Commonwealth v. Fenton

478 N.E.2d 949, 395 Mass. 92, 1985 Mass. LEXIS 1548
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedJune 5, 1985
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 478 N.E.2d 949 (Commonwealth v. Fenton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. Fenton, 478 N.E.2d 949, 395 Mass. 92, 1985 Mass. LEXIS 1548 (Mass. 1985).

Opinion

Abrams, J.

We granted the Commonwealth’s application for further appellate review to consider whether G. L. c. 269, § 12B (1984 ed.),1 is the exclusive statutory regulatory scheme [93]*93for all types of air guns. See Commonwealth v. Fenton, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 537 (1984). We agree with the Appeals Court that G. L. c. 269, § 12B, is the exclusive remedy and that air guns are statutorily excluded from the penalty imposed by G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (1984 ed.). See Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 389 Mass. 641, 644 (1983). Any change expanding the reach of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), to encompass air guns must be made by the Legislature.

We summarize the facts. The defendant, Timothy G. Fenton, was convicted in 1981 in a jury-waived trial of unlawfully carrying a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and was sentenced to serve from three to five years at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar Junction. In 1983, the defendant filed a motion for release from unlawful restraint pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), 378 Mass. 900 (1979). In the affidavit accompanying his motion, he claimed that our decision in Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 389 Mass. 641, 644 (1983), mandated that, as an adult,* 2 his conviction for carrying a carbon dioxide (C02) powered revolver was a legal impossibility because an air gun is exempted from the operation and penalties of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (4).3 A Superior Court judge denied the defendant’s motion. The defendant appealed and the Appeals Court reversed the conviction holding that “Rhodes [94]*94excludes all types of air guns from the operation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 {a), and ... the gun in question comes within a common lexical definition of the term ‘air gun’ or ‘air rifle.’” Commonwealth v. Fenton, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 537, 538 (1984).

On this appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the C02 powered gun is properly classified as a firearm, as we defined it in Commonwealth v. Sampson, 383 Mass. 750 (1981), because the revolver is a weapon, capable of discharging a shot or bullet, under the maximum length and designed to injure or to incapacitate. Id. at 756-757, 759.4 We need not decide that issue because to sustain a conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), a violation of which requires a mandatory term of imprisonment, “none of the four exceptions enumerated in that section can apply.” Commonwealth v. Rhodes, supra at 645. The exception relevant to this case, (4), exempts a person from conviction if he or she has “complied as to possession of an air rifle or BB gun with the requirements imposed by [§ 12B of G. L. c. 269].” Id.

The Commonwealth asserts that the C02 powered gun is not an “air rifle” or “BB gun” and is therefore not exclusively regulated by § 12B.5 We disagree. In Commonwealth v. Rhodes, we did not limit our holding to those two specific weapons, but rather exempted the possession of “any type of air gun” from the penalties of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). “[W]hen [95]*95the issue is whether the item in question may be deemed a ‘weapon’ subject to regulation, a question of law is presented.” Commonwealth v. Sampson, supra at 761. We do not distinguish here between an air gun, as the type of C02 revolver used here is commonly called, and an air rifle or BB gun. Id. It is not within our province to distinguish, as the Commonwealth would have us do, between guns powered by a present C02 canister and a BB pistol functioning by air pressure generated by a manual cocking. That is a distinction for the Legislature to make. “In this context, if the Legislature intended to require a license for possession by an adult of any type of air gun it should have done so more precisely. A criminal statute must be sufficiently explicit to give clear warning as to proscribed activities. Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 734 (1977), with any ambiguities tobe construed strictly against the Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Rhodes, supra at 646-647.

Possession of “any type of air gun,” by either an adult or a minor is regulated exclusively by G. L. c. 269, § 12B. We therefore conclude that, because § 12B imposes no penalties for possession of an air gun by an adult, the defendant’s conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), is erroneous. The order denying the defendant’s motion for release pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), is reversed. The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed and the finding of guilt is set aside. Judgment is to enter for the defendant.

So ordered.

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Bluebook (online)
478 N.E.2d 949, 395 Mass. 92, 1985 Mass. LEXIS 1548, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-fenton-mass-1985.