Commonwealth v. Eric McAndrew.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: June 6, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-0074
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-74

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ERIC MCANDREW.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of

disorderly conduct. On appeal, he claims there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.

When analyzing whether the record evidence is sufficient to

support a conviction, an appellate court is not required to "ask

itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v.

Hartnett, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 467, 475 (2008), quoting

Commonwealth v. Velasquez, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 147, 152 (1999).

Nor are we obligated to "reread the record from a [defendant]'s

perspective." Palmariello v. Superintendent of M.C.I. Norfolk,

873 F.2d 491, 493 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 865 (1989). See Commonwealth v. Duncan, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 152 (2008).

Rather, the relevant "question is whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v.

Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

When evaluating sufficiency, the evidence must be reviewed

with specific reference to the substantive elements of the

offense. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Latimore, 378 Mass.

at 677-678. To sustain the defendant's conviction for

disorderly conduct pursuant to G. L. c. 272, § 53, the

Commonwealth had to prove three elements: (1) that the

defendant involved himself in at least one of the following

actions, (a) he engaged in fighting or threatening, (b) he

engaged in violent or tumultuous behavior, or (c) he created a

hazardous or physically offensive condition by an act that

served no legitimate purpose; (2) that the defendant's actions

were reasonably likely to affect the public; and (3) that the

defendant either intended to cause public inconvenience,

annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly created a risk of public

inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. See Commonwealth v. Accime,

476 Mass. 469, 472-473 (2017); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 100 Mass.

App. Ct. 345, 351 (2021).

2 Here, the Commonwealth proceeded on the theory that the

defendant had engaged in tumultuous behavior. "'Tumultuous'

conduct, 'while perhaps not physically violent, may nevertheless

be characterized as involving riotous commotion and excessively

unreasonable noise so as to constitute a public nuisance.'"

Commonwealth v. Sholley, 432 Mass. 721, 729 (2000), cert.

denied, 532 U.S. 980 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,

368 Mass. 580, 597 (1975). Also, "tumultuous behavior," for the

purposes of § 53, may include "the refusal to obey a police

order." Commonwealth v. Marcavage, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 34, 38

(2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 891 (2010).

In the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury

were entitled to find that the defendant was told, given the

Supreme Judicial Court's mask mandate, that it was not lawful

for him to enter the courthouse without a face mask despite his

assertion that he did not have to wear one. The defendant

claimed that he had a medical exemption, and he asked to speak

to the supervising court officer. When the defendant was asked

to wait outside the building until someone could assist him with

his purported medical exception, he refused and demanded

entrance into the courthouse without a face mask. In the course

of his discussion with the defendant, Assistant Chief Court

Officer Curt ordered the defendant to exit the building more

than ten times during this incident. When Curt attempted to

3 escort the defendant out of the courthouse by guiding him by his

elbow, the defendant pulled his arm back sharply, and told Curt

to not touch him and to get his hands off him. As the defendant

became combative, he was taken to the floor and handcuffed with

the assistance of other court officers.

By disobeying the court officer's repeated orders to leave

the building, the defendant interfered with the court officers'

ability to maintain security in the courthouse. See Marcavage,

76 Mass. App. Ct. at 38. The disruptive nature of the

defendant's conduct in the setting of a courthouse made his

behavior "far more damaging to public order" than had he done

those same actions outside or, "for example, [at] a sporting

event." Sholley, 432 Mass. at 730. From these circumstances,

the jury were entitled to find that the defendant engaged in

violent or tumultuous behavior; that his actions were reasonably

likely to affect the public; and that he either intended to

cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly

created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.

See Accime, 476 Mass. at 472-473; Cooper, 100 Mass. App. Ct. at

351.

Finally, the defendant claims that the courthouse

surveillance video footage contradicts Court Officer Curt's

testimony and his description of what took place at the

courthouse entrance. We have viewed the surveillance video and

4 disagree with the defendant's characterization. In any event,

to the extent there existed any conflicts in the evidence, "a

reviewing court 'faced with a record of historical facts that

supports conflicting inferences must presume -- even if it does

not affirmatively appear in the record -- that the trier of fact

resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and

must defer to that resolution.'" McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S.

120, 133 (2010), quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. See

Commonwealth v. Wilborne, 382 Mass. 241, 245 (1981), quoting

Commonwealth v. Amazeen, 375 Mass. 73, 81 (1978) ("To the extent

that conflicting inferences are possible from the evidence, 'it

is for the jury to determine where the truth lies'").

Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the

defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Shin & Tan, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: June 6, 2025.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.