Commonwealth v. Faith Woods.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: December 9, 2024
• Docket: 24-P-0195
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-195

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

FAITH WOODS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury-waived trial, the defendant was convicted

of negligent operation of a motor vehicle pursuant to G. L.

c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). On appeal, she challenges the denial of a

motion for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the

Commonwealth's case and maintains the judge erred by considering

facts not in evidence in finding her guilty. We reverse on the

first ground and therefore do not consider the second.

"The standard for evaluating a motion for a required

finding of not guilty is 'whether, after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 784 (1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass.

671, 677 (1979). "Our analysis asks not whether the evidence

requires a finding of guilty, but whether it permits such a

finding beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Rodriguez,

456 Mass. 578, 582 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448

Mass. 207, 215 (2007). "[I]t is not enough for the appellate

court to find that there was some record evidence, however

slight, to support each essential element of the offense; it

must find that there was enough evidence that could have

satisfied a rational trier of fact of each such element beyond a

reasonable doubt." Latimore, supra at 677-678.

For the defendant to be guilty of negligent operation, the

Commonwealth must prove that she "operated the vehicle

'negligently so that the lives or safety of the public might be

endangered.'" Commonwealth v. Zagwyn, 482 Mass. 1020, 1021

(2019), quoting G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). "The statute 'only

requires proof that the defendant's conduct [in operating the

vehicle] might have endangered the safety of the public, not

that it in fact did.'" Zagwyn, supra, quoting Commonwealth v.

Ferreira, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 35 (2007).

The Commonwealth's trial evidence consisted of testimony

from the responding officer and photographs of the crash scene.

The officer testified that he was called to the crash scene

2 after the accident. He found the defendant's damaged vehicle

off the road "wedged between the guardrail and utility pole."

The defendant had an egg-sized bruise on her forehead and a

bloody nose; the vehicle had a "spider web" crack on the

windshield consistent with the defendant striking her head on

the window. The front right tire of the car was flat and the

passenger-side mirror was knocked down. The defendant told the

officer that she hit a patch of ice, but he observed that the

roadway was dry and salted.

We recognize that "a driver may be involved in a collision,

even a single-car collision, without acting negligently."

Commonwealth v. Howe, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 358 (2023).

Without a witness to the accident, there was "no evidence of the

level of care actually exercised by the driver." Aucella v.

Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 415, 419 (1990). "The mere happening of

an accident . . . where the circumstances immediately preceding

it are left to conjecture, is not sufficient to prove negligence

on the part of the operator of the vehicle." Id. at 418; cf.

Howe, supra at 358-359 (upholding conviction for negligent

operation where there was extensive damage to vehicle, and

officer testified based on his experience and observations that

defendant crossed into "opposite lane of travel, causing

3 [vehicle] to strike a telephone pole and a mailbox before

spinning around and striking another mailbox").

The Commonwealth also presented some evidence of

intoxication. The officer testified that the defendant smelled

of alcohol. The officer did not recall finding any alcohol in

the vehicle. He conducted three field sobriety tests. On the

first -- the only test that showed any impairment -- the

defendant "did okay," performing fifteen steps out of eighteen

correctly; she "did very well" on the second test; on the third,

she "showed that she could follow the instructions and count"

despite beginning with the wrong number initially.

This was scant evidence of impairment and it was weakened

by the testimony that the defendant sustained a head injury from

the accident. "[A]lthough evidence of an operator's

intoxication is relevant to a charge of negligent operation, a

conviction of negligent operation requires something more than

just operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of

alcohol." Zagwyn, 482 Mass. at 1022; cf. Commonwealth v. Ross,

92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 380-381 (2017) (physical impairment in

all field sobriety tests combined with evidence of excess speed

at night on narrow residential road supported conviction of

negligent operation).

4 The evidence was not enough. The Commonwealth's proposed

inference was not "of sufficient force to bring minds of

ordinary intelligence and sagacity to the persuasion of [guilt]

beyond a reasonable doubt." Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677, quoting

Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 368, 373 (1928); see

Rodriguez, 456 Mass. at 583 (reversing conviction where

inference required to prove element of offense "may be

plausible, but cannot bear the weight of proof beyond reasonable

doubt").

Judgment reversed.

Finding set aside.

Judgment for the defendant.

By the Court (Sacks, Shin & Hershfang, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: December 9, 2024.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.