Commonwealth v. Fisher

1 Pen. & W. 462
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 15, 1830
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 1 Pen. & W. 462 (Commonwealth v. Fisher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 1 Pen. & W. 462 (Pa. 1830).

Opinion

Huston, J.

If the first exception is sustainable, it will be un-necessary to consider the second. By the act of the 25th February, "1826, the canal commissioners were authorised to locate, and contract for making a canal, locks and other works necessary thereto, from the river Swatara, at or near Middletown, to or near to a point on the east side of the Susquehanna opposite the mouth of Juniata; and another portion from Pittsburg to Kiskiminitas. This .act is entitled, an act to commence a canal, tobe constructed atthe expense of the State, to be styled “The Pennsylvania Canal.”' On the 9th April, 1827, was passed, an act to provide for the further extension of the Pennsylvania canal. The first section provides for extending one part, from the eastern section up the Juniata to Lewistown: another up Kiskiminitas and Conemaugh, from the western section of the Pennsylvania canal to Blairsville: and also, a canal, locks and other works necessary thereto, up the valley of the Susquehanna, from the said eastern section of the Pennsylvania canal, to a point at or near Northumberland; to be selected with due regard to the accommodation of the trade of both branches of. the river. It is on this last, the lands for which damages are claimed, are situate. It was asking a great deal from this court, when we were required to believe, that from Middletown to Juniata, [464]*464¡made the year before, was not here called the eastern section; and that it was impossible to ascertain from the law, thát it included all that part of the Pennsylvania canal between the mouth of Juniata and Northumberland.

The 8th section provides, “ that if any person shall consider himself aggrieved by reason of the canal passing through lands of which he is the owner, or by interfering in any manner with his rights of property, he may at the completion of the work thereupon, or within one year thereafter, petition the Court of Quarter Sessions of the county in which the damage has been committed, and the said court shall thereupon appoint five reputable citizens within the judicial district, of which the said county is a part, > and not residing in said county, &c.”

It was contended on one side that the phrase, “completion of the work thereupon,” meant the completion of the work on that part of the canal which run through the land of the petitioner; and on the other, that it meant the completion of the work on the canal from the eastern1 section to Northumberland; and we are of opinion, that both the literal meaning of the words, and the whole spirit and scope of the act, require this latter construction. The viewers are to view the premises, and taking into consideration the advantages of said canal to the petitioner, report such damages, if any, as they or any three of them,shall think the owner has sustained by reason of said canal; and in case the said viewers are of opinion, the said petitioner has received no damage, or that the advantages derived from the canal are a sufficient compensation to the petitioner for any injury sustained by him, they will also report the same to the said court, &c. Now it is utterly impossible that there can be any advantage from an unfinished canal; it must be completed and the water in it, before any advantage to the community or to an individual can be derived from it. This construction has, we believe, been put upon this law by every tribunal before whom it has come, except tfie court of Union county.

But'the petitioners have endeavored to raise a great question: that the State' could not take their lands without compensation: and • that compensation must be in money, and must be paid instantly; nay, it was even intimated that the damages ought to have been paid before any damage was done.

Although the petitioners and their counsel have most carefully forgotten certain facts, this court is bound to remember them, if they form a part and an essential and prominent part of the law of the land. From the first settlement of this country, both under the proprietors and the Slate, the invariable usage and law was, in the sale of vacant land to any applicant, to add six acres for every hundred, for roads, &c. These six acres were never paid for by the applicant: they were not any particular and specific or designated six acres, but they were thrown in, that whenever the [465]*465commonwealth thought a public road necessary, through any part of the State, it might make it without interfering with the private right of any individual. The right of the State to take six acres out of every hundred acres sold, is not an implied right, but an express reservation. It infringes no private right, nor does it injure any man by using this right. The very utmost which can be required is, that it should pay for improvements put by the owner on the part afterwards used by the State.

When the State authorized private corporations to make turnpike roads or canals, it compelled them to pay for the land occupied by such road or canal: ' for such corporation was very different from the State; its rights were very different; no reservations had been made for its use, no contract for its benefit. But when the State itself undertook to make public canals, its right was unquestionable. These petitioners, then, ought to be grateful for a bounty given them by the State; to be thankful rather than presumptuous; to acknowledge kindness rather than to assume the attitude of injured persons. If this were not so, if the State had no right to the six acres in every hundred, and was bound, in the strictest manner, to pay for the part appropriated for general and public use, until the canal is completed, it cannot he known how much will be required, nor whether in addition to the part actually occupied, injury will or will not be done to the adjacent lands, nor whether great value may or may not be added to the residue of the farm.

There was a time and there is a case, when some, in their overweening fondness of new and undefined power, spoke of a great State, and the government of a nation, as lightly as of the acts and authorities, and responsibilities of a petty corporation; of the power to make laws for the general welfare, and binding the whole community, as no greater in degree than the resolves of a petty borough. It was forgotten that the latter was restricted by legislative enactment, and. the former was the enacting power, with authority unlimited, except in a few particulars, and not answerable for its acts, except to those from whom it received its power, the people. What the government conceives is for the public good it may do; what that public good requires, it may claim, and how compensation is to be made, how it is to be ascertained, and when to be made, must, from the very nature of things, be directed by that very government itself. If may seem pretty to talk of regulating all this by five men, or a Court of' Quarter Sessions; hut although pretty to talk about, and pleasant to imagine, and profitable too to some, it is not to be carried farther than a little talk and discussion. If ever it shall happen that any actual injury or injustice is done to any citizen, and his case is brought before this court, he will receive redress to the extent of our power. There is nothing like that here: the whole proceeding [466]*466is calculated to prevent the possibility of injury to the citizen in theory; and in practice, has resulted in injustice to the community.The best thing which could happen to a man was, that he

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Bluebook (online)
1 Pen. & W. 462, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-fisher-pa-1830.