS 252
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 19, 1937
DocketAppeal, 107
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 193 A. 112 (Commonwealth v. Goldman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Goldman, 193 A. 112, 127 Pa. Super. 523, 1937 Pa. Super. LEXIS 252 (Pa. Ct. App. 1937).

Opinion

Opinion by

Stadteeld, J.,

This is an appeal by defendant from the conviction and sentence on the charge of larceny of a diamond ring of prosecutrix, Mrs. Leo H. Breslin, on the 28th day of August, 1936, at her home in the Borough of Mt. Carmel, County of Northumberland.

Appellant is a rug salesman and at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, together with his brother, had established headquarters at the Davis Hotel in the City of Pottsville, Schuylkill County. From *525 this Hotel they went out each day to different towns for the purpose of disposing of their merchandise.

About 8:30 on the morning of August 28th, 1936, defendant, together with his brother, John Goldman, left Pottsville to go to Mt. Carmel, Pa. to canvass that town. They reached Mt. Carmel between 9:30 and 10:00 A. M.

Among other places, appellant went to the home of Mrs. Leo H. Breslin, at 313 N. Vine Street, Mt. Carmel. He reached there about 10:00 A. M.

Mrs. Breslin was interested in the purchase of a rug. Appellant brought in one of his rugs and laid it on the floor of the living room of the Breslin home for inspection. Mrs. Breslin was satisfied with the rug and a bargain was struck with the appellant.

The Breslin home faces west, is one half of a double dwelling house and has three rooms on the first floor, a living room or front room, dining room and then the kitchen. The front door of the house opens into the living room and between it and the dining room is an archway making the two practically one room. There is a wooden door between the kitchen and the dining room. In the dining room there is an open stairway leading to the second floor.

After Mrs. Breslin and appellant had agreed on the purchase of the rug, she went upstairs to the front room on the second floor to get her wallet to pay for her purchase. On direct examination she testified: “Q. How long were you upstairs? A. Oh — no more than two minutes at the longest and came down and paid the money and he went out of the house......” And on cross examination: “Q. Can you see in the front room, the living room from upstairs? A. If you stand on the stairs. Q. Do I understand that when you made this purchase you hurried upstairs to get the money. A. Yes, I did. Q. It was two minutes between the time you left the living room until you returned, is that all? A. About that. Q. No more. A. Positively. Q. Are *526 you sure about that? A. Well just figured the necessary time to go up the stairs and go down and count the $28.00. That is all......Q. You knew where the wallet was and you went right up and got it, didn’t you? A. Positively. Q. And only stopped long enough to open the door and get the wallet out. A. That is all. Q. And immediately turned around— A. And came down stairs......Q. When you got to the head of the stairs you could see down stairs, couldn’t you? A. Yes. Q. Where was the defendant standing when you got to the head of the stairs? A. Oh, he was standing about in the centre of the room. Q. Could you see him from the head of the stairs? A. You could see him. I don’t remember having noticed him from the head of the stairs ......Q. But you saw where he was standing. A. Yes ......Q. Was he standing still when you came down stairs? A. I think so.”

The Commonwealth contends that Mrs. Breslin placed her wedding, engagement and the alleged stolen ring on the second shelf of the bookcase part of the secretary which stood at an angle on the north side of the room with the back to that small portion of the partition wall which remained between the living room and the dining room near the foot of the open stairway.

In this living room is an ordinary sized window and glass front on the outside door. There were no windows on either side of these rooms. There were curtains and shades on the window and on the door. The shades on both window and door were drawn about half way on this day.

The only time Mrs. Breslin was out of the room was when she went upstairs to get her wallet. At this time the defendant was standing in the centre of the room and the child, Leo Breslin, Jr., was somewhere in the living room.

It is further contended by the Commonwealth that while Mrs. Breslin was upstairs the defendant asked *527 her son Leo Breslin, Jr. to get him a drink of water from the kitchen, and the child replied that he couldn’t reach the glasses. That the boy then went to the kitchen from the living room to get the water and had returned to the living room before his mother had come down stairs.

The front bedroom upstairs is close to the top of the stairway, and the only time Mrs. Breslin was out of sight and hearing of her son was when she went from the top of the stairway into the bedroom, and returned to the top of the stairs, a very short distance. She does not testify hearing any conversation between the appellant and her son.

The only witness upon which the Commonwealth relied and upon which it depends to sustain this conviction is Leo Breslin, Jr., a minor child of the prosecutrix. The boy was four years and seven months old when the alleged crime was committed and had not reached his fifth birthday, when he testified to events which had occurred about three months prior thereto. Defendant objected to the child being sworn and allowed to testify on the ground of his tender age, and that he did not have sufficient conception of the nature of an oath.

The Court submitted the case to the jury solely upon the evidence of the child.

The defendant denied taking the ring. There was no evidence that he ever had the ring in his possession.

The jury found appellant guilty in the manner and form in which he was indicted.

Motion in arrest of judgment and for a new trial was made and overruled. The defendant was sentenced to pay the costs, a fine of $100 and to serve one year in Northumberland County prison. Prom this sentence defendant appealed.

The only assignments of error which it is necessary to discuss, are those which relate to permitting the minor *528 child referred to to be sworn and to testify on the part of the Commonwealth.

The court in banc, in an opinion by Cummings, J., frankly states, that without the testimony of this witness a conviction could not have been had.

As stated in Piepke v. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co., 242 Pa. 321 at 329, 89 A. 124: “......that where there is no precise or fixed rule as to the time within which infants are excluded from giving evidence ‘their admission depends upon the sense and reason they entertain of the danger and impiety of falsehood which is to be collected from their answers to questions propounded to them by the Court......’

“The substantial test of competency of an infant witness is his intelligence and his comprehension of an obligation to tell the truth”.

It is conceded that the trial judge has a wide discretion in passing on the competency of such witness. Appellant contends that there was an abuse of discretion in permitting Leo Breslin, Jr. to testify.

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Related

Commonwealth v. McDaniel
323 A.2d 885 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1974)
Hildreth v. Key
341 S.W.2d 601 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1960)
Rosche v. McCoy
156 A.2d 307 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1959)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
193 A. 112, 127 Pa. Super. 523, 1937 Pa. Super. LEXIS 252, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-goldman-pasuperct-1937.